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ABSTRACT 
Irrespective of its Western origin, the idea of human rights is widely acknowledged. 
Following the establishment of the United Nations, the movement of human rights has 
been dramatically extended from its local boundaries to a more global domain by 
means of international treaties, declarations, conferences etc by which a universal 
standard of human rights has been established. However, a sharp contrast has 
occurred between advocates of relativism of human rights and supporters of the 
universalism of human rights as a result of attempts to impose a single interpretation 
to human rights instruments that is the western liberal tradition. 
After the collapse of the communist regimes, the conflict about the universalism of 
human rights takes place between developed and less developed Countries, or 
between Islam, and the West. Therefore, this thesis explores the extent to which 
human rights jurisprudence can accommodate different cultures. 
The thesis concerns particular aspects of the subject of human rights. It compares 
rights provided for the accused person during trial in the judicial system in Saudi 
Arabia with those embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights. It 
examines in particular; the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality, legal 
assistance, an interpreter, adequatg time and facilities, a speedy trial, prompt 
information of the accusation, trial in the presence of the accused, the accused's right 
to defend himself in person, equality of arms, the calling and cross-examination of 
witnesses, the right not to be compelled to confess guilt, an independent and an 
impartial trial, an open court, a reasoned judgment, an appeal against conviction or 
punishment, double jeopardy, and compensation for miscarriage of justice. 
The thesis shows that (a) generally speaking, the judicial system in Saudi Arabia 
provides the accused during the trial stage with similar rights to those called upon by 
the European Convention although it sometimes uses different terminology. (b) 
Suggestions to readdress deficiencies in the Saudi judicial system can be adopted 
without violating Islamic law. (c) The Saudi judicial system in certain areas provides 
the same rights with a higher standard of application. (d) Due to the fact that it is 
based on the religion of Islam, the Saudi judicial system provides the accused with 
rights totally unknown to the European Convention. 
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Introduction 
A- Background: 
The subject of human rights is not confined to lawyers, but rather it is a civil and 
cultural issue. Human rights have a general effect on all philosophical, social, 
political, moral and legal levels. Human rights influence the lives of human beings in 
most parts of the present day world, and live deeply in people's minds and hearts. 
During the second half of the twentieth century and especially after the unprecedented 
violations of human rights during the two World Wars, human rights have been 
dramatically moved from narrow local confines towards an international level by 
means of declarations, conventions, conferences, non-governmental organisations etc. 
This movement has resulted in the establishment, one way or another, of an 
international standard of human rights. 
Human rights are manifold and cannot be precisely investigated unless each right or at 
least an interrelated set of rights is examined separately. This thesis is, therefore, 
devoted to one part of human rights that concerns rights provided for an accused 
person. In a criminal action the position of the accused is significant and serious as he 
faces the state with all its power and capabilities. He should be provided with 
adequate rights to enable him to exercise the right of self- defence. 
Since the rights and guarantees of the accused at all the criminal proceedings are 
important issues, international conferences, treaties and charters as well as 
constitutions and regulations are always concerned to observe this. However, the 
criminal trial stage is the most significant stage where such rights and guarantees 
should be observed. It is the stage where the criminal action is resolved, and deemed 
as the last opportunity for the accused to exercise the right of self- defence. Apart 
from the fact that the judicial ruling is the symbol of justice, it is difficult to correct 
any fault committed at this stage. Therefore, article 14 of the international Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1950), articles 2,3 and 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights defined the rights to be provided to the accused during 
the criminal trial stage. 
I 
This study is limited to one aspect of human rights i. e. the right to fair trial in criminal 
cases. In other words it is confined to the rights of the accused in the criminal trial 
stage. Other criminal stages, such as inference, investigation or execution of 
punishment, are excluded. 
Despite the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights is not applicable to 
Saudi Arabia, it has been used in this study as a model for the international standards 
of human rights for the following reasons: 
(a) Saudi Arabia has not joined the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. And the basic premise here is that if not in all circumstances at least in 
most circumstances the standard of human rights in Europe is fully consistent 
with the standard of human rights within the UN. 
(b) All rights that are stipulated in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights regarding the accused during trial are also provided in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols. Not only that but 
also jurisprudence developed by the European Court of Human Rights has 
widened the scope of these rights and clarified their meaning precisely. 
(c) The European Convention establishes not only the world's most successful 
system of international law for protection of human rights, but one of the most 
highly developed forms of any kind of intentional legal process. Mark Janis 
argues that "European human rights law provides, therefore, not only the most 
important body of case law about the substance of international human rights 
law, but one of the most refreshing and interesting examples of an effective 
international legal process.... In some way, this makes European human rights 
law a good model. " 1 in addition, another feature that distinguishes the 
European human rights law from human rights law within the UN is the fact 
that the European Court of Human Rights has recognized the diversity 
between cultures and therefore a margin of appreciation is given to 
accommodate differences. Unfortunately, this important tool has not been 
recognized by the UN's Human Rights Committee. 2 
(d) From a practical point of view, the scope of these rights cannot be fully 
understood unless their application and interpretation are examined in a 
1- Mark W. Janis el. (2000) "European Human Rights Law" Oxford University Press. P. 6. Hereinafter will refer 
to as Mark W. Janis el. (2000). 
2- Mashood A. Baderin (2003) "International Human Rights and Islamic Law" Oxford University Press. P. 232 . 
Hereinafter refer to as Mashood A. Baderin (2003). 
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particular jurisdiction. Therefore, and since the researcher stays pending the 
preparation of this study in the UK, the scope and the exact meaning of some 
of these rights are illustrated by reference to some jurisprudence developed in 
the UK. 
With reference to Saudi Arabia it is an Islamic country, and its judicial system applies 
strictly Islamic law (Shari'ah), as well as enacted laws. Thus, a study of the judicial 
system in Saudi Arabia entails a study of both Islamic law and codified laws. As to 
the term "Shari'ah" which is used in this thesis interchangeably with the term 
"Islamic law", it is subject to different understanding and interpretation in different 
parts of the Islamic World. Muslim worlds are mainly divided into two sects namely 
Sunni and Shia, and because the judicial system in Saudi Arabia adheres firmly to the 
Sunni sect and because Shia jurisprudence has no application at all in Saudi Arabia, 
this study concerns the Sunni sect especially the four schools of thought. 
As to Islamic law the main sources of legislation are the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The 
companions of the Prophet after his death and their successors of jurists established 
from provisions provided by the two divine sources mentioned above general rules 
(qawa'id usulah Aamah). From these general rules jurists have extracted Islamic 
jurisprudence which contains on many occasions different views regarding a 
particular issue. This is because although they agree about the general rules derived 
from the original sources there is disagreement between them in respect of the exact 
meaning and scope of the general rules (qawa'id usulah Aamah). 
In order to comply with principle of certainty the judicial system in Saudi Arabia has 
taken certain steps. (a) Enacting laws and hence the judicial body must apply rules 
provided in the law. (b) As a general principle, courts in Saudi Arabia adhere to the 
Hanbali School. 
Another area which needs to be pointed out at this stage is that when dealing with 
Islamic law one can find that there are some stories or dictums for either the Prophet's 
companions or the jurists of different era of Islam. These are considered by jurists and 
may be judges in Saudi Arabia as authoritative principles which can be relayed on to 
support a particular view. 
The accused in Saudi Arabia may be subject to trial before the Shari'ah Courts, the 
Board of Grievances, or before one of the administrative committees (tribunals). This 
3 
study, however, is restricted to the main judicial bodies. Namely, Shari'ah Courts and 
the Board of Grievances. Administrative committees will be excluded because it is 
impossible in this limited space to examine rights provided to the accused before 
more than 30 tribunals that have no unified organisations or laws, but rather every 
committee has its own formulation and procedures. Therefore, in chapter 3a general 
discussion of these committees is undertaken which provide a broad evaluation of the 
function of these committees. 
A reader will realize that cases considered by the Saudi judicial institutions and 
referred to in this thesis are positive in respect of the right at hand. This is not to say 
that there are no individual cases where these rights were wrongly adjudicated. But, 
since judicial decisions from both the Shari'ah and the Board of Grievances are not 
published, the researcher felt that an examination of these rights in Saudi Arabia will 
be limited to cases available and to demonstrate the prevalent understanding and 
application of these rights in the Saudi judicial system. 
B- Objective of the thesis: 
It is often maintained that a judicial system that is based on Islamic law cannot 
comply with human rights law. This thesis proves otherwise. So the aim is to 
challenge this claim. This study correlates the practice of the judicial system in Saudi 
Arabia in respect of the rights of the accused during the trial stage to the human rights 
standards required by the European Convention on Human Rights. 
On the other hand, it aims to examine the ability of Islamic Law in assimilating the 
rights called upon by the international instruments to apply so long as they match with 
the Islamic rules and principles. 
C- Statement of the problem: 
Doubtless to say that justice and its application among all human beings on equal 
terms is one of the most significant concerns that worries people. Certainly, the 
human feelings are harmed whenever an innocent man is condemned or a person is 
punished as a result of a trial where freedom of self defence is not secured or he is not 
provided with all necessary means to prove his innocence or a sanction is imposed on 
him before proving his conviction under a valid judicial ruling. 
This thesis will concentrate on finding out the rights provided by the Saudi legal 
system to the accused during the trial stage. In Saudi Arabia, courts apply provisions 
of Islamic Doctrine and abide by all enacted laws. Now, do the guarantees applied by 
the Saudi judicial system agree with those called upon by European Convention on 
4 
Human Rights? And if not can the Saudi judicial system be adjusted to comply with 
the international human rights law without violating Islamic law? Finally if this last 
task is impossible what is the solution? 
D- Significance of the thesis: 
The importance of this thesis, in general, arises from the correlation between these 
rights and human rights. This is due to the fact that establishment of these rights 
means the maintenance of these rights against squandering and irregularities while 
lacking or violation thereof shall mean depriving a human being from his rights. This 
is because these rights are. the effective means he needs to prove his entity and to 
develop his character - the fact which is the most valuable aspect that humanity is 
keen to preserve. This thesis has special importance for Saudi Arabia since the claim 
that human rights are fundamentally a domestic matter is no longer acceptable. The 
obligation of the member states of the United Nations to cooperate with the 
organization in the promotion of human rights provided the United Nations with the 
necessary legal power to embark on an attempt at defining and codifying these rights. 
Furthermore, it is agreed that total rejection of the United Nations recommendations is 
contrary to article 56 of the UN Charter. Moreover, recommendations concerning 
certain United Nations human rights standards constitute or strengthen a rule of 
customary international law. 3 The Human Rights Committee, in this context, 
disclosed the human rights text in the Charter to be part of international customary 
law, and thus obligatory for all states. 4 
On the other hand, being in English this thesis should gain special attention from non- 
Muslim for the increasingly wide recognition of Islam. As a western writer Vogel 
rightly observes: "we must expect... that over the next few decades Islamic law will 
become much more prevalent, both in domestic legal systems and as wielded 
internationally by Islamic blocs of nations. Muslim states' legal systems will reinstate 
Islamic legal nouns, perhaps to the extent of becoming a new family of legal systems, 
like that of the civil-and common-law countries. In international affairs the influence 
of Islamic theories of international law and relations, human rights and economic 
3- Ghali, B. (1995). "The United Nations and Human Rights". New York, United Nations Publication. P. 7 
4- Year Book of the International Law Commission 1976, Vol. 2 part 2 P. 105 
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order will increase. Facing these events and prospects, the West must take stock of its 
knowledge of Islamic law and its ideal. " 5 
I have decided to confine this thesis to the rights of the accused during the trial stage 
for two reasons: (1) the subject of the accused rights in criminal actions at all stages is 
so vast and ramified that this thesis would not suffice for its investigation. (2) The 
trial stage is the significant and decisive stage that determines the fate of the accused. 
E- Method of the thesis: 
As this thesis is an attempt to answer the question whether rights provided for the 
accused during the criminal trial stage in Saudi Arabia comply with the standards 
required by the European Convention on Human Rights, a comparative study is the 
most useful method for achieving this goal. The approach used in this study is that 
each right formulated in the European Convention or its Protocols regarding the rights 
of the accused during trial is examined separately. The meaning and scope of each 
right is identified firstly in the European human rights law, and then applied to the 
judicial system in Saudi Arabia to see if it guarantees the same right. If the answer is 
negative or if the Saudi law has a different understanding or interpretation of the right 
concerned an attempt is undertaken to reconcile the diversity by way of proposing an 
adjustment of the legal system in Saudi Arabia while refraining from violating Islamic 
law and principles. This approach also considers circumstances where the judicial 
system in Saudi Arabia provides the accused with rights that have no counterpart in 
the European Human rights law or where the judicial system provides the same right 
with a higher standard of application and interpretation than the European human 
rights law. 
F- Thesis gap: 
Human rights studies in general, and the rights of the accused during the trial stage in 
particular are very rare in Saudi Arabia. As to studies written in English I did not find 
a single study concerning human rights and the accused in Saudi Arabia. The only 
thesis that can be regarded, one way or another, as relevant to the current study is a 
PhD thesis submitted by Salim Ali Farrar to the department of Law at the University 
of Warwick in (1999). Its title is "The Role of the Accused in English and Islamic 
Criminal Justice". Nevertheless, this thesis differs from my study in two main ways; 
(a) it is limited to rules relating to evidence and proof. It focuses on rules concerning 
5- Vogel, Frank Edward (1993) "Islamic law and legal system studies of Saudi Arabia" Ph. D. Harvard 
University p. 3. Hereinafter will refer to as Vogel, Frank Edward (1993) 
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questioning and confession. So, unlike my thesis it does not examine other human 
rights provided for the accused; and (b) Salim's thesis explores the Malaysian 
experience, while the current thesis examines the judicial system in Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, there are a number of studies comparing human rights in Islamic law and 
international law. But two things distinguish my study: 1- all previous studies are 
confined to theory. In contrast this thesis links theory to application of Islamic 
principles as interpreted and applied by an Islamic state. The importance of this 
approach is recognised by Vogel when he states that: "if Islamic law is studied in 
isolation from application, we can add little to our legal understanding of Islamic 
law. "6 2- Most previous studies have compared human rights in general between 
Islamic law and the international human rights law. Such an approach provides only a 
general perspective of each system, but cannot provide a precise answer to the 
question whether a particular right is provided in Islamic law and in a manner 
consistent with human rights law. 
G- Structure of the thesis: 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, which are sequenced to provide an overall 
legal perspective on the rights of the accused during the criminal trial stage in Saudi 
Arabia. Chapter 1 attempts to provide a descriptive account of the international 
concern with human rights. A separate thesis would be required to present a proper 
study in this regard, but I do not pretend to do more than just acknowledge some 
highly relevant topics here. Chapter 2 concerns the rights of the accused in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Chapter 3 mentions some key principles of 
Islamic Law and the judicial system in Saudi Arabia. Chapter 4 is devoted to cover 
fundamental principles in the Saudi Criminal Law. Chapter 5 examines the defence 
rights of the accused. This chapter is concerned with the right to legal representation 
and other rights that provide a fair trial. The rights of the accused in respect of the 
independence of the judiciary are discussed in chapter 6. The right of the accused 
after the criminal judgement is examined in chapter 7. Finally, chapter 8 covers the 
conclusion. 
6 Vogel, Frank Edward (1993) p. 8 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
"GENERAL BACKGROUND" 
Introduction: 
The contemporary concept of human rights finds its origin in the theory of natural 
law, which has been subject to considerable development through different stages of 
history. The expression "human rights" is a relatively recent term dating from the 
Eighteenth century', but the concept is seen as an extension of philosophers' thinking 
throughout different ages. It is essential to trace these historical and philosophical 
developments, because the scope of a notion can be better understood within the 
culture that has witnessed its birth and development. The first section of this chapter 
thus discusses the theory of natural law. The second section concerns the United 
Nation and human rights. Three topics are covered in this section, namely: the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Finally, section three addresses 
the question of whether human rights have a universal or a relative nature. 
It is worth mentioning here that the discussions provided in this chapter are not 
intended to offer detailed description of their topics. Rather, this chapter aims to serve 
as an introduction for subsequent parts of the thesis. 
Section I Natural Law2 
The concept of human rights is the product of philosophical debate that in European 
societies has lasted over 2000 years. Despite the fact that the term `human rights' was 
- By the philosopher Henry David Thoreau. J. M. Kelly (1992) "A Short History of Western Legal 
Theory" p. 2. Hereinafter will refer to as Kelly (1992). 
'- 
- In this section I refer mainly to J. M. Kelly's hook mentioned above save other details for your 
bibliography, My justification for doing so is: 1- my aim in this section is to provide a basic 
background for the subject in hand, and I do not pretend to undertake an investigation on the subject. 2- 
This book traces the historical development of the subject through succeeding ages. an approach which 
shows the relationship between modern human rights and the natural law in a very clear manner. 
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first mentioned in the eighteenth century3, it is widely accepted that the theory of 
natural law is the foundation of the modern concept of human rights. 4 
Owing to the impossibility of identifying the different meanings of the word `nature', 
the concept of natural law is equivocal. Historically speaking, the theory of natural 
law has not been used to denote a single unified conception, but has been developed 
by philosophers and jurists throughout the ages, from the ancient Greeks until the 20th 
century when the expression `human rights' became a prominent concept 5. D' 
Entreves asserts that there is no one tradition of natural law, claiming for example that 
the similarity between medieval and modern conceptions of natural law does not go 
beyond a shared vocabulary. 6 
In the following an attempt will be undertaken to outline the development of the 
theory of natural law in, respectively, the Classical eras of Greece and Rome, the 
early Middle Ages until 1100, the high Middle Ages (1100-1350), the eras of the 
Renaissance and Reformation (1350-1600), the 17th century, the 18th century (the Age 
of Reason), the 19th century, and the 20"' century. 
To begin with, the Greek philosopher Aristotle believed that natural law embodied 
elementary principles of justice. He distinguished between two kinds of justice, 
namely, one whose validity is universal and absolute; and one owing its existence to 
human convention. ' 
The Roman philosopher Cicero added fresh parameters to Aristotle's theory, stressing 
the vital agency of human reason as mediator of the eternal principles of justice which 
are embedded in nature. Moreover, he characterised "Law" as the highest product of 
man's reason, thus creating a direct link between nature and law, which he called a 
"natural force" 8 
Cicero also links natural law with God, thus creating a connection between the 
concept of absolute justice and divinity: "the true and primal Law, designed for 
command and prohibition, is the right reason of the high God "9 
By the philosopher Henry David Thoreau. Kelly (1992) p. 2 
See for example Andrew Heard "Human Rights: Chimeras in Sheep's Chttp: P' (2001) Clothing? " 
1w 15fd. law. hotmail. msn. com (20/07/2001) p. 6. Hereinafter will refer to as Heard (2001). 
A. P. d' Entrcvcs (1970) "Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy". Hutchinson 
University Library. London. p 1. Hereinafter will refer to as D' Entreves (1970) 
- Ihid, p. 17 
- Lynch, J (2001) Natural Law. http: Encarta, msn. com P. 1 (2.9.2001). hereinafter will refer to as 
Lynch (2001) 
Kelly (1992) P. 58 
- Mid, p. 58 
9 
Moving to interpretations of natural law in the early middle Ages, the religious 
influence is now clearly discernable, as a result of the Christian Church's domination 
of the spiritual realm after the collapse of the Roman Empire. The Classical and the 
Christian philosophies are fundamentally divided by their different conceptions of the 
divinity. Cicero's God is an abstract force which men tap into by means of their 
reason; whereas the God of Christianity is personal, and communicates his 
commandments to chosen individuals by revelation. 
10 
However, Christian philosophy offered many points of integration with Classical 
principles. St Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-74) made a synthesis of Christian teachings 
and the natural law that results from reason. Like Aristotle, St Thomas distinguished 
divine or natural law from human law, though he linked the former to Decalogue and 
Christ's commandment to love one's neighbour. Again, St Thomas stressed the 
antecedence and supremacy of natural law over man-made statutes. The latter, 
whether secular or ecclesiastical, were invalid if contrary to natural law. 
" But natural 
law lays down only general principles which can, in the form of positive law be 
applied in different ways to meet different circumstances. Including different cultural 
traditions. Equally he emphasises the importance of human reason: "Human law has 
the quality of law only so for as it proceeds according to right reason: and in this 
respect it is clear that it derives from the eternal law. " 
12 
Thus, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, that is the high middle Ages, the 
Aristotelian tradition that reason, not revelation, was man's link with eternal law 
remained an influence'. It is also interesting to note that in St Thomas's theology, 
individuals have certain immutable rights as part of the law of God. 
14 Within the 
limits of reasons, there could be different applications of natural law in different 
societies. 
After St. Thomas, a different doctrine began to shape the individual's obligations: one 
which centres human duties on the will of God. The will of God is binding on all 
people solely because it is His will's; natural law is perceived as meaning that the 
10 
- Ibid. p. 102&103 11 
- lbid, p. 142 1' 
- Ibid, p. 144 13 
- Ibid p. 142 
14 
- Symonides, J. (2000) "Human Rights: Concept and Standards". Aldershot, 
Burlington USA, 
Singapore, Sydney, UNESCO Publishing. P. P. 37. Hereinafter refer to as Symonidcs (2000). 
15 
- Kelly (1992). P. 145 
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duty to do something or to abstain from acting in particular way is not what human 
reason views as right, but what God commands. 16 
From now until after the Reformation, philosophy was obliged to accommodate itself 
within theological dogma. However, the perception of an antecedent natural, or 
divine, law to which human law must conform still persisted. 17 
In the 17"' century the previous status of natural law underwent dramatic change. Not 
only was its medieval connection with religion challenged 18, but also the idea that 
natural law had transcendental value was attacked by philosophers such as the 
Dutchman Grotius (1583-1645)19, the Englishman Hobbes (1588-1679), and the 
Portuguese Spinoza (1632-77). Regardless of personal religious convictions they not 
only returned human reason to the centre of human conduct, but also placed natural 
law on a secular basis, relating man's motivation to the facts of his physical 
existence20. In addition, the divine nature of natural law was challenged by the 17"' 
century philosophers. John Locke (1632-1704) was one of the most influential of the 
new, rational voices of this century. In "The Reasonableness of Christianity" Locke 
does not deny that certain moral laws are God-given, but he insists on the paramount 
importance of human reason in controlling the operation of these laws. In his "Second 
Treatise of Government" Locke develops his views on the role of human reason in 
determining positive law: reason is the "law of nature" which exists prior to positive 
law: reason is the mediator of the principles of natural law, on which civil government 
is based21. 
Grotius's theory of natural law led to a theory of natural rights that is considered to be 
the oldest precursor of the concept of human rights". He held that a part of the nature 
of man is the social desire to coexist peacefully with others. The implications of this 
perspective produced principles involving the individual's natural rights. Accordingly 
a shift of tone from natural law to natural rights took place during the seventeenth 
century. Thus Grotius is considered the founder of the modern theory of natural 
ý3 law. " 
16 
- Ibid, p. 186 17 
- Ihid, p. 188 
-Heard (2001) p. 6 19 
- D' Entreves (1970) p. 55 21 
- Kelly (1992) p. 222-224 21 
- Mautner, Thomas, cd. (2000) "The Penguin Dictionan" of Philosophy". London: Penguin. P. 
321 &322 
22 
- Symonides (2(X)0). p. 37 & Lynch (2001) p. 1. 2' 
- D' Entreves (1970) p. 55 
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The development of natural law theory in the 18th century must be seen in the context 
of the Enlightenment, which dominated the intellectual and political life of Europe 
and beyond. This movement was centred on belief in the power of human reason and 
intelligence. Man was seen as capable of huge advances in science and technology in 
the interest of humankind. This mood led to the rejection of all kinds of orthodoxies, 
and an emphasis on the importance of empirical proof. 24 
Furthermore, although they routinely mentioned the spirit of God, the majority of 
lawyers perceived natural law in terms of reason. Natural law was invoked in some 
parts of Europe to provide material from which the complete internal system of a 
particular country could be extracted. For instance, Christian Wolff (1679-1754) 
presented a whole system of law based on human nature. This work was rewritten 
with a system of international law in 1752. In this treatise all rights and obligations 
are deduced from human nature. 25 
In 1776 the American Declaration of Independence was promulgated, stating that 
"men are created equal, and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the purpose of the 
institution of government is to guarantee those rights; that institution rests on the 
consent of the governed; and if government becomes destructive of those rights, it can 
be abolished and replaced with a new form". 
In 1789 the French Revolution saw the French citizens' overthrow of their monarchy 
and the declaration of the Rights of Man, in which seventeen rights were proclaimed 
as "natural, inalienable, and sacred rights of man". The English revolutionary writer 
Thomas Paine supported the idea of natural rights. In his book "The Rights of Man" 
published in two parts in 1791 and 1792, he differentiated natural rights from civil 
rights in terms of those rights which appertain to man as an individual, and another set 
of rights which appertain to man as a member of a society. 26 
However, the assertion of universal natural rights also had vehement critics. Edmund 
Burke (1729-1797) argued that rights are different from one society to another 
because they are the result of political struggles through history. 27 David Hume 
(1711-1776) claimed that there is no single unified standard of natural law by which 
human conduct can be scrutinized. Hume maintained that emotion is a stronger 
:'- Kelly (1992) p. 249& 250 '` 
- Ihid, p. 264) 26 
- Heard (2001) p. 5 27 
- Ibid, p. 5 
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motivator than reason in all human actions: human behaviour is the consequence of 
individual inclinations, and if coincidentally patterns of conduct can be identified 
within a society, this is only a matter of custom. As Kelly comments, Hume's denial 
of universal reason underlying human behaviour "naturally undermined belief in 
reason-based natural-law doctrine; his analysis... introduced a new era. "'`g 
Empirical science had its effect on legal theory. Specifically, the idea found currency 
that laws are only suited to their own countries, and that accordingly every country 
will have its particular regulations. When the government of Maria Theresa proposed 
a unified code of law for the Habsburg empire the plan was opposed on the ground 
that: "the geographical situation of the provinces is not the same, nor is the air they 
breathe, the food they consume or their constitution". 
29 
Jeremy Bentham also rejected the idea of natural rights regarding natural rights as 
simple nonsense. His criticism of natural rights was based on the position that rights 
cannot be discussed in isolation from law. 30 In the pragmatic mood of his century, he 
claimed that there are no natural rights because rights are created by the laws of 
society. 3' Interestingly, he also drew attention to the risk that brutal leaders could 
abuse the concept. 
It therefore appears that many writers in this period debated the expression `natural 
rights', and thus the term `human rights' began to be used. 32 
In the 19`h century, following the widespread objection to the idea of natural law 
which was the consequence of the Enlightenment, clear acceptance of the theory is 
not to be found outside the Catholic Church. Here a connection between morality and 
the law was still perceived. 33 However, a significant development on the natural 
rights debate in this era was the introduction of issues such as slavery and child 
labour. The campaigners against these abuses, however, saw them as instances of 
28 
- Kelly (1 992) p. 271 29 
- Ibid. p. 274 30 
- Ibid, p. 276. Bentham declares: "When a man is bent upon having things his own way and can give 
no reason for it, he says: I have a right to have them so. When a man has a political caprice to 
gratify-when lie finds it necessary to get the multitude to join with him... he sets up a cry of rights... 
the language of natural rights requires nothing but a hard front, a hard heart and an unblushing 
countenance. It is from beginning to end so much flat assertion: it neither has any thing to do with 
reason nor will endure the mention of it. " 
31 
- Wasson, B (1992) "Human Rights". In the international Human Rights in Context. 2000. P. 32 & 
Heard (2001) p. 5 32 
- "A Short History of the Human Rights Movement: Early Political, Religious, and Philosophical 
Sources. " Hup: Iwl5fd. lawl5. hotmail. msn. com. Created on julyl4,1994/ last edited on January 25, 
1997. p. 2 (20/)7/2(01) 
33 
- Kelly (1992) p. 334 
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uncivilised and unchristian practice. Only in the 201h century were they identified as 
violations of human rights. 34 
Instances of the operation of a notion of natural law can be found in first part of the 
20`h century. In Ireland, for example, a spontaneous Catholic influence on the secular 
legal system of the Irish state was discernable. 35 In 1934 the Irish Chief Justice Hugh 
Kennedy, invoked natural law in the state (Ryan) v. Lennon, referring to "that 
acknowledged ultimate Source through which the legislative authority has come ... 
" 
as well as explicitly to the term "Natural Law". 36 
An important revival of the notion of natural law took place as a result of the 
atrocities of the Second World War. The founder of the new natural law theory was 
Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949). To demonstrate the illegality of Nazi cruelty, it was 
necessary to refer to a code of justice superordinate to Nazi statutes: "a law which is 
above statute, however one may like to describe it: the law of God, the law of nature, 
the law of reason. "37 
After the Second World War, natural law reappeared in a new form. Radbruch 
explained that the Nazi laws were not just wrong laws, but they were not laws at all 
since they contravened the paramount legal value of treating similar cases equally. 
He further argued that law is invalid and null if it is inconsistent with the notion of 
justice. 38 In the same context, the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany has more 
recently invoked the theory of natural law as an authoritative principle in some 
judgments. In separate cases in the 1950s and 1960s the German courts described the 
Nazi laws as void on the ground that these laws infringe the basic tenets of justice. 39 
The idea of transcendent law is taken further when some writers recommend 
resistance to unjust laws. Helmut Coing (born 1912) stated: "but in the face of a 
criminal goverrment, deliberately acting in a manner forbidden by the natural law, 
resistance is by natural law both permissible and legitimate. , 40 
34 
- "A Short History of the Human Rights Movement: Early Political, Religious, and Philosophical 
Sources. " Http: lwl5fd. lawi5. hotmail. msn. com. Created on july14,1994/ last edited on January 25, 
1997. p. 2 (20/07/2001) 
35 
- Kelly (1992) p. 374 36 
- Ibid. p. 375 17 
- Ihid, p. 379 '8 
- Ibid. p. 418 &419 39 
- Matthias Herdcgen "Natural law, Constitutional Values and Human Rights: A Comparative 
Analysis". Human Rights Law Journal. 31 August 1998 Vol. 19 No. 2-4 P. 37 
40 
- Kelly(1992)p. 419 
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Section II Human rights and the United Nations 
The current movement of human rights works within the Organization of United 
Nations. This movement started with the establishment of the Charter of the United 
Nations followed by many international and regional treaties regarding human rights. 
In this section three topics will be involved. Namely, the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. 
Generally speaking, three main instruments compose the International Bill of Rights. 
These are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR), and two 
principal covenants, which were opened to signatures in 1996, but came into force 
only 10 years later. The first is the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), and the second is the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Each covenant protects designated categories of 
rights. The former ensures the rights of self-determination; legal redress; equality; 
life; liberty; freedom of movement; fair, public, and speedy trial of criminal charges; 
privacy; freedom of expression, thought, conscience and religion; peaceful assembly; 
freedom of family association; and participation in public affairs. It also prohibits 
torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery; arbitrary 
arrest; double jeopardy; and imprisonment for debt. 
Other categories such as the right to gain a living by work; to have safe and healthy 
working conditions; to enjoy trade union rights; to receive social security; to have 
protection for the family; to possess adequate housing and clothing; to be free from 
hunger; to receive health care; to obtain free public education; and to participate in 
cultural life come within ICESCR. In addition, the rights indicated in the ICCPR 
constitute what is known as the first generation of human rights, while the rights 
provided in the ICESCR are called the second generation of human rights. 41 
The third part of the Bill of Rights, namely the ICESCR, will not be examined here 
because this thesis focuses on the rights of the accused, which would appear to fall 
within the rights protected by the ICCPR, and have no bearing on the ICESCR. 
(1) The UN Charter: 
The tragedy of the Second World War emphasised the importance of a new 
international legal order for the post-war period. Various diplomatic efforts and 
"- There is also a third generation of human rights. These are collective not individual rights. See 
Mashood A. Baderin (2003) p 22-23 
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debates resulted in the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations at the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945.2 
The text of the Charter makes sparse reference to human rights. In the following 
human rights texts and writers' comments on them will be briefly indicated. 
The Charter's Preamble states: "we the people of the United Nations determined to... 
reaffirm faith in fundamental Human Rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small... " 
Moreover, article (1)(3) indicates that one of the purposes of the United Nations is "to 
achieve international co-operation ... 
in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. " 
The United Nations is obliged, according to article 55, to promote a universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. To fulfil this task the United Nations 
is provided with certain powers falling within one of the three areas of "study", 
"examination" and "recommendations". By these methods the United Nations 
recommends states to enter treaties on human rights. Recommendation is the main 
means of the United Nations in the field of human rights: no legal obligation is 
imposed upon states save by article 56 which imposes the duty to examine 
recommendations carefully and in good faith. 43 
Pursuant to article 68 the Economic and Social Council: "shall set up commissions ... 
for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required 
for the performance of its functions. " 
Commentators' perspectives vary as to the effectiveness of the above provisions. 
Those who are not satisfied with these texts argue that despite the confirmation of 
respect for and protection of human rights, the Charter does not adequately clarify the 
nature of those rights and freedoms. Moreover, the Charter does not grant individuals 
the right to be a party in a complaint before the United Nations or the International 
Court of Justice. Furthermore, it is widely held that the human rights provisions of 
the Charter are vague and weak and do not define the meaning of the human rights 
42 
- The drafting history is beyond the scope of this study. For more literature on the history of 
drafting the Charter see for example, Bruno Simma (2002) "The Charter of the United Nations. " 
Second Edition. Volume 1. Oxford University Press. p. 1-12. Hereinafter will refer to as Bruno Simma 
(2002). 
- Ghali. B. (1995) "The United Nations and Human Rights. " New York, United Nations Publication 
p. 6. Hereinafter will refer to as Ghali (1995). 
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and fundamental freedoms. Again, it was expected of the United Nations Charter 
that it would contain provisions establishing a system that could effectively protect 
human rights at the international level; however, that did not happen because of 
opposition from the major powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, France and 
the United Kingdom. These states were not ready to accept strong commitments in 
that field because they all had serious problems with human rights at that time. 45 
On the other hand, some argue that, although the Charter does not define human 
rights, it provides for special attention to the correlation between human rights and the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Steiner and Alston state that "the 
UN Charter, at the pinnacle of the human rights system, has relatively little to say 
about the subject, but what it does say has been accorded a great significance, 
through interpretation and extrapolation as well as frequent invocation, the sparse 
text has constituted a point of departure for inventive development of the entire 
movement" 46 
As to the question of the obligatory character of the United Nations Charter, it is often 
maintained that the human rights provisions in the Charter are not of an obligatory 
character; but that their aim is to promote recognition and respect for human rights. 
Additionally, some authors have argued that the parties of the United Nations Charter 
accept only a moral promotional obligation toward human rights. 47 
However, this stance is rejected on the grounds that the Charter internationalises the 
concept of human rights, and accordingly states must assume some international 
obligations relating to human rights. Even though, through such great milestones of 
human freedom as the American Declaration of Independence and the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, there was some international 
recognition of human rights protection prior to the UN charter, the process that 
proclaims the internationalisation of human rights began essentially with the 
establishment of the United Nations. Thus the Charter is the first international 
document to recognise human rights and fundamental freedoms as one of the 
principles of international law. 48 
'4 
- Symonides (2000) p. 11 "- Ihid. p. 11 
'b 
- Steiner. H. a. A., P (2000). "International Human Rights in Context". Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. P. 140 
47 
- Waston, B. (1992). Human Rights. International Human Rights in Context. H. a. A. Steiner, P. New 
York, Oxford University Press. P. 23 
'x 
- Symonides (2000) p. 12 
17 
In addition, the claim that human rights are fundamentally a domestic matter is no 
longer acceptable. The obligation of the member states of the United Nations to 
cooperate with the organization in the promotion of human rights provided the United 
Nations with the necessary legal power to embark on an attempt at defining and 
codifying these rights. Furthermore, it is agreed that total rejection of the United 
Nations recommendations is contrary to article 56. Moreover, recommendations 
concerning certain United Nations human rights standards constitute or strengthen a 
rule of customary international law. 49 The Human Rights Committee, in this context, 
disclosed the human rights text in the Charter to be part of international customary 
law, and thus obligatory for all states. 50 
When the legal validity of the preamble of the Charter was questioned, the report of 
the Rapporture of Committee 1/1 asserted that: "The provisions of the Charter, being 
in this case inadvisable as any other legal instrument, are equally valid and 
operative... It is thus clear that there are no grounds for supposing that the preamble 
has less legal validity than the two succeeding chapters. , 
51 
(2) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Representatives from Australia, Chile, China, France, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and the USSR were appointed to prepare the drafted declaration that 
was adopted on 10 December 1948, with forty-eight votes in favour, none against and 
eight abstentions. 
The Declaration asserts that human rights are based on the inherent dignity of every 
person. Individuals' dignity and the rights to freedom and equality are inalienable 
rights, thus human rights are by nature universal rights, and they cannot be 
abrogated. 52 This view of the rights provided in the Declaration shows the 
relationship between human rights as presented in the Declaration and the concept of 
natural law. 
In respect of the legal character of the Declaration, the question to be answered is 
whether the Declaration in itself constitutes a legal document containing obligatory 
provisions. The answer is to be found in the recognition that the purpose of the 
Declaration was not to impose legal obligations, but rather to set up international 
09 
- Ghali (1995) p. 7 10 
- Year Book of the International Law Commission 1976, Vol. 2 part 2 P. 105 
- Bruno Simma (2002) p. 35 `'-Ghali(1995)p. 24 
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objectives on human rights for all states. Therefore, the UDHR is not legally binding. 
The operative part of the Resolution 217 (III) reads: "now therefore, the General 
Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every 
individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, 
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of 
member states themselves and among the peoples of territories under their 
jurisdiction. "53 This character of the Declaration is due to the desire of the powerful 
members in the Organization to give the Declaration only a moral and educational 
function. During the adoption of the Declaration the representative of the United 
States said: "In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary 
importance that we keep clearly in mind the basic character of the document. It is not 
a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a 
statement of law or of legal obligation. " Slightly diverging from the above position 
the representative of the Soviet Union asserted that any enforcement of these rights is 
a domestic matter whereby the international community should abstain from playing 
any role. Sy 
But although it is not legally binding many legal documents are essentially influenced 
by principles provided in the Declaration. The General Assembly has on many 
occasions asserted the importance of the Declaration's principles. In addition, the 
Declaration's provisions have influenced most regional treaties and constitutions. 
Accordingly, some would maintain that these principles are now regarded as part of 
the customary international law, 55 or at least seen in terms of general principles 
recognized by civilized nations56. Moreover, it is argued that even though not 
regarded as a legal document containing legal obligations; the Declaration's 
implications have legal significance. Thus its perspectives on human rights and 
s' 
- Robertson. A. a. M., J (1996) "Hunan Rights in the World. " Manchester and New York, 
Manchester University Press, p. 28. hereinafter will refer to as Robertson (1996) 
S' 
- Mohammed Al-Qasimi (1999) "Establishing and Interpreting International Human Rights 
Standards: A Universal Idea in A Plural Society". Unpublished PhD Thesis; University of Durham. p. 
95. hereinafter will refer to as Al-Qasimi (1999) 
ss 
- Robertson (1996) p. 28. Against this view some argue that an act to constitute a customary 
international law, it must he widely practiced. So the mere acceptance and recognition are not 
sufficient. 
`t, 
- Al-Qasimi (1999) p. 100 
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fundamental freedoms are seen as authoritative, creating obligations for the United 
Nation's members. However others reject this view with the argument that for any 
document to be considered as an authoritative interpretation of another document, the 
former should be an obligatory legal instrument and have the same significance as the 
latter 57 
(3) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
The General Assembly Resolution No. 217(IH) was not limited to the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, but also stipulated that work should continue on the 
two other aspects of the Bill of Rights. That is, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 
Continuous debate took place regarding the draft of the Covenant. The Committee 
concerned at first provided a draft of the Covenant that was devoted only to civil and 
political rights. However, the General Assembly's opinion at that time was that the 
draft should also cover economic, social and cultural rights. The Security Council 
noted the difference between civil and political rights on one hand, and social, 
economic, and cultural rights on the other, and then proposed that the General 
Assembly reconsider its previous decision. Finally, it was decided to set up two 
separate covenants, one addressing civil and political rights, and the other economic, 
social, and cultural rights. 
During 1958-1961 provisions concerned with civil and political rights were approved. 
From 1962 to 1963 there was dispute over the introductory articles, particularly in 
respect of whether the obligations to respect the rights in the Covenant should have 
immediate or future effect. In 1966, after almost two decades of negotiations and 
rewriting, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was agreed upon. 
It came into force in 1976, after being ratified by the required 35 states. 58 Two 
Optional Protocols supplement the ICCPR. The first provides individuals with 
essential procedural rights to submit complaints in the case of their rights being 
violated. The second Optional Protocol prohibits capital punishment. 
To distinguish between civil rights and political rights it is argued that: "Civil rights 
covers rights to protect physical integrity, procedural due process rights, and non- 
57 
- Lautcrpacht, H (1950) in Steiner, H. a. A., P (2000). "International Human Rights in Context". 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. P. 151 
`' 
- Robertson, (1990) p. 30&34 
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discrimination rights. Political rights enable one to participate meaningfully in the 
political life of one's society such as freedom of expression, assembly, and 
association, and the right to vote. "59 However, this statement is not clear-cut. Civil 
rights are essential to protect political rights. 
In order to clarify the general scope and character of the ICCPR two subjects should 
be studied, namely, the rights protected, and the mechanism to remedy any violation 
of these rights. In the following these two subjects will be outlined in turn. 
Rights protected: 
During the debate over the provisions some believed that it would be impossible to set 
forth in great detail the scope and content of each right. Others however, who 
favoured a more specific approach and felt that the Covenant should not duplicate the 
UDHR, criticized this approach. The substantive provisions of the Covenant clearly 
reflect the influence of this dichotomy. Some articles are written in general terms, 
while others are quite detailed. 6° 
The ICCPR guarantees the following substantive rights: 
1- Right of self-determination. 
2- Right to life. 
3- Freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
4- Freedom from slavery, servitude, and forced labour. 
5- Rights to liberty and security of the person. 
6- Right of detained persons to humane treatment. 
7- Freedom from imprisonment for inability to fulfil a contract. 
8- Freedom of movement. 
9- Right of aliens to due process when expelled. 
10- Right to fair trial. 
11- Freedom from retroactive criminal law. 
12- Right to recognition as a person before the law. 
13- Rights to privacy. 
14- Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 
15- Freedom of opinion and expression. 
39 
- Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz, and Melissa Castan (2000) "The Intenrationa! Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Cornmentarv. " Oxford University Press. p. 3&4. Hereinafter 
will refer to as Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz, and Melissa Castan ( 2000) 
60 
- Chali (1995) p. 44&45 
21 
16- Freedom from war propaganda and freedom from incitement to racial, 
religious, or national hatred. 
17- Freedom of assembly. 
18- Freedom of association. 
19- Rights of protection of the family and the right to marry. 
20- Rights of protection for the child. 
21- Right of participation in public life 
22- Right to equality before the law and rights of non-discrimination. 
23- Rights of minorities. 
Some rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as the right to 
own property and the right to asylum, are not included among the rights recognized in 
the Covenant. Similarly, the Covenant contains rights that are not listed in the 
Declaration. The following rights are not laid down in the Declaration: the right of 
detained persons to be treated with humanity, freedom from imprisonment for debt, 
prohibition of propaganda for war and of incitement to hatred, the rights of the child, 
and the rights of minorities. 
In accordance with article 2(1) a contracted state is obliged to implement the 
substantive Covenant rights promptly in its domestic law. A state should thus enact 
legislations, or take other measures to make its internal practice conform with 
guarantees provided in the Covenant. 61 If these rights are infringed the state 
concerned must provide effective remedies for the victim. 62 A competent body will 
decide the remedies. 63 
Paragraph I of article 5 provides protection against misinterpretation of the Covenant 
to justify violation or restriction of a right or freedom. Paragraph 2 of the same article 
deals with possible conflicts between the Covenant and legislations and customs in 
any state party, and provides that States are prohibited from limiting rights already 
enjoyed under their jurisdiction on the ground that such rights are not recognized in 
the Covenant. 
However, Robertson and Merrills maintain that some of the provisions are vague and 
imprecise, making interpretation an uneasy task. 64 In addition, some criticize the 
61 
- Article 2 (2) of the ICCPR. 62 
- Article 2 (3) (a) 
63 
- Article 2 (3) (h) 64 
- Robertson(1996)p. 38 
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Covenant for permitting governments to temporarily suspend some of these rights in 
cases of civil emergency. 
Human Rights Committee: 
In 1966 it was decided that providing the individual with a right to present complaints 
to the Human Rights Committee should be introduced through an optional protocol. 
This optional protocol, which came into force in 1976, adds legal force to the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by allowing the Human Rights Committee to 
examine individual complaints about alleged violation of the Covenant rights. 
The Committee is composed of independent experts selected by a meeting of the State 
Parties. They serve in their personal capacity. Its task is to consider the periodic 
reports which all states are required to submit, to formulate general, objective 
observations, to consider complaints from a State Party regarding another State Party, 
and to consider complaints from an individual against a State Party. 65 
According to ICCPR the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations is tasked to 
ensure increased compliance with the provisions of the ICCPR. State parties send 
"initial", "supplementary" and five yearly periodic reports. The Committee also 
enters into public discussion with representatives of state parties concerning the 
human rights situation in the representative states. 66 
With respect to individual complaints, the First Optional Protocol provides 
individuals with the right to submit complaints to the HRC about a state's alleged 
breaches of their rights under the Covenant. The HRC has the competence to handle 
individual complaints only against states that have ratified both the Covenant and the 
Optional Protocol. Therefore, any matter concerning a state that is not a party to the 
Protocol is clearly outside Human Rights Committee jurisdiction. 
With respect to the procedures before the Committee, it should at first consider the 
admissibility of the complaint. For the complaint to be admissible, the following 
criteria should be satisfied: 1- there must an individual victim: in other words the 
claimant must be identified; 2- an individual petition must be in written form; 3- the 
complaint must concern an act within the jurisdiction of the relevant state; 4- the 
alleged violation must be committed after the state ratification of the First Optional 
Protocol; 5- the complaint may not be examined before another international body; 6- 
65 
- Ghali (1995) p. 46 '- Christopher, H (2000) "The Status of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
In Domestic Law of Stare Parties: An Initial Global Sunev Through UN Human Rights Committee 
Documents. " Human Rights Quarterly Journal. Vol. 22 P. 188 
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all domestic remedies must be exhausted; 7- the complaint must also be accompanied 
with sufficient evidence to prove the case; and 8- the complaint must relate to a matter 
arising under the Covenant, that is to say, which infringes one of the rights of the 
Covenant. 
Once the complaint is considered admissible, the HRC will study the merits of the 
complaint. All relevant documents are forwarded to the state concerned, which 
should submit written explanation to the Committee within six months. The state's 
observation will then be sent to the claimant who may submit any additional 
information. Finally, the committee formulates its views on the complaint. The 
consideration of the HRC on the complaint takes place in a closed meeting, and all 
documents are confidential. However, the final views are published. The Committee 
has the right to direct the state concerned to amend its law or any practice that it 
considers incompatible with the rights of the Covenant. 
67 Even though the HRC 
views are not legally binding because the HRC is not a judicial body, the HRC is "the 
pre-eminent interpreter of the ICCPR which is itself legally binding. The HRC `s 
decisions are therefore strong indicators of legal obligation, so rejection of those 
decisions is good evidence of a State's bad faith attitude towards its ICCPR 
obligations. "68 
Section III Universalism versus Relativism 
Human rights as an idea are generally acknowledged by all nations and states all over 
the globe. No single country nowadays will accept a description of being a human 
rights violator, but rather such a description will be regarded as a stigma in its 
political history thereby the universality of human rights is clearly established. 
However, this universality of human rights should be distinguished from the 
universalism of human rights. The latter concept started when an attempt of imposing 
a single interpretation to the norms of human rights i. e. western liberal tradition was 
undertaken. In his attempt to distinguish between the two concepts (universalism and 
universality) Mashood A. Baderin69 illustrates that: "Universality of human rights 
refers to the universal quality or global acceptance of human rights idea ...., while 
`universalism in' human rights relates to the interpretation and application of the 
67 
- Heffernan, L (1997) "A Comparative View of Individual Procedures under the ECHR and the 
ICCPR". Human Rights Quarterly Journal. Vol. 19. P. 97-103 
68 
- Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz, and Melissa 
Castan (2000) p. 14 
69 
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human rights idea. The universality of human rights has been achieved over the years 
since the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, and is evidenced by the fact that there is no 
State today that will unequivocally accept that it is a violator of the human rights. 
Today, all nations and societies do generally acknowledge the human rights idea, 
thereby establishing its universality. However, universalism in human rights has not 
been so achieved. Universalism connotes the existence of a common universal value 
consensus for interpretation and application of international human rights law. The 
current lack of such universal consensus is evidenced by the fact that universalism 
continues to be a subject of debate within the international human rights objective of 
the UN. " 
From this moment the conflict between advocates of both the universalism and the 
relativism began to take place. 70 In fact, the debate regarding the universalism of 
human rights takes a very sharp contrast. " 
The key argument on which the claim for universalism of human rights is based is 
that every person is sacred and inviolable. A rejection of the sacredness of every 
person will result in the belief that only some human beings are truly human beings, 
as illustrated by the following extract: "Serbian murderers and rapist do not think of 
themselves as violating human rights. For they are not doing these things to fellow 
human beings, but to Muslims. They are not being inhuman, but rather are 
discriminating between the true humans and the pseudohumans. "7'` This distinction 
between true and pseudo human beings runs counter to the basic assumption of 
human rights, namely that every human being is sacred regardless of his status i. e. 
race, colour, sex, language, religion etc. 
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the world has 
witnessed a significant development towards the universality of human rights. This 
development can be seen from three angles: (1) increase in awareness of human 
rights; (2) significant increase in the number of human rights documents at 
international level; which might be helpful in establishing a common understanding of 
human rights; and (3) in practical terms, the international machinery created by the 
70- See, Mashood A. Baderin (2003) p. 23-26. 
71- An example of this contrast can be identified by a reference for instance to Steiner, H. a. A., P 
(2000). "International Human Rights in Context". Oxford, Oxford University Press. P. 366. 
72 
- Michael J. Perry (1997) "Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and 
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25 
world community to supervise and promote human rights. 73 All this tends to reinforce 
the theory that some rights such as rights to equal protection and free speech are the 
same everywhere. 74 
Moreover, Claude and Weston point out that international human rights law has 
become a substantive part of the international law as a whole, serving as a standard 
against which to measure national behaviour. They add that despite the variation 
between different political regimes in the achievements of human rights, and even in 
the absence of realization of the comprehensive conception of human dignity, the 
human rights standards that have been adopted universally have become a major 
feature of the world's political scene. 75 In the 1993 World Conference on human 
rights, Secretary Christopher argued: "We respect the religious, social, and cultural 
characteristics that make each country unique. But we cannot let cultural relativism 
become the last refuge of repression. " 76 
Additionally, Universalists often argue that there is no specific pure culture because 
each culture derives its principles from a variety of sources and borrows from other 
cultures. 77 In this vein Symonides writes: "While the modern human rights theories 
have been articulated largely by Western philosophers, the moral concepts are not 
exclusively Western and find counterparts in non-Western thought as well. Of course, 
the truth of a philosophical principle should not depend on its geography but on the 
soundness of its foundation. Self-determination, for example, is a Western- 
originated concept, yet it has spawned the birth of many Third World States. It is 
significant that the key human rights instruments starting with the UDHR were not 
drafted by Western States alone, in any event, the instruments have been endorsed by 
nations around the world. "78 
However, proponents of the relativism of human rights sharply challenge this 
perspective. The case for relativist theory rests on the claim that it is not possible to 
strike a balance between protecting the individual and giving effect to some wider 
73 
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- Fernando R. Teson (1985) "International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism. " Virginia 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 25. No. 4 P. 874 
75 
- Claude, R in Waston, B. (1990). "Human Rights in the World Community. " Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press. P. 11 
76 
- Michael J. Perry (1997) "Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related 
Matters. " Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 19 No. I P. 498 
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- Kuper, A in Steiner, H. a. A., P (2000). "International Human Rights in Context. " Oxford, Oxford 
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interest in any universal way. The universal principles are simply too general to be 
self applying. The matter depends entirely on particular cultures. What kind of 
decision-making procedure is appropriate. This being so, there would seem to be little 
possibility of overcoming transcultural disagreement over certain conducts. 
79 
Relativists would maintain that human rights movements stem from the liberal 
traditions of western thought. For example, some non-western societies argue that 
some provisions in the UDHR or ICCDR are in conflict with their own cultures. They 
claim that these instruments aim to provide universal expression for certain tenets of 
the liberal political culture; and that those tenets are only appropriate in states which 
are products of that culture. 80 
A more extreme view of the relativists argue that, international human rights 
instruments constitute an attempt to destroy the diversity of cultures by universalising 
the west's notions of human rights. In addition, relativists maintain that in view of the 
great diversity, no trans-cultural ideas of rights can be agreed on. Therefore, any 
attempt to impose a specific culture on another is unjustified. 81 
Furthermore, advocates of cultural relativism claim that an understanding of moral 
rights depends on the cultural context, because conceptions of right and wrong, and 
therefore substantive human rights standards vary from one culture to another, 
because these standards reflect domestic circumstances and values. More 
interestingly they argue that a Western version of human rights must not be imposed 
upon less developed countries, but rather even if an international standard for 
substantive human rights should exist, its scope and understanding should vary 
fundamentally from one society to another. 82 
Panikkar offers three reasons for his objection to the universalism of human rights, in 
brief: 
(1) Only a universal culture may generate a universal concept; 
(2) Western culture cannot claim universality; 
79 
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(3) Eastern and other cultures are founded on premises incompatible with 
the assumptions of Western principles. b? 
To elaborate on the first argument: Panikkar asserts that no concept can be described 
as universal since no concept has validity outside the society which generated it. An 
essential condition that the universality claim must fulfil is that human rights should 
be the universal point of reference for any disagreement about human dignity. This 
means that the culture that witnessed the birth of human rights should in logic be a 
universal culture too. 
With respect to the second point, Pannikar argues that there is no single unified 
Western culture. The formulation of universal human rights is denied not only from 
outside the west but also from within this culture. (a) From the theological point of 
view human rights should derive from a superior unchangeable value, mainly God's 
value. Otherwise, human rights become it political device in the hands of the 
powerful. (b) Historians sec human rights from a political point of view, as an 
illustration of the domination of Iowerful countries wishing to preserve their 
privileges. (c) Marxists consider human rights as a reflection of the welfare of a 
particular cast of, ockty. Human rights are only a political weapon. 
In a statement on human rights prepared by the American Anthropological 
Association and submitted to the Commission on Human Rights in the United Nations 
during the drafting of the universal Declaration of Human Rights, it was asserted that 
an attempt to draw up a Bill of human rights must hear in mind the following: 
I. Only if the group from which the individual has acquired his cultural values is 
respected can respect he accorded to the individual. 
2. There is no means to evaluate cultures. As a result, to respect cultural 
difference, is obligatory. 
3. Values and standards are relative. " 
Furthermore, at the Vienna Conference of 1993 some Asian states pointed out that 
Western versions of human rights failed to take into account important elements in 
their religions and political traditions and that they therefore could not fully accept 
these provisions. They also challenged the universalism of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights on the grounds that it was prepared and formulated without their 
R. Panikkar t 19,02) -h The Notion Human Ri, q/rr. c A Wcstr"rn Concept- Diogrnrs Vol. 120. P. 84-86 
-'I'tx f: xccuti%c Board of itic Anx"rican Anthrolu)iogical Association. (1947) American 
Anthrofmlugio. Ivtcna%h3 wi.. "on. in. tttiA. Published by American Anthropological Association. Vol. 
49 No. 4 P. 54 t. 041 
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participation. These opinions were reflected in the Bangkok Declaration adopted by 
Asian states in 1991 prior to the Vienna Conference. Article 8 of the Bangkok 
Declaration states that: "while human rights are universal in nature, they must be 
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm- 
setting, hearing in mind the . si, pni 
icance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. - 
In any event, the Vienna Conference concluded that human rights could be a universal 
notion without eliminating local differences; and that despite the importance of 
religious, historical, and cultural differences between nations. individual states are 
still responsible for protecting and promoting internationally recognised human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. This conclusion in my view is only a declaration of the 
universality of human rights. Therefore, the universalism of human rights has not 
been achieved yet. 
Section It' universalism and Islamic Societies 
The above rcprescntx the main arguments of both adherents and opponents of the 
universalo, in of human rights. It is important from the outset to point out that during 
the Cold War. debates between advocates of universalism and supporters of the 
Cultural relativism of human rights took place mainly between the Communist 
regimes and the democratic west. Today. after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
debate takes place tktween developed and less developed countries, or in a religious 
(Islam -«'rst) scenario. 
Since the engagement of Islamic law and Muslim practice in this debate is today 
clearer than ever l fore. and since this thesis concerns certain aspects of human rights 
in an Islamic state (Saudi Arabia) one should not leave the controversy without 
offering a contribution which may provide guidelines for assessing the case in Islamic 
societies, and it proposal to water down the conflict. 
To begin with it is useful to mention that an analytical study of the theories of 
relativism and univcr-, alistn presents two conflicting perspectives. On the one hand, 
the relativist theory has the potential to be used as a screen for human rights 
infringements. Brutal rc, wiºncs could rationalize their violation of human rights by 
2y 
purporting that such a violation is consistent with their cultural norms. s' On the other 
hand, the claim for the universalism of human rights is widely and correctly rejected 
on the ground that it reflects a particular western culture, and these values are not in 
fact universal. 
In the following, an attempt is made to provide a solution to the question of 
universalism. This attempt is a call for further work, both by Islamic states on one 
side, and by human rights bodies within the United Nations on the other. The 
significance of this proposal is its potential to mitigate the consequences of adopting 
an extremist view in either tiniversalists or relativist terms. 
Because the proposal draws on the work of two western thinkers, namely Michael 
Walzer and John Rawls, it is necessary to sited some light on their political 
philos. cophics. 
In Walzer' moral philosophy, the terms 'maximalist' and 'minimalist' morality 
express a basic contrast. `' The tear 'maximalism' applies to the actual practice of 
morality in any given community. Since maximalism has an empirical basis, its forms 
are always particular to the community in which it evolved, and further, are always 
contingent on the previous history of that community. 
'`s The main concern of 
maximalist morality is to achieve distributive justice. 
89 Walzer's own position vis-ä- 
vis the principles of such a system is strongly relativist: he argues that it is not 
possible to fotYntulate in universal terms the objectives required for specific 
communities. It is only possible to achieve distributive justice by taking into account 
the particular social meanings that attach to particular goods in particular 
communities. "`' Although he is a relativist, Walzer argues that the detail of a scheme 
of maximalist morality is shaped around some norms that are very general (or. in 
Walter's terminology, 'thin'). 'Ilicsc norms might have wider application than to a 
s5 
- For instance, Ann F-liraheth Mover t 1'117) argues that: "Where there is no settled doctrine in the 
prerninlern jurisl, ruJr-nrr , in, / n established Islamic authority on a point, states naturally are left free 
to invent ><ha: run171 on riyhtý ciuuld he imposed in the name of Islam" . "Islam and 
Human Rights: 
Traditinrr and 1'ohtit-C' 11.0 
'y 
" fnt ctamislc, Ahsiulla1t A. An-Na'im states: "recent history is also important for utulerstandin, i'' 
apparent psicholn, yual and political resi. stunee to human rights when perceived as a tool of Western 
cultural ina'rrr. tlitn, " Al' lullcth A. An-Na'itn "Islamic Law and Hunan Rights Todcr_s'". Interights 
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particular community. 91 These general and more widely applicable norms thus belong 
in Walzer's second category, that of `minimalist' morality. 
The point about minimalism is its aspiration to be independent of any culture-specific 
context. 92 Walzer presents the idea that minimalist morality is that which expresses 
non-specific, and possibly even universal concerns. 93 But despite the fact that 
minimalism is thus free from specific cultural influences, it can function as an 
instrument by which to evaluate moral uncertainties arising within specific cultures. 
94 
However, this function seldom has the outcome that a specific guidance is offered 
with which to address specific problems within a specific maximalist morality. 
Typically, it is more likely to reveal possible ways of working towards a solution. 
95 
Seen as a tool for this purpose, minimalism's usefulness consists in suggesting ways 
of thinking about, and perhaps remedying, the problems or deficiencies of a specific 
maximalist morality. 96 It is also the case that if minimalist principles are involved in 
order to correct the shortcomings of a particular culture, this will inevitably entail 
engagement with maximalist values. 97 The reason is that it is not possible for 
individual critics to express even general principles in terms that are free from the 
idiom of their own culture. 98 
In Walzer's philosophy this is not a problem. According to Walzer's analysis, 
minimalism is `thin', that is: it offers insufficient matter to provide practical solutions 
in an actual context. Any critic of a particular current practice must use ' thickness' 
with which to frame his argument; and this thickness will necessarily derive from his 
own culture-specific norms. 99 
Walzer argues that even when people refer to minimalist values for guidance, they 
should do so in terms of what best suits the background of their own culture. 
too 
To sum up, for Walzer there is a distinction between a local level of morality and a 
more general level which is possibly universal. But, minimalist norms are not 
91 
- Ibid, p. 3 92 
- Ibid, p. 3 93 
- Ibid, p. 50 94- Ibid, p. 10 and pp. 16-17 95 
- Ibid, p. 6 96 
- Ibid, p. 39 97 
- Ibid, p. xiii 98 
- Ibid, p. 9 99 
- Ibid, p. 11 and p. 17 10° 
- Ibid, p. 3 
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superordinate to maximalist values. According to Walzer's view, decisions about 
practical measures should be taken only from a basis of strictly local considerations. 
Many Muslim societies might favour the adoption of this philosophy, as it would tend 
to preserve institutions and practices in Islamic countries and thereby to protect the 
culture- specific values which are fundamental to Islamic States. However, this could 
widen the gap between practice in Islamic communities on the one hand, and the 
international standard of human rights on the other. Obviously, a wider gap between 
cultures could be an obstacle to development and cooperation on the level of politics, 
economic, security, etc. Therefore, it is preferable to consider a more appropriate 
solution. 
The second philosophy, as we mentioned above, is enunciated by John Rawls. Rawls 
proposes the use of hypothesis in his philosophy. People in a particular community, in 
his view, should construct an imaginary situation in which they are making judgments 
about their society from the outside, without personal bias, and consider what the 
outsider would decide. 101 These outsider's principles must then be compared with 
their own societies' considered judgments of justice. 
Principles that are reached by the imaginary means, i. e. the hypothetical outsiders, 
may not be compatible with their societies' considered judgments. Once this is the 
case people may adjust (change) their considered judgment, or instead they should go 
back to the construction that is shaped via the imaginary outsiders and consider 
whether it has any deficiencies. 
By this approach Rawls hopes to achieve a position of `reflective equilibrium' in 
which the considered judgments of particular society gel with principles which the 
neutral outsider would choose. ' 02 
A reflective equilibrium approach does not give priority to either local or overarching 
norms. Rather, it identifies both sets of norms as potentially useful sources of 
guidance on the question as to how interests of fundamental importance should be 
protected. Reflective equilibrium is then used to assess or maybe refine our 
considered judgments and the neutral guiding principles on which they should be 
based in the light of one another. 103 A significant feature of this political philosophy 
101 
- J. W. Harris (1997) "Legal Philosophies". Butterworths. P. 282 102 
- Ibid, p. 283 '03 
- J. Rawls (1971) "A Theory of Justice". p 48-49 and p. 20 n. 7 
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is that both considered judgements and guiding principles have equal status. Neither 
of them has higher order status. ' 04 
Adopting this approach could serve our goal in this discussion. Rawls' model offers a 
means of reconciliation of the extreme contrast between a western interpretation of 
human rights provisions in the current instruments (universalism), and a strict 
applicability of cultural values (relativism). 
Seen as a practical tool to reconcile and accommodate the above conflict on human 
rights within the context of the Islamic world, this approach makes two demands. (a) 
Local governments should take account of the international standards of human rights 
and revise their practice and institutions to make them consistent with international 
levels. (b) But if that is impossible, human rights bodies within the United Nations 
should bear in mind that gaps between cultures are sometimes very wide and thus 
every culture should be given space, especially when the change required by the 
international standards is destructive to the community concerned. 
For the sake of clarification, the following explanation might be helpful. In respect of 
an Islamic state an adoption of this approach in the field of human rights entails that 
the current human rights standard should be seen as `the neutral outsider guidance' 
mentioned by Rawls; and Islamic society's institutions and practice should be 
regarded as the `considered judgements' that are also referred to by Rawls. Thus, any 
issue arising regarding human rights in Islamic society should be considered from an 
impartial point of view. Neither the national practices in an Islamic state, nor the 
international standard of human rights should be preferred. 
If there is a conflict between the practices and institutions of the Islamic state on the 
one hand, and international human rights on the other, the Muslim state should 
reconsider its practice and modify it to be consistent with international human rights 
standards. However, if this is impossible because, for example, human rights 
contradicts Islamic law explicitly, the burden now must be shifted to the international 
bodies of human rights to apply the principle of `margin of appreciation' whereby the 
state concerned (here an Islamic state) will be given the space to apply international 
human rights norms consistently within its context. 
There are a number of reasons for adhering to this approach: 
104 
- J. Rawls, (1993) "Political Liberalism". p. 8, n. 8 
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1- Most current norms and principles of human rights do not contradict Islamic 
law, and sometime Islamic law sets a higher standard than that required by the 
international human rights standards. This fact might be more evident if 
Muslim societies made a clear distinction between a practice that is based only 
on a custom or habit of a particular Muslim society and a rule of Islamic 
law. ' 05 Islam is widespread in different lands of the world i. e. Asia, Africa, 
Europe, etc. People from different origins practise Islam. Each Muslim society 
has its own customs and practices. In many cases these customs or practices 
overlap with Islamic law, so both those who practice such customs and the 
outsider observer mistakenly believe that that practice is a requirement of 
Islamic law. ' 06 
2- By applying the principle of public welfare, Islamic law has the ability to 
assimilate human rights concepts that are declared in the international 
instruments on human rights regardless of their origin. 
3- In the case of an unequivocal difference between Islamic law and international 
human rights standards, this approach will allow the Islamic state to preserve 
Islamic rules. 
4- Human rights today are a political fact and constitute an essential part of the 
law of nations, not only in the form of treaties, but also as part of the 
customary law. Governments cannot consider human rights as purely national 
law since this perspective would contradict contemporary international law. 107 
In addition, regardless of their historical origin, human rights are the result of 
valuable human efforts aiming at enhancing and protecting human beings 
despite their backgrounds. Human rights call for protection of the dignity of 
individuals and provide basic freedom and guarantees. The suggested 
105 
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approach renders the Islamic states much closer to the international human 
rights. 
5- With regard to the application of the margin of appreciation by human rights 
bodies in the United Nations, this principle has been successfully adopted by 
the European Court of Human Rights to accommodate differences between 
European states with regard to the application of European Convention of 
Human Rights. Logically speaking, if the European Court adopted this 
principle to reconcile diversity between states relatively closer than the 
worldwide nations, the need for the adoption of this principle at the 
international level is then more urgent. In some areas the gap between cultures 
is extremely wide. Perhaps this is the consequence of the differences in the 
values on which each culture is based. In fact many human rights writers, 
when dealing with subjects related to human rights in different cultures fail to 
realize this diversity. 108 
Theoretically speaking, western culture, for instance, differs from Islamic 
culture in fundamental aspects. So when western writers make judgments the 
result often contains basic fallacies. Put differently, the nature of the modern 
western culture is based on what is called "open culture" or "the culture of an 
open letter". 109 This notion means that the culture does not restrict or limit 
itself to a fixed set of values; rather it has the ability to accommodate change 
and can shift its stated values. This feature of modern western culture, 
although it has the advantage of adaptability to new values and new norms 
when change is required, cannot be fully adopted in a Muslim society. It can 
only be applied in areas where the change concerned is not prohibited by 
Islamic law. 
108 
- For example, Teson states: "... This principle of moral worth forbids the imposition upon 
individuals of cultural standards that impair human rights. Even if relativists could show that 
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her standpoint. 
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In addition, western human rights advocates mistakenly rank religious values 
on the same level as social or cultural values. In relation to Muslim societies 
this is a serious mistake, and a clear manifestation of the poor knowledge they 
have about the nature of Muslim thought. 110In the religion of Islam, God's 
commandments apply to public and private ways of life. Religious rules are 
unlike social and cultural rules such as how to dress or eat, which may be 
changed, as this would not contravene the fixed values in the society. This 
error perhaps stems from the fact that most modern western societies are 
secular and the separation between church and state is clearly established. As a 
result of the religious quarrels that divided Europe in the eighteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, religion in the west is primarily regarded as a private 
and personal matter. And English law is not committed to any religion. " 
Therefore, the margin of appreciation is an important tool to accommodate 
cultural differences. 
0- Vogel, Frank Edward (1993) p. 4-5 1- See e. g. Bowman v. Secular Society [ 1917] AC 406 
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CHAPTER 2 
The European Convention and the Accused during the Trial Stage 
Introduction: 
Chapter 1 offers a background to International Human Rights in historical, legal- 
political and cultural terms. The development of western theory of natural law, 
deemed to be the foundation of the concept of human rights, is traced from the 
Classical era to the Second World War in the twentieth century, the century in which 
the concept became widely recognised and established. Chapter 1 also includes a 
study of Human Rights within the United Nations, showing the current form of the 
movement. This examination particularly addresses human rights in the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The chapter concludes with an examination of 
the claim for universalism of human rights, and the proposal of a tool whereby to 
accommodate the sharply contrasting demands of international human rights and of 
strict Islamic relativism. 
Since this study is devoted to the rights of the accused during the criminal trial stage, 
Chapter 2 will focus on these rights and therefore discussion of other human rights 
will be excluded. 
Although the Charter of the United Nations refers in some of its provisions to human 
rights, it does not refer in particular to the rights of the accused during criminal trial. 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights cover the rights. of 
the accused during trial. These Articles provide everyone charged with a criminal 
offence with the following rights: a fair hearing, a public hearing, an independent and 
impartial tribunal, the presumption of innocence, and non- retroactivity in criminal 
matters. Moreover, Articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights guarantee the following rights to the accused during trial: 
- equality before the courts and tribunals; 
-a fair hearing; 
-a public hearing; 
- an independent and impartial tribunal established by law; 
-a public pronouncement of judgment; 
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- the presumption of innocence; 
- the right to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he 
understands, of the nature and cause of the charge against him; 
- to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence and to communicate 
with his counsel; 
- to be tried without delay; 
- to be tried in his own presence, and to defend himself in person; 
- to choose his own lawyer, or to have free legal assistance if he has not 
sufficient means to pay and where the interests of justice so require; 
- to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him; 
- to have free interpretation services if he cannot speak or understand the 
language used in court; 
- not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt; 
- the right to appeal in criminal cases; 
- the right to compensation for a miscarriage of justice; 
- the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence; 
- non- retroactivity in criminal matters. 
However, most of these rights presented by the Declaration and the Covenant have 
their counterpart in Articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and Articles 2,3 and 4 of Protocol No. 7. Moreover, the 
jurisprudence developed by the European Court of Human Rights has extended the 
scope of the Convention to include rights not expressly protected by the Convention 
and its protocols. Therefore, and because this jurisprudence provides an important 
ground on which to investigate and clarify the scope and the domain of each 
guarantee, this chapter will be devoted to the rights of the accused during the criminal 
trial stage as set out in the European Convention. 
The scope and the meaning of each right will be examined in order to illustrate and 
specify the European standard for criminal trials. The chapter is divided into two 
main parts. Part (1) focuses on the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. This requires a study of the historical background of the 
Convention, of the rights guaranteed, the system of enforcement, and of principles 
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concerning the interpretation of the Convention's texts. This will be limited to a 
discussion of general aspects of the topics. 
The significance of part 1 is that: (a) understanding the function of the Convention as 
a whole facilitates the process of understanding the scope of each right, and (b) the 
principles employed by the European Court to interpret the Convention, in particular 
the margin of appreciation, are important tools to accommodate diversity between 
jurisdictions of different nations. 
Part 2 of this chapter is devoted to the rights provided to the accused during the 
criminal trial stage in the European Convention. This part is divided into 4 main 
sections. Section one concerns fundamental principles of the criminal law. Section 
two focuses on the defence rights of the accused during trial. The third section is 
devoted to the rights of the accused based on the independence of the judiciary. 
Finally, the last section will examine the rights of the accused after cri minal 
judgment. 
It should be clarified from the outset that rules of evidence' will not be dealt with in 
this thesis, save the right of the accused not to be forced to confess guilt. This is for 
the following reasons: 
1- The study of the rules of evidence, especially in Islamic law, is complex enough to 
entail a separate thesis. 
2- As a general rule, the European Court demonstrated that the rule of evidence is a matter 
that is left entirely to the national court's discretion. In his comment on the European 
Court's approach regarding the rules of evidence, Brice Dickson argues: "The 
convention, after all, is worded in very general terms, not with specific rules of 
evidence in mind, and its framer did not intend it to be used as a means whereby all 
decisions on the facts in domestic courts could be reopened in Strasbourg. " 2 
3- The right no to be compelled to confess guilt, although not explicitly mentioned in the 
European Convention, is explicitly articulated in Article 14 (g) of the ICCPR. 
4- The right not to be compelled to confess guilt has a particular significance because 
most alleged violations of human rights with regard to the evidence rule in Saudi 
I- Such as hearsay evidence, absconding witnesses, anonymous witnesses, unlawfully obtained 
evidence, experts' evidence, defence evidence, undercover agent and entrapment, and fear of reprisals. 
For more material in these subjects see e. g. Keir Starmer (1999) "European Human Rights Law " LAG 
Legal Action Group 
2- Brice Dickson (1997) "Human Rights and the European Convention. " London Sweet & Maxwell. 
Hereinafter will refer to as Brice Dickson (1997) 
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Arabia concern this right. It is therefore felt to be importance to shed some light on 
the issue. 
Part One The European Convention on Human Rights 
This subject will be treated in the following sequence: historical background, rights 
protected, system of enforcement, and finally principles concerning the interpretation 
of the Convention. 
(1) Historical background: 
After the Nazis' violation of human rights in Europe, which was the clear reason for 
the outbreak of the Second World War, and after the realization of the need to 
establish public order in Europe on the foundations of democracy, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights as complementary to the efforts of the United Nations to 
develop and implement universally an international Bill of human rights, the 
European community started to think about creating European unity. Consequently, 
European governments prepared a treaty to establish a council of Europe. 3 More 
generally, the convention was a response to gross human rights infringements that 
Europe had witnessed during the Second World War. It also was seen as: (a) a sample 
of western values, and (b) a remedy that might protect Western Europe from 
communist subversion. 4 
The statute of the Council of Europe was signed in London in 1949. The first task of 
the Council was to set up a convention on human rights in Europe5. Article (3) of the 
statute provides that "every member of the Council of Europe must accept the 
principles of the rule of law, and of the enjoyment by all persons within its 
Jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedom. " Accordingly, respecting 
human rights is a condition of membership of the European Council. The draft of the 
European Convention on Human Rights was prepared in 1949 by a number of experts 
and then submitted to the Ministerial Committee of the Council of Europe. However, 
in the first session it was requested by the majority to eliminate the subject of 
protection and development of human rights and liberties from the agenda of the 
coming meeting for the Consultative Assembly of the Council, because this subject 
3- Ramcharan, B. (2000). "Complementarity between Universal and Regional Organizations/ 
Perspectives from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. " Human Rights Law 
Journal. Vol, 21. P. 324 
- Harris et al. (1995). "Law of the European Convention on Human Rights" London, Butterworths. 
1&2. Hereinafter will refer to as Harris (1995) ý- 
Robertson(1996) p. 120 
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had been discussed within the ambit of the United Nations, which led to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
Despite the Committee of Ministers' decision, many of delegates on the Consultative 
Assembly insisted on preparing a draft convention on human rights in Europe. 
Therefore, the Committee of Ministers returned the subject of human rights to the 
agenda of the Consultative Assembly. 6 
The Convention draft was transmitted to the Consultative Assembly's Committee on 
Legal and Administrative Questions, which agreed that at this time only the principal 
rights and fundamental freedom will be protected, and rights in this proposed 
convention must be based on the declared rights in the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights 1948.7 
The committee report was adopted by the Consultative Council in September 1949 
with some alterations, and then the draft of the convention was transmitted to the 
Ministerial Committee. The Ministerial Committee appointed an experts' committee 
to study the draft convention. They then prepared a draft based (principally) on the 
draft that was prepared by the Consultative Assembly. After that the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was drawn up within the 
Council of Europe. 81t was opened for signature in Rome on 4 November 1950, and 
entered into force in September 1953 after 10 states ratified it. 9 This number has 
increased especially since the end of the Cold War. The Convention has a 
considerable influence of the lives on over 800 million individuals in the European 
countries that have ratified it. 10 
The Convention consists of two main parts. Part (1) provides a list of the substantive 
rights guaranteed by the convention. Part (2) concerns procedural issues. That is the 
enforcement machinery and rules governed the admissibility of applications. 
(2) Rights protected: 
Article 1 of the Convention reads: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
every one within their jurisdiction the rights and freedom defined in section 1 of the 
6- Mark W. Janis (2000) p. 16&17 7-Ibid, p. 19 
8- Robertson (1996) p. 122 9- The United Kingdom was the first country to ratify, on March 6,1951 and the 10°i ratification 
occurred on September 3,1953. See Brice Dickson (1997) p. 6 
10 
- L. J. Clements, Nuala Mole, and Alan Simmons (1999) "European Hunan Rights: Taking A Case 
Under The Convention. " Sweet & Maxwell. London. P. 3. Hereinafter will refer to as L. J. Clements, 
Nuala Mole, and Alan Simmons (1999) 
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convention. " It is obvious from this text that state parties are obligated to protect any 
person under their jurisdiction irrespective of his nationality or legal status. 
12 rights and freedoms are provided by the Convention: 
1) the right to life; 
2) freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
3) freedom from slavery and servitude; 
4) the right to liberty and security of the person; 
5) the right to a fair trial; 
6) protection against retroactivity of the criminal law; 
7) the right to respect of private and family life, the home and 
correspondence; 
8) freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
9) freedom of expression; 
10) freedom of assembly and association; 
11) the right to marry and found a family; 
12) the right to an effective remedy if ones rights are violated. 
Protocol No. 1 adds three further rights: 
13) the right to property; 
14) the right of parents to ensure the education of their children in conformity 
with their own religion and philosophical conventions; 
15) the right to free elections. 
Protocol No. 4 adds four more rights: 
16) freedom from imprisonment for debt; 
17) liberty of movement and freedom to choose ones residence; 
18) freedom from exile and the right to enter the country of which one is a 
national; 
19) prohibition of the collective expulsion of aliens. 
Protocol No. 6 adds one further right: 
20) prohibition of the death penalty in time of peace. 
Protocol No. 7 adds five further rights: 
21) the right of an alien not to be expelled from a State without due process of 
law; 
22) the right to appeal in criminal cases; 
23) the right to compensation for a miscarriage of justice; 
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24) immunity from being prosecuted again; 
25) equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as regards matters of a 
private law character between them and their relations with their children. 
It is worth mentioning here that these rights are not absolute since many articles 
restrict some of these guarantees depending on different circumstances. For instance, 
article 10 (2) restricts the freedom of expression by declaring that: "The exercise of 
these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to 
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others for 
prevention of the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. " In the case of Art 6 which is the main 
subject of this thesis, there is no specific override (except publicity). But, the Court 
has held that a principle of fair balance applies throughout the Convention. 
Robertson and Merrills argue that although political and civil rights that are 
guaranteed in this Convention are very important because they are deemed as the 
most distinctive mark of the democratic community, they do not contain all desired 
rights, therefore many individual complaints were rejected [by the commission] on the 
ground that the Convention does not stipulate such rights. For example, it does not 
expressly guarantee the right of members of minority groups, and the right to equality 
before the law. Furthermore, it dose not guarantee freedom from racist or other 
propaganda or the right to recognition as a person before the law. All these rights are 
protected by the ICCPR. In addition, some rights are found only in optional protocols 
that not all parties have accepted. " Consequently, it is argued that the Convention in 
some respects is inadequate, because it provides the minimum standards, which could 
be agreed by European States in the 1950s. 12 
This criticism may however be opposed on the ground that jurisprudence developed 
by the Court has broadened the scope of the Convention to include these matters as 
exceptions or as part of the dynamic interpretation. The dynamic interpretation, as we 
will see later, considers the Convention as a living instrument. This tool allows the 
11 
- Robertson (1996) p. 124 12 
- Leach, P. (2001). "Taking A Case to the European Court of Human Rights. " London, Blackstone 
Press Limited. p. 4. hereinafter will refer to as Leach, P. (2001) 
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European Court to keep pace with novel issues and enables the Court to protect rights 
not mentioned explicitly in the provisions of the Convention. 
(3) The system of enforcement: 
The Convention system is based on two principles; first, that the best protection can be 
provided through the national courts, and second, that if the national remedy is 
inadequate there is an international remedy. 13 In other words, the Strasburg 
mechanism is intended to be a subsidiary to national systems to safeguard human 
rights. Thus, in addition to providing a list of civil and political rights and freedoms, 
the Convention creates a system of enforcement of the obligations. Three institutions 
have been established: the European Commission of Human Rights (set up in 1954), 
the European Court of Human Rights (set up in 1959) and the European Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe. And above all, in accordance with protocol no .l1 
the rights of individual application is now mandatory and the new full time court that 
replaced the Commission and the old Court has automatic jurisdiction with respect to 
all inter- state cases brought before it. 
(a) The European Commission of Human Rights (1953-1998) 
During the negotiation about the Convention in the Council of Europe the delegates 
confirmed the idea of establishing the commission of human rights in addition to the 
court. The aim of creating such a commission was to provide two functions: (1) to 
weed out valueless petitions and (2) to serve as an international organ accessible by 
individuals. 14 
In terms of organization the Commission consisted of a number of members equal to 
the number of contracting states. Its members were selected by the Minister's 
Committee of the European Council among slates prepared by the Consultative 
Assembly. Their term was a renewable 6 years and they were not governmental 
delegates, but acted in an individual capacity, and they selected their president. 15 
The increasing case-load of the commission and the court led to a reform of the 
Convention supervisory machinery by adopting protocol No . 11 which merged the 
commission and the court in 1998. The purpose was to simplify the structure and at 
13 
- Brett, R. (1994). Papers in the Theory and Practice of Human Rights. Is More Better? Essex, The 
Human Rights Centre, University of Essex. P. 5 1. hereinafter will refer to as Brett (1994) 14 
- Mark W. Janis (2000) p. 27 15 
- Ibid, P. 28 
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the same time to strengthen the Judicial character of the system by making it fully 
compulsory and abolishing the Committee of Ministers' adjudicative role. 16 
(b) The Committee of Ministers: 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe composed of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the member states or their representatives and meeting twice a 
year, is a political organ. However, it was granted a judicial function in pursuance of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, because when detailed drafting began, 
many governments indicated that they were not ready to accept the power of a 
European court. ' 7 
If a case was not referred to the court, the Committee of Ministers had to decide 
whether there had been a violation of the Convention. It took such decisions by a two- 
thirds majority. In most cases the Committee of Ministers supported the results in the 
Commission's report. However, sometimes parties succeeded in reaching settlement 
before the case reached the Committee of Ministers or during its consideration. 
In such cases, the Committee of Ministers discontinued examination of the case and 
did not take a decision to clarify whether the Convention was violated. When it 
appeared that the Convention was violated; the Committee of Ministers had to set a 
limited period within which the party concerned had to reform the violation. 
Nevertheless, the Committee of Ministers had no right to order the state concerned to 
take certain procedures for remedying the violation, but could only provide 
recommendations. ' 8 
However, in accordance with protocol No. 11 the Committee of Ministers no longer 
has jurisdiction to decide on merits of cases, though it continues to retain its important 
role of monitoring the enforcement of the Court's jurisdictions. 19 As one might expect 
this amendment is widely welcomed because it is not acceptable to provide a political 
tool with a judicial function. 20 According to article 8 of the statute of the European 
Council, the Committee of Ministers has the right to suspend or expel from the 
European Council any contracting state when it violates article 3 of the statute. 
Therefore, the ultimate sanction that can be applied is expulsion from the 
16 
- Mahoney, P. (1999). "Speculating on the Future of the Reformed European Court of Human 
Rights. " Human Rights Law Journal 20. P. 1 
- Brett (1994) p. 52 18 
-Robertson (1996) p. 131 19 
- Drzemczewski, A. (2000). "The European Human Rights Convention: Protocol No. ]]- Entry into 
Force and First Year of Application. " Human Rights Law Journal Vol. 21. P. t 20 
- Leach (2001)p. 5 
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organization. This article makes membership of the Organization conditional on 
exercising human rights as provided by the Convention. 
(c) The European Court of Human Rights: 
Under protocol No. 11 which is ratified by all Council of Europe member states and 
entered into force on 1s` of November 1998, the European Commission of Human 
Rights as well as the European Court of Human Rights were replaced with a new 
European Court of Human Rights, operating full time. Furthermore, all individual 
applications now have direct access to the new Court. 21 
As far as the organization is concerned the Court is composed of a number of judges 
equal to the number of contracting states. 22 Judges sit on the Court in their individual 
capacity and do not represent any party. 23 The Council of Europe's Parliamentary 
Assembly elects judges for the renewable term of six years; judges retire at the age of 
70.24 
The court elects its President and two Vice Presidents. Committees of three judges are 
set up to decide whether or not the individual application is accepted. They exercise a 
filter role with respect to applications, as did previously the Commission. This 
committee may, by a unanimous vote, declare inadmissible or strike out of its list of 
cases an application submitted under Article 34 where such a decision can be taken 
without further examination. This decision is final . 
25 If no such decision is determined 
a chamber of 7 judges will decide the question of admissibility as well as merits. In 
addition, if the case involves inter-state application the chamber will decide the 
question of admissibility and merits. 26 Chambers of seven judges are constituted to 
form by rotation to deal with the majority of cases. The Grand Chamber of 17 judges 
is established for 3 years on the basis of rotation, for most important cases. Parties 
within three months of the judgement by the ordinary Chamber can apply for a 
rehearing before the Grand Chamber. However, it should be noted that this kind of 
hearing is not an appeal since the Chamber President and the national judge move on 
from the Chamber to sit in the Grand Chamber during the rehearing. 27 
21 
- Drzemczewski, A. (2000). "The European Huntan Rights Convention: Protocol No. ]]- Entry into 
Force and First Year of Application. " Human Rights Law Journal Vol. 21. P. 1 22 
- Article 20 of the Convention. 23 
- Article 21 of the Convention. 24 
- Article 23 of the Convention. 25 
- Article 28 of the Convention. 26 
- Article 29 of the Convention. 27 
- Mahoney, P. (1999). "Speculating on the Future of the Reformed European Court of Hunan 
Rights. " Human Rights Law Journal 20. P. 1 
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The procedure before the court is public. Hearings are public except in required 
circumstances. The final decision should be submitted to the Committee of Ministers 
that supervises the execution. 28Until October 1994, only the Commission as well as 
the Contracting state had the right to bring a case to the Court. However, since 
November 1998 individuals, non-governmental organizations and groups of 
individuals have the right to bring their cases directly to the Court. The new article 34 
provides that "the court may receive applications, from any person, non-governmental 
organization or group of individuals claming to be the victim of violation by one of 
the high contracting parties of the rights set forth in the convention or protocols 
thereto. The high contracting parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right. " 
The individual complaints are first the subject of a preliminary examination by the 
Committee of three members of the Court that determine their admissibility. There are 
2 conditions to accept an application submitted by either the individuals or States 
parties: 
1) Domestic remedies must be exhausted. 
2) The application must be submitted within six months from the date of the 
final decision of the domestic remedy. 29 
Nevertheless, several other criteria apply only to applications submitted by 
individuals: an individual application will be rejected as inadmissible if it is (a) 
anonymous, (b) already examined by the Court or through another international 
procedure, (c) incompatible with the provision of the Convention, (d) manifestly ill 
founded, (e) or which constitutes an abuse of the right of petition. 30 
In addition to its power to decide whether the Convention was violated, the Court is 
empowered to impose compensation. Further, after accepting the case, the Court can 
according to article 37 drop it in one of the following situations: (1) the applicant does 
not intend to pursue his application, (2) the matter has been resolved, (3) for any other 
reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of 
the application. 
28 
- Drzemczewski, A. (2000). "The European Human Rights Convention: Protocol No. )]- Entry into 
Force and First Year of Application. " Human Rights Law Journal Vol. 21. P. 6 29 
- Article 35 of the Convention. 30 
- Article 35 of the Convention. 
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(4) The interpretation of the Convention: 
When trying to interpret the provisions of the Convention the Court applies among 
others the following principles: 1- the margin of appreciation, 2- proportionality 3- 
convention as a living instrument, 4- autonomous concepts, 5- interpretation in the 
light of the ' Travaux preparatoires', and 6- interpretation in accordance with the 
Vienna Convention. These principles will be highlighted very briefly, save the margin 
of appreciation which will be discussed in considerable detail because of the 
importance it occupies in accommodating diversity between conflicting systems. 
1: The margin of appreciation 31: 
The doctrine means that when the state takes legislative, administrative or judicial 
actions in the field of Convention rights, it is permitted to a certain measure of 
discretion, subject to European supervision. 32 The importance of the doctrine is 
described as: "The margin of appreciation has provided the system with the flexibility 
needed to avoid confrontations and is considered as a useful tool in the eventual 
realization of a European -wide system of human -rights protection, in which a 
uniform standard of protection is secured. "33 The function of the European Court is 
subsidiary to that of the domestic system. 34 This means that its role will apply only if 
the national authorities fail to safeguard rights protected by the Convention. The 
national authorities are initially empowered to assess whether a restriction on a 
particular right breaches the Convention. That is to say the national authorities will 
assess whether there is a legitimate purpose for any given restriction, whether the 
imposed restriction corresponds to a pressing social need, or whether the restriction is 
necessary and proportionate. 35 In fact, the function of the European Court as Keir 
Starmer puts it is to: "consider whether the assessments made by the domestic 
authorities are true to the Convention. "36 To carry out this task, the European Court is 
of the opinion that it cannot employ its own assessment as a substitute for that of the 
national authorities, but rather the jurisprudence of the Court shows its willingness to 
31 
- Albeit the significant of the margin of appreciation doctrine as a tool to accommodate diversity 
between cultures, the UN Human Rights Committee surprisingly has not formally adopted the margin 
of appreciation doctrine. For more discussion about the reason of the HRC refrain from the adoption of 
the doctrine see for example, Mashood A. Baderin (2003) p. 231 &232 32 
- On the doctrine of margin of appreciation see e. g. Steiner, H. J., and Alston, P., International Human 
Rights in Context, Law Politics, Morals (2000) pp. 845-857 
33 
- Mashood A. Baderin (2003) p. 234 34 
- Handyside v UK (1976) Para 48; Application No. 00005493/73; AK divar v Turkey (1997) 23 
EHRR 143 Para 65 
35 
- Handyside v UK (1976) Paras 4.26 to 4.82; Application No. 00005493/73 36 
- Keir Starmer (1999) p. 187 
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give the view of the domestic authorities margin of appreciation. 37 This is maybe 
because the state bodies are, as a general rule, in a better position to consider the 
necessity of restriction. 38 The European Court insisted that: "It is in no way [the 
court's] task to take the place of the competent national court but rather to review... 
the decisions they delivered in the exercise of the power of appreciation... " 39 
Moreover, the European Court in Klass v Germany 40pointed out that: "it is certainly 
not for the Court to substitute for the assessment of the national authorities another 
assessment of what might be the best policy in this field. " 
Even though, the doctrine of a margin of appreciation is vigorously criticized and 
described by Anthony Lester as "slippery and elusive" and by Rosalyn Higgins as " 
objectionable as a viable legal concept"'41 it plays a significant function in the 
interpretation of the Convention in drawing the line between what is properly a 
matter for each community to decide at local level and what is so fundamental that it 
entails the same requirement for all countries whatever the variation in traditions and 
culture. 42 
This should nevertheless not be understood to mean that the domestic authorities have 
unlimited discretion to adopt whatever measures they regard appropriate. 43 The Court 
held that: "in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court cannot confine itself to 
considering the impugned court decisions in isolation; it must look at them in light of 
the case as a whole... The Court must decide whether the interference at issue was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons adduced... to 
justify it are relevant and sufficient... X44 in this regard the Court has emphasized that 
"the domestic margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with European 
supervision. "45 
The scope of the margin of appreciation will be varied according to the context in 
question. But the following guidelines are, as a general rule, applied: wide margin of 
37 
- Ibid, p. 187-188 38 
- Leach (2001) p. 95 39 
- Sunday Times v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245 Para 49 40 
- (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 214 Para 49 41 
- Leach (2001) p. 95 42 
- Mahoney, P. (1998). "The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation under the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice. " Human Rights Law Journal Vol 
19. P. 1 
43 
- Klass v Germany (1979-80) 2 EHRR 214 44 
- Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407 45 
- Handyside v. UK (1976) Para 47; Application No. 00005493/73 
49 
appreciation is usually permitted on matters such as national security, and morals47. 
However, some rights of peculiar concern such as private life, free speech, or corporal 
punishments48 entail a narrow margin of appreciation. 49 
There arises the question whether absence or presence of consensus among the 
Contracting States regarding a given conduct could affect the scope of the margin of 
appreciation. According to the Court jurisprudence a wide margin of appreciation 
should be given to a state if there is little common ground amongst the Contracting 
States regarding a given issue. 50 But, a narrow margin of appreciation will be 
allowed once the state members in Europe have achieved a general consensus with 
regard to a particular issue. 51 
2: Proportionality: 
The Court applies the principle of proportionality, which means providing a fair 
balance between the public interest of the society on the one hand, and the 
requirement to protect fundamental rights of individuals on the other. 52 The Court, in 
order to evaluate the proportionality of a certain measure, will consider the existence 
of other methods that could safeguard the public interest concerned less intrusively or 
without interference at all. 53 Pursuant to the case law of the European Court, the 
principle of fair balance between the protection of individual rights and the interests 
of the society at large can be achieved only if restrictions on individual rights are 
strictly proportionate to the legitimate aim they pursue. 54 In Barthold v Germany the 
applicant, a veterinary surgeon, was given an injunction by the domestic court not to 
repeat similar statements on the ground that he broke the rules of professional conduct 
prohibiting advertising and unfair competition. The key argument against him was 
that he had made disparaging remarks about a number of other professionals and gave 
special prominence to his own practice in a newspaper. The European Court ruled 
that: "It may well be that these illustrations had the effect of giving publicity to Dr. 
Barthold's own clinic, thereby providing a source of complaint for his fellow 
veterinary surgeons, but in the particular circumstances this effect proved to be 
46 
- Ireland v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 25 47 
- See for example Rees v. UK (1986) 9 EHRR 56 48 
- See for example Tyrer v Turkey (1978) 2 EHRR 1 49 
- Keir Starmer (1999) p. 189 50 
- X, Y and Zv UK (1997) 24 EHRR 143 51 
- Keir Starmer (1999) p. 189 52 
- Harris (1995) p. 11 53 
- Leach (2001) p. 95 54 
- Keir Starmer (1999) p. 170 
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altogether secondary having regard to the principle content of the article and to the 
nature of the issue being put to the public at large. The injunction issued ... does not 
achieve a fair balance between the two interests at stake. According to the Hanseatic 
Court of Appeal, there remains an intent to act for the purposes of commercial 
competition, within the meaning of section 1 of the 1909 Act, as long as that intent has 
not been entirely overridden by other motives. A criterion as strict as this in 
approaching the matter of advertising and publicity in the liberal professions is not 
consonant with freedom of expression. Its application risks discouraging members of 
the liberal professions from contributing to public debate on topics affecting the life 
of the community if even there is the slight likelihood of their utterance being treated 
as entailing, to some degree, an advertising effect" 55 
3: The Convention as a living instrument: 
The Convention must be given a dynamic or evaluative interpretation. This means 
that it must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions rather than assessed in 
terms of what was intended by those who formulated the Convention in 1950. 
However, the interpretation should not result in introducing a right that was not 
intended to be included when the Convention was drafted. For example, the right to 
marry cannot be interpreted to include a right to divorce, even though this right is now 
generally recognized in Europe. 56 
4: Interpretation in the light of the `Travaux preparatoires': 
This means that when trying to interpret the Convention the Court should refer to 
what was intended by the original drafters and then interpret it accordingly. The 
drafters' intention can be found in the preparatory drafts. Nonetheless, such an 
approach is rarely exercised because the principle of interpreting the Convention, as a 
living instrument, is more likely to prevail. 57 
5: Autonomous concepts: 
Legal expressions in the Convention such as civil rights or criminal charges 
mentioned in article 6 of the Convention are given autonomous meanings. This means 
in the words of Philip Leach that "the classification under national law will be a 
55 
- (1985) 7 EHRR 383. 56 
_ Harris (1995) p. 7&8 57 
- Keir Starmer (1999) p. 157 
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factor in the Court's determination as to whether the Convention is applicable, but it 
will not be decisive". 58 
6: Interpretation in accordance with the Vienna Convention: 
The European Convention should be interpreted according to the general rules of the 
international law. Harris explains that pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the law 
of Treaties 1969, the basic rule in the interpretation is that a treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 59 The Court stated 
that: "given that it is a law-making treaty, it is also necessary to seek the 
interpretation that is most appropriate in order to realize the aim and achieve the 
object of the treaty, and not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree 
the obligations undertaken by parties. , 60 The objects and purpose of the European 
Convention include realization and promotion of human rights, democracy, and the 
rule of law. 
Part Two The Convention and the Trial of the Accused 
This part investigates guarantees required by the European Convention on Human 
Rights for the accused during trial. It consists of four sections. Section one focuses on 
fundamental principles of criminal law. Section two concerns the accused's defence 
rights. Rights of the accused based on the court independence are covered in section 
3. The final section is devoted to rights provided for the accused after criminal 
judgment. These sections are undertaken in turn, but first general aspects of the right 
to fair trial are given. 
General aspects of the right to a fair trial: 
Article 6 provides that: 
I. "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly by the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or 
58 
- Leach (2001) p. 97 59 
- Harris (1995) p. 5&6 60 
- Wemhoff v Germany (1979-80) 1 EHRR Para 8 
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national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or 
the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent 
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law. 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
o (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and 
in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
o (b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his 
defence; 
o (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, 
to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; 
o (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against hint and to obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him; 
o (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand 
or speak the language used in court. " 
Article 6 protects the right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of an 
individual's civil rights and obligations, or of any criminal charge against him. It is 
clear that paragraph one of article 6 applies to both civil and criminal cases, while 
paragraphs two and three are limited to criminal proceedings. 
Generally speaking, the idea of setting up certain procedures to be followed by 
judicial bodies is that it should serve as a safeguard against a possible abuse of 
government policy. 61 So, pursuant to the Court jurisprudence this article is 
interpreted in a broad sense because it is so fundamental to the operation of 
democracy. The European Court stated that: "in a democratic society within the 
meaning of the Convention, the right to a fair administration of justice holds such a 
prominent place that the restrictive interpretation of article 6 (1) would not 
61 
- Mark W. Janis et al. (2000) p. 403 
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correspond to the aim and purpose of that provision. "62 Furthermore, it is argued that: 
"the right to a fair trial has a position of pre-eminence in the Convention, both 
because of the importance of the rights involved and the great volume of applications 
and jurisprudence that it has attracted. " 63 
Commenting on article 6 Fenwick claims " in order to appreciate the way it operates, 
it is crucial to understand the relation between Paras 1 and 3. Paragraph 1 imports a 
general requirement of a fair hearing applying to criminal and civil hearings which 
covers all aspects of fair hearing. Paragraph 3 lists minimum guarantees of a fair 
hearing in the criminal context only. If Para 3 had been omitted, the guarantees 
contained in it could have arisen from Para 1 but it was included on the basis that it 
is important to declare a minimum standard for a fair hearing. , 
64 
Practically speaking, the applications of this Article have created many problems. On 
the one hand, the understanding of the import and the scope of the rights expressly 
guaranteed by this Article differ between the States Parties. On the other hand, the 
notion of the right to a fair trial in this Article entails the protection of other rights not 
expressly stipulated, such as the right to equality of arms, and the right to a reasoned 
judgment. Moreover the differences between the common and civil law systems in 
criminal cases complicate the interpretation of Article 6, since every system follows 
different means in a criminal investigation. 65 Therefore, the Court has reiterated that 
the Convention must be interpreted in such a way as to guarantee rights which are 
practical and effective, as opposed to theoretical and illusory. 66 
Unlike other guarantees in Article 6(1), the right to a fair hearing is less precise, and 
has been described as a right that is open-ended. Therefore, other rights that are not 
listed in Article 6 can be added if they are considered as essential elements to a fair 
hearing. 67 The Court has emphasized that its task is to consider whether the 
proceedings as a whole in a given case were fair or not68. Consequently, a deficiency 
in the procedure before the court may be overlooked if the proceedings as a whole are 
62 
- Delcourt v. Belgium A 11(1970) para25; Application No. 00002689/65 63 
- Harris. (1995) p. 164 64 
- Fenwick Helen (2002). Civil Liberties and Human Rights. London: Cavendish. p. 54 65 
-Harris (1995) p. 164 66- Allenet De Ribemont v France (1995), Para. 35 
67 
- Harris (1995) p. 202 68- Khan v UK (2000). Para 38; Application No. 00035394/97 
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fair. 69 The Court has constantly confirmed that it is not its role to deal with errors of 
facts or law committed by a domestic court unless it may have breached rights 
guaranteed by the Convention. 70 For example, if the appellate court has remedied 
any lack of proceedings before the court of first instance then the European Court of 
Human Rights by considering the fairness of the whole proceedings will disregard the 
deficiency of the original trial. 71 
The concept of a criminal charge 
1-The concept of a "criminal": 
Within the terms of the Convention, the word criminal has an autonomous concept. 
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights has the jurisdiction to decide whether the 
conduct concerned is or is not criminal according to the terms of the Convention. 72 
The necessity of assigning an autonomous Convention meaning to the word criminal 
arises from the fact that relying on the domestic law to classify an offence could mean 
that a Contracting State can avoid the obligation to guarantee a fair hearing by merely 
reclassifying the offence from, for instance, criminal to disciplinary. In addition, not 
giving an autonomous meaning might lead to the undesirable situation of 
dissimilarities in the application of the term among different state parties73. In order 
to determine whether a conduct is criminal or not, the Court has applied three criteria 
introduced for the first time in Engle and others v. the Netherlands. 74 
First: The classification of the domestic law. A State Party has the ultimate discretion 
to distinguish in its national law between criminal and disciplinary offences. This is 
because the right to legislate is a sovereign right, which a state should practice 
independently. So if the offence is classified in the domestic law as criminal then this 
classification is decisive75. However, classifying the offence as non-criminal, for 
69 
-Brown v Stott (2001) 2 All ER 97. 7° 
-Khan v UK (2000) Para 34; Application No. 00035394/97 71 
-Edwards v UK A247-B (1992) Para 39; Application No. 00013071/87 72- Demicoli v Malta A210 (1991) para. 3 1; Application No. 00013057/87 73 
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example, as a regulatory or disciplinary offence, is not final from the viewpoint of the 
Convention. It can be only considered as a starting point to the enquiry76. 
Second: The nature of the offence. Another factor that has been used to determine 
whether an offence has a criminal character or not is the nature of the offence. To 
draw a conclusion in this regard attention must be paid to rules invoked. In other 
words an offence will be considered as criminal if the rules invoked are imposable on 
the whole population. The fact that these rules are directed not towards all citizens, 
but rather towards a given group possessing a special status could lead to the offence 
being regarded as not being of criminal nature". Moreover, when considering the 
nature of the offence regard should be paid to the sanction imposed. The offence is 
likely to be of criminal nature if the sanction imposed is of punitive and deterrent 
nature. In Ozturk v FRG, 78 although driving without due care is classed under the 
German law as a regulatory offence, it was regarded by the European Court as a 
criminal offence for the purpose of article (6) because this offence was applicable to 
the public (all road users) and it has a sanction of a punitive and deterrent aim. 
Third: The degree of the severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks 
incurring. With regard to the degree of severity of punishment that might be imposed, 
the Court considers the offence as criminal if is it accompanied by a prison sentence 
or a substantial fine that appears to be imposed for the purpose of redressing the 
wrong which has been inflicted on society rather than to maintain internal discipline 
within a limited sphere of activity79. 
It is very interesting to note that the Court applies these factors alternatively. That is 
to say any one of them is sufficient to satisfy the Court's view as to the presence of 
criminal conduct. However, when it fails to reach a clear conclusion the Court can 
also use a cumulative approach by exercising a separate criterion. In Lauko v 
Slovakia 80 the Court stated that "these criteria are alternative and not 
cumulative... This does not exclude that a cumulative approach may be adopted where 
76 
- Demicoli v Malta A210 (1991). para. 31; Application No. 00013057/87 See also Engle and others v. 
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the separate analysis of each criterion does not make it possible to reach a clear 
conclusion as to the existence of a criminal charge. " 
2-The concept of a "charge": 
Like the word criminal, the word `charge' has an autonomous Convention meaning. 
The European Court will examine the facts of the situation and determine whether the 
applicant was substantially affected by the steps taken against him. 
81 Thus the Court 
has defined the word `charge' as "The official notification given to an individual by 
the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence. "82 
Or alternatively when "the situation of the [suspect] has been substantially 
affected. " , 83 When the complaint concerns the length of proceedings it is very 
important to know the precise moment of the charge. However, it is worth noting here 
that the Court should take into account the substantive, not the formal, meaning of the 
word. What is significant in this regard is whether steps taken against the accused 
substantially affect him or not. Thus, it is necessary to look behind the appearances 
and investigate the realities of the procedures in question. 
84 A person has been found 
subject to a charge, for instance, when arrested for a criminal offence, 
85 or when 
86 officially informed of prosecution against him. 
Interestingly, Article 6 will be applicable until the charge is finally determined. This 
will include no doubt an appeal proceeding. 
87 If the criminal proceedings are 
discontinued without the accused being brought to trial, Article 6 in respect of the 
word "charge" ceases to apply as of the date of their discontinuance. 88 Similarly, if 
the accused is convicted Article 6 will cease to apply since he is no longer charged 
with an offence. Therefore, Article 6 does not apply on a criminal charge basis to the 
assessment of costs in criminal cases, or an application for clemency. 89 
81 
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Section I Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law 
Two topics are involved in this section, namely the presumption of innocence and 
non-retroactivity in criminal law. 
(A) The presumption of innocence 
Article 6 Para 2 provides that: "Every one charged with a criminal offence shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. " 
The presumption of innocence is considered in both common and civil law systems as 
a fundamental principle of criminal justice. 90 Viscount Sankey declares that: 
"throughout the web of English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, 
that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt. s9I Moreover, the 
European Court has stated that this principle is one of the elements of fair hearing that 
is required by Article 6 (1). 92 The aim of this principle is to protect a person charged 
with a criminal offence from having a verdict of guilty passed on him without his 
guilt having been proved according to law. Precisely, the Court has pointed out the 
scope of this guarantee and its consequences as follows: "Paragraph 2 embodies the 
principle of presumption of innocence. It requires, inter alia, that when carrying out 
their duties, the members of the court should not start with the preconceived idea that 
the accused has committed the offence charged; the burden of proof is on the 
prosecution and any doubt should benefit the accused. It also follows that it is for the 
prosecution to inform the accused of the case that will be made against him, so that 
he may prepare and present his defence accordingly, and to adduce evidence 
sufficient to convict him. " 93 
As in Article 6 (1), the terms `criminal' and `charge' in Article 6(2) refer to 
autonomously defined Convention concepts. In addition, the application of this 
Article considers the court proceedings. Thus pre-trial procedures, such as taking a 
blood test or medical examinations, are not covered by this Article. 94 However and 
more importantly it applies to appeal proceedings provided that an appeal is against 
the conviction. 95 But if the appeal concerns the sentence of a convicted person the 
90 Ibid, p. 241 
91 
- Quoted from Andrew Ashworth and Meredith Blake. "The Presumption of Innocence in English 
Criminal Law. " Criminal Law Review [1996] 306-317 
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Article does not apply. In Engel v Netherlands 96 the Court has held that: "it deals 
only with the proof of guilt and not with the kind or level of punishment... " In respect 
of the requirement that members of the court should not start with the preconceived 
idea that the accused is guilty, an official indication of the guilt of the accused before 
having been tried and found guilty is deemed a breach of the right to be presumed 
innocent. Therefore, the Court has held that: " the presumption of innocence will be 
violated if, without the accused's having previously been proved guilty according to 
law and, notably, without his having had the opportunity of exercising his rights of 
defence, a judicial decision concerning him reflects an opinion that he is guilty. This 
may be so even in the absence of any formal finding, it suffices that there is some 
reasoning suggesting that the court regards the accused as guilty. "97 
In addition, a court's declaration that there are some suspicions regarding an 
accused's innocence is not regarded as a violation of the right to be presumed 
innocent, provided that such declaration of suspicions is declared before an acquittal 
has been made final. 98 It is essential to note that the presumption of innocence may be 
breached not only by a judge but also by other public authorities. Therefore, the Court 
in All Enet De Ribemont v France, 99 where some of the highest-ranking officers in 
the French police referred to the applicant as one of the instigators of a murder, held 
that this was clearly a declaration of guilt which encouraged the public to believe that 
the applicant was guilty, and prejudged the assessment of the facts by the competent 
judicial authority. Accordingly, the Court decided that there has been an infringement 
of Article 6 (2). 
Moreover, in a different case the applicant was charged of causing minor injuries to a 
pedestrian while driving a car. After being charged the applicant stated that he had not 
been driving the car at the relevant time and refused to make further comment. The 
domestic court summed up the trial by stating that the circumstances of the case led 
"to the sole, and unequivocal conclusion that only the accused could have committed 
96 
- A22 (1976). Para 90; Application No. 00005100/71; 00005101/71 97 
- Minelli v Switzerland A62 (1983) Para. 37; Application No. 00008660/79 98 
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the offence; presumably he refused to make a statement because he was under the 
influence of alcohol, but there is no evidence for that finding. " 
The European Court in its observation states that speculating about the possibility that 
the applicant was under the influence of alcohol contributed to the impression that the 
national court had a preconceived view of the applicant's guilt. Thus, the European 
Court was satisfied that the presumption of innocence had been violated. '00 
Accordingly, the significant conclusion from applying the principle of the 
presumption of innocence under Article 6 Para 2 is that: (1) the burden of proof must 
lie with the state, and (2) any doubt concerning the evidence has to be interpreted in 
favour of the accused. 
However, the application of this principle is not absolute. In some circumstances the 
burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defendant. This is justified on 
the urgent need to take effective action against some sort of crimes, and on the 
reasonableness of requiring the defendant to adduce evidence of matters better known 
to him than anyone else. 
In practice the presumption of innocence is often subject to contrary legislations. 
Ashworth and Blake found 219 examples, among 540 offences triable in the Crown 
Court, of legal burdens or presumptions operating against the defendant. They pointed 
out that no fewer than 40% of the offences triable in the Crown Court appear to 
breach the presumption of innocence. In 1972 the Eleventh Report of Criminal Law 
Revision Committee observed that: "we are strongly of the opinion that, both in 
principle and for the sake of clarity and convenience in practice, burdens on the 
defence should be evidential only. s101 This exception of the strict application of the 
presumption is also recognized by the European Court. According to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court the presumption of innocence does not contradict 
the presumption of fact or laws that might operate against the accused, provided that 
they are confined within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of 
what is at stake and maintain the rights of defence. 
100 
- Telfner v Austria (2002) 34 EHRR 7 101 
- Andrew Ashworth and Meredith Blake. "The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law. " 
Criminal Law Review [1996] 306-317 
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The European Court in Salabiaku v France, for instance, ruled that the trial court took 
account of the fact that the applicant had been warned by an airline official not to take 
possession of the goods unless he was sure they belonged to him. The national court 
inferred that by failing to do so and by having in his possession a trunk containing a 
quantity of cannabis he committed the offence of smuggling prohibited goods. The 
European Court was satisfied that the domestic courts had not resorted automatically 
to the presumption of guilt, but had inferred from the fact of possession a 
presumption, which was not subsequently rebutted by the applicant. Therefore, the 
national courts had not applied the Customs Code in a way which conflicted with the 
presumption of innocence. ' 02 
In his comment on the European Court judgment Lord Steyn argues that this test 
depends upon the circumstances of the individual case. Therefore, any interference by 
the legislative body in the presumption of innocence requires justification and must 
not be greater than is necessary. The principle of proportionality must be observed. 103 
Although such an approach by the European Court provides guidelines for the matter 
concerned it does not provide a tool by which the particular court can decide whether 
shifting the onus of proof from the prosecution to the accused violates the 
presumption of innocence. Therefore it is necessary to refer to the English 
jurisprudence on the issue. In fact this dilemma arises from the need to strike a 
balance between the interests of the individual in protecting his right, and the interest 
of society at large to guard against the dangers of certain crimes such as uncontrolled 
drugs and terrorism. Ashworth and Blake suggest two ways in order to find out 
whether the presumption that shifted the burden of proof to the defendant violates the 
presumption of innocence. One way is to draw a distinction between irrefutable 
presumption (deeming provisions) leaving no room for the defendant to prove the 
contrary, and refutable presumptions that leave open the possibility of refutable by 
other evidence. A second way is to distinguish between presumptions and mere 
inferences. Even though the fact that these inferences have been enacted as part of the 
statutory definition they are essentiality permissive. Provisions of this kind do not 
102 
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reverse the burden of proof. Thus they are compatible with the presumption of 
innocence. 104 
With regard to the English courts, in his attempt to answer the above question Lord 
Hope in Rv DPP, ex p Kebeline105 suggests that it is necessary to distinct between 
two kinds of burdens. (1) Law or persuasive burden, and (2) Evidential burden. 
A persuasive burden means the burden of persuading the jury as to the accused's guilt 
or innocence, and requires the accused to prove, on a balance of probabilities, a fact 
which is essential to the determination of his guilt or innocence. It reverses the burden 
of proof by removing it from the prosecution and transferring it to the accused. 
Evidential burden means the burden on the accused of introducing evidence in 
support of his case. It is necessary only for the accused to adduce sufficient evidence 
to raise an issue before it has to be determined as one of the facts in the case. The 
prosecution is not required to lead any evidence on the point, so the accused must do 
so if he wishes to bring the point into consideration. However, if this happens, the 
onus of proof remains with the prosecution. The accused need only raise a reasonable 
doubt about his guilt. 
In Rv Larnbert106 the defendant was arrested in possession of a bag containing over 
£140,000 worth of cocaine. He was charged with an offence of possession of a 
controlled drug with intent to supply contrary to s5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. 
At his trial the defendant relied on the defence provided by s 28 (2) and (3) (b) of the 
Act asserting that he had not believed or suspected, or had reason to suspect, that the 
bag had contained cocaine or any controlled drug. The judge directed the jury that the 
prosecution had to prove only that the accused had knowingly had the bag in his 
possession and that it had contained a controlled drug, and that thereafter the burden 
was cast upon the defendant to prove on the balance of probabilities, that he had not 
known that the bag had contained a controlled drug. In short, the judge directed the 
jury that s 28 imposed a legal (persuasive) burden rather than merely an evidential 
104 
- Andrew Ashworth and Meredith Blake. "The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law. " 
Criminal Law Review [ 1996] 306-317 
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burden upon the defendant. On his appeal to the House of Lords the accused 
contended that the judge's direction violated the presumption of innocence. 
It was held that in order to reverse the provisions regarding onus in respect of drugs 
offences, these provisions must satisfy the criterion of proportionality. Provided the 
overall fairness of a criminal trial is not compromised, presumptions of facts or law 
will not necessarily violate Art 6 (2) of the European Convention. The majority 
considered that in the context of drug offences, imposing a legal burden on the 
defence is a disproportionate means of addressing the legislative goal to ease the task 
of the prosecution. It was possible to interpret these provisions as imposing only an 
evidential burden on the defendant. 
(B) The principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law 
Article 7 is worded as follows: 
"1- No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international 
law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than 
the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 
2- This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person of any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations ". 
The concept of a "penalty" in this article is an autonomous Convention concept. 
Therefore the European Court reserves the right to assess whether a particular 
measure amounts in substance to a "penalty" within the meaning of this provision. 
When assessing the measure in question, the Court may take into account its nature 
and purpose, its characterization under the national law, the procedures involved in 
the making and implementation of the measure, and its severity. However, the most 
important point in any assessment regarding the existence of a penalty is whether the 
measure in question is imposed following a conviction for a criminal offence or 
not. 107 In addition, the word "law" in article 7 as in other articles refers to statutory 
law and case law. ' 08 
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Harris and others argue, "Article 7 incorporates the principle of legality, by which, in 
the context of criminal law, a person should only be convicted and punished on a 
basis of law"109 
The impact of the principle of non- retroactivity was elucidated by the Court as that: 
"Article 7 Para 1 of the Convention is not confined to prohibiting the retrospective 
application of the criminal law to an accused's disadvantage. It also embodies, more 
generally, the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty... 
and the principle that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to an 
accused's detriment for instance by analogy, it follows from this that an offence must 
be clearly defined in law. This condition is satisfied where the individual can know, 
from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of 
court's interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him liable. " 
110 
Therefore, article 7 should be interpreted in line with its object of providing effective 
safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, conviction, and punishment. 
"' 
As to the application of this article it is worth mentioning here that there is little 
jurisprudence on the principle of non-retroactivity in criminal cases under either the 
European Court on Human Rights 112 or the Intentional Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 113 
Non-retroactivity in criminal law embodies two principles. First is nullum crimen sine 
lege i. e. no crime except in accordance with the law. The second is nulla poena sine 
lege i. e. no punishment except in accordance with the law. The retroactive application 
of the criminal law (ex post facto criminal law) infringes both principles. 
The relevant law must have existed before the act or the omission in question was 
committed for the conviction to be based on it. This concept leads to the fact that no 
person can be convicted if he could not have known beforehand that such an act was a 
criminal. ' 14 However, the European Court has noted that the wording of many statutes 
is some times imprecise. The need to avoid excessive rigidity and keep pace with 
changing circumstances means that some legislation is inevitably couched in terms 
which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague. 115 Furthermore, this Article will be 
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infringed if the law in question is unpredictably interpreted after the commission of 
the act in question. 16 Therefore, Article 7 requires criminal law to be accessible to 
the public. "7 
This article does not prohibit the progressive development of the criminal law through 
judicial law-making, provided it is consistent with the essence of the offence and 
could reasonably be foreseen. ' 18 Article 7 will be violated if the definition of a 
criminal offence is extended to include conduct that was not previously seen as a 
crime. Nevertheless, if the development of the common law is compatible with 
essence of the crime concerned and also it could be reasonably foreseen then this 
development is not in breach of article 7. In SW and CR v UK 
119 the applicants 
argued that the House of Lords' removal of the marital rape exception violated Article 
7. However, the Court held that the change in the law had been gradually evolved 
through judicial interpretation and was reasonably foreseeable. Therefore the Court 
was not satisfied that Article 7 was infringed. 
Regarding the term "under national or international law" that is provided by Article 7 
(1) this means that a breach of Article 7 will not be found if the act or the omission 
that is considered as the basis for the conviction is criminalized by the international 
law at the time the conduct was committed, even if the conduct is not criminal under 
the national law. Therefore, despite the fact that it is not recognized as an offence in 
the domestic law, a conviction for torture, for example, will not violate Article 7. The 
application of the international law in this regard might create some vagueness, since 
crimes under the international law are not precisely defined. However, it is argued 
that it is likely that crimes under the international law refer to: "crimes in respect of 
which public international law permits individuals to be prosecuted by states under 
their national law on the basis solely of their custody of the alleged offender 
(universality jurisdiction). Such offences include, in customary international law, war 
crimes and piracy. They also include, for the states parties to the relevant treaties, 
drug trafficking, hijacking... , 120 
Despite what has been said about universal crimes, and the meaning of the word 
penalty in the Convention, the application of Article 7(1) is straightforward and does 
116_ Ibid, Para 40 
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not raise any ambiguity save if the application of the new law retroactively is in the 
interest of the accused. This could occur when the offence is dropped from the 
criminal law and becomes no longer a crime, or if the punishment for the offence in 
question is lightened. At the outset a distinction should be made between two 
altogether different matters. The first is where the crime falls within the category of 
temporary crimes. Some conducts are criminalized just for a particular period. For 
example, for protecting a particular kind of animal such as the fox, the authority 
concerned in a particular society criminalizes the hunt of this species of animal for a 
given period. When this period lapses the conduct is no longer an offence. So if 
someone commits the act during the prohibited period he deserves the penalty even if 
the charge against him starts only after the expiry of the prohibiting period. Therefore, 
in this case the accused cannot claim the benefit of the new legislation that 
decriminalizes the conduct in question. Otherwise the temporary legislation becomes 
useless. Clearly, this case is irrelevant to the principle of non-retroactivity in criminal 
law and thus irrelevant to our discussion. The second matter occurs when a person 
committed a prohibited act, but, after the commission and before the punishment the 
legislator decriminalizes the conduct which accordingly becomes lawful; or the 
legislator continues to criminalize the conduct but lightens the penalty for this 
conduct. In these cases the change in the law is in the interest of the accused. Thus the 
application of the new law retrospectively will be in favour of the accused. Now the 
question is whether the European Court requires the same interpretation. According to 
Ralph Beddard the Strasburg jurisprudence does not guarantee this. 121 
In fact, the Court interpretation is not persuasive. Even though the text provided by 
the Convention, unlike article 15 of the ICCPR which expressly guarantees this 
right 122, does not explicitly provide such a right it would be much better if the Court 
interpreted this article in a way which could guarantee this right. Trying a person with 
regard to an act which no longer a crime lacks logic and could end in imposing 
unnecessary harm, which could run contrary to the objectives of the punishment. 
In any event, one should be clear that the Court does not prohibit the retroactive 
application of a criminal law if it is in the interest of the accused, but rather leaves the 
case to be decided separately by every Contracting State. 
121 
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With regard to Para 2 of article 7, it is considered to be the sole exception of this 
Article. The wording is the same as in Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. The International courts and tribunals employ the general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations as one of the sources of international law. 
Considerable decisions taken by international tribunals are based on the general 
principles. But in reality international tribunals often find it difficult to assertion 
whether a particular principle is in fact a general principle recognized by civilized 
nations. In pointing out the problem Rudolf B. Schlesinger states: "in a case after 
case, the judge writing the opinion simply expressed a hunch, a hunch probably based 
upon the legal system or systems with which he happened to be familiar. " 
123 
Therefore, he was an advocate of the jurists and philosophers' efforts to establish a set 
of general principles recognized internationally. 124 
As to the meaning of the term-civilised nations, Jeffery Hart argues that: "the term 
civilised nations is not being used without politically correct embarrassment. The 
civilised world consists of advanced modern nations, mostly the West. s125 Against this 
narrow perspective M. Cherif Bassiouni argues that: "The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice notes that the Court will apply the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations. Therefore, it is important to perceive and understand 
the Islamic concepts of human rights since they will be part of those general 
principles that the Court will have to apply. "126 
Section II Defence Rights of the Accused during Trial 
Within this section 10 rights of the accused are discussed. These are his rights to: (a) 
have a lawyer, (b) have an interpreter, (c) have adequate time and facilities, (d) have a 
speedy trial, (e) to be informed promptly of the accusation against him, (f) to be tried 
in his presence, (g) to defend himself in person (h) to be equally treated (i) to call and 
cross examine witnesses, and (j) not to be compelled to confess guilt. 
(A) The right to legal representation 
Article 6 is worded as follows: "Everyone charged with. a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights... (c) to defend himself ... through 
legal assistance of his 
123 
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own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given 
it free when the interests of justice so require... " 
The purpose of this Article is to place one accused of a criminal offence in a position 
which enables him to practice his defence rights effectively. 127 The importance of this 
guarantee is explained clearly by the Court as: "one of the fundamental features of 
fair trial. "128 On the whole, rights guaranteed in this Article are applicable in all 
stages, that is to say the courts for the first instance as well as the appellate courts. 
The said Article contains two rights: the right to choose a lawyer and the right to free 
assistance if he satisfies the required conditions. 
With regard to the application of the first right, that is to say, the right to choose a 
lawyer, since the rights guaranteed in the Convention are considered to be practical 
and effective and not just theoretical rights, a lawyer must be given the opportunity to 
visit his client in person out of the hearing of officials. 129 However, the Court is of the 
opinion that despite the importance of a relationship of confidence between a lawyer 
and the accused, this right is not absolute. 130 So, privacy between the lawyer and the 
accused can be subject to some restrictions. 131 This right can be restricted in order to 
protect public interests. 132 Therefore, providing the accused with the right to appoint 
his own lawyer does not mean that the Contracting States cannot regulate such 
practice. A state has the jurisdiction to set up legislation governing the required 
qualifications and conduct of lawyers. '33 
The decision whether any restriction on the accused's right to be assisted by a lawyer 
infringes the right to fair hearing should be considered in the light of the proceedings 
as a whole. If the lawyer cannot receive instructions in confidence, then there is a risk 
that legal consultation might lose much of its effectiveness. 134 The Court found 
violation of Article 6(3) (c) when the court dismissed an appeal at a hearing at which 
the defence counsel was absent due to the fact he was not informed about the hearing 
date. 135 In addition, and more importantly, if the accused chooses to be assisted by a 
127 
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lawyer he still has the right to attend the hearing. 
136 But it emerges from Campbell 
and Fell v UK 137 that the right to legal representation is not contingent on the 
accused's presence. 
Moreover, the accused's refusal to be present in the court cannot be regarded as a 
proper reason for depriving the accused of representation. The Court has held that: 
"... the fact that the defendant, in spite of having been properly summoned, does not 
appear, cannot -even in the absence of an excuse- justify 
depriving him of his right 
under article 6 Para 3 of the convention to be defended by council" 
138 
Although the court has not provided an explicit answer to the question whether the 
accused can choose an advocate, a person who has no legal training, to defend him, it 
seems that a positive answer should be given. Since the accused has the right to 
defend himself in person, by fortiori, he also has the right to choose to be assessed by 
a non-lawyer. Apparently, the Court has left this matter to be decided by each 
contracting state. 
Regarding the second right presented by Article 6 (3) (c), that is, the right to have free 
legal assistance; this right is subject to two conditions: 
First, that the accused should lack the means to pay the lawyer's costs. In this regard 
the accused is responsible for proving his lack; 139 
Second, if the domestic court is convinced that the first condition is satisfied, it should 
support the accused by giving legal assistance if the interests of justice so require. To 
fulfil this latter task the court concerned should determine this question in the light of 
the case as a whole. 140 The national courts under the supervision of the European 
Court of Human Rights undertake this assessment. 14'Three criteria are taken into 
account when determining whether the interests of justice require legal assistance or 
not: 1- the complexity of the case; 2- the ability of the accused to participate 
effectively in his case; 3-what is at stake for the accused. 142 For instance, in Mc Vicar 
v UK the applicant complained that the unavailability of legal aid in defamation 
proceedings operated to deprive him of a fair trial. Because he was unable to pay legal 
costs, he was asked to present himself for the greater part of the proceedings. The 
136 
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European Court explains that whether the national court violated the right to free legal 
representation would depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. In the 
instance case the applicant: (1) was a well-educated journalist capable of formulating 
a cogent argument. (2) The rules relating to the exclusion of evidence were clear and 
unambiguous and should have been understood by the applicant. Further, the outcome 
of a libel action turned on the simple question of whether or not the applicant was able 
to show on the balance of probabilities that the allegations at issue were substantially 
true. Therefore, the Court did not accept that the law of defamation was sufficiently 
complex to require a person in the applicant's position to need legal advice. As a 
consequence, there is not a breach of the right to have free legal aid. ' 43 However, in a 
different case the applicant was also refused legal aid. The case was complex and 
therefore the national court had adjourned the hearing for further consideration of the 
complex point of law on the merits of the claim. As a consequence the European 
Court was satisfied that the right to free legal aid was breached. ' 44 
Pursuant to the Strasbourg jurisprudence the main issue in this regard is the 
distinction between de jure and de facto protection. In Artico v. Italy 145 the domestic 
court had appointed counsel to represent the applicant. But the Counsel in reality did 
not represent the applicant, who was convicted. Before the European Court the 
government of Italy argued that the law in Italy presumed that an appointed counsel 
acted on behalf of his client unless explicitly replaced or relieved of his duty. The 
European Court found that Article 6 (3) (c) was infringed on the ground that the 
Article dictated assistance not nomination of counsel. In its words the Court stated 
that: "article 6 (3) (c) speaks of `assistance' and not of `nomination'. Again, mere 
nomination does not ensure effective assistance, since the lawyer appointed for legal 
aid purposes may die, fall seriously ill, be prevented for a protected period from 
acting or shirk his duties. If they are notified of the situation, the authorities must 
either replace hint or cause him to fulfil his obligations. " 146 
Moreover, when the accused is granted a right to appeal, his right to legal aid is 
established despite his chance of success. 147 Furthermore, the appointment of more 
than one lawyer is permissible and may be required in some cases. Nevertheless, the 
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national court should pay heed to the defendant's views as to the number of lawyers 
needed. 148 In addition, when appointing a lawyer the domestic courts should have 
regard to the defendant's wishes. However, they can override those wishes when there 
are relevant and sufficient reasons for holding that this is necessary in the interests of 
justice. 149 
(B) The right to an interpreter 
Article 6 Para 3 lays down that: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights... (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if 
he 
cannot understand or speak the language used in court". 
The object of this right is to guarantee equality between an accused who is not 
capable of speaking the language used in court, and a defendant who can understand 
and speak the court's language. '50 
The accused's right to have an interpreter is unconditional. Thus lack of sufficient 
means to pay for an interpreter is not a condition, because providing a proper 
interpretation is part of the judicial system's organization to ensure a fair and just 
trial. 151 Moreover, compelling an accused to pay the cost of interpretation after being 
convicted is regarded as a violation of the right to a fair trial because he may waive 
his right to be assisted by an interpreter for fear of financial consequences. Therefore, 
the Court has pointed out that the right guaranteed in Article 6 Para 3 (e) "entails for 
any one who can not speak or understand the language used in a court, the right to 
receive the free assistance of an interpreter, without subsequently 
having claimed 
back from him payment of costs thereby incurred" 
152 In addition, the right to the free 
assistance of an interpreter includes the right to translate all the necessary documents 
or statements which enable him to understand in order to have the benefit of a fair 
hearing. 153 
Although the Court's view is not clearly established as to whether the national court is 
obliged to translate any document presented by the accused in order to support his 
defence, it seems that the European Court is reasonably of the opinion that only 
documents provided by the prosecutor must be translated. However, as to documents 
148 
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given by the accused to defend himself, the domestic authority is not legally required 
to translate such documents. Translation of these is the defendant's duty. 
A written translation or interpretation is not always required, provided that sufficient 
oral information is given. 154 As to the accused, who is represented by a lawyer, the 
question is whether it is sufficient if the lawyer, but not the accused himself, is able 
to understand the language used in court. Although, the Court does not say this in so 
many words, it would appear from the tenor of its considerations as a whole in 
Kamasinki v Austria155 that the accused himself should understand the proceedings 
against him in order to discuss any important points with his lawyer. In addition, if the 
court determines that a lawyer must assist the accused, and the former cannot speak 
the language that the accused understands, the court is under an obligation to provide 
the accused with an interpreter to assist his communication with his lawyer. '56 
Obviously, since the rights provided by the Convention must be practical and 
effective the interpreter has to be qualified. In other words, he must demonstrate an 
adequate capability to translate sufficiently. In Kamasinski v. Austria' 57 the Court 
stated that in order for the right to be assisted by an interpreter to be practical and 
effective, the obligation of the competent authorities is not limited to the appointment 
of an interpreter but, if they are put on notice in the particular circumstance, may also 
extend to a degree of subsequent control over adequacy of the interpretation provided. 
An assessment of the accused's ability to understand the language used in court is a 
question of fact, which is left totally to the decision of the national court. Thus, the 
burden is upon the accused to prove that the domestic court's assessment of his 
capability to understand the language is wrong. '58 
Moreover, it is argued that the right to be assisted by an interpreter would properly be 
extended to cover deaf or dumb people. 159 Nevertheless, the right to be helped by an 
interpreter can be waived. '60 
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(C) The accused's right to adequate time and facilities 
Article 6 (3) lays down that: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights... (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of his defence" 
i- Adequate time: 
A person charged with a criminal offence is entitled to adequate time to prepare his 
defence. This guarantee aims to protect the accused from a "hasty trial". 
16' This right 
applies from the moment that a person is charged with a criminal offence. 
162 
However, Article 6 (3) (b) does not specify any period in which the adequate time will 
be examined. Therefore, the Court refers to certain factors when determining whether 
adequate time is given or not: for example, the complexity of the case, 
163 the 
workload of the accused's lawyer, the stage of proceedings. 
164 In addition, an 
accused's lawyer, or legal aid when needed, should be appointed a reasonable time 
before the trial. 165Moreover, if the defence lawyer is replaced, he should be given 
additional time to prepare his case'66 
With regard to allowing adequate time for an appeal, this needs, generally speaking, 
less time than for a tri al. 167 
More generally, the case law of the European Court demonstrates that Article 6 (3) (b) 
requires actual prejudice. The onus of proving this prejudice lies with the defendant. 
This fact leads to the conclusion that Article 6 (3) (b) will hardly ever be found 
infringed because it is difficult for an accused to prove actual prejudice. Therefore, 
the Court found no violation of the Article, in the absence of any evidence of 
prejudice, even though the applicant had met and instructed his legal aid barrister only 
ten minutes before a trial that result in a sentence of seven years' imprisonment. ' 
68 
ii- Adequate facilities: 
Article 6 Para 3 (b) guarantees a person charged with a criminal offence, adequate 
facilities for the preparation of his defence. The meaning of the word `facilities' was 
161 
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defined by the European Commission in Jespers v. Belgium 169 as including the 
opportunity for an accused to acquaint himself with results of investigations carried 
out throughout the proceedings, whenever they occur and however they are defined. 
Yet, the European Commission in this case pointed out that an individual could not 
invoke this definition in order to imply a right of unlimited access to the investigating 
authorities' files on a case. The right to have adequate facilities means that the 
prosecution will be required to disclose to the defence all material evidence obtained 
during the investigation stage whether for or against the accused. A failure to fulfil 
this task might render the proceedings unfair. 170 
None the less, article 6(3) (b) should not be understood to mean that the prosecution is 
obliged to reveal to the accused or his lawyer before trial all the evidence when the 
plan is to present them in court. 171 
The Court described the necessary requirement to satisfy the right to adequate 
facilities as that the accused is given "the opportunity to organize his defence in an 
appropriate way and without restriction as to the possibility to put all relevant 
defence arguments before the trial court. s 172 
The right to adequate facilities implies the right of the accused to communicate with 
his lawyer to prepare his defence. 173 Moreover, if the right to appeal is guaranteed, the 
accused should be provided with adequate facilities to prepare his appeal. The Court 
found a violation of this Article where a military court permitted only a short period 
of time to file an appeal. 174 
(D) The right to trial within a reasonable time 
Article 6 Para 1 lays down that: "In the determination of ... any criminal charge... 
every one is entitled to a hearing within a reasonable time... " 
Thus a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Convention. The purpose of such a guarantee 
Was precisely explained by the European Court as to: "ensure that the accused 
Persons do not have to lie under a charge for too long and that the charge is 
determined. "175 
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The right to be tried within a reasonable time in criminal cases is also designed to 
avoid the situation that a person charged remains too long in a state of uncertainty 
about his fate. 176 
According to the case-law of the European Court, the reasonable time in Article 6 (1) 
starts to run from the charge and will continue until the proceedings, including appeal 
proceedings, are determined. 177 However, a significant issue here is the precise 
definition of the words "reasonable time". This expression is vague and therefore, it is 
not possible to determine the exact meaning for reasonableness of time, which can be 
assessed only in the light of the particular circumstances of each case. 
178 
Accordingly, the Court has identified factors to be applied to determine whether or 
not the accused has been deprived of his right to be tried within a reasonable time. 
These factors are: 1- The complexity of the factual or legal issue, 2- the conduct of the 
accused, 3- the conduct of the concerned state, 4- what is at stake for the accused. 
Many reasons may cause complications in a case. For example, the need for expert 
evidence 179, or the need to obtain evidence from abroad. 180However, ten years' delay 
was considered unreasonable in Konig v Germany. 181 Moreover, a delay for a period 
shorter than four years was also regarded by the Court as unreasonable because the 
case was dealt with at a single jurisdictional level. 
182 But the Court did not find a 
breach of a reasonable time where five years had elapsed before rendering the final 
judgment, since the proceedings in this case had passed through three jurisdictional 
levels. ' 83 
With regard to the application of the second criterion, that is to say, the conduct of the 
accused, the Court is of the opinion that a violation is not to be found if the delay is 
caused by the accused himself. 184 Therefore, where the applicant flees from 
jurisdiction or disappears while subject to a charge, the time during which he is absent 
is not to be taken into account when determining the length of proceedings. 185 
However, the Court has found that the state is still responsible for any delay caused by 
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the accused where he refused to appoint his lawyer. The Court has justified this by 
confirming that Article 6 does not require the accused to co-operate actively with the 
judicial authorities. ' 86 
In evaluating the third criterion, the Court considers that a violation of Article 6 will 
be found if the delay is attributable mainly to the actions of the concerned state. The 
Court has constantly reiterated: "Only delays attributable to the State may justify a 
finding of a failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement". 
' 87 For instance, 
a state was found responsible for the delay which resulted from unjustified delays in 
transforming cases between courts or in hearing of appeal. '88 
In most cases however, such delay results from an increasing backlog of cases in the 
judicial system in the Contracting States. The basic principle in this regard is that the 
Contracting States are obliged according to the Convention to organize their legal 
systems so as to enable the national courts to comply with Article 6 (1)'s 
requirement. 1 89 
If the excessive workloads are caused by exceptional circumstances, which are not 
foreseeable, the State in question is not responsible for such delay, provided that it 
takes all the necessary steps to avoid this. Thus the Court has repeatedly stated, "... a 
temporary backlog of business does not involve liability on the part of the Contracting 
States provided that they take, with the requisite promptness, remedial action to deal 
with exceptional situations of this kind"190 
A state will be held liable for a delay if the workload is a result of ineffective or 
insufficient judicial system, particularly if the backlog was expected. In Guincho v 
Portugal191 for example, it was held that since the backlogs were to be expected, the 
steps taken by Portugal were evidently insufficient. The Court concluded that the 
exceptional situations were not such as to deprive the applicant of his right to a 
judicial determination within a reasonable time. 
With regard to the fourth factor, namely what is at stake to the applicant, the Court is 
of the opinion that, in cases of special importance to the applicant where for example, 
186 
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he is deprived of his liberty by holding him in detention pending trial, the domestic 
courts are under obligation to act effectively to speed up their procedures. 
' 92 
Nevertheless, not in every case are these factors considered in the same way. The 
fundamental principle is that the reasonableness of time is to be determined by 
reference to the particular circumstances of the case in question. Sometimes the 
circumstances call for a global assessment so that it is not considered necessary to 
consider these questions in detail. 193 Moreover, it is argued that "no particular factor 
is conclusive, the approach must be to examine them separately and then to assess 
their cumulative effect. " 194 
(E) The right of the accused to be informed of the accusation 
Article 6 Para 3 is worded as follows: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has 
the following minimum rights... (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him... " 
The aim of this guarantee is to provide the accused with the necessary information 
that enables him to prepare his defence. 195 Accordingly, this right requires that an 
accused should be informed of the nature of the accusation against him, that is to say 
the kind of offence. Moreover, he also must be informed clearly of the cause of the 
accusation, i. e. the facts that are considered as the basis of the charge against him. 
196 
The Court demonstrated that: " Article 6 Para 3 (a) provides the accused with the 
right to be informed not only of the cause of the accusation, that is to say the acts he 
is alleged to have committed and on which the accusation is based, but also the legal 
characterization of those acts. Thus information should be detailed". 
197 
In general, the scope of the right to be informed promptly of the accusation must be 
evaluated in the light of the more general right to a fair trial. The Court has considered 
that in criminal cases the provision of full, detailed information concerning the 
charges against an accused, and the legal characterization that the court might adopt in 
the matter, is an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the proceedings are fair. ' 98 
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Moreover, the right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation must 
be considered in the light of the accused's right to prepare his defence. 199 
With regard to the term "in detail" the Court demonstrated that the judicial 
notification provided in the case of Brozicek n Italy 200 was sufficient since it listed the 
offences of which the defendant was accused, stated the place and date thereof, and 
referred to the relevant Articles of the criminal law and the victim's name. Yet, it 
would seem that this information is not in fact sufficient because it did not mention 
the fact of the accusation. 
Article 6 Para 3 (a) does not specify any formal manner in which the defendant is to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 201 Although 
paragraph 3(a) of Article 6 does not clarify whether the relevant information must be 
provided in a written form or not, the Court is of the opinion that it is usually given in 
writing. However, an oral explanation is permissible provided that such explanation is 
sufficient. 202 In addition, the information should be given to the accused in a language 
that he understands. So if he cannot speak or understand the language used before 
national courts, the accusation against him must be translated correctly into the 
language he understands. In this regard the Court pointed out that domestic judicial 
authorities must take steps to ensure observance of Article 6 Para 3 (a)'s 
requirements, unless they were in a position to establish that the applicant in fact had 
sufficient knowledge of the language to understand from the notification the purport 
of the letter notifying him of the charges brought against him. 203 
(F) The accused right to be tried in his presence 
Although Article 6 does not expressly provide such a right, this has emerged from the 
obligation in Article 6(1) to guarantee a public hearing. The accused person, as a 
general principle, has the right to be present at the trial hearing. 204 There is no dispute 
that the right of an accused to participate effectively in a criminal trial is guaranteed 
by Article 6 read as a whole. This includes the right to be present. 205 
The Court explains that: "it flows from the notion of a fair trial that a person charged 
with a criminal offence should, as a general principle, be entitled to be present at the 
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sý 
trial hearing. "206 In addition, the right to attend the hearing was interpreted broadly 
by the Court to the effect that the national court should not only guarantee his 
presence but also should ensure his effective participating in the trial. In response to 
an applicant's complaint with regard to hearing difficulties, the European Court stated 
that: "Article 6, read as a whole, guarantees the right of an accused to participate 
effectively in a criminal trial. In general, this includes, inter alia, not only his right to 
be present, but also to hear and follow the proceedings. " 207 
This entails that evidence should be adduced in court in the presence of the accused, 
and any judgment based solely on evidence collected during the investigation stage is 
not acceptable. 208 Moreover, the state is responsible for ensuring the attendance of the 
accused if he is in custody. 209 
The right to be present is, however, waivable, provided that it is established in an 
unequivocal manner. 210 In addition, a trial in the absence of the accused is permitted, 
provided that the state has acted, although not successfully, diligently to provide the 
accused with the necessary notification of the trial. 211 Importantly, if the accused who 
was tried in absentia learn of the proceedings, he must be able to obtain fresh 
determination of the merits of the charge. 2122 Moreover, the hearing might take place 
in absentia where the accused is seriously ill and unfit to attend the hearing, provided 
his lawyer is representing him and the latter is given unrestricted opportunities to 
counsel the accused. 213 
Clearly trial in absentia is permitted where the accused attempts to delay the 
proceedings by claiming, for instance, a false illness. 214 
Special features of the proceedings at issue may justify the absence of a public 
hearing before the appellate court, provided that there has been a public hearing at the 
original court. Thus the right to attend an appeal depends on its scope. If the appellate 
court's jurisdiction is limited only to matters of law, attendance is not necessary. On 
the other hand, if the appellate court deals with both facts and law, the need for the 
206 
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presence of the accused depends on what is at stake for him and the court's need to 
determine the facts. 215 
(G) The right of the accused to defend himself in person 
Article 6 is worded as follows: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights ... (c) to 
defend himself in person ... " 
With regard the right of the accused to choose to defend himself in person, if 
according to the legal system in a Contracting State the accused is obliged to receive 
legal assistance, this obligation however in itself will not contradict the right laid 
down as mentioned in the Article. 216 
Moreover, if the accused chooses to defend himself, it is his duty to show diligence 
himself. 217 This is, in fact, an unclear position. But it seems that what is meant by this 
stance is that if the accused who chooses to defend himself in person is incapable of 
doing so, the state can prevent him from defending himself in person, and can also 
oblige him to be defended by a lawyer. 
(H) The right to equality of arms 
The right to a fair hearing entails the application of the principle of equality of arms. 
This notion means in criminal cases that the accused must be given a reasonable 
opportunity to present his case before the court under the same conditions provided to 
the prosecutor. The lack of such equality between the Procurer General and the 
appellant before the Court of Cassation led the European Court in Borgres v. Belgium 
218 to conclude that Article 6(1) was violated. In addition, it was held that not treating 
an expert witness appointed by the accused equally to the one appointed by the court 
is regarded as an infringement of the principle of equality of arms. But granting the 
prosecution a longer time to lodge an appeal than that provided to the accused is not 
considered as a breach of Article 6 (1). 219 
(I) The right to call and cross-examine witnesses 
Article 6 (3) provides that: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights... (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him 
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him... " 
215 
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Again, the word `witness" carries the autonomous meaning given by the Court. In 
Kostovski v Netherlands220 the Court pointed out that even though only the person 
whose statements were read out at the trial was considered by the Netherlands' law as 
a witness, in the light of the autonomous meaning given to this word, the authors of 
statements whether read out at the trial or not should be regarded as witnesses for the 
purpose of Article 6 Para 3(d), because their statements were in fact before the court 
and were taken into account by it. 
The scope of this guarantee is demonstrated by the Court as requiring that "an 
accused should be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and 
question a witness against him, either at the time the witness was making his 
statement or at some later stage of the proceedings. " 
221 
These rights entail that the accused should be provided with an adequate and proper 
opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him at some stage in the trial. 
And this right applies to both trial and appeal proceedings. 222 In addition, all the 
evidence must normally be produced at a public hearing in the presence of the 
accused with a view to adversarial argument. Thus, relying on statements taken 
abroad and preventing an accused or his lawyer from confronting the witness led the 
Court in A. M. v Italy to determine that Article 6 (3) (d) had been infringed. 223 
Nevertheless, if witnesses live abroad and the trial court has no power to enforce them 
to attend the hearing, they can be examined in their country of residence. Even though 
the European Court is reluctant to sanction the use of an anonymous witness2224, it has 
accepted that in some circumstances evidence can be given by an unidentified 
witness, provided the accused has ample opportunity to challenge the evidence. 225 
In Said v France226 the applicant, who was convicted for drug offences, claimed that 
since the judicial bodies refused to organize a confrontation between him and the 
prosecution witnesses, his right to a fair trial was breached. The European Court 
pointed out that neither at the stage of investigation nor during the trial was the 
applicant able to examine the witnesses or have them examined. Thus, the lack of any 
220 
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opportunity to confront the prosecution witnesses violates Art 6. Despite the 
difficulties involved in securing evidence in relation to offences of drug trafficking, 
these considerations, according to the European Court, did not restrict the right of the 
defence guaranteed by Article 6. Consequently, the European Court stated that Article 
6 (1) and 3(b) had been violated. 
In another case the European Court distinguished between police officers as witnesses 
and disinterested witnesses or victims. Police officers are frequently required to give 
evidence in court. Accordingly, the use of anonymous police officers as witnesses 
should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances. Less restrictive measures 
should be used wherever possible. 227 
However, using as evidence statements of witnesses obtained at the pre-trial stage is 
not in itself inconsistent with the Convention, provided that the defence's rights are 
guaranteed. 228 
As to the right of the accused to call witnesses on his behalf, the Court has reiterated 
that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by a domestic 
law and as a general rule the national courts have the power to assess the evidence 
before them. 229Therefore, as to the right of the accused to call his witnesses the 
general rule is that the national courts are free to assess whether the justice needs to 
call them or not. The Convention does not require the attendance and examination of 
every witness on the accused's behalf: its essential aim is, as indicated by the words 
"under the same conditions", full equality of arms in the matter. 
230 
Obviously, the domestic court is not responsible for the failure of the defence counsel 
to call a particular witness, 231 or if a defence witness fails to appear for reasons 
beyond the court's control. 232 
In general, the accused must be present when witnesses are being heard in a case 
against him. 233 However, in exceptional circumstances, the interest of justice may 
permit the exclusion of the accused to ensure that a witness gives an unreserved 
227 
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statement provided that the lawyer of the accused is allowed to remain and exercise 
any cross-examination. 234 
(J) The right not to be compelled to confess guilt 
In principle, evidence extracted by force or maltreatment is not acceptable. The 
European Commission in Austria v. Italy 235 stated that the Convention would be 
violated if a trial court admitted, as evidence, confession obtained by torture or ill- 
treatment. Therefore, The European Commission is of the opinion that early access to 
a lawyer is an important guarantee as to the reliability of confession evidence and 
implied that a confession obtained during incommunicado detention would require 
very close scrutiny. 236 
The European Court observed that the Convention does not lay down rules on 
evidence as such. It cannot therefore as a matter of principle and in the abstract 
exclude the admission of evidence obtained in breach of the provisions of domestic 
law. It is for the national courts to assess the evidence they have obtained and the 
relevance of any evidence that a party wishes to have produced. The Court has 
nevertheless to ascertain whether the proceedings considered as a whole, including the 
way in which the evidence was taken, were fair as required by Article 6 (1). 2237 
The general principle is that every Contracting State has the power to apply its own 
rules of evidence in the criminal sphere. The Court has re-iterated that Article 6 does 
not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence, which is a matter of a 
domestic law. It is not the function of the Court to decide whether particular kinds of 
evidence, for instance, unlawfully obtained evidence is admissible or whether the 
accused was guilty or not. Rather it should consider the fairness of the proceedings as 
a whole including the way in which the evidence was obtained. 238 Variation is thus 
very wide in the rules of evidence in different European legal systems. However, the 
Strasbourg authorities have established certain restrictions within which a Contracting 
State must exercise these rules. 239 
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Section III The Rights of the Accused in respect of the Independence of the 
Judiciary 
In this section rights to: an independent court, an impartial court, an open court and a 
reasoned judgment are examined in turn. 
(A) The right to an independent court 
It is believed that: "Most of the decided cases on the meaning of an independent 
tribunal concern administrative or disciplinary tribunals, in which the Strasbourg 
authorities have not imposed standards as high as might be applied to the ordinary 
courts of law. This is particularly true of such matters as the duration of office of 
tribunal members and their protection from outside pressure. "240 
The European Court has repeatedly stated that the administrative bodies could 
adjudicate in minor matters without infringing Art 6 (1) provided there was an 
opportunity to challenge the decision before an independent and impartial tribunal . 
2241 
The fact that the tribunal in question exercises other functions, for instance, an 
administrative role, does not infringe the required independence. 242 
The word independent means the court's independence from Parliament, 243 the 
executive and from the parties of the case. 244 In Benthem v Netherlands 245 the Court 
found that a member of the executive body was not independent. Therefore, a 
decision that was taken by him did not fulfil the requirement of Article 6(1) regarding 
an independent tribunal. It is very interesting to know that the European Court's 
approach in assessing the relation between members of the tribunal concerned and the 
executive is to differentiate between instructions and mere guidelines. The executive 
may issue guidelines to members of a court or tribunal about the performance of their 
functions, so long as any such guidelines are not, in reality, instructions. 246 Directions 
by the executive that amount to instructions, however, infringe the Convention, 
because the court thereby surrenders its judicial function to the executive. Further, the 
Court found that accepting an opinion from a Foreign Minister as binding for a judge 
247 is an infringement of the independency of the tribunal. In addition, an involvement 
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of ministers in any aspects of the criminal justice process is likely to cause violation 
of the independency of the court. The Court pointed out that the Home Secretary 
setting the applicants' tariff following their convictions for murder and sentences of 
detention during Her Majesty's pleasure, was exercising sentencing powers but was 
clearly not independent of the executive. 248 To decide whether the tribunal 
concerned is independent or not, the Court takes into account the manner of 
appointment of its members, the duration of their term of office, the existence of 
guarantees against outside pressure, and the question of whether the body presents an 
appearance of independence. 249 
As to the manner of appointment of the members of the tribunal concerned, 
consideration must be given to the manner of appointment as a whole 
in deciding 
upon the independency of its members. 250 Thus, appointing tribunal members by the 
executive body is not, in itself, incompatible with the Convention, and does not 
breach the right to be tried before an independent tribunal251. Moreover, the Court 
found the composition of the courts martial in the United Kingdom, before the reform 
implemented in 1996, did not satisfy the requirements of independence in Article 
6(1). It noted that all members of the court were appointed by a convening officer, an 
officer, superior in rank to and often holding direct and indirect command over the 
appointed members. 252 
As far as duration of their term of office is concerned, a short term is permissible, 
provided that there are reasonable grounds for such shortness. In Campbell and Fell v 
UK 253 the Court found that "the term 3 years of office is admittedly relatively short, 
but the Court notes that there is a very understandable reason: the members are 
unpaid ... and it might well prove difficult to 
find individuals willing and suitable to 
undertake the onerous and important task involved if the period were longer. " 
With regard to application of the third criterion, that is to say the guarantees against 
outside pressures, this element implies that members of the tribunal concerned must 
be provided with necessary guarantees to prevent them from being removed during 
their term of office. Yet, not laying down protection from removal in the legal system 
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was not regarded by the Court as a breach of independence if such protection is 
provided in practice. In Campbell and Fell v. UK, while serving a sentence of 
imprisonment for terrorist offences, the applicants were involved in prison violence 
that led to disciplinary proceedings being brought against them. Following 
proceedings before the Board of Prison Visitors, they were convicted of disciplinary 
charges and lost a range of privileges and period of remission. The Court noted that 
the Rules contain neither any regulation governing the removal of members of the 
Board nor any guarantee for their irremovability. The Court further observed that 
regardless of the fact that the Home Secretary could require the resignation of a 
member, this would be done only in the most exceptional circumstances and the 
existence of this possibility cannot be deemed as threatening in any respect the 
independence of the members of a Board in the performance of their judicial function. 
Therefore the Court unconvincingly concluded that: "it is true that the irremovability 
of judges by the executive during their term of office must in general be considered as 
a corollary of their independence and thus included in the guarantee of Article 6 
para. 1 ... 
However, the absence of a formal recognition of this irremovability in law 
does not in itself imply lack of independence provided that it is recognized in fact. 1'254 
Such a finding is open to criticism. The guarantee of irremovability is an essential 
element of the protection against outside pressure. Relevant here is the members' 
feeling of security from possible removal by high rank executive members. Therefore, 
it is not sufficient to provide this guarantee in practice but rather it should be 
articulated explicitly in the law. 
Furthermore, transferring the tribunal members to exercise another task was not 
considered by the Court as a contradiction of the guarantees against outside 
pressure. 255 The appearance of independence is also an important element when 
considering the independence of a tribunal. In Belilos v Switzerland256, the case was 
decided by a single member, a lawyer from police headquarters and a municipal civil 
servant. But he sat in his personal capacity and not subject to orders in the exercise of 
his function. Moreover, he took a different oath from that required of police 
representatives. In principle, he is not subject to any dismissal during his term of 
office (4 years). However, despite all the above aspects, the Court concluded that an 
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ordinary person might see him as a member of the police force, subordinate to his 
superior and loyal to his colleagues. In such a situation, what is important is the 
confidence that must be inspired by the courts in a democratic society. 
(B) The right to a competent and impartial court established by law 
1: A competent tribunal established by law: 
The Court has defined the word tribunal as follows: "... a tribunal is characterized in 
the substantive sense of the term by its judicial function, that is to say determining 
matters within its competence on the basis of the rules of law and after proceedings 
conducted in a prescribed manner... "'`57 The definition implies that the Convention 
requires that the concerned body must have a judicial role, rendering a binding 
decision pursuant to prescribed procedures. Thus granting the body in question power 
to make only recommendations or to give advisory opinions does not satisfy the 
Convention's requirements in this regard. In Benthem v Netherlands 
258 the Court held 
that "a power of decision is inherent in the very notion of tribunal within the meaning 
of the Convention... 'tendering' only an advice... is only a practice of not binding 
force.... " 
With regard to the words established by law, these mean that laws issued by 
Parliament must regulate the judicial system. But this does not mean that the 
legislative authority will formulate every detail regarding the organization of the 
court. The executive authority might have the jurisdiction to regulate matters other 
than the fundamental rules of the court's organization and jurisdiction, provided that 
this power is subject to judicial supervision. Moreover, "established by law" also 
means that function must be in accordance with law. 259 
Robertson and Merrills 260 state that: "the requirement that the tribunal should be 
established by law is intended to ensure that the administration of justice, in the sense 
of the organization and structure of the courts, is not a matter of executive discretion, 
but is regulated by laws made in the usual way. It therefore, prohibits the creation of 
extraordinary tribunals by executive order and, as it covers jurisdictional as well as 
institutional matters, also prevents the executive from investing the ordinary courts 
with special powers in an unconstitutional manner. " 
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2: The impartiality of the tribunal: 
Impartiality means lack of prejudice or bias . 
261 Even though Janis and others criticise 
the approach of the Court when attempting to establish the required standard of 
impartiality as: "In its various cases examining the impartiality of a tribunal, the 
Court has not been entirely consistent in its formulation of the proper standard for 
deciding whether or not a decision-maker met the required level of objective 
impartiality" 262 the impartiality of a tribunal can be tested, as a general principle, 
according to a subjective test, that is to ascertain the personal conviction of a given 
judge in a given case, and an objective test, that is to determine whether he has 
offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect. 263 
With regard to the subjective approach, the general principle is that the judge is 
impartial until the contrary is proven. 264 In order for the impartiality of the court's 
members to be challenged an actual bias against the applicant must be shown. 
265 
Moreover, the doubt regarding the impartiality of a court must be a legitimate one. 
Accordingly, any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate doubt must 
withdraw. 266 
As far as the objective approach is concerned, it must be determined whether, quite 
apart from the judge's personal conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may raise 
doubts as to his impartiality. In this respect even appearances may be of a certain 
importance. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic 
society must inspire in the public and, above all, as far as criminal proceedings are 
concerned, in the accused. For example, in Procola v. Luxembourg 267 the Court 
pointed out that the Luxembourg Council of State, which reviewed the legality of 
administrative decisions, was not acting consistently with the standard of impartiality 
required by the Convention, when four members sat on a panel that had previously 
given an advisory opinion concerning the matter in question. The applicant in this 
case, according to the Court, had legitimate grounds for fearing that the members of 
the Judicial Committee of the Council had felt bound by the opinion previously 
delivered. This implies that in deciding whether in a given case there is a legitimate 
261 
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reason to fear that the particular judge lacks impartiality, the standpoint of the accused 
is very important, though not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be 
held to be objectively justified. Thus, the Court has held that the mere fact that a judge 
has also made pre-trial decisions in the case cannot be taken as in itself justifying 
fears as to his impartiality. What matter is the extent and nature of the pre-trial 
measures taken by the judge. 268 Harris and others illustrate that an objective test of 
impartiality resembles the English law doctrine that "Justice must not only be done: it 
must also be seen to be done. " 269 Thus, the appearance of the judge's impartiality is 
very important since it builds the public confidence. 
A fair hearing requires that persons who have participated significantly in pre-trial 
proceedings be excluded. Therefore, any one who served as an investigating judge or 
as a public prosecutor and took considerable decisions in a certain case is not to be 
allowed to serve as a judge in the same case because he might incline to maintain the 
view he has formed. In that sense he may be judging himself in a given case, and 
thereby be regarded as in contradiction to the common law principle "no person may 
be a judge in his own cause. " The point of excluding any member of a tribunal as a 
consequence of his previous involvement in the legal proceedings finds its origin in 
the assumption that individuals are predisposed to maintain positions they have 
formed. 270 
To evaluate whether such involvement of the judge in a given case is consistent with 
the maintenance of impartiality under Article 6(1), the Court will review the precise 
actions of the judge concerned in a stage prior to his instance function. The Court has 
found no violation where at earlier hearings the trial judge had been entitled to act for 
an absent prosecution under the actual facts of the case, the Court found that the judge 
in question had taken no actions of any significance. 271 The Court explained such an 
approach by stating that: "The mere fact that [a judge] made pre-trial decisions... 
cannot be taken as in itself justifying fears as to his impartiality; what matters is the 
scope and nature of these decisions. " 272 
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(C) The right to a public hearing 
Article 6 Para 1 provides that "Every one is entitled to a... public hearing.... " 
Generally speaking, the case-law of the European Court with regard to this article is 
relatively slight small. This is may be due to the fact that the scope of the right to 
public hearing is clearer than other aspects of the right to a fair trial. 273 
The objective of a public hearing in criminal cases is to (1) maintain the public 
confidence in the administration of justice and to (2) protect the accused from the 
dangers of his case being handled in camera. 274 The European Court has constantly 
elucidated the precise scope of a public hearing: "The public character of proceedings 
before the judicial bodies referred to in Article 6 (1) protects litigants against the 
administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny; it is also one of the means 
whereby confidence in the courts, superior and inferior, can be maintained. By 
rendering the administration of justice visible, publicity contributes to the 
achievement of the aim of Article 6 (1), namely a fair trial, the guarantee of which is 
one of the fundamental principles of any democratic society, within the meaning of the 
Convention. " 275 
Accordingly, the right to an open court is distinguishable by the fact that it serves not 
only the interest of the parties but also the whole population. 276 
An important way to build public confidence in the judicial system is by allowing the 
press and public to hear the trial. Furthermore, a right to a public hearing entails that it 
should be an oral hearing. However, the right to a public hearing is not absolute since 
some restrictions are provided for in Article 6 (1) which reads: "... the press and 
public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, where 
the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, 
or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances 
where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice ". In Campbell and Fell v 
UK277, for example, the Court found no violation of Article 6(1) when prison 
disciplinary proceedings were held in secret for reasons of public order and security. 
Another instance is where the case concerned the interest of a child. The chief 
concern in this regard is the ability of the child to participate effectively in criminal 
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proceedings. The European Court found that Article 6 (1) is breached where the 
Crown Court tried 11-year-old boys who were accused of committing the crime of 
murder, because of the incomprehensible and intimidating formality and ritual of the 
court, which was accompanied by a blaze of publicity, and the defendants' inability to 
follow the proceedings and take decisions in their own best interest. 278 
In addition to these exceptions the right to a public hearing can be waived by the 
accused. But his waiver should be made in an unequivocal manner and must not run 
counter to any important public interest. In Hakansson and Sturesson v Sweden, 279 
although no express waiver was made, the Court held that since proceedings in the 
court concerned usually take place in private, and since the applicants could have 
been expected to ask for a public hearing, but did not do so, they must thereby be 
considered to have unequivocally waived their right to a public hearing. The Court 
added that it did not appear that the litigation involved any questions of public interest 
that could have made the public hearing necessary. Accordingly, there was no 
violation of the public-hearing requirement in Article 6 (1). 
As to publicity in the appeal stage the case law of the Court shows that this is a matter 
which needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The Court will consider the 
special features of each case. However, as general principle, the following rules 
might be used as guidelines for the Court's approach regarding the issue. Provided 
that there has been a public hearing before the original court, a public hearing is not 
required if the appellate court has the power to render a judgment solely in points of 
law. But, if it has the jurisdiction to deal with points of facts as well as law the 
requirement of a public hearing depends on the special features of the case in 
question. In Ekbatani v. Sweden, for instance, the applicant was charged with 
threatening a civil servant in breach of the Swedish Panel Code. During the trial 
hearing before the City Court of Gothenburg, both the applicant and the traffic 
assistant (the victim) were heard. On this testimony the City Court in a judgment on 
the same day found the applicant guilty of the charge brought against him and 
sentenced him to a fine of 600 Swedish Crowns. At the City Court two public defence 
lawyers assisted the applicant. Later the applicant appealed against the judgment 
before the Court of Appeal. He was represented first by a public defence lawyer and 
later by a private counsel. The Court of Appeal informed the parties that as the case 
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might be determined without a hearing, they were invited to file their final 
submissions in writing. The applicant's counsel stated his objection to the case being 
determined on the basis of the case file, on the ground that a hearing was necessary 
for thorough examination of the case. However, the Court of Appeal held no hearing 
and confirmed the City Court's judgment. The applicant appealed to the Supreme 
Court which held: "The Supreme Court finds no reason to grant leave to appeal, for 
which reason the Court of Appeal's judgment shall stand. " Before the European Court 
the applicant complained that in breach of article 6 (1) the Court of Appeal had 
decided his case without a hearing. The European Court stated that the question 
before it was whether a departure from the principle that there should be a public 
hearing at which the accused has the right to be present and argue his case, could, in 
regard to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, be justified in the circumstances 
of the present case by the special features of the domestic proceedings viewed as a 
whole. The Court must take account of the nature of the Swedish appeal system, the 
scope of the court of appeal's powers and the manner in which the applicant's 
interests were actually presented and protected before the Court of Appeal. The 
European Court held that provided that there had been a public hearing at first 
instance, the absence of public hearing before a second or third instance might be 
justified by the special features of the proceedings at issue. In the instance case the 
Court of Appeal was called upon to examine the case in respect of the facts and the 
law. It had to make a full assessment of the question of the applicant's guilt or 
innocence. The only limitation on its jurisdiction was that it did not have the power to 
increase the sentence imposed by the City Court. Such a question cannot be 
determined without a direct assessment of the evidence given in person by the 
applicant who denied the charge against him. Therefore, the Court decided that: 
"having regard to the entirety of the proceedings before the Swedish courts, to the 
role of the Court of Appeal, and to the nature of the issue submitted to it, the Court 
reaches the conclusion that there were no special features to justify a denial of a 
public hearing and of the applicant's right to be heard in person. Accordingly, there 
has been a violation of Article 6 (1). " 280 
280 
- Ekbatani v Sweden A134 (1988) Para 31- 33; Application No. 00010563/83 
92 
Moreover, if a tribunal that is not subsumed as a classic court deals with the case and 
if a public hearing is not provided in it, this deficiency can be redressed if a public 
hearing is provided in the court that hears the appeal. 281 
(D) The right to a public pronouncement of judgments: 
The relevant text of article 6 (1) provides: "Judgment shall be pronounced publicly... " 
Unlike the right to a public hearing, the right to a public pronouncement of judgment 
has no exceptions. 282 Judgment therefore, should be pronounced publicly even if part 
of the proceedings has been held in secret. 283 
The Court has reiterated that the term used in the second sentence of Article 6 (1) 
"judgment shall be pronounced publicly" might suggest that a reading out aloud of 
judgment is required. However, any member States of the Council of Europe have a 
long-standing tradition of recourse to other means besides the reading out aloud of the 
judgment, such as deposit in a registry accessible to the public. The Court therefore 
does not feel bound to adopt a literal interpretation. It considers that in each case the 
form of publicity that is to be given to the judgment under the national law of the 
concerned state should be assessed according to the special features of the 
proceedings in question and by reference to the object and purpose of Article 6 (1)284 
Moreover, in contrast with the right to a public hearing, the right to a judgment 
pronounced publicly cannot be waived . 
285 
(E) The right to a reasoned judgment 
Giving reasons for the judgment in criminal cases is an important factor in achieving a 
fair trial. In general, the national courts have the ultimate discretion to organize the 
content and the form of the judicial judgment. Nevertheless, they must state precisely 
the grounds for their judgment to enable the accused to establish his appeal according 
to the reasons given. In Hadjianastassiou v. Greece286 the applicant was charged, 
convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment by a military court for disclosing 
military secrets by selling information from his work on the guided missile project to 
a private company. Upon appeal, before the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, the 
28' 
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applicant's conviction was, in substance, upheld, the full reasons for the appeal 
court's decision being communicated to the applicant after more than one month and 
a half of the judgment. The applicant had earlier appealed within the five-day time- 
limit as prescribed by the law concerned to the Court of Cassation alleging the 
erroneous application and interpretation of the provisions under which he had been 
convicted. The Court of Appeal held that this appeal was vague and inadmissible on 
the grounds that it did not identify any concrete and specific error in the contested 
judgment. The applicant claimed that the lack of reasons in the judgment of the 
Courts-Martial Appeal Court and the shortness of the time-limit for appealing had 
infringed his right under article 6 (1) and Article 6 (3) (b). The European Court held 
that: "The Contracting States enjoy considerable freedom in the choice of appropriate 
means to ensure that their judicial systems comply with the requirements of Article 6. 
This does not, however, exempt the national courts from indicating with sufficient 
clarity the grounds on which their decision is based. The Court's task is to ascertain 
whether the method adopted in this respect has led to results which are compatible 
with the Convention. " 
Moreover, a national court is not obliged to provide a detailed answer to every 
question presented to it unless this is regarded as fundamental to the outcome of the 
case. 287 In Helle v Finland288 the applicant in his second submission contended that 
the fairness of the domestic proceedings was vitiated on account of the failure of the 
Cathedral Chapter and Supreme Administrative Court to articulate clearly the reasons 
which led them to reject his interpretation of the 1966 decision and the evidence 
which he had adduced to that end. The European Court notes in this context that while 
Article 6(1) obliges the courts to give reasons for their judgments, it cannot be 
understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument adduced by a litigant. 
The extent to which reasons must be given depends on the nature of the case. 
Section IV The Rights of the Accused after Criminal Judgment 
The European Convention provides the accused with 3 rights after delivery of the 
criminal judgment. There are right to appeal against the criminal judgment, the right 
to compensation for miscarriage of justice and finally the right not to be tried again 
for the same offence. The following discussion deals with each of these in turn. 
287- Clements, Let al. (1999), p. 166 
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(A) The right to appeal in criminal cases 
Article 2 of the Protocol No. 7 lays down that: "1- Everyone convicted of a criminal 
offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed 
by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right, including the grounds on which it may 
be exercised, shall be governed by law. 2-This right may be subject to exceptions in 
regard to offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in cases in which the 
person concerned was tried in the first instance by the highest tribunal or was 
convicted following an appeal against acquittal. " 
The purpose of establishing such a right is to provide a similar obligation to those 
provided by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which covers 
the right to appeal in criminal cases in Article 14 Para (5). 289 The importance of 
providing an appeal arises from the possibility that a wrong judgment may be 
rendered, and providing a convicted person with another chance to challenge his 
conviction or sentence is a crucial guarantee to avoid possible wrongs. 
This article provides a convicted person with the right to have his conviction or 
sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. Pursuant to the Explanatory Report of 
Protocol no. 7 to the European Convention of Human Rights this article does not 
require that in every case the convicted person should be entitled to have both his 
conviction and sentence so reviewed. Hence, for instance, if the person convicted has 
pleaded guilty to the offence charged, the right may be restricted to a review of his 
sentence. 
As far as the organization of the appeal is concerned, it is left totally to be determined 
by the domestic law. Thus some Contracting States restrict the right to appeal to 
questions of law, while in other States parties it is allowed against facts as well as law. 
The Explanatory Report states "Different rules govern review by a higher tribunal in 
the various member States of the Council of Europe. In some countries, such review is 
in certain cases limited to questions of law.... In others, there is a right to appeal 
against findings of facts as well as on the questions of law. The article leaves the 
modalities for the exercise of the right and the grounds on which it may be exercised 
to be determined by domestic law. " 
Interestingly, this view differs fundamentally than the view that is taken by the 
Human Rights Committee in the application of the ICCPR. In Domukovsky et al. v 
289- A. H. Robertson and J. G. Merrills (1993). "Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European 
Convention on Human Rights" p. 240. hereinafter will refer to as Robertson and Merrills (1993). 
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Georgia the Committee noted from the information before it that: "The authors could 
not appeal their conviction and sentence, but that the law provides only for a judicial 
review, which apparently takes place without a hearing and is on matters of law only. 
The Committee is of the opinion that this kind of review falls short of the requirements 
of article 14 paragraph 5, of the Covenant, for a full evaluation of the evidence and 
the conduct of the trial and, consequently, that there was a violation of this provision 
in respect of each author. " 290 
However, the right to appeal in criminal cases may be subject to exceptions: 
1- For offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law. 
2- In cases in which the person concerned has been tried in the first instance by 
the highest tribunal. 291 
3-Where the accused was convicted following an appeal against acquittal. 292 
With regard to the term `minor offences' mentioned in the first exception, the 
Explanatory Report indicates that an important criterion in deciding upon the meaning 
of the term is whether the offence is punishable by imprisonment or not. 
In respect of the case law of the European Court, one should point out that the 
European Court even prior to protocol no 7 regards the right to appeal in both 
criminal and civil cases as an inherent part of the right to a fair trial required by 
Article 6. Further, since there is no clear case law as to article 2 of Protocol 7, and 
because there is also no case law that provides a clear scope of the right to appeal in 
the criminal sphere, it might be worth referring here to cases regarding the right to 
appeal in civil rights and obligations, in order to gain an overview of the scope of this 
right. 
As to the cases determined by the tribunals or administrative committees that do not 
satisfy article 6's requirement, these must be subject to control by a judicial body that 
has full jurisdiction and provides the requirement of Article 6 paral. The European 
Court reiterated that: "Even where an adjudicatory body determining disputes over 
civil rights and obligations does not comply with Article 6 para. I in some respect, no 
violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are 
290 
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subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does 
provide the guarantees of Article 6 para. It, 293 
With regard to ordinary courts Article 6, generally speaking, requires a high level of 
review in relation to matters of law. 294 As to matters of fact Article 6 requires a right 
to challenge findings of fact, but not necessarily a full re-investigation of the facts, as 
an aspect of the right to a fair trial. 295 
In addition; and in accordance with case law of the European Court, it is not necessary 
for every stage of proceedings to be undertaken publicly. The Court found no 
violation of Article 6 when the first instance trial had been held in public and an 
appeal involved only points of law. Moreover, the Court pointed out that it was not 
necessary for the appeal judgment to be read out in public; handing a written copy to 
the applicant was sufficient. The Court held that: "The public character of judicial 
proceedings protects litigants against the administration of justice in secret with no 
public scrutiny and maintains confidence in the courts. Nevertheless, in applying the 
publicity requirements of Article 6 (1) account must be taken of the entirety of the 
proceedings conducted in the domestic legal order. In the present case the Federal 
Court of Justice, which solely determines issues of law, was empowered by German 
law to proceed without a hearing only if it dismissed the appeal and made final the 
order of the lower court of appeal the proceedings of the lower court complied fully 
with publicity requirements of Article 6. " 296 
It seems that the general scope of the right to appeal in civil cases is also applicable to 
criminal cases. Provided that the trial court complies fully with Article 6, the appellate 
court might not fully comply with these requirements. For example, the right to a 
public hearing, or the right to be present at the hearing in criminal cases, can be 
restricted before the court of appeal if these rights are provided in the trial court. In 
Kamasinski v Austria297 the applicant complained that he did not have a fair trial in 
criminal proceedings in Austria, and in particular complained of the non- attendance 
of the defendant at the hearing on appeal against sentence and compensation order. 
The Court observes, "Personal attendance of the defendant does not take on the same 
293 
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crucial significance in an appeal hearing as it does for the trial hearing. This is an 
area where the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation. " 
(B) The right to compensation for miscarriage of justice 
Article 3 of protocol No. 7 reads: " When a person has by a final decision been 
convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been 
reversed, or he has been pardoned, on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact 
shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has 
suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to 
the law or the practice of the state concerned, unless it is proved that the non- 
disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to hint. " 
Since there is no case-law jurisprudence in the European Courts regarding the issue, 
the following explanation relies on the Explanatory Report of Protocol 7. There are 
certain conditions for applying this guarantee: 
1- The person concerned must be convicted of a criminal offence by a final decision. 
A decision is final "if according to the traditional expression, it has acquired the 
force of res judicata. This is the case when it is irrevocable, that is to say when no 
further ordinary remedies are available or when the parties have exhausted such 
remedies or have permitted the time- limit to expire without availing themselves of 
them. " 298 
Thus, a judgment by default is not regarded as final if the national law allows the case 
to be re-examined. Moreover, if the charge is dismissed or the accused is acquitted, 
this Article will not apply. So, an unlawful detainee cannot base his compensation 
claim on this Article. But, under Article 5 of the Convention he can. 
2- The basis for reversing the conviction or pardoning the person should be some new 
facts that show conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice amounting to 
serious failure in the proceedings, leading to prejudice against the accused person. It 
follows that compensation is not required if the conviction has been reversed or a 
pardon has been granted on different grounds. 
3- A convicted person would lose his right to be compensated if the non- disclosure of 
facts were attributable totally or partially to him. 299 
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With regard to the term "according to the law or the practice of the state concerned", 
this might mean that it is left to the contracting states to set up the procedures by 
which the claim for compensation can be exercised, and it might also mean that the 
national courts have the ultimate discretion to decide the sum of the compensation. 
(C) The right of the accused not to be prosecuted or punished again (no double 
jeopardy) 
Article 4 of the Seventh Protocol provides that: 
1- "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings 
under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has 
already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and 
penal procedure of that State. 
2- The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the re-opening of 
the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State 
concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there 
has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect 
the outcome of the case. 
3- No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the 
Convention. " 
This Article embodies the principle that a person may not be tried or punished again 
in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same state for an offence for 
which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted. 300 Article 14 (7) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is almost akin to Article 4 (1) of 
the Seventh Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. However, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 4 are new and have no counterpart 
in the International Covenant. 301 
The purpose of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 was explained by the Court as to prohibit 
the repetition of criminal proceedings that have been concluded by a final decision. 302 
As a result, for this Article to be applied requires that a person should be finally 
acquitted or convicted. 303 
300 
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Paragraph 2 provides the Contracting States with the right to reopen a case if new 
facts are discovered or if there has been a fundamental defect in the proceedings that 
could affect the judgment of the case. 304 
Since the prohibition of double jeopardy is established to protect an accused from 
being exposed to trial and punishment more than once for the same offence, reopening 
the case to the accused's advantage is allowed. 305 In addition, nothing in this Article 
precludes an accused from being subject to a different kind of proceedings for the 
same offence. 306 
As to the importance of the right guaranteed in this Article, it is not subject to any 
derogation in time of war or other public emergence. 307 
With regard to the Court's application of Article 4I will refer to 3 cases to clarify the 
scope and the domain of this Article. In Gandinger v Austria, , the accused caused an 
accident while driving his car which led to the death of a cyclist. He was convicted by 
the regional court of causing death by negligence and accordingly he was sentenced. 
Subsequently, the district authority issued a sentence order for driving under the 
influence of drink. The latter decision was based on a different Act and medical 
report. In his application to the European Court the accused mentioned that the district 
authority and the regional government had punished him in respect of the facts that 
were identical with those on the basis of which the regional court had decided that he 
did not have a case to answer under the Criminal Code. Therefore, he claimed, there 
had been a breach of Article 4 of protocol No. 7. In its judgment the European Court 
noted that, according to the regional court, the aggravating circumstances, namely 
excessive blood alcohol level referred to in the Article concerned of the criminal 
Code, was not demonstrated with regard to the applicant. However, the 
administrative authorities found that the level required in order to bring the case 
within the ambit of the Road Traffic Act had been attained. 
The Court observed that the provisions in question differ not only as regards the 
designation of the offence but also, as regards their nature and purpose. Nevertheless, 
it concluded that since both impugned decisions were based on the same conduct, 
there had been a breach of Article 4 of the Protocol No. 7.308 
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The second case is Oliveira v Switzerland. In this case the applicant was driving on a 
road covered with ice and snow when her car veered onto the other side of the road 
hitting one car and then colliding with a second, whose driver sustained serious 
injuries. She was first ordered to pay a fine of 200 Swiss Francs by the police 
magistrate for failing to control her vehicle, as she had not adapted her speed to the 
road conditions. Subsequently, the district court and the court of appeal imposed a 
CHF 1,500 fine (from which however, was deducted the amount of the initial fine) for 
negligently causing physical injury. 
In its judgment the Court pointed out that "that is a typical example of a single act 
constituting various offences. The characteristic of this notion is that a single criminal 
act is split up into two separate offences, in this case the failure to control the vehicle 
and the negligent causing of physical injury. In such cases, the greater penalty will 
usually absorb the lesser one. There is nothing in that situation which infringes 
Article 4 of the Seventh Protocol, since that provision prohibits people being tried 
twice for the same offence whereas in the case in question, a single act constituting 
various offences, one criminal act constitutes two separate offences". 309 The Court 
went on to clarify that "it would have been more consistent with the principles 
governing the proper administration of justice for sentence in respect of both 
offences, which resulted from the same criminal act, to have been passed by the same 
court in a single set of proceedings. However, Article 4 of protocol 7 does not 
preclude separate offences, even if they are all part of a single criminal act, being 
tried by different courts, especially, where the penalties were not cumulative, the 
lesser being absorbed by the greater" . 
310 
Moreover, the Court noted that this case is distinguishable from the case of Gradinger 
mentioned previously. In the latter case two different courts reached inconsistent 
findings on the applicant's blood alcohol level. Thus, in Oliveira v Switzerland it 
decided that there had been no violation of the Article 4 of the Seventh Protocol. 
In the third case, Franz Fischer v Austria, 311 the applicant, whilst driving under the 
influence of drink, knocked down a cyclist who was fatally injured. After hitting the 
cyclist, the applicant drove off without stopping to give assistance and only gave 
himself up to the police later that night. In 1996 the St. Polten District Administrative 
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Authority finding the applicant guilty of a number of road traffic offences, ordered 
him to pay a fine of 22,010 Austrian schillings with twenty days' imprisonment in 
default. This sentence included a fine of 9,000 Austrian schillings with nine days' 
imprisonment in default imposed for driving under the influence of drink, contrary to 
the Road Traffic Act. In 1997 the Regional Court convicted the applicant under the 
criminal Code of causing a death by negligence and sentenced him to six months' 
imprisonment. The applicant contended that Article 4 of Protocol 7 was infringed 
because he was punished twice for driving under the influence of drink, first by the 
District Administrative Authority, and second by the Regional Court. He also 
maintained that the present case was not comparable to the Oliveira v. Switzerland 
case as in that case the criminal courts had quashed the fine imposed by the police 
magistrate and stated that, if the fine had already been paid, it was to be deduced from 
the second fine. However, in this case two sentences were actually imposed. 
The European Court recalls that the aim of Article 4 of Protocol 7 is to prohibit the 
repetition of criminal proceedings that have been concluded by a final decision. The 
Court admitted that its approach in the cases of Gradinger and Oliveira in order to 
judge whether the applicants were being tried or punished again for an offence for 
which they had already been finally acquitted or convicted appears somewhat 
contradictory. In each case, the Court reiterated that two sets of proceedings arose out 
of one traffic accident. In the Gradinger case, the applicant was first convicted by the 
criminal courts for causing death by negligence, but acquitted of the special element 
under Article 81 (2) " allowing himself to become intoxicated", where there was an 
irrebuttable presumption of intoxication with a blood alcohol level of 0.8 grams per 
litre. He was then convicted by the administrative authorities of driving "a vehicle 
under the influence of drink" contrary to the Road Traffic Act. But in the Oliveira 
case, the applicant was first convicted by the police magistrate for failing to control 
her vehicle, as she had not adapted her speed to road conditions. Subsequently, she 
was convicted by the criminal courts of causing physical injury by negligence. 
In the Gradinger case the Court, while emphasising that the offences at issue differed 
in nature, found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol no. 7 as both decisions were based 
on the same conduct. In the Oliveira case it found no violation of this provision, 
considering that it presented a typical example of a single act constituting various 
offences which did not infringe Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, since that provision only 
prohibits people being tried twice for the same offence. The European Court 
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accordingly observed that: "the wording of Article 4 of protocol No. 7 does not refer to 
"the same offence" but rather to trial and punishment "again" for an offence for 
which the applicant has already been finally acquitted or convicted. Thus, while it is 
true that the mere fact that a single act constitutes more than one offence is not 
contrary to this Article, the Court must not limit itself to finding that an applicant 
was, on the basis of one act, tried or punished for nominally different offences, ... 
there are cases where one act, at first sight, appears to constitute more than one 
offence, whereas a closer examination shows that only one offence should be 
prosecuted because it encompasses all the wrongs contained in the others. An obvious 
example would be an act which constitutes two offences, one of which contains 
precisely the same elements as the other plus an additional one. There may be other 
cases where the offences only slightly overlap. Thus, where different offences based 
on one act are prosecuted consecutively, one after the final decision of the other, the 
Court must also examine whether or not such offences have the same essential 
elements. "312 
The Court also pointed out that in the Gradinger case the essential elements of the 
administrative offence of drunken driving did not differ from those constituting the 
special circumstances of the Article 81 (2) of the Criminal Code. However, there was 
no such obvious overlap of the essential elements of the offences at issue in the 
Oliveira case. 
The Court noted two differences between the Franz v Austria case, and the Gradinger 
case. (1) The proceedings were conducted in reverse order; (2) there was no 
inconsistency between the factual assessment of the administrative authority and the 
criminal courts, as both found that the applicant had a blood alcohol level above 0.8 
grams per litre. 
However, the Court considered that: "these differences are not decisive. As said 
above, the question whether or not the non bis idem principle is violated concerns the 
relationship between the two offences at issue and can, therefore, not depend on the 
order in which the respective proceedings are conducted. As regards the fact that Mr 
Gradinger was acquitted of the special element under Article 81(2) of the Criminal 
Code but convicted of drunken driving, whereas the present applicant was convicted 
of both offences, the Court repeats that Article 4 of protocol No. 7 is not confined to 
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the right not to be punished twice but extends to the right not be tried twice. What is 
decisive in the present case is that, on the basis of one act, the applicant was tried and 
punished twice, since the administrative offence of drunken driving under the Road 
Traffic Act, and the special circumstances under the criminal Code... do not differ in 
their essential elements... there has, thus, been a violation of Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 7.70313 
The explanation of the court did not clarify the exact scope of the principle of no 
double jeopardy. It is clear from the first case that the reason why the court considered 
that the single act, that composes two offences, contradicts the article is because the 
two national courts had reached different conclusions. It is conceivable that one act 
can constitute more than one crime. This is in fact natural and the greater crime 
should absorb the lesser one. If, for example, A assaulted B and as a result B died, the 
assault is a crime and the killing is another crime. Both are caused by a single act. It is 
natural here to try A with regard to the crime of murder and the punishment for 
murder will absorb the punishment of the assault. 
However, in another instance A may be tried and found guilty of committing the 
crime of assault but not the murder and after that he was tried before different court 
and was found guilty of committing the crime of murder. Now even if the second 
court absorbs the lesser punishment when deciding the punishment for murder, it 
violates the right not to be prosecuted twice for the same act. The accused in this 
example is clearly exposed to the danger of the trial twice for one act. This is 
presumably what is meant by the principle of no double jeopardy. The role the 
principle should play is that the stability of the legal status of the accused must be 
protected by not exposing him to the possibility of having him tried for a second time. 
Any other statement could mean that a person might be subjected to endless 
proceedings against him. 
More controversially, the European Court stated in the first case that article 4 was 
violated, because the two courts achieved different findings. This means tacitly that if 
the two courts had achieved the same conclusion, no violation would be found. 
This conclusion by the European Court lacks logic. One should ask what is the benefit 
of having the accused tried before two tribunals if the second tribunal will be 
restricted by the findings of the first court. For the second court will take into 
313 
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consideration when determining the case the fact that if it reaches a different 
conclusion, the principle of no double jeopardy will be deemed violated. It was 
expected from the European Court when examining whether the principle in question 
is breached that it would focus not on the findings but on the process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Main Features of Islamic Law and the Judicial System of Saudi 
Arabia 
Introduction: 
An examination of the rights of the accused in the criminal trial stage in Saudi Arabia 
requires some account of the judicial system. This chapter illustrates the structural 
elements of the judicial system in Saudi Arabia. The significance of the term "law" 
cannot be appreciated if it is considered only in terms of its technical meaning' . 
Maududi explains that: "our assessment of a system is mainly based on and affected by 
our perception of the ends of human life and by our notions of right and wrong, good 
and evil and justice and injustice. Consequently, the nature of a legal system depends 
entirely upon the source or sources from which it is derived. Thus the differences 
discernible in the legal and social systems of different societies are mainly due to the 
differences of (in) their sources of guidance and aspiration. "2 
The importance of this chapter arises from the fact that Islamic law is not just law in 
the legal sense nor it is a mere religion that is confined to religious matters. 3 Mawdudi 
states: "whatever aspect of the Islamic ideology one may like to study, he must, first of 
all, go to the roots and look to the fundamental principles. Then and then alone he can 
have a really correct and satisfactory understanding of the ideology and its specific 
injunctions and real appreciation of its spirit and nature. 994 
This chapter is divided into 2 main parts. The first is devoted to the main features of 
Islamic law. This part consists of the following sections: 
Section one concerns the sovereignty of Islamic law. Section two deals with the 
dignity of human beings. Sources of Islamic law are covered in section three. Section 
four outlines the four schools of Islamic law. Section five concerns the nature of 
- Al- Qasirni zS Abdul A 'L-29 a Maududi. "Islamic law and constitutions" 45 (11th ed. 1992). Quoted from Al- Qasimi p. 30 
3- Vogel, Frank 
°- Edward (1993) p3 Abu'l A la, 
and Message" 
Mawdudi "Political theor3' of Islam". In Khurshid Ahmad (1992) "Islam: its Meaning The Islamic foundation. Leicester p. 149.. Hereinafter will refer to as Khurshid Ahmad (1992) 
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Islamic law. Finally section six describes the classification of types of crime in Islamic 
law. 
The second part concerns the judicial system in Saudi Arabia. This part is divided into 
two sections. Section one provides a historical background. The second section is 
devoted to the courts or judicial institutions in Saudi Arabia. 
Clearly, this chapter deals with complex subjects that require lengthy comparative 
study, which I do not pretend to undertake. My goal for this chapter is to provide a 
legal foundation for the arguments and discussion in following chapters. Hence, topics 
in this chapter are clarified only to the extent that is necessary to achieve this 
objective. 
Part One Main Features of Islamic Law 
SECTION I The Sovereignty of Islamic Law 
Unlike western democracy, whose philosophical foundation is the sovereignty of the 
people; Islam establishes its polity on the foundation of the sovereignty of God and the 
viceregency of man. 5 Islamic political philosophy is based on believing that Allah is 
the Sole Sovereign. He is the Lawgiver. 6 No one is authorized to order mankind to act 
or not to act in a certain way. Even the Prophet himself was not allowed to do so. The 
Qur'an states { say (0 Muhammad): "I don't tell you that with me are the treasures of 
Allah, nor (that) I know the Unseen; nor I tell you that I am an angel. I but follow 
what is revealed to me. " Say: "are the blind and the one who sees equal? Will you not 
then take thought? )7 
The law laid down by Him is not subject to modification by people. 8 God said: 
{Surely, We have sent down to you (0 Muhammad) the book (this Qur'an) in truth 
that you might judge between men by that which Allah has shown you (i. e. has taught 
you through divine Revelation) }9 
The Holy Book is the constitution of the Islamic state. This constitutionality is 
confirmed by the following verses: { The command (or the judgment) is for none but 
5 
- Abu'1 Ala Mawdudi. "The theory of /slam" In Khurshid Ahmad (1992) p. 160 A - M. Cherif Bassiouni "Islam: Cnncent. Law and Wnrld Habeas Cnrnu. e" Rutoers Camden T. aw Journal (1969) Vol Ip 169 
- Surah 6 Al- An'am. Verses. 50 9- Abu'l Ala Mawdudi. "The theory of Islam ". In Khurshid Ahmad (1992) P. 159,159 
- Surah 4. An-Nisa. Verse. 105 
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Allah. He has commanded that you worship none but Him (i. e. His Monotheism) }. 
tOHe 
also said: {and Blessed be He to Whom belongs the Kingdom of the heavens and the 
earth, and all that is between them, and with Whom is the Knowledge of the Hour, and 
to whom you (all) will be returned. } 11 
But God in the Qur'an commands us to accept and apply whatever the Prophet 
Muhammad says because the Messenger never speaks for his own desire rather he 
says what had been revealed to him. God said: { and whatsoever the Messenger 
(Muhammad) gives you, take it; and whatsoever he forbids you, abstain (from it) Y }1` 
Thus, laws that are stated by Muhammad should be regarded as a divine law as well. 
Allah said: {Nor does he speak of his own desire. It is only a Revelation revealed l 13 
Democracy in Islam provides Muslims with limited common sovereignty under the 
suzerainty of God. Mawdudi points out: "every Muslim who is capable and qualified 
to give a sound opinion on matters of Islamic law, is entitled to interpret the law of 
God when such interpretation becomes necessary. In this sense the Islamic polity is a 
democracy. But... it is a theocracy in the sense that where an explicit command of God 
or his Prophet already exists, no Muslim leader or legislator, or any religious scholar 
can form an independent judgment, not even all the Muslims of the world put together 
have any right to make the least alteration to it". 14 To the same effect Abdur Rahman 
1. Doi (1997) states that: "in the Shari'ah ... there 
is an explicit emphasis on the fact 
that Allah is the Lawgiver and the whole (Ummah) the nation of Islam, is merely His 
trustee. It is because of this principle that the Ummah enjoys a derivative rule-making 
power and not an absolute law- creating prerogative". 
' 5 
However, one should be clear that the terms "every Muslim who is capable and 
qualified to give a sound opinion on matters of Islamic law" mentioned above by 
Mawdudi should not be understood to mean that every person studying Islamic law is 
capable and qualified to interpret the Qur'an or the Sunnah. The science of Islamic 
law is divided into many majors. There is the science of Al Towheed means 
monotheism (belief in God's unity), the science of Al- Fiqh means jurisprudence, the 
science of Usul Al-Fiqh means the root of Fiqh i. e. the principles Islamic 
10 
- Surah 12. Yusuf. Vesrs. 40 11 
- Surah 43 . 
Az-Zukhruf. Verse 85 
12 
- Surah 59 Al- Hasher. Verse 7 13 
- Surah 53. An-Najm. Verses 3&4 14 
- Abul A la' Mawdudi " Political Theory of Islam". In Islam Khurshid Ahmad (1992) p. 161 15 Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) "Shari'ah: the Islamic law" Ta Ha Publishers. London. United 
Kingdom. p. 5. Hereinafter will refer to as Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) 
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jurisprudence of Usul Al Fiqh or the general rules by which a jurist can understand 
provisions of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, the science of Al Tafseer means the science 
of interpretation, the science of Al Ageedah means the science of creed or belief, the 
Science of Sunnah, and the science of Qur'an16 
A person who studies Islamic law in general will have knowledge of the above 
subjects that make him qualified to understand what jurists have said about particular 
issue, and might be qualified to teach Islamic law, but definitely he is not qualified to 
extract a legal opinion from the provisions of the Qur'an or the Sunnah, or to interpret 
the divine texts. Muslims in this regard differentiate between a mujtahid and non- 
mujtahid scholar. A non- mujtahid scholar knows only the opinion provided by a 
mujtahid scholar regarding particular issue, and accordingly his knowledge is limited 
to the Islamic rule that is already established but he is not capable of establishing new 
rules from the original texts. A mujtahid scholar, nonetheless, is capable of extracting 
a new rule from the Islamic original provisions. He is not limited to what other jurists 
have said about specific issue. A qualification for the second category requires a very 
deep and comprehensive knowledge of all the above subjects. 
In respect of the interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, an interpreter must show 
very high qualifications because, in a Muslim's view, he interprets the word of God. 
He must have a deep knowledge of the Arabic language, verbal indications, rhetoric, 
grammar or syntax and the science of Qur'anic readings", reasons for revelation in 
respect of every verse in the Qur'an and the aborgator and the abrogated verses. 
As a consequence, an authoritative interpretation of a verse of the Qur'an is the 
interpretation provided by another verse of the Qur'an itself, the Prophet, and the 
Prophet's Companions' 8 respectively. So, if the verse is interpreted by one of the 
above means there is then no room for the call for reinterpretation. Moreover, if no 
interpretation is found the majority of scholars regard interpretation provided 
consensually by the successors of the Prophet Companions as an authoritative 
interpretation because they had met the Companions and presumably heard the 
Companions interpretations' 9. 
16 
- The Qur'an and the Sunnah are explained later in this chapter. 17 
- There are 7 ways for reading the Qur'an. IB 
- The presumption here is that the Companions of the Prophet had better understanding of the Qur'an 
interpretation because they attended the circumstances of the revelation. See Salim Ali Farrar (1999) p 
168. 
19 
- Leaders of the Four School of Doctrines lived in the successor's era. 
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Since the current calls for reinterpreting the divine texts concern issues such as 
apostasy and the status of man and woman that are already interpreted by authoritative 
interpretation, these calls in fact have no validity in Islamic societies. 20 
In short, a Muslim state is obliged to apply Islamic law. Not only that, but also an 
Islamic society is deemed out of Islam and Muslims become unbelievers if they do not 
apply Islamic law. This conclusion is vehemently emphasized in the following verse: 
{And whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed (then) such (people) are 
the Fasiqun [the rebellious i. e. disobedient (of a lesser degree)] to Allah )21 
SECTION II The Dignity of Human Beings 
Islam lays considerable stress on the dignity of human beings. Allah said: (We have 
honored the children of Adam 122. This verse and others in the Holy book illustrate the 
significance of mankind. According to Islamic writers the dignity of human beings is 
embodied in many aspects. 
Mankind is uniformly honourable in respect of his humanity and the Islamic state 
should organize, ensure and promote an honourable life for every one23. Individuals 
are equal despite their colour, language, race or nationality. Islam calls for removal of 
all barriers to achieve such equality. The main idea in Islam is that the whole of 
humanity is one family of God. 24 Article (1) of the Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam declares that: "(a) - All mankind is one family that is joined by 
servitude to Allah and by lineage to Adam. All people are originally equal in human 
honour, dignity, responsibility, and accountability without distinction or 
discrimination based on origin, colour, language, sex, belief, political affiliation, 
social status... etc. The true belief is the guarantee for the development of his dignity 
and honour through the integration of mankind. (b) All people are the children of 
20 
- Examples of these calls are found in Declan 0' Sullivan (2001) "The Interpretation of the 
Qur'anic Text to Promote or Negate the Death Penalty for Apostates and Blasphemers". Journal of 
Qur'anic Studies. Volume III issue 2. Centre Of Islamic Studies, School of Oriental and African 
Studies. University Of London. P 63-93. See also Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im in Henry J. Steiner and 
Philip Alston (2000) " International Human Rights in Context" P. 395&396 
221 
- Surah 5 Al-Ma'idah. Verse. 47 22 
- Surah 23 
- Muhammad Fazl-ur-rahman Ansari (no year) "The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim 
Society" Indus Educational Foundation. Karachi (Pakistan). Volume II. P. 375. hereinafter will refer to 
as Muhammad Fazl-ur-rahman Ansari. 
24 
- M. Cherif Bassiouni (1969) p165 
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Allah and the more beloved to Him are those who are the most useful to them. There is 
no preference to one over the other except by righteousness and good conduct. " 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that equality in Islamic law means an 
absolute equality of the dignity of human beings, but not an absolute equality in the 
western sense in which individuals share similar rights and obligations. 25 Equality in 
Islam means that every category of human beings has obligations and rights 
appropriate for his nature. For the sake of clarity the following example is given. 
Some writers when studying human rights in Islamic law argue that Islamic law 
discriminate between men and women. They cite as an example of this discrimination 
the Islamic rules regarding inheritance. 26 Pursuant to Islamic rules women are only 
entitled to half of inheritance that a man is entitled to. From Islamic point of view this 
rule is not discrimination if it is considered in the light of whole obligations that both 
men and women bear in Islamic society. A male in Islamic law should bear a complete 
living cost of his wife and children regardless of his wife's financial status. Even if 
the husband is poor and his wife is wealthy he is still responsible in providing for the 
needs of his wife and children. He is responsible for all their needs of accommodation, 
clothing, feeding, etc. In addition, while a male in Islam is entitled to double the 
female's inheritance he has the sole responsibility of providing for his parents during 
their life if they are in need. To express it in another way, despite her financial status a 
female in Islamic law is not obliged to bear the financial burden of her parents during 
their life. 
Dignity in Islam is not precluded to any group of people for it is inherent in all human 
beings and it is not subject to denial to any person, irrespective of his origin, race, 
colour, religion or other characteristics. The Cairo Declaration correctly describes 
respect for human rights in Islam as a divine obligation whereby a state or an 
individual is under obligation to protect them. The Declaration states that " Based on 
the belief that fundamental rights and freedoms in Islam constitute a part of the 
religion of Muslims which no person has the right to partially or wholly suspend or 
abrogate or violate or ignore, they are divine obligatory provisions that Allah has 
prescribed in His Books, through His final Messenger ... 
" 
25 
- Ann Elizabeth Mayer (1997) "Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics". Westview Press. 
Printer Publisher. London; p 80 
26 
- See for example, Ann Elizabeth Mayer (1997) "Islam and Hunian Rights: Tradition and Politics". 
p. 95 
111 
Accordingly, once Islamic law provides a guarantee of human rights this right or 
guarantee is not subject to derogation or suspension. For instance if Islamic law 
requires, certain evidence to prove the offence, or certain conditions for treating war 
prisoners, these requirements must be fulfilled in all times and with regard to any 
person whether the Islamic state is under serious threat or not, whether the person is a 
Muslim or not and whether he is an ordinary accused or a terrorist. 
The prominent position of human beings in Islam confirms beyond any doubt the 
importance of promoting and exercising respect for human rights. Human existence 
has a supreme status in Islam. This stature is based on the fundamental persuasion that 
"God has endowed man with dignity which has made him superior to other creatures; 
God has made man His vicegerent on earth". 
Salah Al-Deen states that the Qur'an declares man's viceregency on earth. This 
viceregency is interpreted to mean that a human being has agreed to take the 
responsibility of following the right path and of promoting justice and happiness for 
mankind. On the other hand, it implies that men are under obligation to show resistance 
to sin and oppression. 27 
In addition, dignity in Islam is embodied in the prohibition of subjecting a man to 
humiliation of any sort even by applying to him any description which he may not 
like. Allah said: {O you who believe! Let not a group scoff at another group; it may 
be that the latter are better than the former. Nor let (some) women scoff at other 
women, it may be that the latter are better than the former. Nor defame one another, 
nor insult one another by nicknames. How bad is it to insult one's brother after having 
Faith [i. e. to call your Muslim brother (a faithful believer) as: "0 sinner" or "0 
wicked"]. And whosever does not repent, then such are indeed Zalimun (wrong-doers, 
28 etc. ) } 
Another aspect of dignity in Islam may be seen in the fact that mankind is created in an 
optimum form. God said: { and He shaped you and made good your shapes) 29. 
27 
- Salah Al- Deen "Huquq Al-Insan W Al-Damanat Al-Qud'ah Fi Al-Islam" Journal of Law, Kuwait 
University. Vol. No. 3 September 1983 P. 117 
28 
- Surah 49. Al-Hujurat. Verse No. 11 29 
- Surah 64. At-Taghabun. Verse. No. 3 
112 
Furthermore, Man has been honoured and God ordained him to worship none except 
Allah. A man is ordained not to bow down to any other creatures. God said: {He has 
no partner. And of this I have been commanded, and I am the first of the Muslims) 
30 
Muhammad Al-Zuhaili points out other aspects of this dignity when he says that the 
dignity of a man in Islam is embodied in many elements among which are: (a) Angels 
were asked to kneel to a human being (Adam). (b) Sacred books are revealed to 
mankind and not to other creatures. (c) Prophets were sent to people. 
31 
Accordingly one can summarize the consequences of the dignity of human beings as: 
(a) Islamic law is universal and any discrimination based on race, wealth, colour, clan 
etc is completely forbidden. 32 
(b) Individuals can enjoy absolute freedom and liberty provided that such enjoyment is 
not incompatible with others' rights, or Islamic law. 
33 
(c) As Ansari states, the Islamic state has a duty to ensure the honour of all individuals 
as human beings. Thus, any law capable of diminishing an individual's dignity is not 
adoptable in the Islamic state. 34 
(d) Tort, degrading and cruel treatment for any person be he a Muslim or not is 
forbidden. 35 
SECTION III Sources of Islamic Law 
Islamic scholars define the sources of Islamic law as "the proofs from which legal 
rulings are derived". 36 Sources of Islamic law can be distinguished as primary or 
secondary. The primary sources consist of the Holy Qur'an, the Sunnah (the Prophet 
traditions), Ijmah (consensus), and Qiyas (analogy). These sources have been 
generally accepted and used by Islamic jurists through the ages. There is an agreement 
among Muslim scholars about the mandatory nature of rules derived from any of the 
primary sources37. 
30 
- Surah 6. Al-An'am Verse. No. 163 3' 
-Muhammad Al-Zuhaili (1997) "Huquq Al-Ihsan Fi Al-Eslaºn". Dar Al-Kalm Al-Teeb 
& Dar ibn 
Katter. Damascus& Beirut p. 130 &131. Hereinafter will refer to as Muhammad Al-Zuhaili 
32 Khurshid Ahmad ( 1992) p. 40&41; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni (1969) p. 164 
33 
- Al- Qasimi p. 56&57 34 
- Muhammad Fazl-ur-rahman Ansari p. 368 35 
- Ihsan Al-Kelanee "Asslamh Al- Shakssah Wa Huquq Al- 
Defi'a Wa Door Al- Mohamat Fi Al- 
Eslam. " Journal of Law, Kuwait University. Vol. No. 3 September 1983. P. 194 
36 
- Abdulkader Owdeh "Al- Teshrea' Al- Gena'ee Al-Island" 
Part I p. 164. Hereinafter will refer to as 
Abdulkader Owdeh 
37 
- Ibid, p. 164 
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The secondary sources are: Istihsan38 (juristic preference), Masalah Morslah. (public 
interest), Urf (custom) 39, Sadd Al- Dhara' 40 (Blocking the Ways) and Ijtihad 41. 
Muslim scholars disagree about the application of the secondary sources. Moreover, 
public interest is also called Istihsan (juristic preference) or Istislah42; other scholars 
have employed Istidlal43 instead of applying the principle of public interest. 
An important point here is that there is a difference between the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah on the one hand, and the other sources on the other. The Holy Book and the 
Sunnah are the basis for legislation. They alone contain provisions that establish 
comprehensive rules. The rest of the sources do not provide new comprehensive rules 
and are only considered as devices to deduce branch rules from texts provided in the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah. Therefore, any rules deduced from other sources should not 
contradict the two sacred sources 44. 
In this section I will give brief illustrations of primary sources. The secondary sources 
will be excluded save the principle of public interest that can be regarded as an 
essential tool to deal with new issues. 
1: The Qur'an: 
Karnali defines the Holy Book as "the book containing the speech of God revealed to 
the Prophet Muhammad in Arabic and transmitted to us by continuous testimony, or 
tawattur". 45 The Qur'an is God's Word. It was revealed to Muhammad over a period 
of twenty- three years (610-632). 
38 
- Meaning equitable preference to find a just solution. See Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 81. It is 
also defined as "seeking the best" or "aiming at the best". This principle is very similar to Istislah. The 
Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam. Stacey International. 1991. P. 201 
39 
- Custom is also regarded in some Islamic schools as a valid source of Islamic law provided that it 
does not contradict other sources. 
40 
- The use of this source is very rare and rules classified under this principle could be derived from the 
rinciple of public interest. 
- Ijtihad is: "the use of human reason in the elaboration and explanation of the Shari'ah law.... It is 
an exercise of one's reasoning to arrive at a legal conclusion on a legal issue, done by the jurists to 
deduce a conclusion as to the effectiveness of a legal precept in Islam". See Abdur Rahman I. Doi 
(1997) p. 78. Although it is a significant source that is deemed to be a clear reason for development of 
Islamic jurisprudence during the period of the Fourth schools, a very high qualification is required in 
order to apply this source, entailing clear distinction between the Mujtahid jurist and non-mujtahid 
jurist. After closing the gate of Ijtihad this source is not widely used. 
42 
_ Meaning the seeking of the best solution for general interest. See Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 
81 
43 
- It is the process of seeking guidance, basis, and proof from the sources. See Abdur Rahman 
I. Doi 
(1997) p. 82 
44 
- Abdulkader Owdeh p. 165 45 
- Mohammad Hashim Kama] (1991). "Principles of Islamic jurisprudence" p. 245 
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The Holy Book consists of 114 Surah (chapters) which vary in length, and each Surah 
consists of a number of verses. 46 The Qur'an provides three categories of rules: 
1- Tent or creed rules: rules concerning belief and faith in God, Angels, Holy Books, 
Messengers and the Day of Judgment. 
2- Moral and ethical rules: rules concerning virtues and vices. 
3- Practical rules: rules concerning the practice of an individual Muslim. This type 
organizes two aspects; (a) Rules concerning worship such as prayer, fast and 
pilgrimage, which aim at organizing the relationship between God and man. (b) 
Dealings rules concerning contracts, conduct and punishments, which aim to 
organize relationships both between individuals and between nations47. 
The Qur'an consists of about 500 verses48 containing legal injunctions dealing with a 
variety of subjects such as marriage, rights and obligations of spouses, divorce, 
contracts, loans, deposits, punishments, wills, inheritance, equity, liberty, justice, 
human rights, laws of was and peace etc. 49The Qur'an also informs us on everything 
we need to know about Allah, the nature of human beings, how we should treat each 
other, where we came from, what is the meaning of life, what is our goal in this life. 
However, the most distinguished feature of the Qur'an is the presence of God in our 
midst50 
One might suggest that the Qur'an provides details regarding worship and rules 
associated with worship, such as family law and inheritance law, since most rules in 
this domain have a devotional nature and no room for the mind and are not susceptible 
to development in society. However, civil, criminal, international, constitutional 
economical laws are given in a very general approach that can provide only basic 
46 
- Galal Al-Deen Al-Suoty (1951). "AI-E'tkan Fi Olom Al-Qur'an". Dar Al-Nasher Publisher. Mecca. 
Part I p. 64,65 and 67 . Hereinafter will refer to as 
Galal AI-Dan Al- Suoty (1951). 
47 
- Abdulrahman Al-Homady (1989) "Al-Qadi' Wa Nedamoh Fi Al-Kitaab Wa Al-Sunnah" Om Al- 
Qura' University Publisher K. S. A p. 329 & 330. Hereinafter will refer to as Abdulrahman Al-Homady 
(1989) 
48 
- Some have tried to number each subject as to: family law, (70 verses), civil law (70 verses) penal law 
(70 verses) jurisdictions and procedures (13 verses) constitutional law (10 verses) international law (25 
verses) economic and financial rules (10 verses). Abdulrahman Al-Homady (1989) p. 330,331,332 and 
333. 
49 
- Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 7 50 
-IG. Zepp, Jr (1992) "A Muslim Primer". Sheed and Ward. London p. 59 hereinafter will refer to as 
I G. Zepp, Jr (1992) 
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principles and general rules51. The reason for this is that these rules are subject to 
development according to changes in time and place52. 
The Qur'an has been transmitted to us by way of continuous testimony in written and 
verbal forms. This continuous testimony implies certainty and decisiveness of 
authenticity of the Qur'an. It was written through the Prophet by a reliable group of 
the Prophet's companions, and was memorized by many others of the prophet's 
companions. Those groups, it is believed, cannot collude in falsity. It has been 
transmitted through those groups to other groups, none of which disagreed in one letter 
or utterance despite distances between countries and differences between societies53. 
The authenticity of the Qur'an is, therefore, not subject to any doubt. Allah had sent it 
down through Gabriel, through Muhammad. God said { Verily, We, it is We Who have 
sent down the Dhiker (i. e. the Qur'an) and surely We will guard it (from 
Corruption)}. 54 This verse is a challenge to human beings and people are under 
obligation to believe in the miracles of the Qur'an. It is a clear fact that more than 14 
centuries have elapsed and not a single word of this Qur'an has been changed. Allah 
also said: { this is the Book (the Qur'an) whereof there is no doubt... }55 
The Qur'an is regarded as a miracle from Allah to the Prophet Muhammad. God said: 
{and this Qur'an is not such as could ever be produced by other than Allah (Lord of 
the heaven and the earth), but it is a confirmation of (the revelation) was before it [i. e. 
the Taurat (Torah), and the Injeel (Gospel)], and a full explanation of the Book (i. e. 
laws, decreed for mankind) - wherein there is no doubt- from the Lord of the Alamin 
(mankind, jinn, and all that exists) 1.56 The Prophet said: "there was no Prophet among 
the Prophets but was given miracles because of which people had security or had 
belief, but what I have been given is the Divine Revelation which Allah has revealed to 
me. So I hope that my followers will be more that those of any other Prophet on the 
Day of Resurrection". 57 
Muslims pay great respect and attention to the Qur'an. Al- Faruqi describes such 
concern as: 
51 
- Except in some rare cases. 52 
- Abdulwhah Kelaf (1970) "Ilm Usul Al-Figh Wa Klast Tareek Al- Teshrea' Al-Islami" Dar Al-Qaim 
Publisher. Al- Kuwait. P. 32,33 & 34. hereinafter will refer to as Abdulwhab Kelaf (1970) 
53 
- Abdulkader Owdeh p. 165 54 
- Surah 15. Al- hijr. Verses. 9 55 
_ Surah 2 Al- Baqarah. Verse. 2 56 
- Surah 10. Yunus verse. 37 57 
- Muhammad Khan (1997). Sahih AI-Bukari, Vol. 9 Hadith No. 379 
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"No book ever commanded as wide or as deep a reverence as did the Qur'an; none 
has been copied and recopied, passed from generation to generation, memorized in 
part or in toto, recited in solemn worship as well as in salons, marketplaces, and 
schoolrooms as much as the Qur'an. Above all, no book has ever been the cause of 
such deep religious, intellectual, cultural moral, social, economic, and political 
change in the lives of millions, or of peoples as ethnically diverse as has the 
Qur'an. , 58 
2: The Sunnah 
The Sunnah is the second source after the Qur'an59, and it is defined as "the saying, 
deeds and approvals accurately narrated from the Prophet". 601t is also defined as "the 
statements and actions of the Prophet Muhammad, as well as the statements and 
actions of others done in his presence which did not meet his disapproval" 
61. The 
Sunnah consists of three elements: 1- The Prophet's words. 2- Deeds of Prophet. 3- 
The Prophet companions' words or deeds that were accepted by the Prophet 
62 
With regard to its role, the Sunnah has the following functions: 
First: it reinforces a rule decided in the Qur'an. For example, the prohibition of a 
murder is stated clearly in the Qur'an. The Sunnah came to reinforce such prohibition. 
Second: it provides details and interpretation to the general principles given in the 
Holy Book. The Qur'an tells us we must pray. The Sunnah shows us how. The Qur'an 
indicates that fasting is obligatory to every Muslim in the Month of Ramadan63. The 
Sunnah provides details about fasting rules. Allah said in the Holy Qur'an: {and We 
have also sent down unto you (0 Muhammad) the Dhiker [reminder and the advice 
(i. e. the Qur'an), that you may explain clearly to men what is sent down to them, and 
that they may give thought) 64. 
Third: it provides new rules to cover matters not decided by the Qur'an. For instance, 
the Qur'an does not forbid men to wear gold, but the Sunnah does. 65 
58 
- Isma'il Al- Faruqi (1984) "Islam" Niles. Illinois: Argus Publications 59 
- Abdulrahman Al-Homady (1989) p. 341. & Abdulkader Owdeh p. 174 60 
- The Noble Qur'an. English translation of the meanings and commentary. King Fahd Complex for 
the Printing of the Holy Qur'an. Madianh. K. S. A. 1419 A. H = 1999 A. D. P. 865 
61 
- Al- Qasimi (1998) p. 43 62 
- The Prophet's acceptance could be derived from his confirmative action or by merely not rejecting 
the act in question. 
63 
- Ramadan: the month of fasting. It is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. In it the Noble Qur'an 
started to be revealed to the Prophet. 
64 
- Surah 16. An-Nahl. Verse No. 44 65 - Abdulrahman Al-Homady (1989) p. 344 and 345. & Abdulkader Owdeh p. 174 & 175. 
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The Sunnah is an authentic source of Islamic law. This authenticity is indisputable 
since every care was taken to assure the accuracy of the saying or a deed of the 
Prophet Muhammad. Reliable specialists under the scrutiny of Muslim jurists 
undertook this task. The method used here was by tracing back a statement through a 
chain of reporters, to end with the Prophet himself 
66. 
It was collected into books. The most authentic books are called "As-Shah As-Sittah", 
"the six books of Sunnah"67 
Generally speaking God revealed the Qur'an fourteen hundred years ago and the 
original Words of God are still available. The Sunnah have been collected and handed 
down precisely to us. Therefore, their authenticity is not questionable, and they are 
compulsory. God said: {And whatsoever the Messenger (Muhammad) gives you, take 
it; and whatsoever he forbids you, abstain (from it)J. 
68Allah also said: (Nor does he 
speak of (his own) desire. It is only a Revelation revealed } 
69 
3: Ijmah- Consensus 
Ijmah can be defined as: the unanimous agreement of the mujtahideen70 on any matter 
of a Muslim community of any period following the demise of the Prophet 
Muhammad. 71 
Since this source is based on both the Qur'an and the Sunnah, it is considered a 
binding legal source of Islamic law. God said: {O you who believe! Obey Allah and 
. obey the Messenger (Muhammad) and those of you (Muslims) who are 
in authority 172 
Scholars believe that by the term "those of you who are in authority" it was meant 
rulers and jurists. So if jurists agree on a point it becomes obligatory73. The Prophet 
said: "my nation would not all agree to something which was wrong". 
74 He also said 
"Allah would not let my nation be agreed on perversity. Allah puts out His Hand to 
66 
-IG. Zepp, Jr. (1992) p. 83 67 
- As-Sahih As-Sittah: the six books of Hadith: compiled by Bukari (d. 256 A. H= 
870 A. D. ) Muslim 
(d. 261 A. H. = 875 A. D), Abu Dawud (d. 275A. H = 888 A. D), Nasa'I (d. 303 A. H = 915 A. D), Tirmidhi 
(d. 279 A. H = 892 A. D), and Ibn Majah (d. 273 A. H = 887 A. D). There collections are called Sahih 
Sittah. 
68 
- Surah 59. Al- Hashr. Verse. 7 69 
- Surah 53 An- Najm Verse. 3&4 70 
- The singular is mujtahid, which means a jurist who 
displays the ability to derive rulings from the 
Qur'an or the Sunnah or other Islamic sources. 
71 
- Al- Qasimi (1998) p. 44 72 
- Surah 4. An-Nisa. Verse No. 59 73 
- Abdulkader Owdeh p. 180 74 
- Al- Qasimi (1998) p. 45 
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support the group and who leaves the group will be left in hell' 75. This source is the 
third after the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The first leader after the death of the prophet 
(Abu- Baker), when adjudicating between litigants referred firstly to the Qur'an. If he 
did find an answer he referred to the Sunnah. If he did not find an answer he then 
asked people if they knew an answer to the question in hand. If he did not find the 
answer he held a meeting with jurists. If they were unanimous he rendered his 
judgment according to this agreement76. Such consensus however, may not contradict 
the Qur'an or the Sunnah. 
4: Al- Qiyas (Analogy) 
Al- Qiyas can be defined as the legal principle from which the law on a certain issue 
that has to do with the welfare of the Muslims is derived. 77 It is a verdict and a 
judgement given by an Islamic jurist. This verdict or judgement must be based on the 
Qur'an, the Sunnah or on the Ijmah respectively78. 
There are four pillars of an analogical deduction: 
First: the original issue whose rule is provided by Qur'an or the Sunnah. 
Second: the associated issue whose rule is not provided by the Qur'an or the Sunnah. 
Its connections with the original issue must be demonstrated in order to show the rule. 
Third: the legal rule that is provided explicitly for the original issue and which must 
be applied to the branch. 
Four: the effective cause. 79 
Furthermore the application of the analogy requires the following conditions: 
1- Its application is only permitted in the absence of an answer to the question in 
Qur'an, the Sunnah and the Ijinah. 
2- Al-Qiyas must not conflict with the three primary sources of Islam or with other 
Islamic jurisprudential principles. 
3- Al- Qiyas must be based on the Qur'an, the Sunnah or the Ijmah. 80 
The Qiyas has its basis in both the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Thus it is a legally binding 
source. 81 
75 
- Muhammad bin Aeesa (1980) "Al-Gam'a Al- Sahih; Sonan Al-Tremady". Dar Al-Faker Publisher. 
Part 3 P. 315 
76 Abdulrahman Al-Homady ( 1989) p. 356 & 357 
77 
- Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 70 78 -The Noble Qur'an p. 880 79 
- Abdulrahman Al-Homady ( 1989) p. 360 80 
-Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 77 81 
- Abdulrahman Al-Homady (1989) p. 361. 
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5: Al Masalah Al Morslah (Public Interest) 
Al - Masalah Al-Morslah means: "the matters which are in the public interest and 
which are not specifically defined in the Shari'ah". 
82This is a very important and 
helpful source for dealing with new issues and is considered as the most valuable 
source that enables the legislator in the Islamic state to keep pace with new 
circumstances. To apply this principle the following conditions must be satisfied: 
(a) The interest must be a real one, not only imaginary interest. That is to say, the 
legislation in question can bring happiness or prevent unhappiness. 
(b) It must be public interest not personal interest. 
(c) Legislation must not contradict rules or principles provided in the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah or Ijmah83. 
Criminalizing the possession of arms or guns, for instance, is based on the principle of 
public interest, because according to the principle that everything is permitted unless 
prohibited by law 84 the possession of such items is originally not prohibited. However, 
the state may consider the possession of such items would threaten people's life and a 
possible cause of increase in the number of crimes. Consequently, the interest of a 
society entitles or may oblige the state concerned to criminalize such possession 
85 
. 
In this thesis, according to the principle of public interest I shall answer the question of 
whether the idea of fundamental human rights, in particular those concerning the 
accused during the criminal trial stage, is alien to Islamic law, or whether there is a 
possibility that Islamic law in general and the criminal justice system in Saudi Arabia 
in particular is able to absorb concepts of human rights as presented in the 
international instruments, and if so to what extent? 
SECTION IV The Four Schools of Islamic Law 
The jurisprudence developed by the Four Schools of Doctrine has provided a great 
service to Islam since such comprehensive jurisprudence provides guidance in every 
aspect of life, in their time and for all time to come. 
82 
- Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 8 83 
- Abdulrahman Al-Homady (1989) p. 374 and 375. Scholar 
Ahmad bin Hanbal (the founder of the 
Hanbali school of thought) relied on this principle. This is the most prevalent school in Saudi Arabia. 
84 
- In accordance with this principle individuals can do everything, except that which they are 
expressly prohibited from doing by law 
85 
- Establishing acts or laws to regulate novel circumstances, such as Traffic acts or 
Jail laws, is always 
founded on this principle. 
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This development of jurisprudence was based totally on Islamic sources, especially the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah. Therefore, as far as the main principles of Islam are 
concerned, an examiner of Islamic jurisprudence will find differences of opinion only 
in secondary issues: few differences will be found in fundamental concepts. 
Hanafi school: was founded by Abu Han afi86 (81-150 A. H= 700-767 A. D). This 
school has spread primarily in Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 
Maliki School: was founded by Malik Ibn Anas 87 (94- 179 A. H= 716-795 A. D). This 
school has spread in West Africa and North Africa. 
Shafi'i School: was founded by Mohammad Al- Shafi88 (150-205 A. H=676- 820 A. D). 
This school has spread in Indonesia, Egypt, Philippines, Malaysia, and Seri lank. 
Hanbali School: was founded by Ahmad ibn Hanba189 (164-241 A. H =780- 855 A. D). 
This school has spread in Saudi Arabia 90 
SECTION V The Nature of Islamic Law 
The nature of Islamic law may be considered from more than one angle. Nevertheless 
for the purpose of this thesis the focus here will be limited to two issues, namely 
certainty of Islamic belief, and the Islamic approach to legislation. The first point 
serves as a fundamental theory from which to view and understand the scope and 
effect of the term "lawful and unlawful" in Islamic society. Even though the point 
86 
- Abu Hanafi is a nickname for Nu'man Ibn 
Thabit ibn Zuta Ibn Mah. He was a non- Arabic scholar. 
He lived during the period of the successor of the companions of the Prophet in Kufa in Iraq. Kufa at 
that time was a famous city for learning. He had met some of the prophet's companions who were still 
alive and had benefited from their knowledge of Islamic law and he had heard the Sunnah from them. 
He is one of the great jurists of Islam. 
87 
- He was born and died in Medina. Medina at that time was considered the centre 
for Islamic 
education. He belonged to an Arabic royal family in Yemen, which had moved to Medina. His fame 
led people to call him the leader of thought in Medina. 
88 
- He was born in Gaza in the Mediterranean Sea 
in the year 150 A. H= 767 A. D. is a descendant of 
the Prophet Muhammad. His mother took him to Palestine after the death of his father. At the age of 
ten he travelled with his mother to Mecca. At an early age he studied the Qur'an, the Sunnah and 
Islamic jurisprudence under well-known scholars. Then he moved to Medina at the age of twenty and 
studied with Scholar Malik (the Founder of the Maliki School). From Medina he travelled to Iraq 
where he devoted his time to research. Al- Shaft benefited from the Maliki School in Medina and the 
Hanafi School in Iraq. Therefore he became a remarkable expert in both schools. But he was not only a 
follower of these two schools: rather he established an autonomous approach in his legal studies. Abdur 
Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 103-104-105-106 
89 
- He was born in Marw in Iraq 164. His 
father died at the age of 30. So his mother took the 
responsibility of bringing him up. He started his education in Baghdad at the age of 16. Many scholars 
thought him. However the most important one is Al- Shaft (the Founder of Shaft'i School. ). Abdur 
Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 108 
90 
- The source is I G. Zepp, Jr. (1992) p. 150 
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might seem irrelevant to the topic, my aim is to provide a clear picture of the Muslim's 
thought and creed, serving as an important background against which to understand 
what the term "infringement of Islamic law" could mean to Muslims. In respect of the 
topic of this thesis, this is especially relevant when it relates to one of the human rights 
principles called upon in the international instruments. 
The second point will reveal the capacity of Islamic law for development to bring it up 
to date. 
A distinguishing characteristic of Muslims is their certainty in respect of their religion. 
An individual Muslim is in absolute assurance of Islam. This certainty is based on 
revelation and reason. 
There is no doubt among Muslims about the definitive revelation "the Qur'an" which 
is described as the "Standing Miracle". Allah said: { this is the Book (the Qur'an), 
whereof there is no doubt 191 
Islamic logic begins with the premise that the truth of the Qur'an is self- validating; its 
accuracy is concretely established since it is the Word of Allah and God is not subject 
to error. As Ira G. Zepp, Jr. puts it: "Muslims who follow the Qur'an, then, feel they are 
as free from error as one can be on this earth. " He continues to argue that such belief 
cannot be described as "a blind faith", because Muslim scholars find the words of their 
scriptures self- evidently true9`. 
The other source of this certainty is human reason. For Muslim the divinity of the 
Qur'an can also be proved by human reason. The Qur'an is regarded as a miracle from 
Allah to the Prophet Muhammad. God said: {and this Qur'an is not such as could ever 
be produced by other than Allah (Lord of the heaven and the earth), but it is a 
confirmation of (the revelation) was before it [i. e. the Taurat (Torah), and the Injeel 
(Gospel)], and a full explanation of the Book (i. e. laws, decreed for mankind) - wherein 
there is no doubt-from the Lord of the Alamin (mankind, jinn, and all that exists) ). 
93 
In respect of Muslim faith the Qur'an is seen as a living instrument. The Prophet said: 
"there was no Prophet among the Prophets but was given miracles because of which 
people had security or had belief, but what I have been given is the Divine Revelation 
which Allah has revealed to me. So 1 hope that my followers will be more that those of 
91 
- Surah 2 Al- Baqarah verse. 2 92 
-IG. Zepp, Jr. (1992) p. 254 93 
- Surah 10. Yunus verse. 37 
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any other Prophet on the Day of Resurrection". 94 For Muslim the Qur'an contains 
scientific knowledge of which human beings discover only little. Thus Islam calls for 
learning all aspect of Cosmos because some scientific facts reinforce the belief of the 
existence of God. Mind is considered in Islamic religion as one of the most valuable 
gifts from God, distinguishing human beings from other species. Pursuant to this fact 
one can conclude that a Muslim be he a jurist or layman feels that the truth of Islam is 
discoverable by rationality. Recent scientific studies have just discovered facts that 
were disclosed in Islam 14 centuries ago. Hence, many non-Muslim scientists have 
admitted this certainty in Islam. For example, in the Holy Qur'an, God speaks about 
the stages of man's embryonic development: { We created man (Adam) out of an 
extract of clay (water and earth). Thereafter We made him (the offspring of Adam) as 
a Nutfah (mixed drops of the male and female sexual discharge and lodged it) in a safe 
lodging (womb of the woman). Then We made the Nutfah into a clot (a piece of thick 
coagulated blood), then We made the clot into a little lump of f lesh, then We made out 
of that little lump of flesh bones, then We clothed the bones with flesh, and then We 
brought it forth as another creation }95. Hamn and Leeuwenhoek first discovered this 
scientific fact about human embryonic development only in 1677 (more than 1000 
years after Muhammad). 96 
Professor Emeritus Keith L. Moor97 in his comments on this verse in 1981 stated that: 
"it has been a great pleasure for me to help clarify statements in the Qur'an about 
human development. It is clear to me that these statements must have come to 
Muhammad from God, because almost all this knowledge was not discovered until 
many centuries later. This proves to me that Muhammad must have been a messenger 
of God". He emphasized that there is no difficulty for him in accepting the fact that the 
98 Qur'an is the Word of God. 
9; 
- Sahih Al-Bukari, Vol. 9 Hadith No. 379 95 
- Surah 23. AI-Mu'minun. Verses. 12- 14. 96 
- However they mistakenly thought the sperm cell contained a miniature preformed human being that 
pew when it was deposited in the female genital trace. 
- Moore is one of the world's prominent scientists in the fields of anatomy and embryology and the 
author of the book entitled "The Developing Human". This work of scientific reference and was chosen 
as the best book authored by one person, and has been translated into 8 languages. In 1984 he received 
the most distinguished award presented in the field of anatomy in Canada. 
98 
- This was during the Seventh Medical Conference in Dammam, Saudi Arabia. www. islam- 
guide. com 17/ 6/ 2002. "A brief Illustrated Guide to Understanding Islam". During one conference, 
Professor Moor stated: "... Because the staging of human embryos is complex, owing to continuous 
process of change during development, it is proposed that a new system of classification could be 
developed using the terms mentioned in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The proposed system is simple, 
comprehensive, and conforms with present embryological knowledge. The intensive studies of the 
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With regard to the second point, that is to say the Islamic approach to legislation, the 
need to deal with new issues creates the difficulty of harmonizing between 
permanence and change. Tendency towards one of these two ends could cause 
instability or might lead to inadequate treatment of new matters. Thus a balance 
between these systems is very important. 
This need is rightly described by Mr. Justice Cardozo: "the greatest need of our time is 
a philosophy that will mediate between conflicting claims of stability and progress and 
supply a principle of growth". 99 
Islamic law provides a solution for this task. This solution is based on the Islamic 
approach regarding rules and laws. Guidance endowed by God in the Holy Sources 
namely the Qur'an and the Sunnah is of an eternal nature. As a consequence it is not 
subject to change. But what is important here is that these two sources have revealed 
deliberately broad principles and individuals are free to adopt any rules suitable to the 
circumstances. Hence, it is as Khurshid Ahmad correctly puts it: "the basic guidance 
is of a permanent nature, while the method of its application can change in 
accordance with the peculiar needs of every age". He further claims that: "this is why 
Islam always remains as fresh and modern as tomorrow's morn"100 
When the command of Allah or the Prophet is explicitly given, no one is capable of 
making, or qualified to make the least alteration to it. 101Nevertheless, if the Shari'ah is 
silent or does not speak explicitly, the Islamic state has the right, or may be obliged, to 
provide an answer to new 102 
Empowering the legislative authority in the Islamic state with the right to enact laws 
might appear to be in contradiction with the idea that God alone has this right. 
However, this conclusion would be inaccurate. God exercised His legislative 
discretion in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. These sources do not provide detailed laws to 
Qur'an and the Sunnah in the last four years have revealed a system for classifying human embryos 
that is amazing since it was recorded in the seventh century A. D. Although Aristotle the founder of the 
science of embryology realized that chick embryos developed in stages from his studies of hen's eggs in 
the fourth century B. C., he did not give any details about these stages. As far as it is known from the 
history of embryology, little was known about the staging and classification of human embryos until the 
twentieth century. For this reason, the description of the human embryo in the Qur'an cannot be based 
on scientific knowledge in the seventh century. The only reasonable conclusion is: these descriptions 
were revealed to Muhammad from God. He could not have known such details because he was an 
illiterate man with absolutely no scientific training. " 
99 
- Harvard Law Review p. 279. Quoted from Khurshid Ahmad ( 1992) p. 42 100 
- Khurshid Ahmad (1992) p. 43 101 
- Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 5 102 
- M. Cherif Bassiouni (1993) p168 
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deal with every aspect of life. In fact except in some exceptional cases the Qur'an and 
the Sunnah give only general notions. Therefore, the Islamic community or state has 
the discretion to handle new circumstances, provided that their decision does not 
breach general Islamic principles. 
This approach to legislation demonstrates the flexibility of Islamic law, which makes 
it applicable in all times and places. Without such an approach Islamic law would 
certainly have been inadequate after the cessation of divine revelation. 
In short, although the Qur'an and the Sunnah are sovereign over all other laws and 
cannot be amended, the Islamic Shari'ah is not out of date, but can adequately deal 
with novel issues and meet evolving needs that have not been explicitly addressed in 
the two sources mentioned previously. The legislative approach of the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah make the Shari'ah applicable to all times and circumstances: when rules are 
enacted concerning issues that both the Qur'an and the Sunnah are silent about or 
about which they do not speak comprehensively. 
SECTION VI Crimes in Islamic Law 
Islamic jurisprudence has more than one classification of offences. Some jurists have 
classified them into crimes against honour, property, and life; others into crimes 
against society (God's rights) or against the individual's rights' 
03. They could also be 
classified as intentional or non-intentional crimes104. Nevertheless the most prevalent 
classification is founded on the severity of punishment they deserve105 
According to the latter classification offences are divided into three categories: 
Haddud, Qisas and Ta'azir. 
103 
- Muhammad Fazl-ur-Rahman Ansari p. 381; for more details see Adel Omer Sherif "Generalities 
on Criminal Procedure under Islamic Shari'a". In Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Adel Omer Sherif, and 
Kate Daniels (2003). "Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari'a". I. B. Tauris. 
London. New York; p. 5 
103 - Abdulkader Owdeh p. 78 105 
- Courts in Saudi Arabia have adopted this classification. 
See Ahmad Bclal (1990) "AL- Ijra'at Al- 
Jina'i Al-Mogarnh Wa Al-Nedam Al-Ejrea'ee Fi Al- Maºnlakah Al- Arabiah Al- Sudiah" p. 977. 
hereinafter will refer to as Ahmad Belal (1990) 
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1: Haddud Offences' 06 
Haddud offences are translated into English as doctrinal crimes107. These offences are 
very harmful to Muslim society and each crime has a certain penalty prescribed 
precisely in the Islamic law. Therefore one can define them as "crimes that are 
considered as a transgression against God's rights (society's rights) and punishable by 
certain punishments"' 08. The punishments for these crimes are also called Haddud. But 
to distinguish each one, the terms theft Hadd, 109 drinking Hadd etc, are used 110 
There are seven Haddud crimes"' : 
1- The drinking of alcohol 
2-Theft "Taking someone else's property by stealth"' 12 
3- Highway robbery 
4- Unlawful intercourse 113 "Sexual intercourse between a man and woman not 
married to each other" 114 
5-Slander or defamation "a false accusation of adultery or fornication"115 
6- Apostasy16 "a rejection of the religion of Islam in favour of any other religion 
either through an action or through words of mouth"' 17 
106 
- Searching in old Islamic jurisprudence one could not find much discussion about the nature and 
purpose of this kind of offences. The most likely reason for this is that jurists believe that such crimes 
and their prescribed penalties are proved in specific and fixed terms and should be imposed without 
question. However, one can conclude from a few writings about this subject, that punishments in 
doctrinal crimes have a retributive nature. Mohamed S. El-Awa (1998) "Punishment in Islamic Law: A 
comparative Study". American Trust Publications. Indianapolis, Indiana. USA, P. 26. hereinafter will 
refer to as Mohamed S. El-Awa (1998) 
107 
- Faruq's Law Dictionary (Arabic- English) 1997. P. 135. Lebanon Library. See also Security 
Dictionary English- Arabic. Naif Arab Academy for Security Sciences. Riyadh 1997 P. 83 
108 
- This definition is open to criteizem because there is disagreement between Islamic scholars with 
regard to the nature of the crime of defamation, which can be argued to come under the right of God or 
under an individual's rights. 
109 
- The singular of Haddud. ' 10 
- Abdulkader Owdeh p. 79 111 
- Abdulkader Owdeh p. 79. However, there is some disagreement over whether some of these 
offences fall within the category of crimes of Haddud. See Saeed Hasan Ibrahim "Basic Principles of 
Criminal Procedure under Islamic Shari'a". In Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Adel Omer Sherif, and 
Kate Daniels (2003). "Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari'a". I. B. Tauris. 
London. New York; p. 19 
112 
- Mohamed S. El-Awa (1998) p3 113 
- In contrast to modern legal systems where sexual relationships between non- married men and 
women are not deemed an offence, the Jewish, Christian and Islamic religions do not accept this 
practice. This offence is considered in Islamic society as a harmful act because it destroys the very basis 
of family and could cause damage to the reputation of the family. It is also a crucial factor in the 
spreading of some sorts of disease. Therefore the total purity of sex life for both man as well as woman 
is required in Islamic society. Mohamed S. El-Awa (1998) p 13 
114 
- Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p 236. The word adultery is used when one or both parties are 
married to other person or persons. The word fornication is used when both of them are singles. 
115 
- On other words if some accuses another person of committing an adultery crime and cannot prove 
it he then be regarded as committing the crime of defamation. 
126 
7- Rebellion against the Ruler (the Head of the State) without a clear legitimate cause. 
2: Qisas Offences 
Human life is given considerable attention in Islamic law. Allah said: {because of that 
We ordained for the Children of Israel that if anyone killed a person not in retaliation 
of murder, or (and) to spread mischief in the land- it would be as if he killed all 
mankind, and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all 
mankind) 118. Qisas is defined as "laws of equality in punishment for wounds etc. in 
retaliation". ' 19 
It is also defined as "crimes that are punishable by qisas (retaliation 120 or law of 
parity or equality) or by Diyah (blood money) "'221. These kinds of crime are divided 
into the following categories: 
1-Accidental homicide (manslaughter). 2- Quasi- deliberate homicide. 
3- Deliberate homicide (intentional murder) 122 4- Intentional injury 5- Accidental 
injury' 23 
116 
- However, El-Awa considers apostasy as a Ta'azir (chastisement) crime. Mohamed S. El-Awa 
l 
998) p. 56 
- Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 265 Conversion from Islam to another faith or religion is 
considered a crime of Haddud (doctrinal crime). An apostasy may be committed when a Muslim 
person has doubt about the existence of the creature or His Prophet (Muhammad). Likewise rejecting 
the Qur'an is also considered to be apostasy. Allah said {How shall Allah guide a people who 
disbelieved after their belief and after they bore witness that the Messenger (Muhammad) is true and 
after clear proofs had come unto them? And Allah guides not the people who are Zalinnun (polytheists 
and wrong-doers). They are those whose recompense is that on them (rests) the Curse of Allah, of the 
angels, and of all mankind. They will abide therein (Hell). Neither will their torment be lightened, nor 
will it be delayed or postponed (for a while). Verily, those who disbelieved after their Belief and then 
went on increasing in their disbelief (i. e. disbelief in the Qur'an and in Prophet Muhammad) - never 
will their repentance be accepted [because they repent only by their tongues and not from their hearts]. 
And they are those who are astray) Surah 3. Al-Imran. Verses. 86,87,88,89, and 90 118 
- Surah 6 Al-Ma'idah verse. 32 119 
- The Noble Qur'an p. 879 120 
- Al- states Qasimi "Qisas is often translated as the law of retaliation. However, this is an 
inaccurate definition of the term if the purpose of prescribing such a punishment is taken into account. 
The aim of qisas is to ensure parity between the crime and the punishment, whereas the word 
"retaliate" means "to hurt someone or do something harmful to them because they have done or said 
something harmful to you ". In other words "retaliation implies inflicting harm on somebody, for the 
purpose of revenge or the causing of harm and this is not, of course the case with crimes that are 
punishable by qisas. Thus it is more appropriate to translate the word qisas as the law of parity or 
euality, as does Faruqi. " Al- Qasimi (1998) p. 39 & 40 
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- Diyah means blood money (for wounds, killing etc. ) as compensation paid by the killer to the 
relatives of the victim (in unintentional cases). The Noble Qur'an p. 863. however, Muhammad Abdel 
Haleem rejects this definition and states that : "Diya is not 'blood money', as it is normally translated. 
The Oxford English Dictionary gives the primary meaning of the term 'blood money' as 'a reward for 
bringing about the death of another'. The word Diya has no such association in Arabic, and is 
therefore better translated as 'compensation'. Furthermore, it is not a fine since fines go to the state. " 
Muhammad Abdel Haleem 
. "Compensation 
for Homicide in Islamic Shari'a". in Muhammad Abdel 
Haleem, Adel Omer Sherif, and Kate Daniels (2003). Criminal Justice in Islam: judicial Procedure in 
the Shari'a. I. B. TAURIS. London and New York; p 97 
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3: Ta'azir Offences 
Ta'azir is translated into English as "chastisement" 
124 which is defined as: 
"disciplinary punishment for a crime for which no specific Hadd (punishment) 
is 
prescribed nor any form of expiation" 
125. It is also defined as "discretionary 
punishment to be delivered for transgression against God, or against an individual 
for 
which there is neither fixed punishment nor penance". 
126 In consequence all offences 
which are not classed as Haddud or Qisas shall constitute the crime of Ta'azir. 
This kind of offence is divided into 2 kinds: 
First: an act criminalized by Islamic law but for which no prescribed penalty is 
provided. For example, false testimony, breach of trust, bribery and usury are 
forbidden in Islamic law, but no specific punishment is provided for each. In such 
offences the state can either decide the due punishment, which becomes obligatory to 
the judge to apply, or it can leave such discretion to the judge according to the 
circumstances of each individual case. In this kind of chastisement crime the judge can 
adopt any punishment he believes suitable. Both ways are adopted in the judicial 
system in Saudi Arabia. In certain kinds of crime the state has enacted laws to regulate 
some aspects and declared the due penalty for those crimes, placing the court under 
obligation to render its judgement according to the law concerned. Forgery and bribery 
for instance are forbidden in Islamic law. However no prescribed penalty is given. 
Therefore the state in Saudi Arabia has enacted laws in which the prescribed 
punishment is provided. 
Second: an act that is originally permitted, but in the interest of society is made illegal, 
subjecting anyone who commits it to punishment'27. For example, pursuant to article 
14 of the Woods and Walk Law in Saudi Arabia128 cutting down trees from public 
woodland without license from the competent authority is criminalized and punishable 
by certain penalties. This act is not originally illegal or punishable in Islamic law. 
122 - Some Islamic jurists have classified homicide into five categories, while others have classified them into only two kinds. 
123 
- Abdulkader Owdeh P. 
- Security Dictionary English- Arabic. Naif Arab Academy for Security Sciences. Riyadh 1997; p. 
125 
- Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 226 126 
- Mohamed S. El-Awa 
127 (1998) p. 96&97 Most Ta'azir (chastisement) 
offences come under this kind. When exercising such discretion the Islamic state is obliged to act according to the public Interest and its act must be compatible with o f's neral principles of Islamic law. See Abdulkader Owdeh p. 81 - Royal Decree No. 22/M in 1398 A. H (1978 A. D) 
128 
However, because protecting trees from harmful acts is necessary for the environment, 
the government has taken the necessary steps to protect the public interest. 129 
The difference between these two kinds of Ta'azir (chastisement) crimes is that the 
first type is always prohibited while the second type may be forbidden but at a 
different time could be made lawful according to the interest of people. 130 The latter 
kind of Ta'azir crimes might corresponds to the English notion of regulatory offences 
which often impose strict liability. 
Implications of this classification: 
First: with regard to forgiveness, Haddud (doctrinal crimes) are not subject to 
forgiveness. Qisas offences (the law of parity or equality) are forgivable by victim(s). 
So in case of intentional murder the victim's family could waive their right of 
punishing the murderer 131 The head of state has no right to forgive the culprit in this 
kind of crime. However the head of state can forgive the culprit in Ta'azir 
(chastisement crimes) provided that such forgiveness does not affect the victim's 
rights. 
Second: with regard to the judge's discretion, each crime of Haddud (doctrinal crimes) 
has a fixed penalty. When a Hadd crime is proved a judge must render his judgement, 
which should carry the prescribed penalty. In this kind of crime the judge's power is 
limited to the application of the text of the Qur'an or the Sunnah. Thus he has no right 
to make the punishment more or less severe or to replace the prescribed penalty by any 
other punishment. Moreover, a judge has no power to stay the execution. In brief his 
ultimate discretion is limited to the pronouncement of the prescribed penalty. In Qisas 
(law of parity or equality) if the case is proved and the victim does not forgive the 
criminal, the judge's power is also limited to the pronouncement of the prescribed 
penalty. In Ta'azir (chastisement) crimes the judge has full discretion to choose the 
kind of punishment and its severity according to circumstances. Moreover he has the 
right to pronounce stay of execution. 
129 
- Similarly article 59 of the Mining Code enacted by Royal Decree No. 21 M in 1392 A. H (1972 
A. D) "any one undertaking mining activities regulated by this code and failing to observe its 
provisions shall be penalized by a fine of not less than five hundred and not exceeding ten thousand 
Riyals and by imprisonment for a period of not less than one week and not exceeding six months or by 
either of the two penalties". 
130 
- See Abdulkader Owdeh p. 81 131 
- Either with or without compensation. 
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Third: with regard to extenuating circumstances, these have no effect in Qisas and 
Haddud crimes. On the contrary, in Ta'azir (chastisement) the extenuating 
circumstances could change the kind of punishment and its severity 
Fourth: In terms of evidence, the Haddud and Qisas crimes are only proved by either 
testimony or confession. But the majority of crimes in Islamic law come under the 
category of chastisement crimes (Ta'azir). When dealing with this kind of crime the 
court has the ultimate discretion to reach its verdict by means of ratiocination and 
induction (examination) and by full rational capacity provided that its conclusion is in 
line with logic and reason. 132 
It should be emphasized here that if either a Hadd or a Qisas crime is not proved by 
one of the above-mentioned means, the act is still illegal and the culprit is still subject 
to punishment. However, the crime will be reclassified as Ta'azir. The same applies if 
the victim's family forgives the murderer. Although Qisas crimes are harmful to the 
victims, society is damaged by such crimes as well. Thus society has the right to 
defend itself by punishing the murderer even if the victim forgives him. But it only can 
adjudicate and punish him according to Ta'azir categories. 
Fifth: it is clear from this classification that certain punishments that are prescribed 
are not subject to any alteration or change whether or not they contradict the standards 
of international human right. For instance, the punishment for intentional murder is 
the death penalty. This punishment is claimed, to be harsh and unnecessary according 
to international human rights 133. Such a claim cannot be accepted and there is no room 
for reinterpretation. 
Part Two The judicial System in Saudi Arabia 
Section I Historical Background 
The history of Saudi Arabia is divided into three stages. The first stage started by the 
establishment of the first Saudi State. This stage begun when Muhammad ibn Saud 
and Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al- Wahhab made an oath in 1744 (1157 A. H) to re- 
establish pure Islam as it was applied during the Prophet era. This state lost power in 
1817 (1233 A. H). The Second stage, begun by the establishment of the Second Saudi 
132 
- See the Board of Grievances. Decision No. H/1/93 (1401 H). & Decision No. H/1/75 (1401 H) 133 
- See for example the UN General Assembly resolution no. 44/128 of December 1989 regarding the 
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. 
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State in 1824 (1240 A. H) and lasted until 1891 (1309 A. H). Lastly, the third stage is 
the present Saudi State. It started when King Abdulaziz retook Riyadh and established 
his rule over that region. 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia officially acquired its present name after the unification 
of all its parts by King Abdulaziz in 1931 (1351 A. H). The foundation of Saudi 
Arabia was based on a pact between Muhammad ibn Saud, the founder of the first 
Saudi State, and Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahabi 
Movement, to re-establish Islam and to promote monotheism. This foundation may be 
clearly recognized from many articles of the Basic Law in Saudi Arabia. For example, 
article one states, "Saudi Arabia is ... an 
Islamic state ... and 
its constitution is the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah". Article two declares, "The citizens shall acknowledge the 
rule of the King according to the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Apostle... " 
Article seven provides " the powers of ruling the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia originate 
from the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Apostle, both of which reign supreme 
over this and all the other laws of the State". This foundation is strongly reaffirmed 
by King Fahad (the present King) in his statement to citizens on the occasion of 
enacting The Basic Law, The Shura council Law, and The Regional Law. The king 
states "in recent history, the first Saudi State was established before two and half 
centuries on the basis of Islamic law when two pious men made a pact. " 
(A) The judicial system in the Arabian Peninsula prior to the unification of Saudi 
Arabia 
Historians when writing about this era divide it into the following systems134: 
The first system was in the Najd region. The judiciary in this region did not know any 
kind of organization regarding courts and procedures because life was very simple. 
All disputes were settled by the ruler, but if his attempt failed to reach reconciliation 
the case was then forwarded to a single judge who dealt with cases without any 
official procedures and whose judgement was final since there was no system of 
appeal. Judges in this region applied the Hanbali School of law in most cases. The 
second system was that of the Hijaz province with an Ottoman orientation. Since the 
Ottoman Empire in its more recent time had borrowed western laws to settle criminal 
and commercial affairs, this region exercised some kind of court organization and 
134 
- Abdulaziz Al-Eshaikh (1421 AH) "Laniahat Hool Al-Qadi' Fi AI-Mamlakah Al-Arabiah Al- 
Sudiah" Second Edition. Alm Al-Fo'd Publisher p. 75. Hereinafter will refer to as Abdulaziz Al- 
Eshaikh (1421). See also "AiQadi' Fi Al-Mamlakah Al-Arabiah Al-Sudiah" (1419 AH) The Ministry 
of Justice p. 55 
131 
procedures. 135 Finally, the third system existed among Bedouins (desert men). Each 
tribe had its own arbitrator(s) called (Arefah), and whose judgments were based on the 
tribe's custom whether this was compatible with Islamic law or not. 
(B) Historical development of the judicial laws 
When King Abdulaziz unified Saudi Arabia he was faced with the difficulty of three 
different existing judicial approaches as mentioned above. Thus his first task was 
establishing a consistent judicial system. A Royal Decree was issued in 1927 (1346 
A. H) to establish a system of hierarchal courts. Its institutions were classified into 
three hierarchal categories: expeditious courts, Shari'ah courts, and the Commission 
on Judicial Supervision. Subsequently other laws were enacted, however the most 
important laws, are: the Attributions of Shari'ah Jurisprudence Responsibilities Law, 
and the Organization of Administrative Functions in the Shari'ah Courts System Law 
in 1952 (1371 A. H). In 1975 (1395 A. H) the Law of the Judiciary was enacted136 
which is also still in force. This law reorganized the hierarchal courts, as we will 
explain later. 
However, the most crucial reformation occurred in 2000 and 2001. Three fundamental 
judicial laws were enacted: the Law of Procedure before Shari'ah Courts'37, the Code 
of Law Practice138, and the Law of Criminal Procedure139 
Section II Courts or the Judicial Institutions 
The original principle is that Shari'ah courts are the sole judicial authority in all 
criminal cases. The Basic Law declares, "... the courts (Shari'ah Courts) have power 
to adjudicate (resolve) all disputes (litigations) and offences" 140. They have 
jurisdiction over all disputes and crimes, except what is excluded by another law141. 
However, recognizable statutes were enacted to repeal the Shari'ah courts' 
jurisdiction in particular areas, as we will point out below. The complexity of 
modern life and the state's power to intervene in instances of new forms of crime led 
to the establishment of other judicial institutions to cover certain offences. Besides 
135 
- Some of these laws contradict Islamic law. See Abdulaziz Al-Eshaikh (1421 AH) p. 78 136 
- Royal Decree No. (M/64) 137 
- Royal Decree No. (M/ 21) dated on (2000) 138 
- Royal Decree No. (M/ 38) dated on (2001) 139 
- Royal Decree No. (M/39) dated on (2001) 140 
_ Article 49 141 
- Article 26 of the Law of the Judiciary provides: "Courts shall have jurisdiction to decide with 
respect to all disputes and crimes, except those exempted by law. Rules for the jurisdiction of courts 
shall be set forth in the Shari'ah Procedure Law Courts and Law of criminal procedure. Specialized 
courts may be fortned by Royal Order on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council. " 
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Shari'ah courts there are the Board of Grievances and other administrative 
committees that handle particular criminal suits. 
Therefore, the reason for such multiplicity must be examined to evaluate the 
achievement of the judicial system. But it is imperative to start with some illustrations 
of Shari'ah courts, the Board of Grievances, and the administrative committees that 
have criminal jurisdiction. 
One: The Shari'ah Courts 
The Law of the Judiciary 1975 declares in article five that Shari'ah Courts consist of: 
(a) The Supreme Judicial Council 
(b) The Appellate Court 
(c) General Courts 
(d) Summary Courts. 
(a) The Supreme Judicial Council 
The Supreme Judicial Council consists of 11 members. Five of them constitute the 
Council's permanent Body. They are full time members and a Royal Order appoints 
them. Other members are part-time. All the 11 members form the Council's General 
Body. 142 
As far as judicial jurisdiction is concerned, the Council is provided with power to 
exercise supervision over the courts within the limit set down by the Law of the 
Judiciary 143. The Council is empowered to supervise all matters relating to judges 
affairs such as judges' appointment, retirement and discipline' 
44 
. 
Besides these 
powers the Council has the jurisdiction to deal with the following business according 
to article 8 of the Law of the Judiciary: 
1- The consideration of legal (Shari'ah) matters that are considered by the Minister of 
Justice to be necessary to determine general principles of Islamic law in respect 
thereof. 
2- Hearing matters that the ruler (the king) considers as being necessary to be heard 
by the Council. 
3- Giving opinions on matters related to the judiciary upon the request of the Minister 
of Justice. 
142 
- The Law of the Judiciary, Article 6 143 
- Ibid, Article 7 144 
- Ibid, Article articles 53,73, and 86 
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4- Reviewing judgments of execution, amputation, and stoning. 145 
It is thus apparent that some of the Council's jurisdictions are of administrative, 
judicial, or regulatory nature146 
(b) The Appellate Court 
The Appellate Court is composed of a head and an adequate number of judges and is 
divided into three sections. One deals with criminal matters, the second hears personal 
disputes, and a third section hears other matters. 147 Judgements of the Appellate Court 
are rendered by three judges except in cases that involve punishments of execution, 
stoning, amputation, or crimes of kidnapping or hold-up148 where five judges must 
render the judgement 149. Further, there is a General Board of the Court of Appeal. 
With regard to the Appellate Court's jurisdiction, the Appellate Court is empowered to 
review all judgements made by the lower courts, be they criminal or civil cases. On 
the other hand, judgements concerning the following disputes or offences must be 
forwarded directly to the Court of Appeal in all circumstances: 
1- Sentences inflicting amputation or execution. 2- Convictions against trustees of 
endowment property or guardians over minor property. 3- Decisions concerning real 
estate. 4- Default Decisions. 5- Judgments against juveniles. 150 
(c) The General Courts: 
The Law of the judiciary has left the general courts' formation and jurisdiction to be 
determined by the Minister of Justice, upon the motion of the Supreme Judicial 
Council. 151 A single judge delivers his judgement in all suits except cases of 
execution, stoning and amputation and others, which are designated in the law. For all 
of these three judges are needed to render a judgement'52 
145 
- Article 9 of the Law of the judiciary as amended by Royal Decree No. 76 of 14.10.1395 A. H 
provides: " The Supreme Judicial Council Shall convene as Permanent Panel ... to 
look into the issues 
and sentences mentioned in paragraph 2,3, and 4 of article 8 except those which the Minister of Justice 
decides that they be looked onto by the Council's General Panel... " 
146 
- By the administrative competences are meant those related to judges' affairs such as their 
appointment, removal, promotion, duties, termination etc; and by the regulatory authority is meant 
supervision and giving opinions on reports, projects and drafted laws that are sent to the Council. See, 
Ahmad Belal (1990) p. 807 
147 
- The Law of the Judiciary , article 
10 
148 
- Kidnapping and hold-up crimes were added by Royal Order on 5.9.1409 AH. Based on a decision 
of the Board Council of senior jurists. See Ahmad Belal (1990) p. 811 
149 
- The Law of the Judiciary Article 13 150 
- See Abdulrahman A. Al- Turki (2000) "Capital Punishment for Drug Offences in 
Islam and its 
Application in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" Unpublished PhD thesis. University of London (SOAS). 
P. 217 & 218. Hereinafter will refer to as Abdulrahman A. Al- Turki (2000). 
151 
- Article 22 152 
- Article 23 of the Law of the Judiciary . 
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According to article 26 of the Law of the judiciary 1975 the General Courts have 
jurisdiction to settle all lawsuits, except cases that are exempted by law be they 
criminal or civil. Cases under the power of the courts of Summary Jurisdiction are 
excluded from the General Court jurisdiction. 
(d) The Courts of Summary Jurisdiction: 
As is the case in the general courts, the composition of the courts of Summary 
Jurisdiction and the fixing of its powers and jurisdiction was decided by an order of 
the Minister of Justice based on the recommendation of the Supreme Judiciary 
Council153. A single judge delivers rulings for the Courts of Summary Jurisdiction. 154 
These courts are provided with power to adjudicate cases if the case does not involve 
more than SR. 800. Its jurisdiction in criminal matters covers crimes where the 
compensation does not exceed a fifth of the Diyah (blood money), even if the amount 
exceeds SR 8000. Moreover, misdemeanours, Ta'azir crimes, and crimes of Haddud 
are tried in these courts unless these offences come under the General Courts' power. 
155 
Two: The Board of Grievances (The Administrative Court) 
(A) Composition of the Board 
Article 2 of the Board of Grievances Statute states that the Board should be made up 
of (a) the chairman (b) the vice- chairman (c) assistant Deputies (d) Judges who are 
specialists in the Shari'ah and the law. These are supported by a number of technical, 
administrative and other officials. For the purpose of facilitating the function of the 
Board, it is divided into circuits according to the subject it deals with. Thus the 
structure of the Board comprises: (a) The Review Committee. (b) The Committee of 
Administrative Affairs of the Board Members. (c) The Disciplinary Committee. (d) 
The General Body. (e) The General Circuits: [Criminal circuit; Commercial Circuit: 
Administrative Circuit: Disciplinary Circuit: and Subsidiary Circuits. ] 156 
(B) Jurisdiction of the Board 
Pursuant to article 8 the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate the following: 
153 
- Pursuant to Article 24 of the Law of the Judiciary the Minister of Justice issued order No. 14/12/3 
on 20.1.1397AH to determine the jurisdiction of the Court of the Summary jurisdiction. Thus, any case 
which does not come under this court's authority is in the General Court's power. 
154 
- Article 25 of the Law of the Judiciary 155 
- Abdulrahman A. Al- Turki (2000) p. 219&220. 156 
- Abdulrahman A. Al- Turki ( 2000) p. 222 
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(a) Cases relevant to the rights stipulated in the Civil Service and Pensions Laws 
applicable to government officials and employees of public autonomous juristic 
apparatus, or their heirs and beneficiaries; 
(b) Appeals filed by interested persons against administrative orders, on grounds of 
ultra vires, the existence of a formal defect, violation of Laws or implementation 
of regulations, misapplication, and misinterpretation or abuse of office. Refusal or 
abstention by the administrative authority to make an order which is required 
under the Laws or implementing Regulations, is tantamount to an Administrative 
order; 
(c) Compensation claims addressed by interested persons to the Government or 
public persons, which are occasioned their employees or Workers; 
(d) Cases initiated by interested persons regarding disputes relative to contracts to 
which the Government or a public juristic personality is a party; 
(e) Disciplinary cases initiated by the control and investigation commission; 
(f) Penal cases brought against persons charged with having committed the forgeries 
stipulated in the Law; the offences provided for in the Law of Combating 
Corruption; the offences stipulated in Royal Decree No. 43 of 11.1377 AH; 
offences provided for in the Law of Management of public funds, enacted by 
Royal Decree no. 77 of 23.1395 AH; and criminal cases brought against persons 
accused of having committed the offences and contraventions stipulated in the 
laws, where the chairman of the council of ministers has made an order to hear 
them; 
(g) Application for the enforcement of foreign judgements; 
(h) Cases which fall within the jurisdiction of the Board pursuant to specific legal 
provisions. 
This article designates the Board's authority. However, in accordance with paragraph 
(h) many specific laws give the Board power to adjudicate cases arising from 
violation of these laws. For instance, Article 59 of the Trademark Law 157 states that 
the Board of Grievances has jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases or disputes 
arising from the application of this law. Article 18 of the Mail Statute158 provides the 
Board with power to adjudicate infringement of the law. The protection of Public 
157 
- Enacted by Royal Decree N. 5 of 4.5.1404AH. 158 
- Enacted by Royal Decree N. 4 of 21.2.1406 AH 
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Utilities Law 159 empowers the Board to inflict prison sentence. Moreover, the 
second Paragraph of article 8 provides the Council of Ministers with the right to refer 
cases to be heard by the Board. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Board has now 
been extended to cover subjects irrelevant to the original aim of its establishment as 
an administrative court16o 
Three: Administrative Committees that have Judicial Jurisdiction and their 
Function within the Judicial System: 
A feature that clearly distinguishes the judicial system is its multiplicity of judicial 
institutions. Besides the main two bodies, namely the Shari'ah courts as well as the 
Board of Grievances, there are over 30 administrative committees 161 that have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases. Three of these committees have been selected here to 
16 illustrate their range of function` 
159 
- Enacted by Royal Decree N. 62 of 20.12.1405 AH 160 
- Article one of the Board Statute admittedly declares: "the Board of Grievances is an autonomous 
body for administrative Justice... " 
161 
- Amad Al-Najar (1997) "Al-Ed'ah Al-Am Wa Al-Muhakmah Al-Jina'i Wa Tatbegatha Fi Al- 
Mamlakah Al-Arabiah Al-Sudiah" Institute of Public Administration. p. 232. hereinafter will refer to as 
Amad Al-Najar (1997) 
162 
- The following are further examples of these Committees: 
1- The Committees for Penalizing Traffic Violations: these committees were established according to 
the Traffic Law to impose penalties on traffic offenders. According to the by-law each committee 
consists of: 1- the chairman of traffic department in question or his representative. 2- A Shari'ah or 
legal advisor 3- an inspector. 2- The Medical Committees: These are created in accordance with the 
Private Medical Establishment Law under the supervision of the Ministry of Health to adjudicate all 
offences and disputes arising under the Law. Each committee is made up of three Members appointed 
by the Minister of Health. One of them should have legal qualifications and another should be a 
specialist in a medical field related to the infringement in hand. Decisions are not enforceable unless 
ratified by the Minister. However if the due punishment is imprisonment the case will be forwarded to 
the Board of Grievances. These committees exercise both investigative and judicial functions. 3- The 
Copyright Committee: This committee was established under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Information to handle all civil and criminal cases arising under the Copyright Law. The Minister of 
Information forms this committee of three members one of whom is a legal advisor. Its decisions are 
final after the Minister's ratification. 4- The Commission on the Impeachment of Ministers: This 
commission was created pursuant to the Impeachment of Ministers Law. It is authorized to try ministers 
or any equivalent rank for offences they may commit according to the Impeachment of Ministers law. 
According to article 15 this commission consists of three Ministers selected by the Council of Ministers 
and two members of the rank of chairman of the General Courts who must be qualified in Shari'ah. 5- 
The Disciplinary Council for Military Personnel: This commission was established pursuant to the 
Saudi Military Personnel Law to judge all felonies and misdemeanour offences committed by military 
personnel. This council consists of a chairman, four members, and a legal advisor supported by other 
employees. Its verdicts are final; however, in exceptional cases the Minister of Defence may reverse 
them. 6- The Disciplinary Council for Internal Security Personnel: This commission was created 
pursuant to the Saudi Internal Security Law to judge all felonies and misdemeanour offences committed 
by Internal Security Personnel. 7- Judicial Committees for Supplies: These committees were created 
pursuant to the Council of Minister's Decision No. 60 on 25.1.1393 AH to supervise the price of 
goods. Each committee is made up of three legal advisors from the Ministry of Commerce. Another 
legal advisor, who is not a member of the committee, is appointed to serve as public prosecutor. The 
Minster of Commerce must ratify the judgments. 
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1- Committees for adjudicating Securities Disputes (the Commercial Paper 
Committees): 
This set has jurisdiction over crimes of uncovered cheques (false cheques) and other 
relevant crimes 163, cases concerning the infringement of the law of Commercial 
Agencies, and the Law of Weights and Measures. A single member is empowered to 
investigate and adjudicate the case. The convicted person has the right to challenge 
the decision before the Minister of Commerce. 
2-Committees for Combating Commercial Deception 
These were established pursuant to the Commercial Deception Law164 to adjudicate 
offences under the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce. Each committee consists 
of 3 members, from the Commercial Ministry and one from the Municipal Ministry. 
One member should have legal experience. Decisions are final after being ratified by 
the Minister of Commerce except when the punishment is imprisonment, in which 
case, the accused has the right to challenge the decision before the Board of 
Grievances 165. According to the executive by-law these committees exercise both 
investigative and judicial proceedings. 
3- The Customs (Tariff) Committees: 
These were established pursuant to the Customs Law166 under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy. The committee is considered one of the 
oldest committees that have a judicial function. According to article 52 of the 
Customs Law these committees are authorized to adjudicate all smuggling crimes or 
attempted smugglings. Their minutes are regarded as valid unless contested as 
forgeries. In addition to these committees, appellant committees exist to consider first 
instance cases. The customs committees' decision is therefore final. From the 
procedural rulings one can mention that these committees exercise an investigative 
function in addition to their judicial role. 
Legal deficiencies of the administrative committees 
The justification offered for the existence of these committees is twofold: on the one 
hand, a need for specialized judicial functions for particular areas; on the other, the 
need to facilitate and expedite the trials of some types of offence. However, these 
163 
- See article 118 and the following articles of the Securities Law enacted by Royal Decree No. 37 of 
11.10.1383. 
164 
- Royal Decree No. 11 of 29.5.1404 AH (1984) 165 
- Ahmad Belal (1990) p. 867- 869 166 
- The Customs Law was enacted by the Royal Decree No. 425 on 5/3/ 1373 AH (1953) 
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justifications may not be sufficient to override the problems the committees create. 
Six main areas of difficulty can be identified. 
First, independence and impartiality of these committees are questionable. Most of 
these committees have an administrative nature. They are not subject to the Judiciary 
Statute, which declares the independence of the judiciary. Members of these 
committees are employees in executive bodies, and their decisions are in many cases 
subject to ratification of the Minister concerned. This control could affect the 
impartiality of the tribunal's members. 
Second, even though in specific circumstances it is justifiable to give these 
committees such power to deal with non-serious offences to speed up the 
administration of justice, many of these committees are eventually empowered to 
render serious punishments such as imprisonment, heavy fines, seizure and 
withdrawal of licenses. 
A third point in this regard is that the laws that created these committees do not 
provide clear and sufficient criminal procedures for members of the committees to 
apply. This deficiency could result in the violation of an individual's rights. 
In addition, multiplicity of criminal judicial authorities is considered to be an obstacle 
to unifying the judicial rulings. Unification of the judicial ruling requires that all 
judicial institutions be subjected to a single central court which supervises the lower 
courts in applying and interpreting laws. 
Furthermore, most members of these committees have no Shari'ah or legal 
qualifications. One must ask how a person not legally qualified could apply and 
interpret the law. 
Finally, some of these committees are established only in particular cities. A case 
could be tried by one of these committees if it arises in a city in which the committee 
concerned is established. However, the same case could be tried in the Shari'ah courts 
if no such committee exists. The Shari'ah court will apply the old Islamic 
jurisprudence while the committee will apply the enacted law. This could create 
diversity in the judicial rulings. 
It must therefore be concluded that these committees are administrative bodies that 
are incorrectly given considerable judicial power. 
Reasons for the establishment of administrative committees 
Supporters of the committees claim that they have been established because they 
provide the best solution for specific needs. They offer three main arguments 
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Many argue that these committees have been established temporally to cope with new 
legal matters, be they criminal or civil. They support their claim by invoking many of 
the government statements confirming the temporary nature 167 
Another justification for these committees is that a specific committee can deal with 
new laws more satisfactorily than the ordinary courts since their members specialise 
in this particular law. 
Other scholars argue that the aim of creating these committees was to ease the 
workload of cases before Shari'ah courts'68. 
Nevertheless, these arguments may be questioned. 
With regard to the first argument, it may be noted that this does not answer the 
question. In other words why has such power not been given to the natural judicial 
authority? In addition, the term "temporary nature" does not clarify how long these 
committees will last, and if it is temporary what body is proposed as an alternative 
body. It does not seem that there is any serious attempt to propose an alternative body 
or any effort to prepare the Shari'ah Courts to handle such offences. Rather, every 
ministry or government agency when preparing new legislations propose their own 
body and empower it with a judicial role to adjudicate cases arising from the proposed 
law. 
As far as the second argument is concerned, although this argument might be 
acceptable if the number of these committees were limited, it definitely fails to justify 
the existence of over 30 committees of which 24 or more deal with criminal cases. 
Therefore as Al-Jarbou correctly points out "this argument... does not have any 
practical support. Issues that are adjudicated by these committees do not demand too 
much experience and, if so, Shari'ah court judges can be trained to meet such 
experience". 1 69 
16' 
- For example, article 6 of Royal Decree No. 63 of 26.11.1407 AH orders the Minister of 
Commerce and the President of the Board of Grievances to study the status of the current committees 
in the Ministry of Commerce and to decide to transfer their jurisdiction to the Board of Grievances, and 
to submit their recommendation to the Council of Ministers. For further discussion in this regard see 
Ahmad Al-Najar ( 1997) p. 233 
168 
- See for example, Ehmad Al-Najar (1997) p. 232, and Soliman A. Solaim, "Saudi Arabia's Judicial 
Sstem", 25 
. The Middle East Journal 403 197 ]). Pp. 405 and 406. 9- Ayoup Al-Jarbou (2002) "Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: A Comparative Study 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia". Unpublished thesis. The University of Virginia. USA 
p. 158. hereinafter will refer to as Ayoup Al-Jarbou (2002) 
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The third argument is refuted by the fact that an increase in the number of Shari'ah 
court judges, if the argument should be upheld, would resolve the problem. 170. 
However, closer analysis of the background to the situation reveals that the 
establishment of the committees may be traced to two altogether different causes. 
First is that it is in the interest of a particular Ministry, if it is left to its own will, to 
liberate itself from outside supervision and to grant itself an extensive discretionary 
power in supervising all its business. The second is the negative attitude of the 
Shari'ah courts towards enacted laws171. 
As to the first cause, the following facts and points of logic will support my argument: 
Point one; it may be seen from the above explanation that members of most of these 
committees were selected from the same Ministry civil servants (employee) and not 
from the Shari'ah Courts judges. Point two; in most of these committees the Minister 
concerned preserves for himself the ultimate authority to ratify decisions. Most of 
these committees' decisions are not enforceable unless ratified by the Minister in 
question. Finally, establishing an independent judicial authority is regarded from the 
Ministry's point of view as a supervisory authority, which they regard in most cases 
as undesirable. 
This factor in my view is rooted in a fundamental problem in the Saudi Arabian legal 
system, that is to say the absence of constitutional supervision for the enacting or 
application of laws. For example the fundamental laws in Saudi Arabia and in 
particular the Basic Law, which should be regarded in a legal sense as the constitution 
of Saudi Arabia, explicitly declares the independency of the judicial authority. Article 
48 provides "the judiciary is an independent authority; there is no authority to impose 
on them, when adjudicating, other than that of the Islamic Shari'ah. " In practice no 
one is able to challenge the independency of these committees pursuant to this or 
other articles. The Shari'ah courts or even the Board of Grievances will regard this 
issue outside their jurisdiction. Another example is that the Basic law confines the 
'7 
- Ibid, p. 158 171 
- Abdulmen'am Jeerah (1988) "Nedam Al-Qadi' Fi Al-Mamlalah Al-Arabian Al-Sudiah" The 
Institute of Public Administration Riyadh. p. 132. Hereinafter will refer to as Abdulmen'am Jeerah 
(1988). For further discussion and analyses see Ayoup Al-Jarbou in his valuable PhD thesis mentioned 
above (2002) p. 159. AI-Jarbou states: "Sharia courts... have declined to apply enacted laws and 
regulations to cases before them. More importantly, the establishment of theses committees has been in 
some circumstances a response to the Sharia courts' and in recent years to the Board of Grievances' 
refusal to hear some issues because of their illegality such as issues related to non-Islamic bank 
activities, insurance contracts, tobacco and musical instruments" 
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judicial function to the Shari'ah courts and the Board of Grievances. 172 Therefore, the 
existence of such committees is legally disputable. However, in the event of such 
dispute objections will not be accepted on the ground that the committees were 
established according to Royal Decree. 
As far as the second cause is concerned, any one who examines the judicial system in 
Saudi Arabia could not fail to observe the sensitivity in the attitude of Shari'ah 
courts' judges towards the application of man-made laws. This attitude may be seen in 
more than one instance. In 1990 for instance, the Civil Procedure Statute was enacted. 
However, owing to the tension from the judges a Royal Order abolished it. 
Another example is pointed out by Al-Jarbou as "because of the sensitivity of having 
statutory laws, and in order to ease the tension of the traditionalists toward them, the 
term Nizam (plural Anzimh, which means regulations) has been used to refer to 
enacted laws. This is done because the term Qanuwn (law) is very sensitive to the 
traditionalists, and is used in other legal systems to refer to positive laws (man -made 
laws) "173. This fact is not only noted by scholars from outside the judicial authority's 
members but also was subject to criticism from members of the Shari'ah court itself. 
In an interview in a Saudi newspaper174 the judge Abdulmuhssen Al-Obaikan states 
that there are attempts from the Ministry of Justice to reorganize and regulate the 
judicial system by enacting new laws (i. e. the Law of Civil Procedure before Shari'ah 
Courts, the Code of Law Practice and the Law of Criminal Procedure). However, he 
comments disapprovingly, "the Supreme Judicial Council is the main obstacle to 
developing the judicial system of Saudi Arabia" 175. 
Reasons for the Shari'ah courts' attitude towards enacted laws 
Al-Jarbou, trying to account for this negative attitude on the part of traditionalists 
towards enacted laws during the rule of king Abdulaziz, offers four possible 
explanations. Although these contain interesting ideas, close critical examination 
shows them to be only partially valid. 
(a) Ulama (jurists or scholars) had the impression that these laws were 
incompatible with Shari'ah because the Ottoman Empire had borrowed 
many secular laws in its last era. This idea alone, his argument goes, would 
172 
- Articles 49 &53 of the Saudi Basic Law 173 
- Ayoup Al-Jarbou ( 2002) p. 34 174 
- Al- Madianh Newspaper. No 14236 dated on 2/2/ 1423 H P. 3 175 
- He was a judge in the General Courts in Riyadh. And now he was appointed as a senior consultant 
in the Ministry of Justice. 
142 
be sufficient for Scholars to deny any law that existed in the Hijaz region 
after the Ottoman Empire. However, one should reveal that ulama (scholars) 
were under this impression because the Ottoman Empire in its last years had 
been constrained to adopt Western laws in criminal, commercial and other 
fields. In fact, these laws contradicted the Islamic law as we mentioned 
before. Therefore scholars had the right to insist on cancelling these laws, 
since the legitimacy of the government is based, as we also mentioned 
earlier, on the application of Islamic law. So this could not be considered as 
the reason for the current reluctance towards enacted laws that are not 
incompatible with Shari'ah. 
(b) Scholars, he claims, wanted to be more influential in the political decision- 
making domain. However, this reason is valid with the qualification that the 
scholars' aim is not personal (individual) interest (benefit) but rather to keep 
an influential position for the sake of protecting and applying Islamic law. 
(c) The main idea among ulama (scholars) is that God is the sole legislator and 
accepting man-made law could conflict with this thought. A deep 
understanding of the nature of Islamic law, however, might refute this 
argument mentioned by Al-Jarbou. The Islamic state has the right to adopt 
laws to regulate subjects on which Islamic law is silent or does not speak 
explicitly, as pointed out previously. 
(d) The rejection of laws in the Hijaz region aimed to reconfirm the idea that 
preserved legal areas exist which are to be governed only by the traditional 
Islamic Shari'ah, that exists in the books of old Islamic jurisprudence. 
Although this attitude is clearly recognized, that should not be deemed as the 
main obstacle to applying enacted laws because the same attitude is also 
found in procedural areas on which Islamic law is silent or provides little. In 
addition, this attitude is also found with regard to laws that do not contradict 
Islamic law. The main reasons for the attitude must be found elsewhere. 
To find the crucial underlying reasons for the traditionalists' reluctance to accept 
enacted laws, one must look more deeply into the basic viewpoints and training of 
Shari'ah judges. 
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Two main reasons explain their attitudes; the first arising from their deep- seated 
belief that all law must be interpreted from Islamic basic principles, and the second 
from the parameters within which Shari'ah judges are trained 
The first reason is that the main idea among Scholars or even laymen in Saudi Arabia 
is that accepting enacted laws could be a step towards the codification of Islamic law. 
Codification, it is argued, could end in replacing Islamic law with positive laws since 
codification makes Islamic laws mere provisions of law which could be subject to an 
amendment by the legislative authority simply by taking the necessarily legal 
procedures. They always support their argument by citing the replacements that have 
occurred in many Islamic or Arab countries. 
Even though this argument is logically established, some relevant points may be 
added. First, the traditionalists' objective is admittedly achieved. The judicial system 
in general still adheres to Islamic law and applies it in its purist form. This fact is 
admittedly recognized not only by Saudi citizens but also by foreigners who have 
been involved in Saudi law's experience. Jeffery K. Walker states that: "Saudi Arabia 
is the only major Arab country that still adheres to a more or less unamended form of 
Shari'ah"176. This is in fact the core and fundamental objective of both governors 
and citizens in Saudi Arabia177. 
Second, to draw comparisons between different societies the history of each society 
must be taken into consideration. Western Governments colonized most of the Arab 
and Islamic countries that replaced Islamic law by secular laws. This is doubtless an 
influential factor in such replacements particularly when we know that the presidents 
during and after the colonized regimes were supported by the colonizing states. The 
case is different in Saudi Arabia, which did not endure such trials and whose 
establishment was based on the application of Islamic law, both governors and 
citizens prefer the application of Shari'ah. 178 
176 
- Jeffrey K. Walker "The Rights of the Accused in Saudi Criminal Procedure". INTNL & 
Comparative Law JNL 1993 VOL. 15 P. 836. For the same meaning see Parker T. Hart "Application of 
Hanabalite and Decree Law to Foreigners in Saudi Arabia" George Washington Law Review. 1953 
Vol. 22 P. 165. "The Shari'a or sacred law, which is based not only on the Koran, but also on the 
traditional practices and saying (hadith) of the Prophet Mohammed, is virtually the sole body of law in 
Saudi Arabia. " 
177 
-It is common to hear that although there are some deficiencies in different aspect of administration, 
we (Saudi Arabia) still apply the Law of God, which is more important, and overrides any deficiency. 
178 
_ Vogel observes that: "in Saudi Arabia Western law and legal conception have not invaded the 
essential core of the legal system. Saudi Arabia never experienced the Western colonization that in 
virtually every other Muslim country drastically transformed the legal system. " Vogel, Frank Edward 
(1993) p. 18-19 
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The third point is as Al-Jarbou precisely puts it "by refusing to apply statutory laws, 
the Shari'ah courts have lost a great opportunity to establish a very strong 
constitutional review of legislative acts. "179 
Finally the Shari'ah courts' attitude has led to the eliminating of their jurisdiction 
from a considerable number of cases which could be tried by either the Board of 
Grievances or by the Semi- judicial committees that consist of members that have no 
Shari'ah or even legal qualification, as was explained above. 
The second reason for refusing to apply the enacted law may be attributed to the fact 
that judges in Shari'ah courts have no legal training other than in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Their qualification is limited to Islamic law. So if a judge is asked to 
apply provisions of law without understanding the purposes and objectives of that 
law, the judge would deem application of this law to be pointless. This reason is 
recognizable from the difference between judges in the Shari'ah courts and judges in 
the Board of Grievances. In spite of the fact that both are specialists in Islamic law 
and have studied in one of the Islamic universities, judges in the Board of Grievances 
have shown willingness to apply enacted laws and some of their decisions are based 
on legal theories because many of them have been given legal training in the Institute 
of Public Administration'80. In other words, modern life in Saudi Arabia has created 
new activities from which new crimes arise. Out of these activities have emerged new 
philosophies or interests which require protection by state intervention. The 
traditional judges do not know the new philosophy and therefore they are not ready to 
apply the legislation. 
To clarify this point the example of new ideas of commerce and business will be 
given. Modern commerce is based on two principles: (1) trust (2) speed. Creating an 
attractive atmosphere for investments is undoubtedly in the interest of society. 
Therefore, the state in Saudi Arabia has enacted laws to protect this interest, among 
them the Securities (Paper) Statute in which issuing (writing) uncovered checks (false 
checks) is criminalized and punishable. This act according to the law in Saudi Arabia 
is illegal despite the agreement between the beneficiary and the writer of the cheque 
to use the cheque as fiduciary means. This kind of crime is not covered in the old 
179 
- Ayoup Al-Jarbou (2002) p. 70 180 
- Such as doubt in legal cases must be interpreted in favour of the accused. See the presumption of 
innocence in chapter four of this thesis 
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Islamic jurisprudence, and in fact this act does not comprise a crime according to the 
Qur'an or the Sunnah. However, it is made an offence at the discretion of the state 
under the terms of Ta'azir crimes which tackle new types of offence for the protection 
of the interest of the state. By this law the state tries to protect the two principles 
mentioned above. The purpose of this law is that if such an act is tried according to 
ordinary ideas of (justice) the case will last for longer before the dispute is resolved 
and could end by acquitting the committer. This extended procedure is incompatible 
with the two-principles "trust and speed" on which the philosophy is based. 
Therefore, writing a cheque without due balance is a crime despite the writer's good 
faith. This philosophy is not known to traditional judges, who therefore regard it as 
not applicable. '8' 
Proposed solution: reconciliation of tradition with innovation? 
Emad Al-Najar182 suggests that if the existence of these committees continues it is 
better to enact a single law for all these committees which designate its jurisdiction, 
formation and procedures and to make all their rulings appealable before the Board of 
Grievances. Subjecting decisions taken by these committees to an appeal before the 
Board of Grievances will resolve deficiencies of these committees. Yet an important 
point to be noted in this regard is that appeal before the Board must be exercised 
before the Circuit committee in the Board and not before the Scrutinizing (Review) 
Committee. The reason for that is because the Scrutinizing Committee does not 
satisfy the requirement of the right to fair trial. The European Court of Human Rights 
points out that deficiency at one stage can be compensated if the decision concerned 
made appealable before a tribunal that satisfies the requirement of article 6 of the 
European Convention. 183 
This suggestion even though could satisfy standards of international human rights 
law; it does not root out the problem. Discussions provided above indicate that the 
main cause of this dilemma can be attributed mainly to an ideological cause. 
Therefore, an alternative solution proposed. 
To achieve reconciliation between traditionalist approaches and modern demands, 
three steps are proposed 
181 
- Another example is that the idea of subjecting administrative decisions to a judicial supervision is 
not part of their training. 
182 -(1997)p. 239 &240 '83 - Bryan v. The United Kingdom A335-A (1995) para. 40; Application No. 00019178/91 
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The first step towards eliminating the traditionalists' reluctance to apply enacted laws 
is to ask the Board of senior Ulema (jurists) to study the whole case. The Board 
should answer the question whether, if enacting laws that are considered to be in the 
interest of the state contain no provision contradicting the Shari'ah law, should they 
be permitted or forbidden. ' 84 
Although I am not personally qualified to render a fatwa (legal opinion) in this matter, 
the following points seem to indicate a positive answer: 1- the flexibility of the 
Islamic approach to legislation provides the state with discretion to regulate new 
matters that are not covered in Shari'ah. 2- The Ministry of Justice itself has proposed 
and adopted many laws such as the Law of the Judiciary, the Law of Civil Procedure 
before Shari'ah Courts Law and the Law of Criminal Procedures. 3- Judges in the 
Board of Grievances even though they have the same qualifications as judges in 
Shari'ah courts accept and apply enacted laws. 4- Some Shari'ah court judges 
strongly call for the adoption and application of new laws. 185 
The second step towards eliminating the traditionalists' reluctance is to agree that all 
drafted laws must be examined by the Board of Senior Ulema (jurists) before being 
enacted. However, this study must focus only on whether or not the law in question 
contains provisions that contradict Shari'ah Law. In other words, suitability or 
properness should be left to the legislative authority. 
As a third and final step, the training of judges should be extended to include, legal 
theories and principles. 
184 
- The aim of this question is to establish a legal ground on which any reformation in this regard will 
be based. 
185 
- See for instance an interview with a previous judge in the Shari'ah courts. Sheik Abdul-Muhsin 
Al-Obaikan. Mentioned above. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Fundamental Principles of the Saudi Criminal Law 
Introduction: 
This chapter concerns fundamental principles in the Saudi criminal law. It is divided 
into two parts. The first part is devoted to the presumption of innocence. The second 
part addresses the principle of legality. It is important to identify the relationship 
between these two principles in terms of criminal legitimacy, as Ahmad Adrees 
Ahmad has explained. 
Ahmad shows that the two principles together constitute the principle of criminal 
legitimacy. Together they protect personal freedom. The principle of legality is a 
subjective principle embodying the first basis of criminal legitimacy, and is 
considered to be the basis of subjective law. But this principle alone provides 
incomplete protection of freedom. Thus it is very important to provide a second basis 
on which to establish the criminal legitimacy principle. This second basis is the 
presumption of innocence. Ahmad concludes that if the principle of legality is the 
foundation of criminal subjective law, the presumption of innocence is the foundation 
of criminal procedural law. This relation, he argues, was confirmed in the 
international conference in New Delhi in 1959. ' 
Section I The Presumption of Innocence 
Muslim writers have only recently used the term "the presumption of innocence". A 
search in the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and old Islamic jurisprudence does not reveal such 
an expression. 
Even though Islamic law recognizes similar principles mentioned by early Islamic 
scholars, as will be explained later, many recent Muslim writers prefer to use the term 
"the presumption of innocence" rather than refer to the principles provided by the 
early scholars. This is perhaps because, through being confined to criminal matters, 
1- Ahmad Adrees Ahmad (1984) "Aftrad Bara't Al- Motahem" Unpublished PhD thesis, Cairo 
University p. 193-196. Hereinafter will refer to as Ahmad Adrees Ahmad (1984). The conference 
concluded that the application of the principle of legality implies the admission of the presumption of 
innocence. 
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the scope of the presumption of innocence is clearer than that of the principles 
provided by early Islamic jurisprudence, though both may produce similar outcomes. 
The majority of Muslim scholars2 argue that Islamic law has the capacity to adopt the 
presumption of innocence. Scholar Abraham Al-Eshaikh3, for example, states that 
justice requires that an accused should not be punished unless his guilt is proven by a 
final judgment, since every human being is presumed innocent. He declares that 
according to Islamic law it is forbidden to punish in the presence of doubt, because 
doubt should be construed in the interest of the accused4. Moreover, the Cairo 
Declaration of Human Rights in Islam declares in article 19 "A defendant is innocent 
until his guilt is proven in a fair trial in which he shall be given all the guarantees of 
defence. "S 
However, a prominent scholar (Abdullah Al-monee')6 argues against the applicability 
of Islamic law to the presumption of innocence. The following discussion will first 
carefully examine his argument, showing its fallacy in his understanding the exact 
meaning and scope of the presumption of innocence. Secondly, it will consider the 
application of the presumption of innocence in the judicial system in Saudi Arabia. 
2- Examples of this majority are: Al- Salah, 0 (1985) "The Right of the Individual to Personal Security 
in Islam" in M. Cherif Bassiouni. The Islamic Criminal Justice System. P. 65; Ahmad Adrees Ahmad 
(1984) P. 9 &10; Abu Musa Al-Ashary (a remarkable judge during the period of the Omer ibn Al 
Kattab, the Second ruler after the death of the Prophet) states that judge has no right to deliver his 
judgment unless justice is as clear as the night (darkness), is clear of daylight; Muhammad Mohee AI- 
Deen Owd (1988). Huquq Al-Insan Fi Al-Ijra'at Al-Jina'i. P. 3-5; Muhammad Al- Awa (1986) "A! - 
Asel Bara't Al- Motahem" "Al- Motahem wa Huquqh Fi Al-Shari'ah A! - Islami" . Essays 
in 
Symposium in the Arabic Centre for Security and Training Studies. Riyadh P. 249,250; - AL-Nadwee, 
A (2000) "Gemhurat AL- Goud AL- Fiqheeh Fi AL- Moamlat AL- Maleeh" Part. I p. 243; See also 
Omer, 0 (1988) "Huquq Al-Motahem Fi Al-Shari'ah Al-Island" Dissertation of Master submitted to 
Om Al Kora University in Saudi Arabia p. 22- 34 ; Abdulmajeed Muhmmud Matlob. (1982). Al-Asel 
Bara't Al-Motahem. Essays in symposium in the Arabic Centre for Security and Training Studies. 
Riyadh p. 232- 233; and Gamil Muhammad Hussein "Basic Guarantees in the Islamic Criminal Justice 
System". In Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Adel Omer Sherif, and Kate Daniels (2003). "Criminal Justice 
in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari'a". I. B. Tauris. London; New York, p, 45 
3-A previous Minster of justice in Saudi Arabia 
- Majelet Al Amen Wa Al he'at (1982). First year P. 30 S- The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has joined this Declaration. 
6 He is the President of the Court of Appeal in the Western Province and a member of the Senior 
Board of Scholars in Saudi Arabia 
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Scholar Abdullah al- Monee's perspective regarding the presumption of 
innocence': 
In his writing about the presumption of innocence, Al- Monee' argues that Islamic law 
cannot accommodate the idea that the accused must be presumed innocent until the 
contrary is proven. In order to advance his view he provides two main arguments: 
1- His first argument is based on the Arabic definitions of the words "Ateham" (i. e. 
accusation) on the one hand, and "Bara't" (i. e. innocence) on the other. He argues that 
there is a sharp contrast between the two words, which makes their combination 
impossible. He further explains that "Ateham" (accusation) and the "Bara't" 
(innocence) are at the two poles of the same axis. In respect of our consideration there 
is no distinction in their status, as there is no factual or imagined ground to give 
preference to one pole over the other. It is the circumstances surrounding the accused 
or the crime that cause one of the two poles to outbalance the other. Now, he 
continues to argue, if there are no circumstances supporting the charge against a 
particular person, this person cannot be called an accused and thus he cannot be 
arrested, detained etc. But, if circumstances support the criminal charge against a 
particular person, this person is then an accused and therefore he is not innocent 
because the accusation creates in our mind a status that contradicts innocence. An 
accusation in itself is a matter which has substance in the human mind. Therefore, the 
Arabic expression "Al- Asel Bara't Al- Motahem" (which is used to mean the 
presumption of innocence), is inconsistent with the meaning of the Arabic word 
"Ateham". 
2- On the basis of the above analysis, scholar Al- Monee' states that the application of 
the presumption of innocence leads to the situation that, even where the circumstantial 
evidence clearly supports the prosecution against the accused, pursuant to the 
presumption of innocence the authority concerned is not allowed to take any 
investigative actions, such as an arrest or detention, against this accused. Under the 
jurisdictions of the positive law, he explains, if the accused is arrested on being 
charged with committing the offence of murder or robbery, for example, and even if 
the accusation against him is supported by circumstances surrounding the case, the 
presumption of innocence functions as an obstacle to the proper administration of 
7- Abdullah Al- Monee' (1999) Baheth Fi Qa'dat Al-Motahem Bre'a Hata Tathbot Edantoh. in 
"Majmo' Fartawa Wa Bohooth" Volume No 4 Dar Al- Aseemah Le- Ancher Wa Al Tozeeh. Riyadh. 
Saudi Arabia. P 389- 411 
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justice. This is because, as he claims, according to this principle, the accused cannot 
be subjected to the investigation procedures unless conclusive evidence to prove the 
crime exists. 
On contrast the Islamic judiciary, he points out, cannot exclude from its consideration 
those circumstances and inferences that support the accusation. Therefore, the 
Islamic judiciary does not guarantee absolute innocence for a person unless the 
accusation against him is not supported by circumstances. 
However, a closer investigation of the above view reveals its fallacy: 
In respect of the first argument, regardless of the correctness of the claim that the 
word "Ateham" is inconsistent with the word "Bara't" and therefore their 
combination is impossible, Arabic semantics are of no significance. The principle of 
the presumption of innocence appeared initially in non-Arabic societies and was then 
translated into Arabic. What is important here is the legal meaning and consequences. 
In fact, the ambiguity regarding the Arabic meaning of presumption of innocence is, 
perhaps, caused by some writers who translate the principle into the Arabic term "Al- 
Asel Bara't Al- Motahem". The latter expression consists of three words. The word 
"Al- Asel" means "the original status", the word "Bara't" means "innocence", and the 
third word is "Al- Motahem" which means "the accused". The combination of these 
three words thus translates into English, as "the original status of the accused is 
innocence". This translation lacks precision because the opposite of innocence is 
guilt, not accusation. Accusation in reality is a status between guilt and innocence. 
Therefore, the correct translation into Arabic is "Aftrad Bara't Al- Motahem". The 
word "Aftrad" means presumption. This translation gives the correct meaning of the 
principle. It alludes to the fact that due to the circumstances surrounding the accused 
and the crime, he is not in absolute innocence. But despite all that, in order to achieve 
the required impartiality, the authority concerned, while treating the accused, must 
presume his innocence and not his guilt. 
With regard to the second argument, scholar Al- Monee' refers to man-made laws, but 
he does not mention a particular law. It seems that he assumes that all positive laws 
apply the principle in a unified manner and thus he speaks of the general meaning of 
the presumption of innocence. Generally speaking, his understanding of the scope 
and consequences of the presumption of innocence is completely misleading. The 
presumption of innocence does not prevent the state concerned from exercising its 
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power to investigate the crime and subjecting the accused to the investigation 
procedures such as arrest, detention, interrogation etc. Moreover, the application of 
the presumption of innocence does not exclude the use of circumstantial evidence. 
The standard of evidence is a matter left to every individual state. Precisely, the 
presumption of innocence as declared by the European Court of Human Rights, 
requires that: "when carrying out their duties, the members of the court should not 
start with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence charged; 
the burden of proof is on the prosecution and any doubt should benefit the accused. It 
also follows that it is for the prosecution to inform the accused of the case that will be 
made against him, so that he may prepare and present his defence accordingly, and to 
adduce evidence sufficient to convict him". 
s 
In short, the presumption of innocence requires mainly three guarantees: (1) judges 
should not start their consideration with the preconceived idea that the accused is 
guilty; (2) the burden of proof must lie with the state, and (3) any doubt concerning 
the evidence has to be interpreted in favour of the accused. 
A third point that could be addressed here to challenge Scholar at - Monee's view is 
that Islamic law is not only capable of adopting the presumption of innocence, but 
also it provides principles that have the same meaning and consequences as the 
presumption of innocence. There are three relevant principles which will be explained 
in the following, but one should mention, inter alia, that the application of these 
principles is not restricted within the criminal field only, but extends to a wider scope. 
Islamic law applies these principles to all branches of law. 
9 However, our discussion 
here regarding these principles will be limited to criminal matters. 
(1) "Al- Asel Bara't Al-deamah"10 this principle consists of three Arabic words; the 
first is "Al- Asel" which means the original status; and the two words "Bara't" and 
"Al-deamah" together mean acquittance (quit- claim)". The combination of these 
words translates into English as "the original status (of a person) is acquittance". The 
8-Barbera, Messegue and Jabardo v Spain (1988) 11 E. H. R. R. 360 
9- Muhammad Al Moheedeef (1993) "Darah Al- Uqubat bee Alshobehat" Part I p. 87. hereinafter will 
refer to as Muhammad Al Moheedeef (1993) 
10 
- AL-Nadwee, A (2000). Gemhurat AL- Goud AL- Fiqheeh Fi AL- Moamlat AL- Maleeh. Part. I P. 
242. Sharkat Al- Rajhee Al- Masrefeah LL- Istethmar. (Al-Raghee Firm for Banking Investment). See 
also Mohammad Hashim Kamli "The Right to Personal Safety (Huq-Anus) and the Principle of 
Legality in Islamic Shari'a". In Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Adel Omer Sherif, and Kate Daniels 
(2003). "Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari'a". I. B. Tauris. London; New 
York, p, 65 
11 
-Rohi Baalabki (2001) "Al- Mawrid" A modern Arabic -English Dictionary. Dar El- Ilm 
Lilmalayin. P. 230. 
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starting point of this principle is that every person is born free (innocent) of guilt. The 
Prophet said: "every child is born free of sins until his own tongue expresses for him ". 
This is, simply, the meaning of the term "the original status is acquittance". 
This principle is linked with the principle of "Astashab Al-Bara't" which means in 
this context the presumption of continuity of the original "acquittance". After being 
born innocent, and while growing up, a person must be presumed innocent until the 
contrary is proven. In the criminal field these two principles simply mean that the 
accused must be presumed innocent until guilt is proved. 12 
(2) "Al- Yageen La Yazol Bi Ashak". This principle consists of five words: "Al- 
Yageen " which means certainty; La which means "is not"; Yazol which means 
"exclude"; Bi means "by"; and finally, Ashak which means "doubt". In combination 
of their meaning, in English, is "Certainty is not excluded by doubt". The principle 
means that any matter that is originally proved with certainty should not be 
overridden or excluded by doubt, but only through a similar certainty 
13. If this 
principle is linked to the two principles mentioned above one can argue that the fact 
that a person is born innocent (original innocence) is certainty. This certainty about 
original innocence cannot be excluded (invalidated) by doubt. Thus, evidence to 
prove the guilt must be sufficient, and any doubt regarding the evidence must benefit 
the accused, because his original innocence is certainly established. 
(3) "Al- Bayyina Ala Al - Moda'ee" this principle consists of three words. The word 
"Al- Bayyina" means "evidence"; "Ala" means "lie" or "bear"; and "Al- Moda'ee" 
means "the plaintiff or the prosecution". This may be rendered in English as "the 
burden of evidence lies with the plaintiff'. The legal source for this principle is that, 
the Prophet said: were people (to) be given what they claim (without proving their 
claim) some would have claimed the lives and properties of others but the oath is 
required from the defendant and the evidence from the claimant. " 14 In a criminal 
context, this principle means that the prosecution must adduce the evidence. 
Strictly speaking, Islamic law requires (a) the accused is originally innocent, (b) his 
innocence must be presumed till guilt is proved, (c) his guilt is only proved by 
conclusive evidence and any doubt will be interpreted in the accused's interest, and 
(d) the burden of proof is on the prosecution. Obviously, this requirement is consistent 
12 
- Muhammad Al Moheedeef (1993) p. 88 13 
- Muhammad Mohee Al-Deen Owd (1989). P3-5 14 
- Al- Bukhari (4552) & Muslim (1711). 
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with international human rights requirements in respect of the presumption of 
innocence. 
Finally, it is very difficult to repair any damage caused by miscarriage of justice, 
which eventually could affect confidence in the judicial system. Therefore, to avoid 
such damage the investigation and the judicial authorities should presume while 
dealing with the accused that they are dealing with an innocent person 15. In addition, 
the presumption of innocence is required in all aspects of life because if the innocence 
of the accused is not assumed, he will be required to prove a passive position and 
without the presumption of innocence the accused faces the onerous if not impossible 
16 burden of proving he did not commit the crime. 
The application of the presumption of innocence in the judicial system in Saudi 
Arabia 
In order to examine whether the judicial system in Saudi Arabia has understood and 
applied the presumption of innocence in a manner consistent with international human 
rights standards, in particular that provided by the European Court of Human Rights, 
a selection of judgments will be discussed. It is worth mentioning, however, that 
although it has been pointed out in the introduction of this thesis that the study will be 
limited to the main bodies of the judicial system in Saudi Arabia and thus that the 
administrative committees are excluded, a number of judgments delivered by the 
Customs Committee are referred to here, because the presumption of innocence is 
often a problematic issue in respect of cases tried before the Customs Committee. 
It is obvious from the European Court's approach that the most important 
requirements of applying the presumption of innocence in the trial stage are that the 
burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and that any doubt should benefit the 
accused. 
With regard to the first point, namely that the burden of proof lies with the state, the 
judicial system in Saudi Arabia requires that judgments should only be based on 
certainty and cannot be based on doubt. So the prosecutor, in order to have the 
accused convicted, must adduce sufficient evidence. 
15 
- Muhmmud Mustafa (1977) "Al- Ithbat Fi Al- Mawad Al- Jina'i Fi Al- Qanoon Al- Mogarn" p. 56. 
Cairo University Press Hereinafter will refer to as Muhmmud Mustafa (1977). 
16 
- Al-Salah, 0 (1985) "The Right of the Individual to Personal Security in Islam" The Islamic 
Criminal Justice System. P. 66 
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For example, the Board of Grievances held "since there is no other evidence except 
the testimony of the other accused which is insufficient to prove guilt, and because 
judgment must be based on certainty and decisiveness and cannot be based on doubt, 
the accused is not guilty"17. On a different occasion the Board also ruled, " despite 
the suspicion surrounding the accused's action it cannot be determined that the 
accused has committed the crime of promoting counterfeiting, because judgment 
should only be based on certainty and decisiveness and cannot be based on doubt"18. 
In another case the accused was charged with forgery. The prosecution supported its 
accusation with the following evidence: (a) two of the accused's close relatives 
testified against him; (b) a forensic report confirmed that the handwriting on the 
license concerned was identical to the accused's handwriting. The Board, however, 
held "hearsay evidence cannot be used as evidence because the witness has not heard 
the testimony from the accused directly. In addition, conviction cannot be solely based 
on the criminal (expert) report because this report is also subject to the probability of 
right and wrong. Despite the suspicion which strongly surrounds the accused, the 
accusation has no conclusive evidence. Therefore, the accused is not convicted "19. 
Furthermore, the Board's decision no H/1/1(1421 H) declares that a multiplicity of 
possibilities and lack of definite evidence supporting them make the evidence 
presented by the accused in his defence an outstanding possibility, against which it 
will be impossible to confirm validity of the charge. Accordingly, evidence presented 
to the effect that the accused had perpetrated the forgery is not sufficient. 
Similarly, the Customs Committee has reiterated on a number of occasions "In 
criminal cases conviction must be based on certainty and cannot be based on doubt or 
conjecture. "20 
In respect of the second requirement, namely that any doubt regarding the evidence is 
interpreted in favour of the accused, The Board of Grievances pointed out: "Criminal 
intent is one of the bases of the crime of forgery and the circumstances surrounding 
the crime create doubt regarding the existence of criminal intent. This doubt must be 
interpreted in favour of the accused. Therefore, the accused is innocent . 
1 
17 
- Decision No. 142/ DG/2 (1421 H) 18 
- Decision No. 181D/G/3 (1421 H) 19 
- Decision No. 155/ D G/ 2 (1421 H) ""0 
- Decision No. (67) (1415 H); & Decision No. (20) (1416 H) 21 
- Decision No. 162/ D/ G (1422 H) 
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In another case a dentist in a private clinic was charged with a forgery, after a 
complaint from a patient, because he signed a document and sent it to an insurance 
company on behalf of the patient without permission. In his defence the accused 
claimed that he had acted in the interest of the patient to speed up the treatment 
process. He added that if he had had ill- intention he could have concealed the 
document in question so that the patient had no access to it. In its judgment the Board 
declared, "To be established, the crime of forgery requires a criminal intent. That is 
to say, while committing the act the accused is aware that he is changing the facts. 
Moreover, claims adduced by the accused in his counter defence are considered as 
outstanding probabilities that repudiate the existence of the criminal intent. Because 
the evidence is insufficient and since conviction should only be based on certainty and 
decisiveness, doubt is construed in favour of the accused. The accused is then not 
guilty. "" 
To the same effect the Customs Committee has reiterated, "Where it is not proved 
with certainty that the accused has committed the crime of customs smuggling this 
should benefit the accused according to the general principle in criminal cases, that is 
to say doubt should be interpreted in favour of the accused. Therefore, the accused is 
not guilty. "23 
Nevertheless, since some types of offence such as smuggling drugs involve a high 
social risk, or because this type of crime creates difficulty in respect of proving the 
case against the accused, the onus of proof is exceptionally shifted from the 
prosecution to the accused. This exception is grounded on the principle of 
proportionality, which means that a balance needs to be struck between the interest of 
the accused in protecting his rights on the one hand, and on the other the interest of 
society at large in protecting its members from the danger of certain sorts of crime. 
Applying the presumption of innocence in smuggling offences, for instance, will 
result in making proof against the accused impossible. If a person receives cargo from 
abroad and the custom authority discovers that this cargo contains illegal goods, in 
this case the person will claim that he did not know about the cargo even if it has been 
sent under his name, or he may claim that he was expecting legal goods and did not 
know about the forbidden goods. 
22 
- Decision No. 169/ D/ G/ 1 (1422 H) 23 
- Decision No. (2) (1410 H) 
156 
In these cases usually the only means of proof is the search minutes. These cannot be 
regarded in themselves as conclusive evidence. However, in view of the nature of this 
kind of crime the Committee may base its judgment on this evidence, though it is not 
conclusive, if the accused fails to adduce counter evidence refuting the credibility of 
the minutes or supporting his claim. In this case the burden of proof is shifted from the 
prosecution, and the accused has to prove that the cargo in question does not belong to 
him or to prove that he did not know about the illegal goods, or at least to raise a 
reasonable doubt regarding these two points. The Committee then weighs the evidence 
presented by the two parties (the prosecution and the accused) and decides on this 
basis. Such an approach is justified in such cases because this is the only means of 
proving violation of the Customs law, and more importantly this approach can be 
compared with the understanding provided by the European Court of Human Rights in 
respect of the presumption of innocence. 24 
However, a very significant matter in this regard is the standard of burden that the 
accused shall bear in order to challenge the accusation. In fact, from a number of 
decisions from the Customs Committee it can be seen that in balancing the evidence 
the element of doubt tends to weigh in favour of the accused. For example, when a 
private firm was charged with smuggling a container of alcohol25, the Committee 
ruled, "since the cargo in question was landed at Jeddah seaport and remained for a 
long time and the fire concerned has not applied to get it permitted; and because this 
firm did not produce the importation list, thereby making its claim that it did not know 
about this cargo a plausible claim; and because judgment in criminal matters should 
be based only on certainty and cannot be based on doubt. Therefore the Committee is 
obliged to construe the doubt to the accused's benefit. " 26 
In another case a person was charged with smuggling counterfeit money in Riyadh 
Airport. In his defence the accused claimed that he did not know that the money was 
counterfeit. 
24 
- Salabiaku v France (1988) Para 28 (Application No. 000 1 05 1 9/83) 25 
- Alcohol is forbidden in Saudi Arabia. 26 
- Decision No. (9) (1414 H) 
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The Committee concluded that since the accused did not use illegal means to smuggle 
this money and did not conceal it but rather let it be clearly seen, and because doubt 
must be construed in favour of the accused, the guilt is not proven'`. 
However, these applications lack a legal tool by which members of the responsible 
body can evaluate whether the required proof of the accused breaches his right to be 
presumed innocent. Without a proper legal tool, assessment of the accused's counter- 
evidence may not be based on objective premises, and the outcome of the assessment 
may vary according to who undertakes it. To fill this gap it might be suggested that a 
tool that is applied by the English judicial system to resolve this problem be used. As 
we mentioned before, English courts make a distinction between two kinds of burden. 
The first is the law or persuasive burden, and the second is the evidential burden. The 
former requires the accused to prove, on a balance of probabilities, a fact that is 
essential to the determination of his guilt or innocence. It reverses the burden of proof 
by removing it from the prosecution and transferring it to the accused. But the latter 
entails the burden upon the accused of introducing evidence in support of his case. It 
requires only that the accused adduces sufficient evidence to raise an issue before it 
has to be determined as one of the fact in the case. Since the prosecution does not 
need to bring any evidence on this point, the accused must do so if he wishes the point 
to be made. Nonetheless, and this perhaps more importantly, if the point is made, the 
burden of proof remains with the prosecution. The accused need only raise a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 28 David M. Tanovich explains the difference 
between the legal and evidential burdens as that "a persuasive or legal burden 
requires the accused to convince the trier of fact that a certain set of facts existed in 
order to discharge the burden. A failure to establish or disprove a set of facts, on a 
balance of probabilities, means that the accused will be convicted even though the 
trier of fact may have a reasonable doubt. ... unlike the persuasive burden, an 
evidential burden does not require the accused to convince the trier of fact of 
anything. However, evidential burdens when accompanied by a mandatory 
presumption resemble a reverse onus clause as they mandate a finding if the accused 
fails to discharge the burden... to discharge an evidential burden, an accused need 
27 
- Decision No. (74) 1415 H) 28 
- See the case of Rv DPP, p Kebeline. [ 1999] 4 All ER 801-859; & the case of Rv Lambert [2001] 3 
All ER 577-644 
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only raise a reasonable doubt by pointing out evidence which suggest that certain 
facts exist. " , 
29 
Accordingly, once the onus of proof is shifted the court concerned can only impose 
the evidential burden upon the accused, because imposing a legal or persuasive onus 
violates the presumption of innocence. 
This is a very helpful tool that the judicial system in Saudi Arabia in general could 
benefit from in order to make their consideration as to the presumption of innocence 
compatible with the European standard of human rights especially since imposing 
evidential burden satisfies the European Convention on Human Rights. 30 
Section II The Principle of Legality 
The expression `legality' is not found in the Qur'an, the Sunnah, or old Islamic 
jurisprudence, and the concept was first introduced in Europe. The central question to 
be addressed in this discussion of legality is whether or not the same principle is also 
applied in and throughout Islamic law. 
Since the principle is of European origin, its exact meaning and the precise application 
can best be studied in a European context such as the European Court of Human 
Rights. Yet for the sake of illustration reference also will be made to the common 
law's application of this principle. 
The scope and application of the principle of legality in Western thought 
The term "legality" has two distinct meanings. Relating respectively to one a broader, 
and one a more specific, area of application. The latter, that of legality in criminal 
sphere, is the main subject of this discussion; however for the sake of clarity the 
former meaning of legality will first be indicated. 
In its broad meaning it has been used to indicate the conditions necessary to make a 
proper law, be it civil or criminal. Fuller (1969), for instance, employs the word 
"legality" in his attempt to describe ways in which laws fail to be valid. He limits 
these to the following: 
29 
- David M. Tanovich "The Unravelling of Golden Thread: The Supreme Court's Compromise of the 
Presumption of Innocence" The Criminal Law Quarterly Vol 35, No 1 (1993) p 195-195 3° 
- Sec R v. Lambert [2001] 3 All ER 577-644 
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(a) A failure to achieve rules at all, as a result of which each case must be judged 
individually. 
(b) A failure to promulgate the rules. 
(c) A failure to apply the rules prospectively. 
(d) A failure to state the rules with sufficient clarity. 
(e) A failure to enact consistent rules. 
(f) A failure to make the rules accessible to the affected party. 
(g) A failure to avoid instability of rules by introducing frequent changes. 
(h) A failure to apply the declared rules. 3' 
These aspects provide eight standards by which the achievement of "legality" is 
tested. Fuller thus stipulates that legality requires the rules to be perfectly clear, 
consistent with one another, known to every citizen, and non-retroactive. 32 However, 
he correctly reveals an important point in this matter. That is to say, it is never 
possible to achieve ultimate certainty with regard to what the law prohibits. Fuller 
comments: "whether we are concerned with legal or moral duties, we are able to 
develop standards which designate with some precision - though it is never complete - 
. the 
kind of conduct that is to be avoided" 33 
In this sense the term "legality" is used to mean the rule of law as defined by F. A. 
Hayek in these terms: "stripped of all technicalities this means that government in all 
its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand- rules which make it 
possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
given circumstances, and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge". 34 
Moreover, Joseph Raz believes that although the principle that the making of 
particular laws should be guided by open and relatively stable general rules is the 
crucial principle of the rule of law, it does not exhaust the scope of the rule of law. 
Thus, he states that the rule of law means, "The law must be capable of guiding the 
behavior of its subjects. It is evident that this conception of the rule of law is a formal 
one. It says nothing about how law is to be made: by tyrants, democratic majorities 
31 
- Fuller, L (1969) "The Morality of Law". New Haven and London, Yale University Press. p. 39. 
Hereinafter will refer to as Fuller (1969) 32-Ibid, 
p. 41 
33 
- Ibid, p. 42 34 
- Hayek, F "The Road to Serfdom", (1944) p. 54. Quoted in Raz, J "The Rule of Law and its Virtue". 
The Law Quarterly Review Volume 93.1977 London, Steven & Sons Limited. P. 195 
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or any other way. It says nothing about fundamental rights, about equality or 
justice". 35 
He further explains that the rule of law has three valuable aspects. Firstly, the rule of 
law is in most circumstances incompatible with arbitrary authority. Consistent with 
this doctrine is the implication that changing the law retroactively or abruptly or 
secretly is prohibited. Raz insists "the one area where the rule of law excludes all 
forms of arbitrary power is in the law-applying function of the judiciary where the 
courts are required to be subject only to the law and to conform to fairly strict 
procedures". Secondly, it is a virtue of the rule of law that it protects personal 
freedom. Thirdly, the application of the rule of law is a fundamental guarantee of 
respect for human dignity, inasmuch as, as Raz correctly states, "respecting human 
dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and plotting their 
future". 36 
Thus, discussion must now focus on the second meaning of the term. That is to say, 
the principle of legality in the criminal sphere. 
The principle of legality in the criminal sphere, historically speaking, was first 
mentioned in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, 178937. Although in this 
sense the principle of legality might be considered as "a legal transplant" to the 
common law from the recent civilian codes of the post-revolutionary period, it has 
deep roots in common law. According to the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 only those 
offences included in the original list of felonies could be regarded as indictable 
crimes. Through the ages the list was extended by adding other conducts to meet the 
exigencies of the day. The legality principle from the late medieval until the early 
modern time can be recognized in the growing specificity of indictments. The content 
of the principle of legality today is also seen where an accused contests an indictment 
on the ground that the offence is unknown. 38 
In Latin, the principle of legality in criminal law is termed "Nullum crimen sine lege, 
nulla poena sine lege" which means, "There must be no crime nor punishment except 
35 
- Raz, J "The Rule of Law and its Virtue". The Law Quarterly Review Volume 93.1977 London, 
Steven & Sons Limited. P 199 
36 
- Ibid, p 202 & 204 37 
- Although the principle had been mentioned earlier by some legal writers, the French Declaration is 
considered as its first important formulation. See Williams, G (1961) "Criminal Laid". London. 
Stevens & Sons Limited P. 576. hereinafter will refer to as Williams, G (1961) 
38 
- McAuley, F and McCutcheon, J (2000) "Criminal Liability: A Grammar". Round Hall Sweet & 
Maxwell. Dublin p. 43. hereinafter will refer to as McAuley, and McCutcheon, (2000) 
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in accordance with fixed predetermined law"39. It is also defined as: "the idea that 
conduct should not be punished as criminal unless it has been clearly and precisely 
prohibited by the terms of a preexisting rule of law"40. 
This meaning of the principle of legality is often used in England under the terms of 
rule of law. 41 A. V. Dicey in his comments on de Tocqueville's writings, which 
compared Switzerland and England in 1836 in terms of the spirit pervading their laws 
and manners, states that in common law what we mean by the term "rule of law" 
includes three distinct concepts: 
(1) The principle of legality: the rule of law means that no person is punishable except 
for a clear infringement of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the 
ordinary courts. In this sense, he explains, the rule of law is in conflict with exercises 
of arbitrary discretion on the part of the government; because wherever there is 
discretion there is room for arbitrariness. 
(2) Equal treatment: the rule of law means that every person whatever his social status 
is subject to the ordinary law and tribunal. 
(3) Law developed by courts and not imposed centrally: here the rule of law means 
that the source for the general principles of the constitution in common law is the 
courts' decisions (the English Constitution is unwritten Constitution), while in other 
countries the source is the general principle of the constitution. 42 
However, it should not be suggested that the conception of legality in common law 
was similar to the modern concept. Judges developed common law, and until the 
eighteenth century the court could punish wrongdoers for conduct that did not 
conform precisely to the definition of a recognized crime. This practice was applied 
until legislation became the primary source of law. 43 
The modern formula of the principle of legality requires that legislative rules must be 
clear and precise to eliminate effectively the need for creative interpretation by the 
courts 44. The court should not be empowered to punish on the ground that the 
conduct conflicts, in its opinion, with moral or social values. 45 Accordingly, Glanville 
39 
- Williams, G (1961) p. 575 40 
- McAuley and McCutcheon, (2000) p. 42 41 
- Ashworth, A (1999) "Principles of Criminal Law". Oxford University Press. p. 70. hereinafter will 
refer to as Ashworth, A (1999) 
42 
- AN Dicey (1959) "An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution". The Macmillan 
Press Ltd. London and Basingstoke. P. 188 & 196. 
43 
- McAuley and McCutcheon, J (2000) p. 43 & 44 44 
- Ibid, p. 45 45 
- Fitzgerald, P (1962) "Criminal Law and Punishment". Oxford at the Clarendon Press. P. 169 
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Williams precisely describes the purpose of the principle of legality as: "the citizen 
must be able to ascertain beforehand how he stands with regard to criminal law, 
otherwise to punish him for breach of that law is purposeless cruelty. Punishment in 
all its forms is a loss of rights or advantage consequent on a breach of law. When it 
loses this quality it degenerates into an arbitrary act of violence that can produce 
nothing but bad social effects. Opinions about what people ought morally to do are 
almost as numerous as human beings, but opinions about what people are obliged 
legally to do should be capable of being ascertained by legal research. °, 46 
The importance of this principle arises from the fact that individuals should know the 
law before it can be fair to convict them of an offence, and both the judicial and 
legislative authorities must exercise their function consistent with rule of law by not 
criminalizing behavior that was not illegal when committed. 47 
As far as The European Convention on Human Rights is concerned, it does not 
mention directly the term "legality". Article 7 as we have stated in chapter two is 
primarily concerned with the principle of non-retroactivity in the criminal sphere48. 
However, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this article as to 
embody the principle of legality. The Court held that: "Article 7 Para 1 of the 
Convention is not confined to prohibiting the retrospective application of the criminal 
law to an accused's disadvantage. It also embodies, more generally, the principle that 
only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty... and the principle that the 
criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused's detriment for instance 
by analogy, it follows from this that an offence must be clearly defined in law. This 
condition is satisfied where the individual can know, from the wording of the relevant 
provision and, if need be, with the assistance of (the) court's interpretation of it, what 
acts and omissions will make him liable. , 49 
Components of the principle of legality: 
The principle of legality embodies four components: (1) the criminal law should not 
be applied retroactively; (2) the criminal law should be formulated to maximum 
46 
- Williams, G (1961)p. 575&576 47 
- Ashworth, A (1999) p. 70 48 
- Article 7 provides: "I- No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time 
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the 
time the criminal offence was committed. 2- this article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of 
any person of any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations". 49- Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) Para 52 (Application No. 00014307/88) 
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certainty; (3) it should be strictly interpreted 50 ; (4) the criminal law must be 
accessible. 
(1) Non-retroactivity: 
Since the non-retroactivity principle was discussed in chapter two, it is enough to 
remember that article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights implies two 
principles: (a) the law must have existed before the act or omission in question was 
committed for the conviction to be based on it; (b) no heavier penalty will be imposed 
than was in force at the time the conduct was committed. 
(2) Maximum certainty of criminal law: 
It is argued that the law and in particular the criminal law must be certain, to the 
extent that: "a man should be able to know (in advance) what conduct is and what is 
not criminal. Particularly when heavy penalties are involved". This argument goes on 
to state that "unless we are certain about the criminal law one cannot tell what is 
criminal except by guessing what view a jury will take, and juries' views may vary 
and change with passing of time". 51 
The importance of the principle of maximum certainty arises from two points. On the 
one hand, treating a citizen as a rational, autonomous person entails that criminal law 
must be precise and clear. This condition is only achieved, as Andrew Ashworth 
correctly suggests, if the criminal provisions "keep close to moral distinctions that 
are both theoretically defensible and widely felt". 52 On the other hand, drafting vague 
rules might lead to empowering an executive body with undesirably wide discretion to 
criminalize conducts not criminalized beforehand by the legislative authority. 53 
The principle of maximum certainty is known in America as the "fair warning" and 
"void for vagueness". There is a close connection between the principle of maximum 
certainty and the principle of non- retroactivity in criminal law because an unclear 
statute is more likely to be applied retroactively if individuals are less sure whether a 
given conduct is lawful or not. An important feature of the American law is that 
courts in the United States have the power to declare the unconstitutionality of 
criminal legislation if it is vague, while the English courts are empowered to declare 
that the legislation at hand is incompatible with the Human Rights Act but not to 
50 
- McAuley and McCutcheon (2000) p. 45 51 
- Shaw v D. P. P. (Director of Public Prosecutions) The Law Reports (1962) 220-294 52 
- Ashworth, A (1999) p. 77 51 
- Ibid, p. 77 
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amend the law. The European Court of Human Rights has not yet made an 
application to abolish a vague statute. 
Yet the scope of the precision or certainty is a matter of degree. Two issues should be 
examined in this regard. First, whether an existing rule is deemed to be not vague if 
its terms can justify the punishment of a person who has failed to conform to it. In 
other words, whether the uncertainty or imprecision of a rule prevents the accused 
from being given a fair chance to adjust his behavior accordingly. S4 Second, whether 
applying the existing rules to a new offence by analogy conflicts with the second 
component of the principle of legality, namely that criminal law should be clear and 
precise. The discussion necessary to address these two issues will focus on the 
standard of certainty required by the European Court of Human Rights and the 
English law. 
With regard to the first point, the application of maximum certainty is not absolute. 
In theory the rule of law requires complete certainty. But as Andrew Ashworth points 
out "this is rarely possible in view of the varying elements which may bear on the 
characterization of conduct as criminal. Unless the criminal law occasionally resorts 
to such open-ended terms as "reasonable" and "dishonest", it would have to rely on. 
immensely detailed and lengthy definitions which might be extremely complicated and 
which might still fail to cover the ground. " 55 
It might be argued that codification of the criminal law is a suitable means to meet the 
terms of maximum certainty. This argument can be advanced on two grounds. 
Firstly, codification provides clear definitions for the major offences in a single 
accessible document. This serves as a fair warning to the citizen. Secondly, 
codification would weaken the courts' power to create new forms of crimes or to 
extend existing crimes significantly. This claim is however not persuasive: Ashworth 
correctly rejects it when he states: "changes of this kind are not inherent in all 
codification exercises. In practice a great deal would depend on the approach of the 
judiciary to the priorities with which the code is drafted. If the code still contains 
wide or vaguely-worded crimes ... that 
is hardly a great improvement in certainty". 56 
With regard to the standard of certainty required by the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the Court declared that Article 7 requires that no person can be 
54 
- McAuley and McCutcheon, J (2000) p. 46 ss - Ashworth, A (1999) p. 78 56 
- Ashworth, A (1999) p. 77 
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convicted if he could not have known beforehand that such an act was criminal. 
However, the Court has noted that the wording of many statutes is sometimes 
imprecise. The need to avoid excessive rigidity and keep pace with changing 
circumstances means that some legislation is inevitably couched in terms which, to a 
greater or lesser extent, are vague. 57 The Court also held that: "an offence must be 
clearly defined in law. This condition is satisfied where the individual can know, from 
the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of (the) 
court's interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him liable. " 58 
Moreover, and more interestingly, the standard of certainty was applied flexibly in 
Steel v. UK59 when the Court used the word "reasonable" to describe the required 
level of certainty. In this case the Court held that the offence meets the standard of 
certainty if it is: "sufficiently precise to allow the citizen- if need be, with appropriate 
advice- to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail. " 
As far as the English law is concerned, even though the claim that the principle of 
legality can be fully applied in statutory laws is, at least in theory, relatively 
persuasive, the claim of complete application of the principle in case law systems is 
not persuasive, either in theory or in practice. P. J. Fitzgerald states that despite the 
fact that many countries have adopted the legality principle, it has not yet been 
accepted in England as a rule of law60. He offers two reasons for this: 
First: the fact that the criminal rules in common law are judge-made laws, and that 
judgments are often retroactive in that the verdict relates back to the facts and 
circumstances that led to the hearings. This fact, his argument goes, cannot be 
concealed by the claim that the courts do not create rules but merely apply the 
existing law to new facts, because any judicial extension of the criminal law will lead 
to punishing someone for an act which could not before the final judgment of the case 
have been known to be criminal . 
61 
Second: Fitzgerald argues that English Parliament has absolute sovereignty. It is 
under no restriction, save the procedural requirement, to make what law it likes. 
Therefore, any law can easily be repealed. As a result, he argues, "any statutory 
57 
- Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993) Para 40 (Application No. 00014307/88) 58 
- Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993) Para 52 (Application No. 00014307/88) 59- (1998) EHRR 603 
60 
- For example, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and the 
U. S. A. 
61 
- Fitzgerald, P (1962) "Criminal Law and Punishment". Oxford at the Clarendon Press p. 170 &171. 
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formulation of the rule against retroactive legislation would have no particular legal 
force" 
. 
6' 
A famous example of this certainty in English law is the Shaw case63. In this case it 
was contended that a conspiracy to corrupt public morals is not a crime known to the 
common law. Parliament in the last 100 years had concerned itself with legislation on 
issues of morality, decency, and the like; ruling that such legislation must be taken to 
be in effect a comprehension code; and that there is no longer any occasion for the 
court to create new offences in its capacity as custos rnorum. This claim, 
nevertheless, was challenged on the following grounds: 
(1) That a conspiracy to corrupt public morals was a common law misdemeanour. (2) 
That courts of criminal law are still empowered to "enforce the supreme and 
fundamental purposes of law to conserve not only the safety and order but also the 
moral welfare of the state... " (3) That the attitude towards some acts will not be 
regarded in all times in the same way. What was prohibited in the past can be made 
legal in the present and vice versa. Although Parliament has enacted legislations to 
cover most offences, gaps remain and will always remain because it is impossible to 
foresee all kinds of conduct that disrupt the order of society. (4) That certainty is a 
most desirable attribute of both criminal and civil law. However, there are matters 
which must ultimately depend on the opinion of a jury. So in the case of a charge of 
conspiracy to corrupt public morals the uncertainty that necessarily arises from the 
vagueness of general words can only be resolved by the opinion of twelve persons. 
Accordingly, the House of Lords ruled 64that "there was in the courts as custodes 
rnorum of the people a residual power, where no statutes had yet intervened to 
supersede the common law, to superintend those offences which were prejudicial to 
public welfare. " 
In addition, it is argued in Knuller v. D. P. P that: "it was suggested and it has been 
suggested that there is an element of uncertainty which attaches to the offence of 
conspiracy to corrupt public morals. It is said that the rules of law ought to be precise 
62 
- Fitzgerald, P (1962) "Criminal Law and Punishment". Oxford at the Clarendon Press. P. 171 63- Shaw v D. P. P. (Director of Public Prosecutions) The Law Reports [1962] 220-294 
64 
- The view taken in the Show case was challenged in Knuller v. D. P. P. [1973] The Law Reports; 
435-397 in which it is stated that the decision in Shaw is in no way to be taken as affirming or lending 
any support to the doctrine that the courts have some general or residual power either to create new 
offences or so to widen existing offences as to make punishable conduct of a type hitherto not subject 
to punishment. However, the reason of invoking the Shaw case is because my aim is not to examine the 
English approach in respect of the principle of legality, but rather to shed some light regarding the 
difficulty of applying the legality principle strictly in a case law system. 
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so that a person will know the exact consequences of all his actions and so that a 
person regulate his conduct with complete assurance. This however, is not possible 
under any system of law... In many cases there can be no certainty as to what the 
decision will be. But none of this is a reflection upon the law. Nor do I know of any 
procedure under which someone could be told with precision just who far he may go 
before he may incur some civil or some criminal liability... So when Parliament has 
made it an offence to publish an article which may tend to deprave and corrupt and 
has left it to the jury to decide whether an article may so tend it is no criticism of the 
law to say that a man will not be sure in advance whether he will be acquitted or 
convicted. " 
We turn to the second issue, namely the application of existing law to new crimes by 
means of analogy. Here we should assume that the original relevant rule is clear and 
precise. The ground on which the accused's conduct will be classified under the 
existing rule is that his conduct is sufficiently similar to that precisely prohibited by 
the rule as to be morally indistinguishable from it. If the analogy is precisely applied 
then there is no fear of arbitrary interpretation. 65 The European Court of Human 
Rights held recently regarding Article 7 (1) of the Convention that: "the very 
apotheosis of the principle of legality in modern European criminal law does not 
require the courts to abjure the analogical extension of existing offences; provided the 
resultant development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could 
reasonably be foreseen, the practice does not violate the non-retrospection clause in 
that article. , 66 
To the same effect, the House of Lords states in C. v D. P. P. that "judges should not 
normally make new laws where Parliament had rejected opportunities to clear up a 
known difficulty or where fundamental legal principles would be set aside in the 
result, this is far from being an outright rejection of the doctrine that the principled 
extension of existing offences is some times justified on policy grounds". 67 
In the Shaw case reference was made to the words of Parke J. in Mirehouse v. 
Rennell: "Our common law system consists in applying to new combinations of 
circumstances those rules of law which we derive from legal principles and judicial 
65 
- McAuley and McCutcheon, J (2000) p. 47 66 
- See chapter 2 67 (1996) 1 A. C. 1 per Lord Lowry. Mentioned in McAuley and McCutcheon, J (2000) p. 49 
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precedents; and for the sake of attaining uniformity, consistency and certainty, we 
must apply those rules, where they are not plainly unreasonable or inconvenient, to 
all cases which arise; and we are not at liberty to reject them, and to abandon all 
analogy to them, in those (cases) to which they have not yet been judicially applied, 
because we think that the rules are not as convenient and reasonable as we ourselves 
could have devised" . 
To sum up, one should understand that absolute certainty, practically speaking, cannot 
be achieved in any system. Judicial systems that depend on codification as the sole 
source for criminal law must empower the judge with certain discretion to interpret 
laws and to apply existing rules to new facts by means of analogy. Otherwise, many 
criminals could escape justice because the legislator is unable to foresee what 
conducts must be criminalized in future. Viscount Simonds stated in the Shaw case 
that although Parliament has enacted legislations to cover most offences, gaps remain 
and will always remain because it is impossible to foresee all the kinds of conduct that 
disrupt the order of society. It is also said that: "Certainty is a desirable feature of any 
system of law. But there are some types of conduct desirably the subject-matter of 
legal rule which cannot be satisfactory regulated by specific statuary enactment, but 
are better left to the practice of juries and other tribunals of fact. They depend finally 
for their juridical classification not upon proof of the existence of some particular 
fact, but upon proof of attainment of some degree. " 68 Therefore, as we have 
mentioned above, the European Court of Human Rights has accepted analogy as a 
source for criminal law. In addition, the Court has defined the standard of certainty 
required in criminal law as that which enables a person to know, even if with the 
court's assistance, what the law is regarding particular conduct. The Court also used 
the word "reasonable" instead of the word "absolute" when describing the required 
standard of certainty 69 
As to the systems depending on case law as a source for criminal law, the Shaw case 
reveals that the absolute certainty cannot be guaranteed with a considerable discretion 
given to English courts to consider whether or not a particular conduct can be 
amounted to a corruption of public morals. 
68 
- Knuller v. D. P. P (1973) The Law Reports 435-497 69 
- Steel v. UK (1998) EHRR 603 
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This conclusion is explicitly asserted by the European Court of Human Rights. In 
S. W. v. UK 70 the Court illustrates that: "However clearly drafted a legal provision 
may be, in any system of law, including criminal law, there is an inevitable element of 
judicial interpretation. There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points 
and for adaptation to changing circumstances.... Article 7 (art. 7) of the Convention 
cannot be read as outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability 
through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the resultant 
development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be 
foreseen. " Accordingly one might conclude that the legality principle requires the 
criminal law to be precisely and clearly formulated just to the extent that this certainty 
precludes the exercise of arbitrary power. 
(3) The strict construction of criminal law: 
The plain meaning of this principle is that any doubt regarding the meaning and the 
scope of particular provisions must be interpreted in favour of the accused. 71 
Glanville Williams says: "if an act of Parliament is so drawn as to make it really 
difficult to say what was intended and what facts come within it, the benefit of that 
obscurity should be given to the accused person" 72 
(4) The accessibility of criminal law: 
Williams states that criminal statutes must be "accessible and intelligible". Any 
criminal justice system that consists of an excessive number of documents of law is 
not compatible with the accessibility requirement of laws. Substantive criminal law is 
not confined to legal professionals but rather it concerns all classes of the 
community. 73 
The source of the principle of legality in Islamic law 
The following Qur'anic verses are considered to be the source of this principle: 
God said: {No one laden with burdens can bear another's burden. And We never 
punish until We have sent a Messenger (to give warning) )74 . He also said: { And 
never will your Lord destroy the towns (populations) until He sends to their mother 
70 
- A335-B (1995) (Application no. 00020166/92) 71 
- Ashworth, A (1999) p. 81 72 
- Williams, G (1961) p. 589 73 - Williams, G (1961) p. 583 74 
- Surah 17. Al- Isra. Verse No. 15 
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town a Messenger reciting to them Our Verses } 75 . He said in another verse: 
{Messengers as bearers of good news as well as of warning in order that mankind 
should have no plea against Allah after the (coming of) Messengers }76 
Muslim jurists extracted fundamental principles from these verses. The first principle 
is that "the legal status of things before revelation is the original permission"77. This 
means that the conduct of a legally commissioned person cannot be described as 
unlawful unless there is a text that makes it forbidden and this person is free to 
practice it or not. 
The second principle is that "the original status of deeds is permission"78. This means 
that every act or omission is originally permitted and since it is not prohibited by any 
text a perpetrator cannot be held responsible 79 . Interestingly, this principle is 
comparable with the negative freedom that English lawyers have traditionally used. 
John Alder states that "the common law embodies the liberal perspective that 
everyone is free to do whatever the law does not specifically prohibit. , 80 
Abraheem Madkor and Adnan Al- Kateeb believe that these two principles mentioned 
by Muslim writers contain the same implication. That is, no act may be considered a 
crime if it has not been explicitly prohibited in Islamic law. If there is no text that 
makes an act illegal then there is no criminal responsibility and no punishment. From 
this they argue that it may therefore be stated that these two principles embody the 
principle of legality in crimes and punishments. 81 
Abdulkader Owda mentions a third principle, that is "No one shall be legally 
commanded, except who is capable of comprehending the legal ruling. No one shall 
be ordered to do something that is impossible. No one shall be ordered to do 
something unknowable to him. This knowledge shall have the necessary criteria to 
persuade a person to implement the legal ruling". He claims that this principle reveals 
75 
- Surah 28. Al-Qasas. Verse No. 59 76 
- Surah 4 An-Nisa. Verse No. 165 77 
- Abdulftah Al-SaFi (1995) "Al-Ahkam Al-amh L Al-Nedam Al-Jaza'eeh" King Saud University 
Press. P. 80 
78 
- Ibid, p. 80 79 
- Mohammad Hashim Karnali "The Right to Personal Safety (Haqq-al-Amn) and the Principle of 
Legality in Islamic Shari'a". In Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Adel Omer Sherif, and Kate Daniels 
(2003). "Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari'a". I. B. Tauris. London; New 
York, p, 69. But, there is a disagreement among Muslim jurists regarding the application of these 
principles. Some apply the first one, while others apply the second. 
- John Alder (2002) "General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law". Palgrave 
Macmillan p. 423 
81 
- Abraheem Madkor and Adnan Al- Kateeb (1992) "Huquq Al- Insan Fi Al- Eslam" Dar Talass L- 
Drassat W Al- Targamah W Al - Nasher p. 118 & 119. Hereinafter will refer to as Abraheem Madkor 
and Adnan Al- Kateeb (1992). 
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that the act must be possible and this act should be knowable. His argument goes 
further to say that "a comprehensive Knowledge" that could convince a person to 
follow the law implies: 
1- Knowledge of legal ruling. This knowledge cannot be achieved unless 
stipulated explicitly and promulgated to all people. Applying this condition to 
crimes indicates that no crime exists except after promulgation. 
2- This rule must contain the necessary elements that could constrain someone to 
act legally. This condition implies that the individual knows or ought to know 
that if he violates the legal ruling he might be subject to punishment. 
Applying this condition to crimes means that dictating crimes must also be 
associated with stating punishments. He concludes by stating that this 
principle confirms the outcome of the foregoing two principles. That is to say 
they all confirm the principle of legality in Islamic criminal law. 82 
Accordingly, both the Basic Law in Saudi Arabia and the Cairo Declaration of Human 
Rights in Islam declare the legality principle. Article 38 of the Basic Law provides: 
"there shall be no crime or punishment except on the basis of a Shari'ah or statutory 
provision, and there shall be no punishment except for deeds subsequent to the 
effectiveness of a statutory provision. " Similarly, article 19(d) of the Cairo 
Declaration provides: "no crime or punishment except in pursuance of Shari'ah 
rules. " 
The application of the principle of legality in Islamic law and the Saudi judicial 
system: 
Islamic criminal law recognizes the principle of legality although it is not explicitly 
stated in the Qur'an or the Sunnah. This principle as we have seen is derived from 
Qur'anic texts as mentioned above. However, the question is whether or not Islamic 
criminal law applies the principle in all types of crimes. 
The answer to this question requires an analysis of the components of the principle of 
legality, in order to see if Islamic law and the judicial system in Saudi Arabia contain 
and apply these components. However, before proceeding, the attempts of Muslim 
writers to answer the question should be examined. 
In respect of attempts to answer this question, Muslim writers are in agreement about 
the precise application of the legality principle in Haddud and Qisas crimes. 
82 
- Abdulkader Owda p. 116 & 117 
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However, the application of this principle in Ta'azir crimes is a controversial issue. 
Most writers are of the opinion that Islamic law does apply the principle in Ta'azir 
crimes. Yet within this majority there is disagreement about the nature of this 
application. Some say that it is a "broad" application, whereas others have used the 
term "flexible" application. However, since there is nothing to indicate that the terms 
"flexible application" and "broad application" signal different meanings, one should 
assume that they are used interchangeably. 
Moseelhy states that Qur'anic texts confirm the agreement of all divine legislations 
that there can be no command except after a message or notification, and no 
punishment without a message and messenger who may preach and forewarn. God, 
he claims, will not punish unless his message is clearly reported. Further, he points 
out that Islamic law has adopted two ways of declaring crimes and punishments: 
(a) Defining precisely every crime and its penalty in Haddud and Qisas crimes. 
(b) Defining Ta'azir crimes in general terms, and leaving their due punishments to the 
discretion of the Islamic state. The state usually invests the judge with considerable 
authority to select the appropriate penalty in every individual case, according to 
extenuating or aggravating circumstances. 83 
Similarly, Abdulftah Kodur reveals that the principle of legality in Islamic law is 
applied precisely in Haddud as well as Qisas crimes, and is applied flexibly in Ta'azir 
crime. This flexibility is congruous with the nature of this kind of crime. Accordingly 
he suggests a new frame for the principle in respect of Ta'azir crimes, namely: "Ito 
crime nor punishment without evidence (clue) in Ta'azir crimes. " He explains that by 
evidence (clue) in this regard he means legal ruling extracted from sources of Islamic 
law. 84 
With a slight difference of perspective Muhammad Frehat situates the principle of 
legality in Islamic law in the idea of equality. He states that equality is unbiased 
justice (objective justice). Justice is clearly required in the Qur'an. For God said: 
(And whenever you give your word (i. e. judge between men or give evidence), say 
the truth even if a near relative is concerned)85 . 
Furthermore, Frehat maintains that 
83 
- Muhammad Moseelhy (1988) "Huquq Al- Insan Been Al- Shari'ah Wa Al- Qanoon Al-Dollev". 
Dar Al- Nahdah Al- Arabiah 1988. Cairo p. 49. Similarly, see Abu- Zahra, M (1998) "Al-Jareemh We 
Al-Oqubah Fi Al-Figh Al-Islami" "Al-Jareemh". Dar Al-faker Al-Arahee. Cairo p. 136 
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- Abdulftah Kodur (1985) "Derassh Mogezah An: Saemat Al- Nedam Al- Gena'ee Be Al- 
Mamlakah 
Al- Arabiah Al- Sudiah" Na7f Academic for Security Sciences. Arabic Centre for Security Studies and 
Training Journal. p. 16,17. 
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equality in Ta'azir crimes must be applied proportionally, taking into consideration 
the person's status. By this he means that the judge when considering the appropriate 
punishment will take into his consideration what is the proper penalty in respect of 
rehabilitating the convicted person. This would lead to differences in responsibility 
even where acts are similar because some offenders, in the judge's view, need only 
lenient penalty while other need a stringent penalty to abstain from recommitting 
crimes. These differences, he explains, cannot be regarded as lack of equality, but 
rather they demonstrate that equality is not computational but is proportionally 
applied. From this idea, he believes, the principle of legality begins because it is 
linked to equality. This legality embodies the reaction of society against any direct or 
indirect wrong. The objective of the legality principle in general is to preserve 
security in society and to promote justice. From this, he claims, one can understand 
the significant role of the principle of Ta'azir which makes it fit for adaptable to 
different situations. He concludes by stating that the principle of legality in Islamic 
law is divided into two parts: 
(a) Textual legality: in Haddud and Qisas crimes, Islamic law confines sources of 
crimes and punishments within certain and definitive provisions. (b) Delegated 
legality: in Ta'azir crimes, the Islamic ruler (Islamic state) is given discretion to 
decide upon crimes and their penalties according to circumstances. As this is a very 
dangerous legality, he therefore suggests that it should be given only to a reliable 
authority86. 
It is very significant to point out that the term "reliable authority" mentioned above is 
often used by Islamic writers to indicate people who have a very good religious 
character. In contrast, the words "reliable authority" means within the western context 
strict and fair producers set up to organize the judicial process. 
However, not all voices agree with the majority. Mohamed Al-Awa87 argues that 
Islamic criminal law in Ta'azir crimes does not apply the legality principle. He says 
that: "the jurists dealing with the subject imply that for the sake of public interest the 
ruler may punish any conduct he considers harmful to the public interest without 
declaring to the public that this conduct will be considered criminal. This is a clear 
exception to application of the general principle that no punishment can be inflicted 
86 
- Muhammad Frahat "Sharee't Al- Tjreem Wa Al-Egab Fi Al- Fiqh Al- lslami Wa Al- Nedain Al- 
Qanoony Al- Mo'asr" Journal of Arabic Centre for Security Studies; Vol. 11 (1991) p33-69 
87 
- Mohamed S. El-Awa (1998) p 114 
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except for an offence which has been so defined in advance. This exception allows the 
ruler or judges a very wide authority to punish harmful acts and omissions, which 
may threaten the public interest in the broadest sense. Some authorities have tried to 
deny that the granting of this discretionary power is an exception to the rule of Nulla 
poena sine lege. The argument for this view is that the lege exists in the general 
principles which command the Muslim community and the Muslim ruler to protect the 
public good. But the fact is that these general principles are very flexible and their 
interpretation controversial. Consequently, one cannot agree with the above view" 
88 
Two major points might be regarded as the main source of this controversy. (1) These 
writers started with the presumption that the application of this principle is absolute. 
In fact, as we have explained above, the application of this principle in any judicial 
system is not absolute. The European Court recently clarifies its approach regarding 
the issue by ruling that: "However clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any 
system of law, including criminal law, there is an inevitable element of judicial 
interpretation. There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for 
adaptation to changing circumstances. Indeed, in... the... Convention States, the 
progressive development of the criminal law through judicial law-making is a well 
entrenched and necessary part of legal tradition. Article 7 of the Convention cannot 
be read as outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability 
through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the resultant 
development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be 
foreseen. " 89 (2) None of these attempts have tried to study the principle in practice as 
applied in an Islamic state. Rather, they have examined the principle only in theory. 
To draw a clear conclusion about the issue, thorough scrutiny of the components of 
this principle in Islamic law and their application in the judicial system in Saudi 
Arabia is essential. This is the second task necessary in order to answer our main 
question. 
(1) The principle of non-retroactivity in Islamic criminal law: 
Even though this principle is not expressly mentioned in the Qur'an, the Sunnah or old 
Islamic jurisprudence, one should not conclude that it is alien to Islamic law. 90 Islamic 
law cannot be applied retroactively unless it is in the interest of the accused. Many 
88 
- Slight corrections to the English of this extract are made. 89 
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recorded cases can be cited in confirmation of the prospective application of Islamic 
law. To state all of these would be superfluous. 9' Nevertheless, it is useful to indicate 
a few: (1) The Qur'an declares that usury is prohibited and punishable. This 
prohibition was not applied to cases of usury prior to this declaration. (2) Prohibition 
of marrying a father's wife was also not applied retroactively. 
92 (3) In the earliest era 
of Islam, adultery was a crime punishable by imprisonment in the house. Later this 
crime was made punishable by lashes or stoning. These two punishments, however, 
were not applied to any crime of adultery committed prior to the declaration of these 
new punishments in the Qur'an. 93 (4) The Prophet said: "Any blood-guilt traced back 
to the period of ignorance (jahiliya) should be disregarded, and I begin with that of al- 
Harith ibn abd al- Muttalib. The usury practices during al jahiliyya have also been 
erased, and I begin with that of my uncle al-Abbas ibn bd- Muttalib. 
94 (5) The 
Prophet's companions also applied this principle after the death of the Prophet. El 
Mawardi relates: `Omer Ibn al Khattab (the second Ruler after the death of the 
Prophet) prohibited men and women from mixing around the Kaaba. Having seen a 
man wandering with women he struck him with a rod. The man addressed hint: "By 
God, if I have done wrong, you have not educated me. " Omer said, "Are you not 
aware of my decree against men and women walking together around the Kaaba? " 
The man said, "I have not seen such a decree". Omer handed him the rod and said, 
"Retaliate ". But the man said, "I am not going to retaliate today ". Omer then asked 
his forgiveness, but the man said that he would not. Then the two nzen separated. 
When they met on the next day, Omer's face grew pale. The man said to him, "0 
Prince of the Faithful, it seems to me that you feel as I felt before". Omer said he did. 
The man said, "God is my witness that I have forgiven you". '95 
(6) A man admitted that he had committed adultery. But he claimed that he did not 
know that adultery was a crime. When the Second Islamic Ruler (Omer ibn al- 
91 
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Khattab) was asked about this he said: if he knew before committing it that adultery is 
a crime he must be punished. But if he did not know, he cannot be punished. 
96 
Accordingly, Judge Abu Ya'la97 refers to the principle of non-retroactivity when he 
states that "Denial should be advanced ... and punishment should not 
be imposed 
without warning". 
Yet, some argue that Islamic law can be applied retroactively in serious offences that 
disturb public order. 98 They support their argument by citing particular stories where 
the Prophet, it is said, applied Islamic law retroactively. However, this argument is 
widely criticized. Some challenge the credibility of the stories on which the argument 
is based. Others argue that the retroactive application in these events was because the 
new rules were to the benefit of the accused. 99 
With regard to the application of this principle in the judicial system in Saudi Arabia, 
two points need to be clarified. First: there is no question of retroactive application of 
offences prohibited by the Qur'an, the Sunnah or old Islamic jurisprudence after the 
passing of many centuries. Secondly: in the case of offences criminalized by the 
state, or where the state designated the due punishment for offences criminalized by 
Islamic law, the retroactive application of law is conceivable. Thus, the examination 
of the principle of non-retroactivity in the judicial system in Saudi Arabia will be 
limited to this latter category of crimes. 
As we have pointed out above, any violation of enacted laws will be tried either in the 
Board of Grievances or by one of the administrative committees. Article 38 of the 
Basic Law in Saudi Arabia declares, "No penalty shall be imposed except with regard 
to acts committed subsequent to the operation of a legal provision". Therefore, the 
Scrutinizing Committee of the Board of Grievances ruled, "Since the criminal circuit 
did not apply the old Combatant of Bribery Act No. 15 (1382) in which the punishment 
was imprisonment from one to five years and a fine from five to a hundred thousand 
Saudi Rails, or one of these, but rather it applied the new Combatant of Bribery Actroo 
in which the punishment is imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years and a 
fine not exceeding one million Saudi Rails, or one of these, this means that the 
96 
- Alshareef, A (1987) "A/- Mabad' Al- Shari'ah Fi Ahkam Al- Uqubat Fi Al- Figh Al-Islam! 
' Dar Al- 
Karb Al-Islami Lebanon.. P. 177 
97 
- He is a remarkable jurist of the Hannibal School. 98 Abdulkader Owda p. 261 
99 
- Abu Zahra, M (1998) p. 239. See also Muhammad Al- Owa (1983) p. 61. 100 
- Issued by the Royal Decree No. 36 in 1412. 
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maximum penalty for both punishments by the new act is more severe than the 
punishment by the old act. Accordingly, the criminal circuit's judgment is 
incompatible with the law, because it must apply the old law which was valid at the 
time the crime was committed, save that the new act is in the accused's interest" 
101. 
Clearly, unlike the European Court, the judicial system in Saudi Arabia applies the 
criminal law retroactively if that is in the interest of the accused. This is perhaps a 
reflection of the humanitarian nature of the Islamic law. Interestingly this application 
is compatible with the ICCPR. 
(2) Maximum certainty in Islamic criminal law: 
As we have seen in Chapter Three, crimes in Saudi Arabia are divided into Haddud 
(doctrinal), Qisas (retaliation) and Ta'azir (chastisement). The first two categories 
are designated precisely. Every crime is defined and its punishment is clearly 
designated. Ta'azir (chastisement) crimes can be divided into three categories in the 
Saudi judicial system: (1) Acts that are not originally prohibited by Islamic law. 
However, in the interest of society the state has enacted laws to make them illegal and 
punishable102. (2) Acts forbidden by Islamic law in general terms, such as forgery and 
bribery, without the designation of specific punishment for each crime. For this group 
the state has enacted laws which provide a clear and precise definition for every crime 
and its penalty. Courts trying these two categories are obliged to apply the laws. 
Therefore one can conclude that in these two kinds of Ta'azir crimes the principle of 
maximum certainty raises only problems similar to those which occur in any codified 
legal system. 103 
(3) Acts prohibited and punishable by Islamic law. But Islamic law provides only a 
general definition, whereby the judge is given some discretion to use analogy to 
punish old offences in new forms. This approach, prima facie, might suggest that the 
judge is not obliged to apply the principle of legality. Nevertheless, closer analysis of 
these cases might lead to a different understanding. In fact, this category is best 
discussed within the court's power to punish for committing a sin. This is defined as 
"committing a prohibited act or ignoring an obligatory act". An example of this kind 
101 
- Decision No. 242/ T/3 (1416 H) 102 
- See our example in chapter 3 of this thesis. 103 
- Abdulftah Kuder p. 10 
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of crime is giving false testimony. Even though there is no precise definition of each 
one, crimes of this type are clearly prohibited in the Qur'an or the Sunnah104. 
This kind of Ta'azir is provided for in Islamic law by general texts which prohibit 
obscenity, debauchery, prejudice etc. These texts do not provide particular definitions 
for each crime. The judge is empowered to apply these general texts to the facts 
104 
- Abdulkader Owda cites the Qur'anic text criminalizing the most important Ta'azir crimes of this 
kind: 
1-The prohibition of some types of food: 
God said: [He has forbidden you only the Maitah (dead animals), and blood, and the flesh of swine, 
and that, which is slaughtered as a sacrifice for others than Allah (or has been slaughtered for idols, on 
which Allah's Name has not been mentioned while slaughtering) Surah 2. Al- Baqarah. Verse No. 173. 
He also said: {Forbidden to you (for food) are: Al-Maitah (the dead animals- cattle- beast not 
slaughtered), blood, the flesh of swine, and that on which Allah's Name has not been mentioned while 
slaughtering, (that which has been slaughtered as a sacrifice for others than Allah, or has been 
slaughtered for idols) and that which has been killed by strangling, or by a violent blow, or by a 
headlong fall, or by the goring of horns- and that which has been (partly) eaten by a wild animal- 
unless you are able to slaughter it ( before its death)- and that which is scarified ( slaughtered ) on An- 
Nusub ( stone-altars). Surah 5. Al-Ma'idah. Verse. No. 3 
2-Breach of trust: 
God said: (Verily! Allah commands that you should render back the trust to those to whom they are 
due). Surah 4. An-Nisah Verse. No. 58 He said: (0 you who believe! Betray not Allah and His 
Messenger, nor betray knowingly your Arrant (things entrusted to you, and all the duties which Allah 
has ordained for you). Surah 8. Al-Anfal. Verse No. 27 
3-Imposture: 
God said: { Woe to Al-Mutaffifun (those who give less in measure and weight). Those who, when they 
have to receive by measure from men, demand full measure, And when they have to give by measure 
or weight to (other) men, give less than due). Surah 83. Al-Mutaffifin. Verses. No. l-3. He also said: 
(Give full measure, and cause no loss (to others). And weight with the true and straight balance. And 
defraud not people by reducing their things, nor do evil, making corruption and mischief in the lands). 
Surah 26. Ash-Shura. Verses No. 181-183. 
4-False testimony: 
God said: {And conceal not the evidence). Surah 2 Verse No. 283. he also said : (You who believe! 
Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even though it be against yourselves, or your 
parents, or your kin, be he rich or poor). Surah 4 An-Nisa Verse No. 135. 
5-Usury: 
{Allah has permitted trading and forbidden Riba (usury)). Surah 2 Al-Baqarah Verse No. 275. 
6- Revilement: 
(Truly, Allah likes not the transgressors}. Surah 2 Verse No. 190. he also said: {Allah does not like 
that the evil should be uttered in public except by him who has been wronged). Surah 4. An- Nisa. 
Verse No. 148 
7- Bribery: 
((They like to) listen to falsehood, to devour anything forbidden). Surah 5 Al-Ma'idah. verse No. 42. 
He also said: (And eat up not one another's property unjustly (in any illegal way e. g. stealing, robbing, 
deceiving, etc), nor give bribery to the rulers (judges before presenting your cases) that you may 
knowingly eat up a part of the property of others sinfully). Surah 2 Al-Baqarah. Verse No. 188. 
8- Gambling: 
(0 you who believe! Intoxicants (all kinds of alcoholic drinks), and gambling, and Al-Ansab, and Al- 
Azlam (arrows for seeking luck or decision) are an abomination of Shaitan's (Satan) handiwork. So 
avoid (strictly all) that (abomination) in order that you may be successful). Surah 5 Al-Ma'idah. Verse 
No. 90 
9- Entering houses without permission: 
(O you who believe! Enter not houses other than your own, until you have asked permission and 
greeting in them). Surah 24 An-Nur. Verse No. 27. 
10- Spying: 
(And spy not). Surah 49. Al-Hujurat Verse No. 12 
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brought before him. This situation might be considered incompatible with the 
required standard of certainty, and could appear to imply that according to Islamic law 
a person can be subject to punishment without knowing that such an act is prohibited. 
However, the following points demonstrate the fallacy of such a conclusion: 
1- Pursuant to Islamic law conducts are classified into (a) lawful or admissible; 
(b) prohibited; (c) permissible; (d) recommended; (e) unrecommended. A 
Muslim is allowed to exercise conducts within categories (a), (c), and (d). But 
he is prohibited from committing acts within categories (b) and (e). It is every 
Muslim's duty, as part of his religion, to know this. 'os 
2- There is a crucial difference between Islamic law and positive laws in this 
respect. This difference is embodied in the fact that the conduct that 
constitutes a sin in Islamic law is unchangeable through ages and societies. 
Sins that were prohibited during the Prophet's era are still prohibited and will 
remain prohibited in all times to come. Attitudes regarding what act can 
constitute a sin are stable. So according to Islamic law a person will not be 
surprised by a sentence of punishment for an act that he did not until his 
prosecution know was prohibited. Sins in Islamic law differ from immorality 
in positive laws. Morality is always subject to change. For example, in the 
past homosexuality was prohibited in English law. However this conduct is 
no longer a crime because peoples' attitudes, and as a result jury's attitudes, 
have changed over time. The real difficulty that faces the principle of legality 
in the English law is that proprieties or rules of decorum are always subject to 
change through different ages. In Knuller v. D. P. P106 , 
for instance, It is stated 
that: "that is the great difficulty in this branch of the law, that all such cases 
would have to be left to the jury and therefore one has a vague and undefined 
branch of criminal law in which juries in different parts of the country might 
take different views of the same conduct. " So what can be regarded as immoral 
and hence prohibited today can be made legal tomorrow and vice versa. 
Accordingly a court will only reflect an attitude regarding a specific conduct 
after a case is brought before it. The court, when exercising its power to 
adjudicate the case, can reflect this change in attitude either by overruling a 
105 
- See, Majid Khadduri (1984) "The Islamic Conception of Justice" Johns Hopkins University Press 
p6 143 
- (1973) The Law Reports. 435-497 
180 
precedent or by applying new rules, and will hence render a new decision. It 
follows that an accused person will be surprised to be convicted of an offence 
which was not established as a criminal act when committed. This difficulty, I 
believe, is at the core of the principle of legality. It is illustrated by Fitzgerald 
as follows: "The principle of legality demands that the citizen should be ruled 
by law and not by the decisions of individual men. The reasons for this are 
obvious. In a liberal community the rules of criminal law should be written 
down in black and white, so that the citizen has a chance to ascertain what the 
rules are and to conform to them. Without this we lose any objective standard 
and uniformity with regard to what is to constitute criminal conduct; for what 
one judge today thinks unimpeachable another court tomorrow may consider 
ant-social and therefore criminal". 107 This difficulty does not exist in Islamic 
law because, as we have mentioned above, conducts that constitute sins are 
always the same. 
Accordingly, one should conclude that since sins in Islamic law were recognised from 
an early Islamic age and the attitude regarding them has remained unchanged until 
now, the required certainty in this kind of Ta'azir crimes is achieved. This conclusion 
is supported by the fact that an ordinary person does not need to know the difference 
between murder and manslaughter to keep pace with rules that prohibit murder. In 
addition, even though it is necessary for a layman to understand that if he commits the 
offence of assault he will be punished, he does not, generally speaking, need to know 
the exact degree of severity of punishment that might be inflicted upon him. 108 
However, a critical point as to the legality principle in Islamic law is that Islamic 
jurists hold the view that punishment is administered in the public interest. 109 
Punishment for the sake of public interest means that to protect society a judge has 
discretion to punish any one, although he did not commit any illegal act, if the 
person's status threatens the safety of society. Abdulftah Kodur maintains that it is 
within Islamic law that a judge can punish according to the public interest if the 
person in question threatens public security. However, he treats the idea with great 
107 
- Fitzgerald, P. (1962) "Criminal Law and Punishment" Oxford at the Clarendon Press. P. 169 lOB 
- Williams, G (1961)p. 583 109 
- Muhammad Hashim Karnali "The Right to Personal Safety (Haqq-al-Amn) and the Principle of 
Legality in Islamic Shari'a". In Muhammad Abdel Halcem, Adel Omer Sherif, and Kate Daniels 
(2003). "Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Shari'a". I. B. Tauris. London; New 
York, p, 71 
181 
caution when stating that the expression "public interest" is extremely flexible and 
dangerous, and might give rise to abuse of freedom. ' 10 
The main argument used for the protection of society view is a case in which the 
Second ruler after the death of the Prophet ordered a man (Nasser ibn Hajaj) to travel 
from Al-Medina City to Basra because the man was very attractive to women. The 
latter, it is tolled, did not commit any wrong, but the Ruler found that there was a 
possibility of committing a wrongdoing in Holy City (Al- Medina) so he decided to 
prevent this possibility by ordering him to leave the city to protect a significant value 
of the Muslim society. That is to say keeping holy places away from transgression. 
Jurists, therefore, argue that it is applicable to punish in order to protect the public 
interest. From this Al-Owa suggests correctly, as we have seen, that Islamic law in 
this kind of Ta'azir does not apply the principle of legality. 
In order to put the point within the Islamic context, it is useful to refer to the 
expression "reliable authority" mentioned above. In western thought, generally 
speaking, this expression means establishing strict and fair procedures which ought to 
prevent the authority concerned from exercising their jurisdiction arbitrarily. 
However, within the Islamic scenario it is used to mention person(s) who show a strict 
obedience to the dictates of Islam. Islamic thought pays great concern to the religious 
conscience. A pious person is God fearing therefore when he acts he bears in mind 
that God supervises him. So if a person's outside character and behaviour indicate that 
he has such a feature he is then in Muslim's view a reliable person. It is expected from 
such a person to act justly and honesty. Where this view is applied to judges in 
Islamic society, one can find that Islamic jurisprudence requires that a person in order 
to be a judge, he must be pious and obedient to Islamic teaching. Whatever his 
practical or academic qualifications a person pursuant to Islamic law is not qualified 
to be a judge if lacks piousness. But, if a judge is pious, he is authorized a discretion 
to punish for the sake of the public interest because his religious character, it is widely 
believed, would prevent him from using this power arbitrarily. Majid Khadduri 
observes that: "The experience of Islam in procedural justice demonstrates again the 
truth that man in earlier societies was more habitually inclined to trust the judge who 
enjoys a good reputation than to trust the judicial system. ""' 
110 
- Abdul ftah Kodur ( 1985) p. 16,17 111 
- Majid Khadduri (1984) "The Islamic Conception of Justice" Johns Hopkins University Press p. 
145 
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Evidently, an observer of the judicial system in Saudi Arabia cannot fail to recognize 
the importance of building the religious character of a Muslim judge as an element of 
the proper administration of justice, because whatever efforts are taken to set up strict 
and fair procedures the judge in most legal system is vested with considerable 
discretion. 
However, relying heavily on the judge's religious character is not always a proper 
safeguard against a possible arbitrary use of power, especially if the aim is to establish 
a stable judicial system. If the judges' character currently is kept in a manner 
consistent with Islamic precepts there is no guarantee that this character will be 
maintained in, for example, a fifty years time. Commenting on the importance of 
procedural justice Majid Khadduri states: "As a procedural form of justice it may not 
seem as significant as substantive justice, but in reality it is no less important and its 
processes are intricate and highly complicated. Without it, the elements of justice 
would become of academic value, just as hidden treasure loses its value unless it is 
put into use. Even if little or no elements of justice were to be found in the law, the 
individual could derive satisfaction if the law were applied with regularity and 
impartiality. "' 12 Therefore, the recent Saudi approach in respect of this matter is an 
important issue towards a proper administration of justice. That it to say a 
combination of both approaches i. e. strict and fair producers and religious character. 
Despite the fact that Islamic law provides the ruler with power to punish for the sake 
of public interest as we have seen, it cannot be expected nowadays from a modern 
Islamic ruler to handle countless number of cases. Therefore, the ruler in Saudi Arabia 
delegated his judicial power to organized courts. In principle, according to Islamic 
law if the ruler delegates his judicial power to a judge the latter is then empowered to 
punish for the sake of public interest. So the question which needs to be addressed 
now is whether or not a judge in Saudi Arabia can punish for the sake of public 
interest even if a person does not commit an offence. 
In fact, court's jurisdictions are governed by statutory laws. Article 1 of the Law of 
Criminal Procedure declares that: "Courts shall apply Shari'ah principles... They shall 
also apply laws promulgated by the state... and shall comply with the procedure set 
forth in this Law.... " Thus, it is essential to refer to these laws in order to find an 
answer. Article 3 of the same Law reads: "No penal punishment shall be imposed on 
"'` Ibid, p 144 
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any person except in connection with a forbidden and punishable act, whether under 
Shari'ah principles or under the statutory laws, and after he has been convicted 
pursuant to a final judgment rendered after a trial conducted in accordance with. 
Shari'ah principles. " Clearly, this article requires two conditions to punish a person; 
(1) he must commit an act that is (a) forbidden, and (b) punishable. (2) The 
punishment is only imposed after a conviction pursuant to a final judgment. Therefore 
this article means that the judge in Saudi Arabia has no residual power to punish for 
the sake of public interest. If a person does not commit an offence, he cannot be then 
subjected to a punishment because he did not commit a forbidden act, and also 
because he cannot be punished except after a conviction. If it is argued that the judge 
in Saudi Arabia can punish for the sake of public interest, this will mean that a person 
is punished without a judicial conviction which is expressly in contradiction with text 
provided in article 3. 
(3) The strict construction of criminal law: 
As to the judicial interpretation of provisions of laws in the judicial system in Saudi 
Arabia one should distinguish between two situations. First: if the case is adjudicated 
according to the Qur'an, the Sunnah or old Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence), the judge in 
this case will apply the law as interpreted and expounded by the founders of the four 
Islamic schools and their pupils. In this case the judge does not provide a new 
interpretation and subsequently the principle of strict construction of criminal law is 
not applicable. Second: if the case is adjudicated according to enacted law the judge is 
empowered to interpret the law. The principle of strict construction of criminal law 
will thus be examined only in this second case. 
As we have pointed out earlier, this component requires that any obscurity of criminal 
law must be interpreted in favour of the accused. The Board of Grievances in Saudi 
Arabia takes this requirement into consideration in its judgments. For example, 
Article 14 of the Combatant of Bribery Act as amended by the Royal Decree No. 35 in 
1388 declares that the briber or the mediator will be discharged if he informs the 
authority about the crime before it is discovered. The Board interpreted this article to 
benefit the accused in case No. 504/l/Q in 1401. It is stated that even though article 
14 declares that the discharge applies to imprisonment and fine penalties, this should 
not be understood to mean that the legislator's aim was to confine its application to 
these punishments alone. But rather it should be interpreted to mean that the legislator 
has left the application of this article to the general rules, which imply that seizure is a 
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punishment and is therefore also contained within the general text that declares the 
discharge' 13 
(4) The accessibility of criminal law: 
In Saudi Arabia codified laws are clearly accessible and not subject to question, since 
no act is applied unless promulgated in the official newspaper14 and citizens have 
access to it. However, the accessibility of Islamic jurisprudence is questionable. 
Many thousands of books constitute the Islamic Figh. These books are also written in 
language of such a level of refinement that a layman has difficulty in understanding 
them. However, several measures have been taken to ease this dilemma. 
1- In an attempt to unify the judicial rulings, courts in Saudi Arabia generally 
speaking apply the Hanbali School" 5. Yet, provided that a judge gives his 
reasons, he can have recourse to the three other schools if he considers that the 
application of the Hanbali School could lead to hardship or conflict with public 
interest. 16 So, once this requirement is satisfied, the judge is then free to 
adopt an opinion provided by any other schools of thought. 
2- Of the books of the Hanbali School only six are designated on which 
judgments should be based' 17 
3- The laws of both the Judiciary and the Board of Grievances require the 
application of the case law system. Article 14 of the Law of the Judiciary 
provides that: "If one of the court's panels, while reviewing a case, deems it 
necessary to depart from an interpretation adopted by the saute or another 
panel in previous judgements, the case shall be referred to the full Court. 
Permission for such departure shall be given by a decision of the panel 
adopted by majority vote of not less than two thirds of its members. If the panel 
does not so render its decision, it shall refer the case to the Supreme Judicial 
Council for a decision in accordance with paragraph I of Article 8". 
Similarly Article 40 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 
declares that " If the Scrutinizing Circuit, when hearing a case, considers 
abandonment of an interpretation which it had adopted or which had been 
113 
- Decision No. H /2 /18 (1402 H) 114 
- Um Al-Qura' is the official newspaper in Saudi Arabia. 115- See chapter 3 of this thesis. 
116 
- Al-Qada'a Fi Al-Mamlakah Al-Arabiah Al-Sudiah (1419 AH). The Ministry of justice p. 69 Ili 
- The Judicial Supervision Committee' decision in 1347. See Ahmad Belal (1990) p. 174 & 175. See 
also Soliman A. Solaim "Legal review: Saudi Arabia's Judicial System". Middle East Journal. 
1971. Vol. 25 P. 405. 
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adopted by another Circuit or which had been adopted by the Scrutinizing 
Circuit it shall refer the matter to the President of the Board of Grievances for 
passing it to the Scrutinizing Board convened under the presidency of the 
Board of Grievances together with three Presidents of the various Circuit to be 
selected by the President of the Board of Grievances ; the joint circuit will 
decide by majority vote of two thirds of the number of members". However, in 
practice these requirements are not precisely applied because judgments in 
both judicial institutions have not been published. 
4- Finally, an important point here is that the difficulty of accessibility of Islamic 
jurisprudence might be held to constitute a clear conflict with the legality 
principle, if Islamic law were viewed from a western point of view. But 
Islamic law is not only law118. It is part of a religion and every Muslim is 
obliged to read and understand Islamic law (the Qur'an, the Sunnah and also 
Islamic jurisprudence). Anyone who has difficulty is obliged to ask those who 
have knowledge. 
In conclusion, Islamic criminal law, as applied by the judicial system in Saudi Arabia, 
contains all the four components, which constitute the legality principle. Thus, the 
principle of legality is protected in the judicial system in Saudi Arabia in a manner 
consistent with international human rights law. 
See our discussion in chapter 3 
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CHAPTER 5 
Defence Rights of the Accused during Trial 
Introduction: 
The international human rights treaties and declarations, in general, require judicial 
systems to provide the accused person with the following defence rights: 1- Equality 
before the courts and tribunals. 2- The right to be informed promptly and in detail, in 
a language which he understands, of the nature and cause of the charge against him. 
3- To have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence and to communicate 
with his counsel. 4- To be tried without delay. 5- To be tried in his presence, and to 
defend himself in person. 6- To choose his own lawyer, or to have free legal 
assistance if he has not sufficient means to pay and where the interests of justice so 
require. 7- To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions 
as witnesses against him. 8- To have free interpreting services if he cannot speak or 
understand the language used in court. 9- Not to be compelled to confess guilt. ý 
These defence rights are multifaceted and in many cases overlap. For instance, the 
right to counsel is the most obvious manifestation of the right to adequate facilities to 
prepare a defence. To address this, however, I will follow the ECHR approach 
regarding these rights. 
The main question underlying this chapter is whether or not the judicial system in 
Saudi Arabia provides the accused with the rights mentioned above in respect of their 
scope and meaning. My approach in this enquiry is to divide the chapter into ten 
separate parts dealing with each of the rights listed above. It should further be noted 
that in general the word "law" in Saudi Arabia is taken to refer to both Islamic law 
and enacted laws; of which as far as this thesis is concerned particularly the 
procedural laws are of interest. Thus, each part will be divided into two main sections 
covering Islamic law and enacted laws respectively. 
In each part, one further sub-division will generally be made in the section treating 
Saudi Arabia Law, as the Code of Law Practice (2001) for Saudi Arabia is applicable 
'- Articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See also Articles 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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to both the Shari'ah courts and the Board of Grievances. Expect in part VIII the law 
in respect of the accused's rights will require separate examination for each of these 
two institutions. 
The ten parts of this chapter deal with the rights of the accused in the following 
sequence: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Right to legal representation; 
Right to an interpreter; 
Right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence; 
Right to trial within a reasonable time; 
Right to prompt information of charge; 
Right to trial in own presence; 
Right to defend self in person; 
Right to equality of arms; 
Right to call and cross-examine witnesses; 
10. Right not to be compelled to confess guilt. 
Part I The Right to Legal Representation 
According to the European Convention on Human Rights the right to be assisted by a 
lawyer is one of the fundamental principles that should be guaranteed to the accused 
person. The Convention states in Article 6 that: "Everyone charged with a criminal 
offence has the following minimum rights... (c) to defend himself ... through 
legal 
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal 
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require. '2 
This part will discuss the right to be defended by a lawyer in the judicial system of 
Saudi Arabia. As explained above, the investigation requires two separate sections, 
the first devoted to Islamic law, and the second to the law in Saudi Arabia. Yet, since 
the Code of Law Practice for Saudi Arabia is applicable to both the Shari'ah courts 
and the Board of Grievances, the law in respect of the rights of the accused to be 
2- Similarly Article (14/3) of the ICCPR declares that: "in the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone shall be entitled to ... 
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his 
own choosing.... " 
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assisted by a lawyer requires separate examination for each of these two institutions. 
Section Two will therefore be sub-divided to meet this requirement. 
Section One Islamic law 
Early Islamic jurists neither used the term "lawyer" nor knew the phrase "practice of 
law". They were familiar only with the phrase "litigation's representative". 
Discussion must therefore first focus on this term in Islamic law. 
Islamic jurists did not limit their discussion of this issue to criminal cases, but rather 
discussed the idea of litigants' representatives in both criminal and civil cases. For the 
purpose of concentrating on our main topic, our discussion will be limited to the 
criminal sphere. 
The discussion of the idea of the litigant's representative in the criminal sphere 
focused mainly on the complainant's right in criminal cases to be represented by 
another person to prove the accusation against the accused. 3 Jurists did not discuss 
the right of the accused himself to be represented by another person save that some 
argued that the right of the private complainant (plaintiff) to be represented was also 
applicable to the accused4. Two main topics will thus be examined in this regard. 
Namely, current Islamic scholars' opinions regarding the accused's right to be 
represented by another person to refute the accusation, and the concept of the practice 
of law, that is the function of the "legal profession", in Islamic law. 
(1) The right of the accused to have a lawyer: 
Although our topic concerns the accused's right to defend himself by means of a 
lawyer, a discussion regarding the victims' right to be assisted by a representative is 
very relevant, because current Islamic jurists have based their view regarding the 
accused's right to be helped by a lawyer on the discussion provided by early Islamic 
3- Crimes in Islamic law are divided into 1) Rights of God ublic ri hts' (opg (2) individual or private 
rights. The latter, such as the claim for retaliation in intentional murder cannot be prosecuted unless 
requested (claimed) by the victim's family. Article 18 of Law of Criminal Procedure in Saudi Arabia 
provides: "no criminal action shall be initiated nor investigation proceedings conducted in crimes 
involving a private right of action, except through a complaint by the victim or his representative or 
heirs, filed with the competent authority, unless the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution considers 
that the filing of such an action and the investigation into those crimes will serve the public interest. " 
However, if the victim's family waives their right to retaliatory punishment, the public prosecution 
reserves the right to prosecute the accused on the basis of Ta'azir (chastisement) punishment. See 
Gamil Muhammad Hussein "Basic Guarantees in the Islamic Criminal Justice System". In Muhammad 
Abdel Haleem, Adel Omer Sherif, and Kate Daniels (2003). Criminal Justice in Islam, Judicial 
Procedure in the Shari'a. p. 44 
- Some touched on this issue very briefly when they said that opinions about the complainant's right 
to be represented in Haddad and Qisas offences are applicable in this situation. 
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jurists in respect of the victim's right to be represented by another person in criminal 
cases. 
As to the plaintiff's right to be represented in the criminal sphere, jurists' views differ 
as follows according to the kind of crime: 
First: Haddud crimes 
These crimes are divided into two kinds: (1) crimes that do not entail any assault on 
the private right (party), such as adultery and drinking alcohol. This type involves no 
private complainant and is thus irrelevant to our present discussion; (2) Haddud 
crimes that entail assault on a private right, such as defamation. In this type of crime, 
jurists disagree about the victim's right to have someone to represent him. The 
majority of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali schools argue that a defamed person 
may have someone to represent him to prove his right against the accused, because 
the Haddud punishment in these crimes cannot be inflicted unless requested by the 
private complainant. The latter thus has the right to exercise this either by himself or 
through another person. Jurist Abu Yusuf of the Hanafi School, however, disagrees 
with the majority and states that the victim is not allowed to be represented in this 
kind of offence. 5 Abu Yusuf's view is based on analogy. He argues that since the 
victim's right to inflict the Hadd punishment by himself cannot be delegated to other 
person then, he explains, the victim in this kind of Haddud offences has no right to 
delegate his right to lodge his case to other person. 
Second: Qisas crimes 
The majority of jurists are in agreement about the legality of representation of the 
complainant in this kind of crimes because it is a private right. 6 
Third: Ta'azir crimes 
The majority of jurists are in agreement about the legality of representation of the 
complainant in this kind of crime. 7 
In addition, Abu Hanafi$ argues that the right to representation is contingent on the 
other litigant's approval except in exceptional circumstances; for example if he is ill 
or absent from the country (on a journey), because representation without the 
approval of the other party breaches the equality of arms doctrine. 9 However, the 
5- Bada'a AI-Sana' i (1982) Part 6 P. 21, Tabeen AI-Haga' iq (1314H) Part 4 P. 255 
6- Bada'a AI-Sana'i (1982) Part 6 P. 21, Tabeen Al-Haqa'iq (1314H) Part 4 P. 255 
7- Bada'a AI-Sana'i Part 6 P. 21 
8- The founder of Hanafi School. See chapter 3 
9- Bada'a Al-Sana'i (1982) Part 6 P. 22, Tabeen Al-Haqa'iq (314 H) Part 4 P. 255 
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Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali schools and jurists Abu Yusuf and Muhammad of the Hanafi 
School disagree with the above opinion, stating that representation is permitted and is 
not subject to the approval of the other party. They support their argument on three 
grounds: (1) that the right to claim is a personal right, thus a litigant can exercise it in 
person or through another person. (2) That not every person is capable of presenting 
his case efficiently, thus depriving him from being represented could be harmful to his 
rights. (3) That a litigant might be busy and not wish to exercise his case in person. 10 
Current Islamic scholars have concluded from the above discussion that pursuant to 
Islamic law an accused person does have the right to be defended by a representative. 
Taha Al Alwanee claims that early Islamic jurists did not study the right of the 
accused to be defended by a representative, but rather they confined their studies to 
the complainant's right for representation to prove the claim against the accused. He 
declares that neither Islamic provision nor jurists' opinions express either prohibition 
or permission with regard to legal representation for the accused. He argues that the 
right of defence is a fundamental principle which an accused person can exercise in 
person or through a representative. 1' To the same effect, Awd M. Awd 12 and 
Abdulrahman Al Homady 13 state that all schools of thought agree about the accused's 
right to be represented in court whatever the crime is. Moreover, they conclude that 
according to the majority of jurists such representation is not subject to the approval 
of the other litigant. 
Similarly, Bandar Al -Swailam states that in Islamic law the accused cannot be 
deprived of his right to be represented by another person. This right is applicable to all 
types of offence because all crimes require explanation and discussion, and not every 
person is capable of this. 14 This view taken by present Islamic scholars mentioned 
above is compatible with international human rights standards especially the 
European Court of Human Rights that considers the accused's right to be assisted by a 
lawyer as one of the fundamental features of the fair hearing. 15 
10 
- Bada'a Al-Sana'i (1982) Part 6 P. 22; Tabeen Al-Haqa'iq (1314 H) Part 4 P. 255 11 
- Taha Alwanee "Huquq Al Motahem Fi Merhalat Al Tahgeeg". In Al Motahem Wa Huquqh Fi Al 
Shari'ah Al-Islami. Arabic Centre for Securities and Training Studies. Riyadh 1982 Part 1 P. 38&39 
12 Awd M. Awd "Hag Al Motahem Fi Al Esta'anh Be Mohanz Been Al Shari 'ah We Al Qanoon" Al- 
Muslim Al-Muasir. The Contemporary Muslim Journal. Vol. 49 1987 P. 79- 82. 
13 
- Abdulrahman Al-Homady (1989) p 461-471 14 
- Bandar Al-Swailam (1987) "Al Motahem Wa Huquqh Fi Al- Fiqh Al-Island" Part 1 Arabic Centre 
for Securities and Training Studies. Riyadh p. 294 & 295 
15 
- Proitrirnol v France (1993) Para. 34 (Application No. 00014032/88) 
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(2) Concept of the "Legal profession" in Islamic law 
In early Islamic states, legal practice was not originally exercised with financial gain 
in view, but rather was practiced to assist the litigants concerned. Thus, this practice 
was not fully organized even after representatives had played a considerable role, 
thereby achieving an initial degree of organization. 
Interestingly, attitudes towards the "litigants' representatives" were not positive: 
representatives were described as: " non religious people and they hold the case by 
which rights are waived... if litigants, however, come to court by themselves justice 
will be discovered quickly... therefore it is much better if people do not seek their 
help... " 16 
Ihsan AlKelanee points out that legal practice was known in other cultures, 
particularly in the Roman and Greek, as an organized profession. In contrast, Islamic 
society did not know legal practice as an organized social practice or in terms of an 
independent career, but rather they knew the system of litigants' representation. 
AlKelanee explains that unlike other societies, Islamic societies throughout history 
did not value those who represented litigants; the occupation was rather seen as a 
degrading career, and many of those with piety had avoided playing this role. In a 
society that holds this view, he argues, falling standards in this occupation are to be 
expected. No surprise then, his argument goes, if the history of the Islamic judiciary 
is one of great caution towards representation. 
This negative attitude continued until legal practice appeared in its purist form when 
the Ottoman Empire issued the Litigants' Representatives Act in 1292 H. Since then 
many modern legislations have been enacted in which legal practice has been 
organized in Islamic states. These legislations have played a major role in changing 
the negative attitude towards the occupation of representation in many parts of the 
Islamic world. 17 
Early Islamic jurists, as has been explained, did not discuss legal practice. As a result 
current Islamic scholars disagree about the profession of law. Some believe it is 
prohibited, while the majority agrees about its legality. In the following the views of 
those who deny the legality of the legal profession will be examined. 
16 
- Abdulrahman Al-Homady (1989) p. 474- 476 17 
- Ihsan Al Kelanee "Asslamh Al Shakssah Wa Huquq Al-Defi'a Wa Door Al-Mohaniat Fi Al Eslam" 
Journal of Law. Published by Faculty of Law in Kuwait University. Vol. 7 No. 3 September 1983 P. 
205 & 210 
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Abu A'lal Al Maududi18, and a recent judgment in the United Arab Emirates19 state 
that legal practice is prohibited in Islamic law. They support their claim chiefly on 
the basis of six points. These points and their validity will be discussed in the 
following: 
The first point asserts that, as legal practice was not known in any previous Islamic 
age, it therefore cannot be accepted20. This view cannot however be accepted as a 
legal source for the prohibition of representation. The general principle in Islam is that 
everything is permitted unless clearly prohibited . 
21 Being unknown in the past does 
not mean that it is prohibited. In fact, this view may be mainly attributed to the fact 
that some scholars have a strong sensitivity towards any western idea, whether 
positive or negative. The same reasoning could lead to the prohibition of any new 
concept such as a traffic or airline system, on the basis that this was not known in 
early Islamic societies. It could reveal Islamic law as being out of date and not 
capable of absorbing new developments. 22 Gamil Muhammad Hussein illustrates the 
point clearly when he states that: "Although classical Islamic Shari'a did not 
specifically include any express provision which oblige the court to avail the accused 
of the right to use a lawyer, essentials of fair and just trial under Islamic law cannot 
be satisfied in any modern society without ensuring the right of the accused to use a 
lawyer or attorney of his or her own choice. Contemporary writers on Islamic Shari'a 
recognize the right to use a lawyer or attorney as one of the most basic rights of the 
accused in any criminal proceedings. " 23 
The second point argues that there is no benefit from having lawyers in courts. 24 This 
claim is not true. The fact is that the lawyer, since he understands the provisions of 
Islamic as well as enacted laws, can present a case clearly before the court and can 
highlight its crucial points. This is an important means of reaching the correct 
decision. 
19 
- Al Maududi (1975) "Al Qanoon Al-Islami Wa Torog Tanfedeh" Mu'ssast Al Resalah . 19 
-A decision in A'man Federalist Shar! 'ah Court in 19/12/1984. J Quoted in Awd M. Awd "Hag Al 
Motahem Fi Al Esta'anh Be Mohamee" Al Muslim Al Mo'asr Journal. 1987 P. 68 
20 
- Al Maududi, A (1975) "Al Qanoon Al-Islami we Torog Tanfedeh" Mu'ssast Al Resalah. p. 74 21 
- Mashohor Soliman (1987) p. 115 22 
- See chapter three of this thesis. 23 
- Gamil Muhammad Hussein "Basic Guarantees in the Islamic Criminal Justice System". In 
Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Adel Omer Sherif, and Kate Daniels (2003). Criminal Justice in Islam; 
Judicial Procedure in the Shari'a. p 50 24 
- Al Maududi (1975) "Al Qanoon Al-Islami Wa Torog Tanfedeh" Mu'ssast Al Resalah p. 71-73 
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The third argument is that the lawyers' aim is to gain personal profit for themselves 
and that they are indifferent in respect of the fact. 25 This argument can be rejected on 
the basis that a Muslim lawyer has a religious and moral duty which he must follow; 
and despite some inevitable exceptions, such as also occur in all other professions, 
from farming to accounting, the rule still holds. According to this argument the 
professions of farming and accounting etc. should also be banned26. 
The fourth claim is that by his professional experience and personal skills a lawyer is 
able to change the facts, which could mislead the judge. 27 This argument is based on 
an exaggeration of the role of the lawyer. Many facts show the fallacy of this claim. 
To begin with it is often maintained that whatever skills the lawyer presents, he 
cannot change the facts since the judges in most legal systems are highly qualified. 
This is particularly the case in Islamic states where the law requires very high 
qualifications from a person to be appointed as a judge. Besides this, serious criminal 
offences are tried in most current judicial systems by a bench consisting of three or 
more judges. Moreover, in most judicial systems criminal judgments are also subject 
to supervision by higher courts. 
The fifth point contends that the participation of a lawyer might complicate the case 
and slow down the procedures28. The invalidity of this argument can be demonstrated 
by reference to three points. First, pursuant to Islamic law as we will point out later, 
an accused person has an important guarantee to be tried without undue delay. So a 
lawyer, when defending the accused, will be restricted by the right to speedy trial. 
Secondly, a fair decision, however relatively delayed, is much better than an unfair 
decision made hastily. Finally and more importantly, the judge presides over the 
hearing, so if he notices any unnecessary delay on the part of the lawyer he can take 
any necessary steps to adjudicate the case within a reasonable time. 
The sixth and final point argues that representation by a lawyer might infringe the 
right to equality of arms. This claim can be refuted on three grounds: (1) the other 
party in the case, whether criminal or civil, is also entitled to a lawyer; (2) the 
argument is inconceivable in criminal cases where the accused faces an experienced 
party (litigant), that is to say the public prosecution; (3) equality between litigants, 
25 
- Ibid, p. 72 26 
- Mashohor Soliman (1987) p. 117 27 
- Al Maududi (1975) "Al Qanoon Al-Islami wa Torog Tanfedeh" Mu'ssast Al Resalah p. 72 28 
- Abdullah Al-Muhmmud (no year) "Majmo't AI-Rasa'1" . Al-maktab Al-Islami. Second edition. Part 2 p. 286 
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generally speaking, cannot be fully achieved even in the absence of a lawyer. Some 
litigants are more eloquent and hence more capable of presenting their cases 
effectively. 29 
Accordingly, the great majority of Islamic scholars and writers are in agreement about 
the legality of legal practice provided that the lawyer does not defend his client if he 
knows that the latter is in the wrong. 30 Therefore, the judicial system in Saudi Arabia 
has correctly adopted the view provided by the majority, and issued, as we will see, a 
code of law practice to organise the legal profession. In fact, this understanding shows 
clear consistency with the international law of human rights especially in respect of 
the right of the accused to be helped by a lawyer. 
Section Two Saudi law 
1: Shari'ah Courts 
Until very recently (2001), the structures of legal practice in Saudi Arabia were not 
precisely organized, and the accused's right to be helped by a lawyer was not fully 
guaranteed. The Law of 1372 H31 was the sole enacted law that mention the right to 
representation. 
To understand the significance of the historical development of the legal profession in 
Saudi Arabia in terms of shaping the current laws, one should divide the study of this 
subject into two stages, namely the right of the accused to be assisted by a lawyer 
before and after the enactment of the Code of Law Practice32, Law of Criminal 
Procedure33, and the Law of Civil Procedure before Shari'ah Courts. 
29 
- Mashohor Soliman (1987) p 131 30 
- See the Permanent Committee for Research and Legal Opinion in Saudi Arabia. Fatu'a "legal 
opinion" No. 3532. See also Fatwa of Scholar Muhammad Bin Authemeen. A previous member of the 
Board of Senior Religious Scholars (Hae't Kibar Al-Aluma). Al muslamoon Newspaper. First Year, 
Vol. 10 P. 14, Almubark, Ahmad. A previous president of the judiciary in the United Arab Emirates. 
"Al Mohamah" P. 177 Conference in Islamic Jurisprudence held in Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic 
University. Riyadh. 1396 
31 
- This law is replaced by the Law of Civil Procedure before Shari'ah Courts 32 
- Issued by Royal Decree No. (M/38) 15 October 2001 33 
- Issued by Royal Decree No. (M139) 16 October 2001 
195 
(A) The right of the accused to be assisted by a lawyer prior to the current laws 
Article 59 of 1372 H Law 34 provided that "Every person has the right to 
representation without restriction". Apparently the phrase "without restriction" was 
selected to confirm that the legislature expresses the opinion of the majority of 
Islamic jurists, who emphasize that representation in court is not contingent on 
approval from the other litigant. This is in fact an important issue, because leaving the 
door open to the judge to decide upon controversial issues could lead to differences of 
opinion between judges as to correct procedures. This might particularly arise where 
one judge favoured the majority opinion, while another judge supported Abu Hanafi's 
interpretation mentioned above. 
However, despite the fact that the text provided in the article is general and is not 
confined to civil or criminal cases, in practice an accused before Shari'ah courts and 
the investigation authority was not allowed to be represented or assisted except in 
exceptional circumstances. For example, where the accused lacks the ability to 
represent himself or where he is a minor 35 . 
Although the judicial and investigation authorities did not offer clear justification for 
their reluctance in this matter, a careful scrutiny of the history might illuminate the 
grounds for their negative attitude. Three historical points might be relevant to our 
discussion: 
1- The disagreement about representation between early Islamic jurists in 
the four Islamic schools of thought had created ambiguity around this 
issue. In particular, as we have seen, jurists did not discuss the right of 
the accused to be represented in trial. 
2- Litigant representation had been viewed as a degrading career 
throughout different Islamic ages as we have pointed out above. It 
seems that this stance had continued until recently among the judiciary 
members and also perhaps in Saudi society. This is evident by the fact 
that some judges considered lawyers as a hindrance in reaching the 
truth in the determination of the case. It was believed that lawyers 
often focused on side issues that were not directly relevant to 
resolution of the case or engaged in tactics that detracted from the 
34 
- This law was repeal by the Law of Civil Procedure before Shari'ah Courts 35 
- See for instance Saud Al Hammali (1419-1418H). Hag Al- Deft'a Fi Merhalat Al-Muhakmah Al- 
Jaza'eeh. Naif Arab Academy for Security Sciences; a Master dissertation. He displays a case in which 
the accused was represented by a lawyer, because he was minor. p. 197 
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achievement of justice. In addition, it was also often maintained that a 
direct interaction between judges and the accused was the best way of 
achieving the most appropriate resolution of the case. 
3- It seems that the idea of representing an accused before the court was 
not familiar when the Law of 1372 H was enacted. Thus, this attitude 
remained until recent years. In reality, most legal professionals did not 
go into legal practice because there was no culture of legal 
representation in the society. 
(B) The right of the accused to be assisted by a lawyer subsequent to the current 
laws 
In spite of many individual attempts to provide an accused with the right to be 
defended by a lawyer, it seems that the legislature correctly preferred to resolve the 
issue through clear integral laws. 
According to the Law of Criminal Procedure the accused's right to be assisted by a 
professional lawyer is guaranteed by article 4 which explicitly declares: "any accused 
person shall have the right to seek the assistance of a lawyer or a representative to 
defend him during the investigation and trial stages". This article does not 
distinguish between kinds of crime. The accused is entitled to this right whatever 
crime he is accused of, whether Qisas, Haddud, or Ta'azir. This confirms that the 
legislature in Saudi Arabia has in this regard adopted the opinion that has been 
accepted by the majority of Muslim scholars. This approach is also in agreement with 
the European Court of Human Rights that considers the accused right to have a lawyer 
as an essential element of a fair hearing 36 
Interestingly, even though the significance of the role of a professional lawyer in 
defending the accused is recognized, the accused's right to be assisted in the stages of 
trial or investigation is not confined to a qualified, licensed lawyer. The accused can 
choose any person to assist him. This might raise the question of how an unqualified 
person can help the accused. However, anyone who is familiar with Saudi society 
may understand. There are many qualified persons though not lawyers who are 
willing to defend an accused person if the latter is a relative or a friend, or just in the 
interests of justice as a kind of social solidarity in Islam. 
36 _ Proitrimol v France (1993) Para. 34 (Application No. 00014032/88) 
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The right to have a lawyer begins from the moment that the accused is arrested. 
Article 35 provides: "In cases other than flagrant delicto, no person shall be arrested 
or detained except on the basis of order from the competent authority. Any such 
person shall be treated decently and shall not be subjected to any bodily or moral 
harm. He shall also be advised of the reasons of his detention and shall be entitled to 
communicate with any person of his choice to inform him of his arrest. " The term 
used in the last sentence "to inform him of his arrest" may imply that the law permits 
only a single communication between the lawyer and the accused, just to report the 
arrest. In fact, reading this article in connection with other articles of the law such as 
article 4 mentioned above, and article 64 which states that: "During the investigation, 
the accused shall have the right to seek the assistance of a representative or an 
attorney. " should give a different understanding. Since article 35 is placed under 
section 3 which is titled "Arrest of the Accused", one can argue that this article is 
worded in such a manner just to ensure that the accused right to have a lawyer begins 
from the moment of his arrest. The accused right to communicate with his lawyer is 
not limited to a single communication. This understanding complies with the 
European standards of human rights in which the right to have a lawyer is regarded as 
a fundamental right that must be effectively exercised. 
In addition, the right to have a lawyer is not obligatory. So the accused can opt to 
defend himself in person and not to be assisted by a lawyer, which means that the law 
does not consider the right to have a lawyer as part of the judicial administration, but 
rather it is considered as a purely private right. In serious crimes, the accused must 
personally appear before the court, without prejudice to his right to seek legal 
assistance. As to other crimes, his attendance is not obligatory provided that a 
representative or an attorney defends him. But the court might issue an order for the 
personal appearance of the accused, if the interest of justice so requires. 37 
It is essential to know that the application of the European human rights standards 
with regard to the right to have a lawyer entails that the lawyer must be given the 
opportunity to visit his client in person out of the hearing of officials38. However, the 
European Court is of the opinion that despite the importance of a relationship of 
confidence between a lawyer and the accused, this right is not absolute. 
39 So, privacy 
37 
- Article 140 of Law of Criminal Procedure 38 
- Can v Austria (1985) Para 17 (Application No. 00009300/81) 39 
- Croissant v Germany (1992) Para 29 (Application No. 00013611/88) 
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between the lawyer and the accused can be subject to some restrictions. 40 In addition, 
this right can be restricted to protect public interests. 41 Therefore, providing the 
accused with the right to appoint his own lawyer does not mean that the Contracting 
States cannot regulate such practice. A state has the jurisdiction to set up legislations 
governing the required qualification and conduct of lawyers. 2 
A comparison between the above requirements and the law in Saudi Arabia reveals 
that Article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedures is not compatible with the 
European Convention because it subjects the accused's communication to the 
supervision of the criminal investigation officer. It provides: "Whoever is arrested or 
detained shall be promptly notified of the reasons for his arrest or detention, and 
shall be entitled to communicate with any person of his choice, to inform him (of his 
arrest or detention), provided that such communication is under the supervision of the 
criminal investigation officer. " According the European Court of Human Rights if 
the lawyer cannot receive instructions in confidence, then a risk that legal consultation 
might lose much of its effectiveness. 43 Accordingly, it is important to redraft the 
article concerned in the Saudi law in a way that guarantees this issue, and any 
restriction must be allowed only in exceptional circumstances. 
As far as legal assistance in Saudi Arabia is concerned, if the accused has no means to 
pay for a lawyer he cannot have legal assistance. This fact is open to criticism because 
it simply means that a rich accused can enjoy the assistance of an experienced 
qualified lawyer, whereas an indigent accused cannot enjoy the same right. No one 
can deny that an accused who is represented by a lawyer is more likely to exercise the 
right of defence effectively. This would probably violate the European Convention on 
Human Rights which states that: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights... (c) to defend himself ... through legal assistance of his 
own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given 
it free when the interests of justice so require. " Thus, in order to achieve conformity 
with the European Convention on Human Rights, this shortcoming needs to be 
addressed in order to ensure legal assistance to those who do not have sufficient 
means to pay the lawyer's cost. 
40 
- Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom (1984) 2 EHRR 165 41 
- Ibid 42 
- Harris (1995) p. 259 43 
- Brennan v UK (2003) 34 EHRR 18 
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Moreover, in order to guarantee the right to have a free legal assistance in a manner 
consistent with the European standards of human rights, the Saudi court must insure 
that the accused in reality is assisted by a counsel. The European Court found that 
mere nomination does not ensure effective assistance. 44 
2: The Board of Grievances 
According to article 19 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances an 
accused person may seek help from an attorney. In contrast to cases before the 
Shari'ah courts, the personal appearance of the accused before the Board is obligatory 
in all criminal cases, whether serious or not. 
As to the accused's right to be helped by a lay advocate, article 19 guarantees the 
right to be assisted by a lawyer, but does not mention a representative who is not 
specifically a lawyer45. However this should not be understood to mean that the 
accused is not allowed to be assisted by a lay advocate. 
The reason for stipulating article 19 as such may be attributed to a historical cause, 
namely the ambiguity in respect of the right to be helped by a lawyer. So when 
enacting the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances the legislature took 
this matter into account and correctly clarified its position regarding this issue by 
granting the right to the accused in any crime tried before the Board. 
However, a careful reading of article 19 can lead to the conclusion that the accused's 
right to be assisted by a lawyer is not absolute, but is conditional on his appearance 
before the Board. If the accused fails to attend the trial he has no right to be 
represented by a lawyer. Article 19 provides that: "the accused shall appear in the 
hearing of a disciplinary or criminal case; he shall defend himself orally or in 
writing; he may seek help from an advocate... Where a person who is charged of a 
criminal case has been summoned but has failed to appear he shall be served with 
another summons to appear in another session and if he has failed to appear the 
Circuit may adjudge the case in default or may issue a warrant and bring him before 
it on a fixed date: if his arrest was impossible it will adjudge the case in default". 
This is in fact in clear contradiction to the status in the European Court of Human 
Rights. The Court has held that: "... the fact that the defendant, in spite of having 
44 
- Artico v Italy (1981) 3 EHRR 1 45 
- Article 19 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances reads: "... he (the accused) may 
seek help from an advocate" 
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been properly summoned, does not appear, cannot - even in the absence of an excuse 
- justify depriving him of his right under article 6 Para 3 of the convention to be 
defended by council" 46. 
As to the right to a lawyer in the appellate courts, Article 36 of the Rules of Pleadings 
before the Board of Grievances states: " Where the application for scrutiny has been 
granted the Scrutinizing Circuit will either confirm or reverse the judgment and in the 
case of reversal it may return it to the Circuit which rendered it or itself hear the 
case; where the judgment was returned to the Circuit which rendered it, if it has 
insisted on its judgment, the Scrutinizing Circuit shall itself hear the case if it is not 
satisfied with the point of view of the Circuit rendering the judgment. 
In all cases where the scrutinizing Circuit decides to hear the case it will decide after 
having heard the statements of the litigants.... " Therefore and since the Scrutinizing 
Circuit reviews decisions taken by for instance circuit on file (papers) basis and no 
hearing is held the accused, his lawyer, and the prosecution do not participate in this 
stage. Accordingly, the right to be represented before the Scrutinizing Circuit is not 
guaranteed except if the case is heard by the Scrutinizing Circuit after the judgment of 
the first instance has been reversed. 
Although the article does not state explicitly the accused's right to be helped by a 
lawyer before the Scrutinizing Circuit, this right is connected to the rights to defence 
provided in article 19. The accused is thus entitled to enjoy all defence rights 
guaranteed before the first instance circuit. This includes, for instance, the right to 
defend himself personally in oral or written form, to seek help from a lawyer, and to 
apply for the issue of a summons to witnesses in order to hear their evidence. 
As far as the standard of the European human rights law is concerned, the above rules 
do not contradict the European standard of human rights because the right to have a 
lawyer is fully guaranteed in the trial court. 
In accordance with article 22, if the accused is expelled from the hearing for 
breaching the Circuit regulations, the circuit may carry on the hearing of the case until 
such time as it becomes possible to proceed with the case in the accused's presence. 
Although this article does not clarify whether or not the presence of his lawyer will be 
permitted if the accused is expelled, the temporal nature of this exclusion might 
suggest that the exclusion in this is limited to the accused. 
46 
- Lala v Netherlands (1993) Para. 33 (Application No. 00014861/89) 
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The lawyer has the right of access to the investigation minutes (record) and may 
obtain copies of the papers relating to his case if the interests of justice so require. 47 
3: Comments on the Code of Law Practice 
Guarantees regarding the right of the accused to be assisted by a lawyer are provided 
in the Law of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of 
Grievances. The former covers the procedure before the Shari'ah courts, and the latter 
covers the procedure before the Board. However, some other guarantees regarding 
this issue are provided in the Code of Law Practice. This law governs both judicial 
institutions. Therefore, the rules provided in this discussion are applicable in both the 
Shari'ah court and the Board of Grievances. The Code of Law Practice is applicable 
to lawyers in the Board of Grievances, the Shari'ah courts and the administrative 
committees. Article 1 declares: "the phrase "law practice" shall mean representation 
of third parties before courts of law, the Board of Grievances, and other 
committees.... " The discussion here will be limited to the main subject of this section. 
That is, the right in Saudi Arabia of the accused to have a lawyer in both institutions. 
According to article 13 of the Code of Law Practice a lawyer has the right to choose 
whatever strategy he may deem appropriate for defending the interests of the accused, 
and in so doing, shall not be questioned in connection with the content of his written 
or oral arguments. However, the lawyer is under obligation to refrain from any 
offensive language or accusation. He is also obliged not to refer to personal matters 
concerning the accused's adversary or representative, 48 unless, of course, these 
personal matters are important and necessary in defending the accused. 
Since the right to be assisted by a lawyer is held to be not merely a token principle but 
an effective practical measure, the Shari'ah courts, the Board of Grievances, 
administrative committees, government agencies, and the investigation authorities are 
obliged to facilitate the lawyer's discharge of his assignment, and must enable him to 
attend any interrogation and peruse any relevant documents. Moreover, his request 
shall not be denied except for a valid reason. 49 
Here it should be asked whether the rights mentioned in articles 13 and 19 above are 
also applicable both to the lay advocate and to the accused himself if he decides to 
exercise his rights personally. In fact these rights are only provided in the Code of 
47 
- Article 17 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 48 
- Article 12 of the Code of Law Practice. 49 
- Article 19 of the Code of Law Practice. 
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Law Practice (duties and rights of lawyers). This law aims to organize legal practice 
and has nothing to do with any representative if he is not a lawyer. However, since 
these rights are essential in order to enable the accused or his defender, whether a 
professional or not, to exercise the defence rights effectively, it is suggested that these 
articles should also be applicable to the accused and lay advocates. This view is 
supported by the fact that not providing the accused or a lay advocate with such rights 
might be regarded as a breach of the right to equality of arms, particularly if a lawyer 
represents the victim. 
According to the Code a lawyer cannot without a legitimate cause decline to represent 
his client before the case has been concluded. 50 However, the lawyer is not prohibited 
from defending more than one accused in the same case provided that there is no 
conflict in their interests. 
As to the accused's right to withdraw his lawyer, article 27 clearly stipulates that the 
accused shall be entitled to dismiss his lawyer. Obviously, this article does not 
confine this right to a particular stage of the case, which means that the accused can 
withdraw his lawyer at any time. The law does not, however, state whether the 
accused has the right to appoint a second lawyer after dismissing his first. Yet this 
should not be understood to mean that he is not allowed to do so, since the law 
guarantees this right and this guarantee must be applied even after dismissal of the 
first lawyer. 
Naturally, the lawyer should not be allowed to act or continue to act for two or more 
defendants where a conflict of interests arises between those defendants. Article 15 
states that: "A lawyer shall neither personally, nor through another lawyer agree to 
represent an adversary of his client or otherwise provide hint with any assistance, 
even in the form of an opinion, in connection with a case that he has previously 
handled or in connection with any other related matter even after expiry of his power 
of attorney". 
In addition, in Saudi Arabia the question cannot arise that the accused's lawyer might 
simultaneously function as an investigator against the same accused, because a lawyer 
is not allowed to work as an investigator. However, the same problem can arise if the 
same lawyer appears as a representative against the same accused on behalf of the 
victim or his heirs in another case. Article 14 of the Code of Law Practice declares 
30 
- Article 23 of Code of Law Practice. 
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that: "(1) A lawyer shall not personally, or through another lawyer, accept any case 
or render any advice against his present or former employer except after the expiry of 
a minimum period of five years from the date of termination of his relation with that 
employer. (2) A lawyer who acts for a client on a part-time basis pursuant to a 
contract shall not accept any case or render any advice against that client before the 
expiry of three years following termination of that contract. " Obviously, this article 
concerns mainly civil cases where conflict between different firms is more likely to 
occur. However, the article should be interpreted to be applicable to criminal cases 
particularly since this right supports the position of the accused. 
Before both the Shari'ah courts and the Board of Grievances the law does not 
mention the right to a competent and effective lawyer. Moreover, it does not provide a 
standard or guidance by which the competence of the lawyer will be judged. Even 
though the European Convention does not mention expressly that a lawyer must be 
competent, this right emerges from the requirement that rights provided in the 
Convention must be effectively enjoyed. The accused is entitled to a fair trial. His 
status is to a considerable degree dependent upon the skill and knowledge and 
experience of counsel. The discussion must now move to an examination of the 
situation in Saudi Arabia where the accused is assisted inadequately. 
This is in fact an important matter to address in the judicial system, particularly since 
Judges are not likely to consider the competence of the lawyer, as: (1) seeking the 
assistance of a lawyer is not obligatory in Saudi Arabia and therefore it is the 
accused's duty to choose a qualified lawyer; (2) the training of judges essentially 
focuses on Islamic jurisprudence as presented in the old Islamic books, in which such 
matters are not detailed. 
With regard to the test by which the standard of competency is judged, obviously this 
is very difficult task. David M Tanovich, trying to provide a test by which the 
competence of the lawyer may be judged, concludes: "I began this article pondering 
the question of what the effective assistance of counsel truly meant. Unfortunately, I 
conclude without an answer. "51 
Many attempts have been made in other jurisdictions to set a test of the competence of 
the lawyer. Suggestions made fall into two main groups. First, there are those that 
51 
- Tanovich, D (1993-1994) "Charting the Constitutional Right of Effective Assistance of Counsel in 
Canada". Journal of the Criminal Law Quarterly. Vol. 36, No 4 P. 422 
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argue that the court itself should establish a test52. This could for example be a test for 
flagrant incompetence, or a more restricted test applying the "safety approach". 53 
However, this suggestion is not practicable in Saudi Arabia where judges are not 
willing to develop or set any standard in which the competence of the lawyer can be 
examined. 
Alternatively, the second suggestion, namely that the legislative body itself should set 
guidelines to be observed by the defending lawyer is more suitable to the status quo in 
Saudi Arabia. The law in Saudi Arabia could specify standards for what we envision 
effective assistance to mean. Professor Klein explains that: "Particularized standards 
which guide lawyers through every stage of the criminal proceedings, might actually 
diminish the number of inadequate representation claims. Such standards detailing 
the steps that ought to be taken in preparing a case would assist and guide the 
attorney in the preparation of the defence in a criminal trial, and would be especially 
useful to the novice attorney or the lawyer whose speciality is in another area of law, 
but who recently has taken on a criminal case. 
Particularized requirements would also enable defendants to understand what is 
involved in the defence of a case and might well enable them to more actively 
participate in the process that so vitally affects them. Through such standards, the 
trial judge would be able to monitor more effectively the quality of representation the 
defendant was receiving. Moreover, the lack of specific standards makes it more 
difficult to evaluate the competency of the representation provided. This in turn 
diminishes the likelihood of obtaining appellate relief for a defendant who had 
ineffective counsel at trial". 54 
Interestingly, the law prevents the lawyer from disclosing any evidence before both 
institutions that could be used against the accused. Article 23 of the Code of Law 
Practice provides: "A lawyer shall not disclose any confidential information which 
has been communicated to him or of which he has become aware in the course of 
practicing his profession even after expiration of his power of attorney, unless such 
non-disclosure constitutes a violation of a Shari'ah requirement... " Therefore, if the 
52 
- Samuels, A "Incompetence or ineptitude of counsel as a ground of appear,. The Criminal Lawyer 
Journal. No. 77 November 1997 P. 1 
53 
- This test means that it is not enough to demonstrate that there was a material irregularity, but 
whether any material irregularity in fact had an effect upon the judgment. 
s4 
- Professor Klein . 
Quoted in Tanovich, D (1993-1994) "Charting the Constitutional Right of 
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Canada". Journal of The Criminal Law Quarterly. Vol. 36, No 4 P. 
414 
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lawyer contravenes his obligation to keep his communication with his client secret he 
will be subject to disciplinary action. Article 29 Para 2 declares that: "Without 
prejudice to a claim for compensation by any aggrieved party or to any other claim, 
any lawyer who violates the provisions of this Code or its implementing regulations, 
or commits a breach of his professional duties or any act as may be incompatible with 
the professional standards shall be subject to one of the following sanctions... " 
Nevertheless, and more significantly, the law does not require the exclusion of 
evidence obtained by breaching the lawyer's obligation to keep his communication 
with his client confidential. In other words, "the defendant cannot be insured a fair 
trial without legal advice and representation, and legal privilege is guaranteed to 
insure its effectiveness. The accused has been induced to speak candidly to his lawyer. 
So, if these confidential communications are admitted in evidence, the state takes 
unfair advantage of him. "55 As a result it can be suggested that if conformity with 
European Convention on Human Rights needs to be maintained to ensure effective 
access to a lawyer the law must state clearly that evidence obtained from the lawyer 
by breaching his obligation that he must keep his communication with the accused 
confidential is not accepted. 
Part II The Right to an Interpreter 
Article 6 Para 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that: "Everyone 
charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights... (e) To have the 
free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used 
in court. " 
This part will be divided into two sections, dealing as before first with the terms of 
Islamic Law, and second with the law of Saudi Arabia. 
Section One Islamic law 
Traditional Islamic jurisprudence does not provide a separate study in respect of the 
accused's right to have a translator if he does not understand the language used in 
court. However, the early jurists had discussed the idea of a translator for any of the 
litigants or witnesses who could not speak or understand the language used in court, 
ss 
- For further discussion about the right to confidential communications with a lawyer see for 
example, T. R. S. Allan "Legal Privilege and the Principle of Fairness in the Criminal Trial. " The 
Criminal Law Review Journal. 1987 Sweet and Maxwell P. 449 
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in either civil or criminal cases. Since these rules may also be applied to the accused 
in criminal cases, the jurists' views regarding this matter will be outlined. 
Islamic jurists address the subject in considerable detail. For example, they discuss the 
validity of a translation provided by a blind or deaf person, or an interpretation made 
by a son to his father or visa versa. However, our discussion will concentrate 
exclusively on matters related to our main topic. Namely, the accused's right to have 
an interpreter. 
Jurists are in agreement about the validity of seeking the assistance of a translator 
through a judge if the litigants or one of them cannot speak the language used in the 
court. 56 They cite the following evidence to support their view: 
1- The Prophet employed Sad bin Thabit57 to translate letters from Jews58. 
2- The judge is not able to understand the case unless it is translated into a 
language which he understands59. 
However, they disagree about the number of interpreters that must be employed to 
render a judicial decision. They are divided into three schools of thought: 
1- A1-Shafi'i60, Al Hanbali61, some jurists of the Maliki62, and Muhammad bin Al- 
Hassan and Zefer from the Hanafi School63 believe that a judge cannot base his 
judgment on the translation of one interpreter. Their view is based on the belief that a 
translation is a kind of testimony, and that the conditions appertaining to testimony 
must therefore be applied in the case of translation. 
2- In contrast to this view Abu Hanafi and his pupil Abu Yusuf64, some jurists of the 
Maliki65, and Hanbali66 Schools, do not classify the translation as testimony, but 
rather regard it as a statement or an item of information. So they do not require the 
conditions of testimony for translation. Thus, the judge can in their opinion rely on the 
translation of a single person. 
3- Other jurists say that translation does not always have the same character. Some 
translations may be considered as testimony. In this case the judge cannot base his 
56 
- Al-Baher Al-Ra'g (1997). Part 7. P113 & Kashaf Al-kana' (1983). Part 6p. 352 57 
- One of the Prophet's companions. 58 
- Al-Bokary, Ketab AI-Ahkam, Hadith No. 895. 59 
- Kashaf Al Kana' (1983) Part 6 P. 352 60 
- Al-Mawardi (1970/1971) Adab Al-Qadee. Part2 p. 695-696 61 
- Al Ensaf (1378H) Part 11. P. 394 62 
- Al Hattab (1398H) Mawaheb Al Jaleel. Part 6 P. 116&117 63 
- Al-Baher Al-Ra'g (1997). Part 7 P. 67 64 
- Bada'a Al Sana' i (1982) Part 7 P. 12 65 
- Tabsert Al Hokam (1406H). Part I P. 357 66 
- Al Ensaf (1378H). Part I1P. 394 
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judgment on one interpreter. Other translations may be regarded as a statement. In this 
case one interpreter is acceptable67. Although the distinction between testimony and 
information is a difficult task, some jurists have nevertheless established a test in 
which the difference can be identified. They say that the translation has the function 
of statement or information if it is general information and does not pertain to a 
particular person. But it is classified as testimony if it concerns a particular person. 68 
Another controversial issue in this regard is whether or not the judge is permitted to 
do the translation himself if he speaks the language of the party concerned. Although 
jurists have not discussed this matter directly, their views can be deduced from their 
general statements. Some Hanafi and Maliki Schools state that the judge may translate 
if he can69, whereas Al Hanbali jurists restrict the employment of an interpreter to two 
situations: (1) if the judge does not understand the litigants. (2) If one litigant is 
Arabic and the other is not70. 
From this one can conclude that the Hanafi and Maliki Schools deem it the right of 
the judge to translate if he knows the language of the parties or witnesses. He can thus 
translate himself or he can seek the help of an interpreter, even if he understands the 
language. But the Hanbali School's view is that the judge is obliged to translate 
himself if he understands the language to be translated, except in the case that one 
party is Arabic and the other is not. The reason for this view is that the judge's 
translation to one party in the presence of a second party who cannot understand the 
translated statements could breach conditions of equality between litigants71. 
As to the cost of an interpreter it seems that Islamic jurisprudence deems the 
translation to be part of the court administration. As a result the state must pay the 
interpreting costs. 72 
67 
- Adrar Al-Shorog (no year) Part I P. 9 68 
- Al Gorafee (no year) Al Furuq. Part 1 P. 4 Alm Al Kotob. Beirut. 69 
- Sharh Al Zarkashee Ala Moktaser Al- Koragee (1412H) Part 7 P. 258, 70 
- Kashaf Al Kana' (1983). Part 6 P. 352 71 
- Al-Fatawa Al-Hendech (1310 H) part 3 p. 322 72 
- Bada'a Al Sana'i (1982) Part 7 P. 12 
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Section Two Saudi law 
Article 1 of the Basic Law and article 36 of the Law of the Judiciary state that Arabic 
is the official language of the court. So no other languages may be used before the 
court. According to article 13 of the Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 66 in 1374 
H the Ministry of Commerce is the authority in charge of translation licenses. The 
Ministerial decision No. 346 in 1397 H states the conditions required to gain a 
translation license. In line with our approach, however, our discussion will be limited 
to the accused's right to be assisted by an interpreter if he cannot speak or understand 
the language used in the Shari'ah courts and in the Board of Grievances respectively. 
1: Shari'ah Courts 
Rules governing the right of the accused to have an interpreter if he does not 
understand the language used in court in Saudi Arabia are quite similar to those 
required by the European Convention on Human Rights. If either a litigant or a 
witness does not understand Arabic, the court may seek the assistance of 
interpreters 73 . It appears, however, that like the case in the European Court, obligating 
the court to seek the help of interpreters is not to imply that a written translation of the 
judgment rendered will be provided. An oral translation is sufficient. The court is also 
not obligated to translate the defence memorandum (pleading) if it is provided in 
writing. Similarly, the court is not obliged to translate all documents provided by the 
accused. Such translations must be regarded as part of the defence task; the court's 
responsibility is confined only to enabling the accused to exercise his defence rights. 
In other words, if the accused submits a translation of a written document, the court 
should allow him to do so. 
But, if the accused admits his guilt before the courts, the confession must be written 
by the accused in his original language and then will be accurately translated into 
Arabic. 74 
The law does not provide an explicit answer to the question of whether the court 
should provide the accused with an interpreter if he is assisted by a lawyer who 
speaks the accused's language. One can then suggest that in order to keep close to the 
approach applied by the European Court of Human Rights, it is the court's duty to 
73 
- Article 172 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 74 
- Circular No. T/208/12 dated on 20/12/1404 H. Ministry of Justice. AL- tassneef al- Maudouy Li- 
tameem al-Wazarah [The Classification Book for the Ministry of justice Regulation and Administrative 
Circulars], Vol. 3 (Ministry of Justice, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1413 H). 
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provide a translator in this case, because the accused himself should understand the 
proceedings against him in order to discuss any important points with his lawyer. 
In addition, if the accused elects to be assisted by a lawyer who cannot speak the 
language of the accused, the court may not provide him with an interpreter to assist 
his communication with his lawyer. This is slightly different from the case in the 
ECHR. According to the ECHR the state is obliged to provide the accused person 
with a lawyer if he has not sufficient means to pay and if the interests of justice so 
require. So if the court in a contracting state determines to help the accused by 
providing a lawyer it must insure that this right is exercised effectively by either 
providing a lawyer who speaks the accused's language, or by providing him with an 
interpreter if the lawyer is not able to communicate with the accused. In contrast, 
courts according to the judicial system in Saudi Arabia cannot provide the accused 
with a lawyer if he has not sufficient means to pay for the lawyer. Thus, if the accused 
decides to be assisted by a lawyer at his own cost, he must either select a lawyer who 
can speak his language or engage a separate interpreter at his own expense. 
With regard to the cost of an interpreter, the Shari'ah Court is responsible for the 
payment of these costs. This rule is applicable regardless of the final judgment. 
Accordingly, courts do not request the accused to pay the cost of the interpreter if he 
is convicted. This perspective is akin to the European Court's judgment in Luedicke, 
Belkcem and Koc v Germany. 75 The European Court has pointed out that the right to 
have an assistance of an interpreter: "entails for any one who can not speak or 
understand the language used in a court, the right to receive the free assistance of an 
interpreter, without subsequently having claimed back from him payment of costs 
thereby incurred. " 
In addition, The Ministry of Justice has established a department for translation which 
means that most interpreters are employees in the Ministry of Justice. No one can be 
appointed unless he passes an exam under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice76. 
There are many advantages to this approach. First: interpreters can be trained to insure 
their competence. Second: in this way the court will use different interpreters from 
those used by the police or the investigation authorities. This should serve as a 
75 
- (1978) Para 46 (Application No. 00006210/73; 00006877/75) 76 
- Article 99 of the Law of the Judiciary. However, for non- popular languages the court may seek 
help from interpreters for every individual case separately and it shall also pay the cost. - Ministerial decision No. 8/T 29/1/1412 H. In addition, the cost of each single translation is governed by the 
Decision No. 1/220 in 10/5/1411 H of the Council of Civil Servant 
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significant guarantee against a possible infringement of the independence of the 
interpreter. Third: having permanent interpreters makes the interpreter more familiar 
with the procedures before the court. Lesley Noaks and Ian Butler explain that: 
"Those with experience in training of interpreters considered that awareness of court 
procedures was as crucial as linguistic skills. It was generally acknowledged that the 
use of an interpreter in a trial was inclined to make the hearing more disjointed and 
cumbersome. Familiarity with legal procedures on the part of the interpreter was 
seen to reduce some of this difficulty". 77 
This is an important step towards the application of the European standards of human 
rights. In Kamasinski v. Austria78 the European Court of Human Rights stated that in 
order for the right to have an interpreter to be practical and effective, the obligation of 
the competent authorities is not limited to the appointment of an interpreter but, if 
they are put on notice in the particular circumstance, may also extend to a degree of 
subsequent control over adequacy of the interpretation provided. 
Furthermore, for the significant role of the interpreter, any intentional 
misinterpretation will make him subject to punishment. Article 172 of the Law of 
Criminal Procedure declares: "... If any willful default or misrepresentation is 
established against one of the experts or interpreters, the court shall punish him". 
Moreover, it seems that the right to be assisted by an interpreter is also extended to 
cover deaf or dumb people. 79 
As far as the number of interpreters required before the court is concerned, article 172 
of the Law of Criminal Procedure has used the word "interpreter" in its plural form 
which might be considered a modification of article 36 of the Law of the Judiciary, 
which uses the single form of the word. Hence ambiguity may arise as to whether or 
not the law requires more than one interpreter in all kinds of crime. To achieve 
accurate interpretation of the legislator's objective the following points must be taken 
into account: 
77 
- Noaks, L and Butler, I (1995) "Silence in Court? Language Interpreters in the Courts of England 
and Wales" Howard Journal of Criminal Justice No. 34 P. 133 & 134 
78 
-A 168 (1989) 13 E. H. R. R. 36 79 
- In a civil case before the General Court in Riyadh one litigant was deaf and the judge accepted his 
wife's translation after being convinced of her ability to translate accurately. This case is mentioned in 
Bader Al Qamdee (1421- 1420 H) " Huquq Al- Moda'a Aleeh" Riyadh; Imam Muhammad bin Saud 
Islamic University; a master dissertation p. 258 
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1- The law of the Judiciary issued in 1975 has used the single form of the 
word "interpreter". Article 36 reads: "Arabic is the official language of 
the court; the court may, however, hear the statements of the litigants 
or witnesses who do not know Arabic through a translator". 
2- The Law of Criminal Procedure issued in 2001 has used the plural 
form of the word. Article 172 reads: "... if the litigants, witnesses or 
either of them do not understand Arabic, the court may seek the 
assistance of interpreters... " 
3- Article 224 of the Law of Criminal Procedure states: "this law shall 
repeal any provisions inconsistent therewith". 
4- In a case before the Shari'ah court, prior to the enactment of the Law 
of Criminal Procedure, the Ministry of Justice was asked whether one 
interpreter is sufficient or not. In its decision No. 1009E in 29/ 12/ 
1400 H the Ministry states that its intention is to achieve a balance 
between all Islamic jurists' views on this issue. Thus, a single 
interpreter's translation may be sufficient as a statement, but 
insufficient as testimony. 
5- Prior to the Law of Criminal Procedure, the First Committee of Court 
Presidents recommended that courts must in all cases rely on two 
interpreters except in exceptional circumstances. 80 
6- Although the law of the Judiciary has used the single form of the word 
interpreter as mentioned above, the Supreme Judicial Council, prior to 
the Law of Criminal Procedure, in its decision No. 92/5/13 in 9/4/1399 
H reversed a judgment rendered by the General Court and reaffirmed 
by the Appellate Court, on the ground that the General Court had relied 
on the translation of a single interpreter. The Council ruled: "After 
considering the case, the Council believes that anyone committing a 
crime that results in public disorder, distinguished by its atrocity and 
aggression, and accompanied by theft of the victim's money, shall 
deserve the maximum punishment. However, since every precaution 
must be taken when imposing the death penalty, and since the General 
80 
-Quoted in Abdulrahman Al Jofan (1412 AH) "Ahkam Altorjoman Fi Al Qada'a"' Imam 
Muhammad ibn Saud University, the High Judicial Institution; Riyadh; A master dissertation p. 363. 
Hereinafter will refer to as Abdulrahman Al Jofan (1412 AH). However, there is no exception in the 
case of crimes punishable by capital punishment, stoning or amputation. 
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Court had relied on the translation of a single person, and the 
translation to be reliable must be carried out by two just men, the 
Council decides to reverse the judgment and commit the case for trial 
again in the General Court". 81 
Accordingly, it seems that the draftsmen of the Law of Criminal Procedure took heed 
of the Islamic jurists' opinion regarding the number of translators required in court, 
and correctly chose to adopt the view that judges in Saudi Arabia seem to have 
chosen. 
In conclusion, it could be argued that the law in Saudi Arabia requires that if the 
accused cannot understand the language used in the Shari'ah court, he must be 
assisted by two interpreters, save in the case of minor offences where the availability 
of two interpreters is not possible. It is clear that Shari'ah Courts by adopting Islamic 
jurists' view go far beyond the standard that is required by the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
2: The Board of Grievances 
Article 13 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances provides: "Arabic 
is the official language recognized in the proceedings of the case; the statement of a 
person who does not speak Arabic will be heard via a translator where the questions 
addressed to him in his language and his answers thereto will be recorded in writing 
and signed by the said person and the translator. A certified translation into Arabic of 
the instruments and documents written in a foreign language will be provided". 
Interestingly, this article has distinguished between the statement made by the 
prosecution on the one hand and the accused's response or questions posed against 
him on the other. The law does not require the statement of the prosecution to be 
translated into a written form, whereas a written translation is required with regard to 
the questions posed to the accused and his defence thereof. Even though no clear 
justification is offered it could be argued that a written translation is required in 
respect of the questions posed to the accused and his response because judgment is 
more likely to be based on the accused's response to the inquiry. In addition, unlike 
the Shari'ah courts, the law of the Board requires no more than one interpreter in any 
case before it, whether criminal, disciplinary or administrative. This might be justified 
81 
- The case is mentioned in Abdulrahman Al Jofan (1412H) p. 363 
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by the fact that crimes adjudicated by the Board are less serious than those tried by the 
Shari'ah courts. In any event, this approach does not violate the European human 
rights standard, since the European Convention regards one interpreter as sufficient 
for all offences. 
With regard to the cost of the interpreter, pursuant to the decision No. 490 in 9/7/1404 
H of the Council of Civil Servants the Board shall pay these costs. However, it is not 
stated whether the Board will pay the cost of translating all documents adduced by the 
accused. 
Even though the law does not provide a clear answer, it might be argued that the 
Board is not obliged to translate any documents provided by the accused. Such 
translation must be regarded as part of the defence task which is entirely the 
responsibility of the accused. This argument might be supported by a comment made 
by the Vice- President of the Board 82 regarding article 13 of the Rules of Pleadings 
before the Board of Grievances which states that: "the text requires that instruments 
and documents adduced before the Board must be accompanied by a credited 
translation into the Arabic language... and the party against whom the translated 
document is used can challenge the credibility of this document. In this case he must 
provide another credited translation; if the parties disagree about the translated text 
the Circuit shall send the two translations to be weighed by an expert. " 
This approach does not raise any point with regard to the violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
Part III: Right of the Accused to Adequate Time and Facilities 
The European Convention on Human Rights provides that: "Everyone charged with a 
criminal offence has the following minimum rights... (b) To have adequate time and 
facilities for the preparation of his defence. " In the following the right to have an 
adequate time and facilities in Islamic and Saudi laws will be examined respectively. 
Section One Islamic law 
When treating the right to adequate time and facilities, the early Islamic jurists again 
did not limit their discussion only to the accused in criminal cases, but rather 
discussed this right in both criminal and civil cases. This means that they considered it 
92 
- Letter No. 5168 in 2/5/1411 H. 
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to be a right for both the accused and the complainant. In the following I will confine 
my discussion to the right of the accused only to, respectively, adequate time and 
adequate facilities. 
1- Adequate time 
According to Islamic law the judge is obliged to provide an accused with adequate 
time to defend himself if he asks for this. 83 Jurists based this view on the statement 
addressed by Omer Ibn Al Kattab (the Second Ruler after the death of the Prophet) to 
Abu Mosa Al Asharee when he appointed the latter as judge. In this letter Omer 
orders: "grant the litigant an interval of time as this would call for less ambiguity... " 
In his comment on Omer's letter Jurist Al Sarkasee says this is evidence that 
according to Islamic law the judge must give the litigants the necessary time to 
prepare their claims and defence. 84 
The accused deserves the right to adequate time if he requests it. However a few 
jurists argue that the accused in such a situation must reveal the reason for this 
request. Otherwise, the judge shall refuse the request. 85 
Jurists reveal that the importance of this right is embodied in the following points: (a) 
that if the judge refuse to give the accused adequate time to prepare his defence, the 
latter may accuse the judge of being unjust, but if the hearing is deferred to give the 
accused sufficient time to prepare his defence the accused will accept the judge's 
verdict as a fair judgment, 86 (b) that if the accused is not given adequate time, he will 
adduce his defence evidence after the judge's decision which might lead to a reversal 
of the judgment '87 (c) that defence evidence adduced 
by the accused may be true, 
whereas obliging him to present his defence evidence hastily could force him to admit 
untrue facts. 88 
In his comment on jurists' views mentioned above Bandar Al -Swailam indicates that 
Islamic law provides the accused with the right to defer the judgment to consider his 
case and to bring any evidence he may feel important to rebut the accusation against 
him. The accused might be temporarily in a position that does not enable him to 
83 
- Ibn Abdulber (1398H) Al-Kafee. Part 2 p. 90 94 
- Al-Mabsut (no year) Part 16 P. 63 85 
- Muntaha Al Eradat ( no year) Part 2 P. 607 86 
- Al-Mabsut (no year) Part 16 P. 63 87 
- Bada'a Al Sana'i Part 7 P. 13 88 
- Al Ensaf Part 11 P. 265 
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defend himself: in the interval created by deferral of judgment his status might change 
to a position where he can defend himself-89 
In addition, Maliki Jurists90 have extended this guarantee to imply that in the case of 
the accused having come to court and adduced all his countere-evidence, if he is 
likely to be convicted the judge is under obligation before rendering his verdict to 
warn the accused by asking him explicitly and directly if he has any other evidence to 
rebut the accusation. According to this view, if the judge convicts the accused without 
such warning his judgment is null. 91 A careful consideration of the view provided 
by Maliki Jurists reveals that Islamic law applies this guarantee in a stricter manner 
than that adopted by the European Court. The latter requires that, in order to find a 
violation of this right the accused should prove an actual prejudice. Therefore, as we 
have seen, it is hard to find an infringement of the right to have adequate time under 
the jurisdiction of the European Court92. In contrast, Islamic law, according to Maliki 
Jurists, requires that to find a breach of the right in question, the court of appeal only 
needs to discover that the trial court fails to ask explicitly the accused before 
rendering its verdict, if there is any other evidence to support his position, and if so, it 
should repeal the judgment. 
However, if the judge discovers that the aim of the accused's request for deferment is 
to delay the judgment, he must refuse it, because if delaying the judgment benefits the 
accused, the interest of the other party in criminal cases, for instance the victim's 
family, may be harmed. 93 
As to the time that might be considered adequate for the preparation of a defence 
response, the following areas of disagreement are found among jurists: (1) some argue 
in favour of designating a maximum period to be permitted by the judge, but disagree 
about what is an adequate time. Some claim that it should not exceed two or three 
days94, while others argue that it should not exceed two or three months. 95 (2) Other 
jurists argue that the judge concerned should decide on an adequate time according to 
89 
- Bandar Al -Swailam ( 1987 ) p. 311 90 
- Hasheet Al Dusuqi ( no year) Part 4 P. 148 91 
- However, Al Shaft'i jurists argue that the judge is only recommended to 
do so and hence if he does 
not warn the accused his judgment is not null. See Shafi'i (1324H) " Al Um" Part 6 P. 224 
92 
- Harris (1995) p. 253 93 
- E'lam Al Moge'en ( no year) Part I P. 110 94 
- Muntaha Al Eradat ( no year) Part 2P 603 95 
- Al Baqr, M (1408 H). "Al Soltah Al Qad'ah Wa Shakseeet Al 
Qadee"' AlZehra' LI Ehlam Al 
Arabee P. 283 
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the individual case, provided that the interval does not harm the interest of the victim 
or his family. 96 
The second view would seem more appropriate, in that every case has its own 
circumstances and that cases differ in complexity. This is particularly true in recent 
times where the accused faces a powerful litigant, namely, the public prosecution. 
This view is obviously consistent with the approach adopted by the European Court. 
Article 6 (3) (b) of the European Convention does not specify any period in which the 
adequate time will be examined, but rather the right to adequate time is examined 
separately in every individual case. 
2- Adequate facilities 
Considerable attention has been given to the accused's right to adequate facilities to 
prepare his defence. According to Islamic jurisprudence these facilities are embodied 
in many aspects. 
Jurists state that when delivering his defence speech the accused must not be 
interrupted because any interruption might weaken his ability to adduce his defence. 
Furthermore, his witnesses should also not be interrupted while giving their testimony 
and the judge must insure their protection from any conduct which might prevent 
them from giving their testimony in the accused's interest. 97 
Another aspect of adequate facilities is that the judge is forbidden to engage in any act 
which might cause distress to the accused and prevent him from adducing his defence. 
For example, he is forbidden to reprove the accused or speak harshly to him. He is 
also forbidden to scowl at the accused or to shout at him. 98 
Regardless of the fact that the above guarantees have no explicit counter-part in the 
European Convention, they correspond to the understanding provided by the 
European Court. The Court described the necessary requirement to satisfy the right to 
adequate facilities as that the accused is given "the opportunity to organize his 
defence in an appropriate way and without restriction as to the possibility to put all 
relevant defence arguments before the trial court". 99 
96 
- Bada'a Al Sana'i (1982) 
Part 7 P. 13 
97 
- Nasser Al Jofan (1416H 
) "Damanat Adalet Al 
Saud Islamic University. 
Qada'a Fi Al Fiqh Wa Al Nedam" PhD Thesis. 
Imam Mohamed bin Sa The High Judicial Institution p. 529-530. Hereinafter 
will refer to as Nasser Al Jofan (1416H ) 
9a 
- Al Mawardi (1971) 
"Adab Al Qadee". Part 2 P. 254 
99 
- Can v. Austria A 96 
(1958) Para 53 (Application No. 00009300/81) 
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In addition, and maybe more importantly, like the case-law of the European Court100, 
according to the Islamic law the accused must have access to all papers and 
documents presented against him, and should be provided with a copy of them. 101 
Section Two Saudi law 
1: Shari'ah Courts 
As to the right to have adequate time, the law in Saudi Arabia provides the accused 
before the Shari'ah courts with the right to have adequate time to prepare his defence. 
Article 137 of the Law of Criminal Procedure provides: "Prior to holding a hearing, 
litigants shall be summoned with sufficient time provided for them. to appear before 
the competent court. An accused person who is arrested in 'flagrante delicto " shall 
be promptly, without prior notice, brought before the court. If he asks that court to 
grant him a grace period (sic) in order to prepare his defence, the court must grant 
him sufficient time". 
The term "sufficient time", like the term "adequate time" used by the European 
Convention, is vague. The court in question is empowered to determine what can be 
regarded as sufficient time. Thus, it can be suggested here that in order to be close to 
the European human rights, courts in Saudi Arabia can benefit from the criteria used 
by the European Court when determining whether the right to have adequate time is 
violated. They include, the complexity of the case, 102 the workload of the accused's 
lawyer, and the stage of proceedings. 103 
Moreover, if the prosecutor has amended the memorandum of the charges, the 
accused shall be notified of such amendment and be granted sufficient opportunity to 
prepare his defence in respect of such amendment. 104 
The accused's right to adequate time is not confined to the first instance courts but is 
extended to include the appellate court. Article 5 of the Cassation of Judgments By- 
law 105 reads: "if a litigant asks to have the memorandum of the other litigant, the 
Appellate Court may enable him to do so and it must grant him sufficient time in 
order to prepare his response". 
100 
- Edwards v. UK A 247B (1992) (Application No. 00013071/87) 101 
- Nasser Al Jofan (1416H ) p. 804 102 
- Albert and Le Compte v Belgium (1983) Para. 41. (Application No. 00007299/75; 00007496/76). In 
this case the Court considered that more than 15 days to prepare the accused defence is reasonable, 
es 
to- 
pecially in view of the lack of complexity of the case 
Harris (1995) p 253 
104 
- Article 160 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 105 
- Issued by the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 60 in 1410 H 
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With regard to the second issue, that is, the right to have adequate facilities to prepare 
his defence, although the law does not provide explicit provisions to guarantee this 
right, it may be identified through some relevant texts. 
The law provides the accused with the right to obtain a copy of the expert's written 
report. 106 Another aspect of the facilities provided for the accused is that he is the last 
to address the court. Article 174 states: "The court shall first hear the prosecutor's 
charges, then the response of the accused or his representative or attorney. Then, the 
court shall hear the claimant regarding the private right of action to be followed by 
the response of the accused or his legal representative or attorney. Each of the parties 
shall be entitled to comment on the statement of the other party, and the accused shall 
be the last to address the court.... " Again this right is not stipulated in the European 
Convention, and it seems that the legislature in Saudi Arabia correctly adopted this 
rule in order to follow Islamic principles. 
In addition to this, if the court convicts the accused, the court must upon the reading 
of the judgment notify the accused of his right to appeal. 107 This right is an important 
guarantee especially since the judicial system in Saudi Arabia holds the right to a 
lawyer to be optional. The accused may decide to defend himself in person and he 
might have no legal knowledge about his right to appeal and its time limits. Therefore, 
the legislature has rightly taken this matter into consideration. 
Furthermore, the law provides the accused with a very crucial right in this regard. The 
court must provide the accused with a copy of any written memorandum adduced in 
court and must grant him an adequate time to consider it. 
108 This rule meets the 
requirements of both the Islamic law and the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
However, the right to adequate facilities implies that the prosecution is under 
obligation to disclose to the defence all the relevant information in the prosecution's 
file. In particular it is the prosecution's duty to preserve evidence. A delay before and 
after charges are laid down and defence arguments of prejudice caused by the delay, 
will often be based on the disappearance of evidence within the prosecution's control. 
Even though the law in Saudi Arabia provides the accused with the right to challenge 
106 
- Article 172 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 107 
- Article 193 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 108 
- Article 62 of the Law of Civil Procedure before the Shari'ah Courts 
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expert evidence'09, it does not provide a remedy if the prosecution fails to follow its 
duty to preserve evidence. The reasons for this could be that: (a) the remedy that the 
courts are familiar with in Saudi Arabia when there is an infringement of the 
accused's rights is to order a new trial110. This remedy in this case is useless because 
all the same difficulties presented by the loss of evidence will remain. J. Marshall 
states: "Whenever potentially exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face 
the treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown 
and very often, disputed... Moreover, fashioning remedies for the illegal destruction 
of evidence can pose troubling choices. ""' (b) When dealing with this issue the court 
must decide upon the degree of importance of the lost exculpatory evidence, and the 
need to assess and respond appropriately to varying degrees of culpability on the part 
of the prosecution. 
2: The Board of Grievances 
With regard to the accused's right to be given adequate time to prepare his defence in 
criminal cases before the Board, article 9 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board 
of Grievances requires that the interval separating the service of summons and the 
date fixed for the hearing may not be less than 30 days. Clearly 30 days is the 
minimum period but the Circuit may increase this time when it considers that the 
accused needs more time to prepare his defence. It seems that like the case before the 
Shari'ah courts, the Board when considering the right in question, does not specify 
any period in which defence evidence must be presented. But rather, this will be 
considered by the court on a case-by-case basis. Equally, this approach is appropriate 
in respect of the consistency with European Convention. 
If the Circuit changes the legal description attributed to the accused or amends the 
charge by adding aggravating circumstances, it must bring such alteration to the 
attention of the accused and upon application made by him grant a sufficient interval 
for him to prepare his defence in respect of the new description or amendment. 112 
Moreover, the Circuit may render judgment in respect of facts not contained in the 
109 
- Circular No. 3/2598 dated 11/8/1382 H. Ministry of Justice. AL- tassneef al- Maudouy Li-tameem 
al-Wazarah [The Classification Book for the Ministry of Justice Regulation and Administrative 
Circulars], Vo1.3 (Ministry of Justice, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1413 H). 
10 
-However, if he is illegally detained the accused is entitled to compensation. "' 
- Quoted in Mahoney, R (1996). "Adequate Facilities to Prepare a Defence: Beyond Disclosure". 
The Criminal Law Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 P. 37 
'12 
- Article 27 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 
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charge sheet or against fresh accusation provided that the papers of the case contain 
the same and provided the accused is granted adequate time to prepare his defence. 
' 13 
Additionally, if the convicted person decides to appeal against the decision rendered 
by the circuit he is given 30 days to do so. 114 
As to the right to have adequate facilities to prepare his defence, article 17 of the 
Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances stipulates explicitly that the papers 
and memoranda filed by a party to the case may not be considered if the accused was 
not enabled have access thereto. Moreover, the accused or his lawyer has a right of 
access to the investigation papers and may obtain copies of the papers if the President 
of the Circuit approves this. 
The accused shall not be expelled from the hearing unless he breaches the Circuit 
regulations. However, if the Circuit carries on the hearing of the case in the absence 
of the accused he will return when it becomes possible to proceed in his presence and 
the Circuit must in this case brief him about the proceedings taken during his 
absence. 115 
Before the Board, as before the Shari'ah courts, the accused will be the last to address 
the Circuit. 116 
When the accused is convicted the Circuit must inform the accused that he has the 
right to scrutinize the decision within 30 days of the notification of judgment, and that 
if he fails to demand scrutiny of the judgment within the said time limit the judgment 
rendered against him is final and must be enforced. ' 17 
To sum up, rules governing the right of the accused to be given an adequate time and 
facilities before the Board are in line with the European human rights. 
Part IV: Right of the Accused to Trial within a Reasonable Time 
In fact, a speedy trial is not always in the accused's interest but rather at times can 
work against it. Robert L. Misner argues "A second difference between the right to a 
speedy trial and the accused's other constitutional rights is that deprivation of the 
right may work to the accused's advantage. Delay is not an uncommon defence tactic. 
As the time between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may 
113 
- Article 28 of the Rules Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 114 
- Article 31 of the Rules Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 115 
- Article 22 of the Rules Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 116 
- Article 22 of the Rules Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 117 
- Article 31 of the Rules Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 
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become unavailable or their memories may fade. If the witnesses support the 
prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. And it is the 
prosecution which carries the burden of proof. Thus unlike the right to counsel or the 
right to he free from compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of the right to speedy 
trial does not per se prejudice the accused's ability to defend himself. " 
118 However, 
for the sake of consistency with my approach when handling topics in this thesis the 
following discussion will treat the principle purely as a right of the accused. 
The European Convention on Human Rights provides in Article 6 Para 1 that: "In the 
determination of ... any criminal charge... every one 
is entitled to a hearing within a 
reasonable time.... " Again this right will be examined firstly in Islamic law and then 
in Saudi law. 
Section One Islamic law 
Like the European Convention on Human Rights, Islamic law does not consider 
criminal and civil cases separately in its discussion of the right to trial within a 
reasonable time, but includes both criminal and civil cases as one issue. This means 
that the right to a speedy trial is considered as an important guarantee for both parties 
in civil and criminal cases. Current Islamic writers have continued to follow this 
approach. However, for the purpose of clarity this discussion is confined to the 
accused person only. 
Furthermore, according to the case law of the European Court, the reasonable time in 
Article 6 (1) starts to run from the charge and continues until the proceedings, 
including appeal proceedings, are concluded, 119 which means that this right starts 
from the pre-trial stage. However, it is important to emphasize that early Islamic 
jurists were not familiar with the idea of dividing criminal proceedings into the stages 
currently identified, that is to say the inference, investigation, trial, and punishment 
stages. They did not discuss this right as a guarantee of the accused against lengthy 
proceedings in the pre-trial stage. This is attributed to the fact that cases in early 
Islamic societies were tried according to simple and speedy procedures. The judge 
undertook all procedures, even investigation or interrogation procedures. Ahmad 
Shalabee when describing the trial proceedings in old Islamic societies states that: 
"litigants submit their papers to the clerk who collects them from parties before the 
arrival of the judge in the gate of the Mosque. The name of the plaintiff and his 
118 
- Misner, R (1984) "Legislatively Mandated Speedy Trial' Criminal Law Journal. Vol. 8 P. 19 & 20 119 
- Wemhoff v Germany (1968) Paras 18-19 (Application No. 00002122/64) 
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litigant adversary are written in each paper. If the caseload is considerably more than 
the judge's ability to adjudicate them in the same day he postpones some of them for 
the second day... the litigants stand up when addressing their statements before the 
judge. If the case, however, needs more time they will sit down. " 
120 Nevertheless, this 
should not be understood to mean that the right to trial within a reasonable time is not 
protected in Islamic law. Apparently, a speedy trial is guaranteed in Islamic law 
particularly if the accused is remanded in detention. Therefore one should examine 
the idea of speedy trial and the idea of custody in Islamic law respectively. 
Jurists state that an Islamic judge is obliged to render his verdict immediately if he 
reaches a clear conclusion on the case before him, because any postponement of the 
judgment is considered as postponement of justice. 121 Jurist Abu Ya'la states: 
"unless he has reason, the judge may not defer the judgment" 
122 Judges should 
adjudicate cases according to the litigants' presence before the judge. 
123 
Judge Hassan Al Eshaikh states that the idea of speedy trial is one of the fundamental 
principles in Islamic law, for God said: {Surely, we have sent down to you (0 
Muhammad) the Book (this Qur'an) in truth that you might judge between men by 
that which Allah has shown you (i, e has taught you through Divine Revelation), so be 
not a pleader for the treacherous) 124. He also said: {And judge (you 0 Muhammad) 
among them by what Allah has revealed and follow not their vain desires, but beware 
of them lest they turn you (0 Muhammad) far away from some of that which Allah 
has sent down to you. And if they turn away, then know that Allah's Will is to punish 
them for some sins of theirs. And truly, most of men are Fasiqun (rebellious and 
disobedient to Allah))125. 
In his comment on these two verses Al Eshaikh argues that they are evidence of the 
judge's obligation to adjudicate between people. Unrestricted instruction implies 
prompt accomplishment of that instruction unless there is legal reason for deferment. 
Speedy trial is, however, contingent on understanding the case clearly. 126 
120 
- Ahmad Shalabee (1989) "Al Teshrea Wa Al Qada'a Fi Al Faker Al Island" Maktabat 
Al Nahdah 
Al Masrah, Cairo, p. 263,264 
121 - Al Bahotee (no year) " Kashaf Al Kana"' Part 6 P. 315 122 
- Muhammad Al Fara (1394H) "Al Ahkam Al Soltanah" p. 73 123 
- Bandar Al -Swailam (1987) p. 307 124 
- Surah An-Nisa. Verse No. 105 125 
- Surah Al-Ma'idah. Verse No. 49 126 
- Hesham Al Eshaikh " Mabd'a Sor'at Al Bet Fi Al Dahoa Fi Al 
Qada'a Al Shara'e" Justice 
Journal , Ministry of Justice 
Vol. 8 1421 H P. 113-116 
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Moreover, Salamah Al Blwee indicates that unreasonable delay of judgment could 
result in three undesirable effects; 1- preventing the interested party from enjoying his 
right; 2- continuation of the dispute; 3- the judge appearing not to desire the 
application of justice. '27 
The right to trial within a reasonable time is guaranteed under Islamic law for both the 
plaintiff and the defendant in civil and criminal cases. Therefore, in contemporary 
Islamic countries the judicial and investigation authorities must act effectively to fulfil 
such requirement because any delay in proceedings will harm their interests. Delay in 
rendering the judgment prevents the plaintiff from enjoying his right and at the same 
time will enable undeserving persons to enjoy another person's right. 
In addition, delay may be considered as a waste of the plaintiff's time and effort and 
might lead the plaintiff to waive his right. Omer Ibn Al Kattab Said: "speed up the 
stranger's case because if he stays longer he might give up his case and depart. " 
The defendant will also be affected because the case against him might prevent him 
from pursuing his life normally. This is particularly seen in criminal cases where his 
dignity and reputation is harmed. 1228 The last perspective provided above regarding 
the aim of the right to be tried in Islamic jurisprudence can be compared with case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights. In Wemhoff v Germany the Court pointed 
out that the purpose of such a guarantee is to: "ensure that the accused persons do not 
have to lie under a charge for too long and that the charge is determined. " 129 
As to the second issue, that is the idea of custody in Islamic law: jurists disagree about 
the right to put the accused in custody before his guilt is proved and their views can 
be represented as follows: 1- some say it is legal 130; 2- other jurists argue that it is 
illegal, because custody is a kind of punishment which may only be inflicted after 
guilt is proved; 3- others say that it depends on the accused's status. If he is an 
incorrupt and pious person, the judge cannot place him in custody; otherwise custody 
is permitted. ' 31 
Moreover, those who accept the idea of detention disagree about its duration. Some 
say it should not exceed one month, others that it should not exceed 6 months. 
12' 
- Salamah Al Blwee (1994) "Al Qada'a Fi A! Dowlah Al Islami" Arabic Centre for Security Studies 
a nd Training. Riyadh Part 1 P. 122 128 
129 - 
Abdulrahman Al Othman (1993). p. 409 Wenthoff 
v Germany (1968) Para 18 (Application No. 00002122/64) 1'0 
- Tabsert 13i Al Hokam (1958) Part 2 P. 319 131 D feer, S (2000) "Al Nedam Al Ejrea'ee Al Gena'ee Fi AI Shari'ah Al Islami Wa Tatbegatha Fi Al 
Arabiah Al Sudiah" p. 130. hereinafter will refer to as Dofeer, S (2000) 
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However others state that it should be left to the judge or the ruler, provided that the 
period for custody does not exceed the period designated for the punishment of the 
proven crime. ' 32 Accordingly, the judge must speed up the trial where the accused is 
in custody, because he might be not guilty. '33 
Section Two Saudi law 
1: Shari'ah Courts 
Since the European Court of Human Rights requires that the right to speedy trial starts 
to run from the moment the accused is charged with committing a crime 134, our 
discussion here should not be limited to the provisions in the trial stage, but rather 
must be extended to cover the pre-trial stages of inference and investigation. 
It is important from the outset to point out that the law in Saudi Arabia does not 
provide an independent article to guarantee the right to have a speedy trial. Yet, this 
right can be identified via other texts provided in the law. 
According to article 109 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, the Investigator shall 
interrogate the accused promptly after his arrest. If this is not possible, he shall be 
kept in a detention centre pending his interrogation. The period of detention shall not 
exceed twenty-four hours. On expiry of that period, the detention centre officer shall 
notify the chairman of the relevant department which shall interrogate him promptly, 
or issue an order for his release. 
Obviously, this article requires immediate interrogation for an arrested accused, and 
also provides some kind of supervision of the investigators by placing the detention 
centre officer under responsibility to protect the accused from illegal detention after 
the expiry of the twenty-four hours without interrogation. He is obliged not to adopt a 
passive attitude regarding the investigator's infringement of this article but to act by 
notifying the chairman of the relevant department. 
If, following the interrogation of the accused, it appears that there is sufficient 
evidence against him of a major crime, or if the interest of the investigation requires 
his detention to prevent his fleeing or affecting the proceedings of the investigation, 
132. Omer, O (1988) p. 188. See Also Dofeer, S( 2000) p. 131 
133 
- Al Akeel, S "Huquq Al Motahem Fi Al Shari'ah" Justice Journal. The Ministry of Justice 1422 H 
Vol. 9 P. 70 
134 
- Wemhoff v Germany (1968) Para 18- 19 (Application No. 00002122/64) 
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the Investigator shall issue a warrant for his detention for a period not exceeding five 
days from the date of his arrest. 135 
Moreover, if the investigator sees fit to extend the previous detention period, he must, 
prior to expiry of that period, refer the file to the Chairman of the relevant provincial 
branch of the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution so that the latter may issue an 
order to extend the period of detention for a period or successive periods provided that 
they do not in aggregate exceed forty days from the date of arrest. Otherwise the 
accused must be released. In cases that require detention for a longer period, the 
matter shall be referred to the Director of the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution 
to issue an order that the arrest be extended for a period or successive periods, none of 
which shall exceed thirty days and their aggregate shall not exceed six months from 
the date of arrest. Thereafter, the accused must be directly transferred to the 
competent court, or released. 136 
Accordingly, the Law of Criminal Procedure provides the accused with fundamental 
guarantees against arbitrary arrest or detention. The law designates six months as 
maximum period for custody. This is consistent with the opinion of some jurists in 
Islamic jurisprudence who say that the maximum period the judge can detain a person 
is six months. Needless to say, designating a maximum period within which the case 
must be forwarded to the court, if the investigation authority is convinced of the 
evidence against the accused, or releasing the accused, is seen to be an important 
guarantee against unduly prolonged proceedings. 
It might be essential to know that the above periods are applied to all crimes and 
accuseds whether the crime is classified as an ordinary offence or a terrorist crime. 
According to article 77 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, if the Investigator seeks the 
assistance of a specialized expert, the latter must submit his report in writing within 
the time prescribed by the Investigator. If he fails to submit his report by the deadline, 
or if he tries to justify a delay, the Investigator may replace him with another expert. 
Consequently, the investigator will also be held responsible for any delay caused by 
the expert; it seems that the aim of the law is to prevent the investigator from claiming 
an excuse in such cases. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the law stipulates significant articles to guarantee 
the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time during the investigation stage, 
135 
- Article 113 of The Law of Criminal Procedure 136 
- Article 114 of The Law of Criminal Procedure 
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these articles are confined to only the arrested or detained accused. The law does not 
mention the accused's right to speedy trial if he has been charged, but not yet arrested 
or detained. It seems that the legislator is mistaken to confine his protection only to an 
accused who has been arrested or detained. In fact, being in any position of 
accusation is potentially damaging. For example, if someone is charged with 
committing a crime but is not arrested or detained, the law does not provide a time 
limit within which the charge against him must be determined. Being under 
accusation though not arrested or detained will affect the legal status of the accused. 
The accused has a real interest to organize his life on a clear basis. 137 The European 
Court explains that the right to be tried within a reasonable time in criminal cases 
protects the accused from remaining too long in a state of uncertainty about his 
fate. 138 Moreover, according to the case-law of the European Court, the reasonable 
time in Article 6 (1) starts to run from the charge. 139As a consequence, in order to 
comply with European standard of human rights, the Saudi law needs to be extended 
to protect every person charged with a criminal offence regardless of his arrest or 
detention. 
Moving on to the right of speedy trial in the trial stage, article 158 of the Law of Civil 
Procedure before Shari'ah Courts obliges the court concerned to render its verdict 
promptly after proceedings, or to defer its verdict to another early hearing. The courts 
are obliged to speed up the case if the accused is detained pending trial, 140 or if he is a 
stranger (foreigner). 141 
However, a speedy trial depends on the case being understood. So according to article 
41 of the Shari'ah Procedure Law the accused should submit his defense 
memorandum to the court at least three days prior to a hearing before the General 
Courts and at least one day before the Summary Courts. 
137 
- It is worth noting that this suggestion should not be understood to mean that after discharging the 
accused the investigation bureau cannot recharge him again if new facts or evidence are discovered. 
The aim of our suggestion is to place the accused in a clear position. 
138 
- Wemhoff v. FRG A7 (1968) (Application No. 00002122/64) 139 ibid. Paras 18-19 
140 
- Circulars No. 192/12ff dated 30/11/1403 H& 40/12ff dated 28/3/1402 H Ministry of Justice. AL- 
tassneef a! - Maudouy Li-tameeni al-Wazarah [The Classification Book for the Ministry of Justice 
Regulation and Administrative Circulars], Vol. 3 (Ministry of Justice, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1413 H). 
141 
- Circular No. 8/T/104 dated 14/10/1411 H Ministry of Justice. AL- tassneef a! - Maudouy Li-tatneem 
a! -Wazarah [The Classification Book for the Ministry of Justice Regulation and Administrative 
Circulars], Vol. 3 (Ministry of Justice, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1413 H). 
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If the representative or the lawyer of the private party intends to delay the case with 
the aim of procrastination, in order to safeguard the right to speedy trial the court 
concerned may order the original party to attend the hearing. 142 
If the trial court acquits the accused, its judgment cannot be challenged before the 
Appellate court either by the prosecution or the plaintiff after 30 days from the date of 
receiving the copy of the judgment, which in any case should not exceed 10 days from 
the date of judgment. 143 This means that the accused will be certain of his acquittal 40 
days at most after judgment. 
In addition, for the purpose of guaranteeing a speedy trial the Appellate Court can 
adjudicate the case after reversing the judgment of the trial court, if the judgment 
appealed against is complete in every aspect, and if urgent action is deemed 
necessary. 144 Complete judgment means that: 1- the hearing in trial court was not by 
default; 2- every party adduced his evidence; 3- the reversed judgment is recorded in 
Appellate court notes; 4- the legal reasons for reversing the judgment are clearly 
displayed. 145 
Similarly the expression that "urgent action is deemed necessary" means that the 
litigant's interest will be damaged if the case is remanded to the trial court. The 
Appellate court's discretion regarding this matter is final. 146 
In short, the accused right to a speedy trial is maintained in the judicial system of 
Saudi Arabia, and thus it could be argued that compliance with the European 
Convention is generally achieved. Yet, it would be much better if the law stipulates 
explicitly that the accused must be tried within a reasonable time. The competent 
court should then decide whether the accused right to a speedy trial is violated. As we 
suggested before, the courts in Saudi Arabia can benefit from the criteria adopted by 
the ECHR. 
2: The Board of Grievances 
With regard to the accused's right before the Board of Grievances to trial within a 
reasonable time, article 9 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 
provides: "The President of the Board or anyone delegated to act on his behalf will 
142 
- Article 51 of the Law of Civil Procedure before Shari 'ah Courts 143 
- Article 194 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 144 
- Articles 203,204, and 205 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 145 
- Abraheem, M (1998) "Nedam Al Ta'n Be Al Tameez Fi Al Mainlakah Al Arabiah Al Sudiah" The 
Public Administrative Institution p. 337. hereinafter will refer to as Abraheem, M (1998) 146 
- 
Ibid, p. 337 
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pass the case to the Circuit having jurisdiction; upon receipt of the case the head of 
the Circuit shall fix a date for hearing it which will be served on the Board of 
Surveillance and Investigation and on the accused who will be given also a copy of 
the charge sheet; the interval separating the service of the summons and the date 
fixed for the hearing may not be less than 30 days". 
Accordingly, the head of the Circuit concerned will designate a certain date on which 
the case will be heard. The text of the article indicates that designation must be made 
immediately after the case is received. 
If the interest of the accused is at stake, for example if he is placed in custody or 
barred from travelling on account of a case being heard by the Circuit, he has the right 
to file a complaint to the President of the Board or anyone delegated by him to act on 
his behalf against the decision of his detention or prohibition from travelling. This 
complaint should be decided within no more than seven days and if this is impossible 
the Circuit shall before the expiration of this time limit fix another time limit giving 
their supporting reasons. 147 
Where the Circuit considers it necessary to seek help from an expert it may fix a date 
for depositing the expert's report. 148 It seems that the aim of this requirement is to 
avoid any delay that might be caused by the expert. The law places the Circuit in 
question in a position in which it cannot derogate itself from its obligation to protect 
the accused's right to trial without undue delay. 
Moreover, if the Circuit acquits the accused the Public Prosecution should apply for 
scrutiny of the judgment within 30 days from the date it receives the copy of 
judgment; otherwise the acquittal verdict becomes final. 149 
Where the judgment is reversed, the Scrutinizing Circuit may adjudicate the case 
itself or return it to the trial Circuit. In the latter case, if the trial Circuit insists on its 
point of view, the Scrutinizing Circuit will itself hear the case. 150 
It is obvious that if the Scrutinizing Circuit reverses the case for a first time the 
adjudication before the Scrutinizing Circuit is optional. However, its jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the case is obligatory where the case is reversed for a second time if the 
trial Circuit insists on its point of view. Clearly the aim of this rule is to avoid lengthy 
proceedings. 
147 
- Article 10 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 148 
- Article 24 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 149 
- Articles 31 & 37 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 15D Article 36 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 
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The above discussion indicates that in the Board criminal cases must be tried 
promptly. Although this requirement is generally speaking applied in the Board in a 
manner consistent with European standard of human rights, it seems that according to 
the current status the accused has no access to a right to prompt trial. It might 
therefore be better if the law explicitly stated the accused's right to speedy trial. A 
breach of this right by the Board would thus enable the accused to redress the 
damages incurred by him. The Scrutinizing Circuit should decide upon a reasonable 
time taking into consideration the factors that are used by the European Court. That is, 
the complexity of the case, the conduct of the accused, what is at stake for the 
accused, and the workload in the Circuit concerned, whether the increase of the 
workload is predictable or random. 
The importance of this suggestion arises from the fact that the right to a trial within a 
reasonable time is one of the fundamental rights of human beings which Islamic law 
as well as international treaties and declarations of human rights call for. Therefore, it 
should be stipulated in explicit and effective terms. 
Part V: Right of the Accused to be informed of the Charge 
Article 6 Para 3 of the European Convention is worded as follows: "Everyone 
charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights... (a) to be 
informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him.... " Again, this topic will be dealt with in 
Islamic law firstly and in Saudi law secondly. 
Section One Islamic law 
Islamic jurisprudence, as we have pointed out above, does not divide criminal 
proceedings into the stages we currently recognize. Further, the judge is responsible 
for all procedures. Therefore, early Islamic jurists did not discuss the accused's right 
to be informed of the charge against him in a stage prior to the trial stage. The 
following discussion will therefore be limited to the accused's right to be informed of 
the accusation in the trial stage. 
Islamic law requires that the accused must be informed of the charge against him'51. 
This right is essential in order to enable the accused to defend himself. Thus, he must 
151 
- Bandar Al -Swailam (1987) p. 183 
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be informed of the facts and the evidence against him. 152 In support of this argument 
jurists cited many events narrated by the Prophet and his companions. For example, it 
is narrated that a man came to the Prophet and admitted that he had committed 
adultery with a woman. The Prophet sent someone to the woman to ask her about the 
accusation against her. She denied it. So the Prophet left her unpunished. 153 
The Prophet also advised Ali bin Abe Talb when he appointed him as a judge: "do not 
judge between litigants, unless you hear them". 
Abdulhameed Al Ansaree states that according to Islamic law the accused should be 
informed of the accusation in a clear form and in understandable language. If, he 
argues, Islamic jurists oblige the judge to inform the defendant of the claimant's claim 
against him in civil cases; this obligation in criminal cases is fortiori. 154 
Generally speaking therefore, the idea of informing the accused of the charge against 
him is known in Islamic law and the accused cannot be deprived of this right. The 
accused has the right to defend himself and this requires that he must be informed of 
the charge. However, Islamic jurisprudence does not provide details as to whether this 
right should be provided in writing or not, and what additional information is 
required. 
Section Two Saudi law 
1: Shari'ah Courts 
In respect of the accused's right to be informed of the accusation against him, the Law 
of Criminal Procedure, in principle, guarantees similar rights to those required by the 
European Convention. Article 6 Para 3 of the European Convention states that: 
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights... (a) to 
be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him.... " In explaining the meaning of the words 
nature and cause in above context the European Court demonstrates that: "Article 6 
Para 3 (a) provides the accused with the right to be informed not only of the cause of 
the accusation, that is to say the acts he is alleged to have committed and on which 
the accusation is based, but also the legal characterization of those acts. Thus 
'52 
- Taha Alwanee (1982) p. 51 153 
- Sulaiman Al-Azdee (no year). Sonan Abee Dawud. Part 4 P. 159. Hadith no. 4466 I54 
- Al Ansaree, A (2000) "Huquq Wa Dmnanat Al Motahem Fi Al Shari'ah Al Island Wa Al Qanoon" 
Dar Al Faker Al Arabee. Cairo p. 
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information should be detailed. " 155 So, this right implies, in general, four 
requirements: (a) the accused must be informed promptly ;( b) he must be informed of 
the nature i. e. the type of the offence; (c) he must be informed of the cause of the 
charge i. e. the acts; and (d) he must be informed in a language which he understands. 
As to points (a) (b) and (c) mentioned above the law in Saudi Arabia contain 
provisions that meet these requirements. Article 34 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 
provides that: "The criminal investigation officer shall immediately hear the statement 
by the accused.... " This requires that the accused must be informed promptly of the 
accusation in order to listen to his statement, and he must be advised of the reasons 
for his detention. '56 When the accused appears for the first time for an investigation, 
the Investigator shall inform him of the offence with which he is charged. 157 If the 
accused is arrested outside the venue of the department conducting the investigation, 
he shall be brought to the investigation department in the area where he was arrested. 
This department shall inform the accused of the incident attributed to him. 158 If the 
accused is arrested or detained he must be promptly notified of the reasons for his 
arrest or detention. ' 59 Moreover, if the court decides to change the description of the 
act given in the memorandum of charges, it must advise the accused of such 
change, 160 and if the Prosecutor amends the memorandum of charges before the court, 
the accused will be notified of such amendment. 161 In addition, during the hearing, 
the court shall inform the accused of the offence with which he is charged and shall 
read and explain to him the memorandum of the charges and provide him with a copy 
thereof. ' ` 
In respect of point (d) that is the accused right to be informed in a language which 
understands. Even though it has no explicit counterpart in the law of Saudi Arabia, 
one can argue that since the application of the articles concerned mentioned above of 
the Saudi law inevitably requires that he must be informed via a language which he 
understands, this requirement is guaranteed. 
155 
- Pelissier and Sassi v France (1999) Para. 51( Application No. 00025444/94) 156 
- Article 35 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 157 
- Article 101 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 158 
- Article 110 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 159 
- Article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 160 
- Article 159 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 161 
- Article 160 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 162 
- Article 161 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 
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2: The Board of Grievances 
Article 8 of the Rules of Pleading before the Board of Grievances states that the 
charge sheet must contain the names, capacities, and place of residence of the accused 
persons as well as the charges preferred against them, the date and place of 
commission of the offence, the evidence supporting the charge and the legal 
provisions of the law to be applied against the accused persons. Moreover, this article 
requires also that the complete file of the case must be attached to the charge sheet. 
The accused will be given a copy of the charge sheet. 163 
Part VI: Right of the Accused to be tried in his Presence 
Unlike other rights, the right of the accused to be tried in his presence has not been 
mentioned explicitly by the European Convention on Human Rights. But rather it 
emerges from the notion of a fair trial. The Court explains that: "it flows from the 
notion of a fair trial that a person charged with a criminal offence should, as a 
general principle, be entitled to be present at the trial hearing. " 
164 In a manner 
consistent with our approach when dealing with the topic in hand, our discussion will 
focus on Islamic law and the Saudi law in turn. 
Section One Islamic law 
The concepts of presence and absence before the court are essentially different in 
European human rights law from their counterparts in Islamic law. In their 
deliberations Islamic jurists have discussed the judge's right to adjudicate the case and 
to render his judgment in the absence of the defendant. However, by "absent 
defendant" they mean the defendant who is in another country where the judge has no 
jurisdiction over him. This is the absent defendant who causes disagreement among 
jurists over proceeding with the case in his absence. If the defendant is in the same 
state, jurists agree that the hearing of the case should be prohibited unless he is 
present. The defendant in this latter case will be forced to attend the hearing in person. 
This clearly differs from the view upheld by the European Court of Human Rights. 
The European Court is of the opinion that the right to be present is waivable, provided 
that it is established in an unequivocal manner. '65 In addition, a trial in the absence of 
the accused is permitted provided that the state has acted, although not successfully, 
163 
- Article 9 of the rules of Pleading before the Board of grievances. 164 
- Ekbatani v. Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 504 165 
- Poitriniol v France (1993) Para 31(Application No. 00008966/80) 
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diligently to provide the accused with the necessary notification of the trial. 
166 Islamic 
law disallows the hearing in absentia where the presence of the accused is in the hand 
of the Islamic state. If he refuses to attend the hearing after being informed he must be 
enforced to attend the hearing, and the court is not permitted to hear the case in 
absentia. This is may be due to the fact that Islamic law does not accept confession, 
which is very important evidence in Islamic law, unless given by the accused himself. 
Further, Islamic law considers the presence of the accused as an essential means in 
respect of rehabilitating the accused by means of repentance. 
Interestingly, since presence is important in establishing justice, the presence of both 
accused and defendant is considered to be not only their right but also their duty. God 
said: (And when they are called to Allah (i. e. His Words, the Qur'an) and His 
Messenger), to judge between them, Lo! A Party of them refuses (to come) and turns 
away) 167 
Accordingly, the judge must ask the accused to attend the hearing, and the accused 
has a religious duty to attend the hearing, but if he refuses to attend and does not 
appoint a representative on his behalf and has no acceptable reason, the judge will ask 
him for a second time to attend. If he persists in refusing, the judge will force him to 
attend. 168 
On the contrary, the European Court allows the hearing even in absentia if the 
accused waives his right or if he fails to appear before the court after being properly 
notified. Thus, according to the case law jurisprudence of the European Court the 
state concerned is relieved from its duty to insure a hearing in the presence of the 
accused, if the state has acted, although not successfully, diligently to notify the 
accused, 169 whereas Islamic law requires a strict application of this guarantee. 
However, according to both the European Court, 170 and to Islamic law, if the accused 
has an excuse such as illness, he will be ordered to appoint a representative. 171 
Therefore, the discussion here is confined to cases where the accused lives outside the 
Islamic state, for example if he flees to another country. Jurists have differed in their 
opinion in respect of this issue. 
166 - Goddi v Italy (1984) Para 29 167 
- Surah 24 An-Nur. Verse No. 48 
168 Al Mawardi (1971) "Adab Al Qadee" Part 2 P. 319&320 169 
- Goddi v Italy A76 (1984) Para 29; Application No. 00008966180 
170 - Harris (1995) p 206 
171 - Tabsert Al Hokam (1378) Part 1 P. 135 
234 
(1) Al Hanafi, 172 some of the Maliki173 and Hanbali14 Schools argue that 
the judge is forbidden to adjudicate the case by default except in 
exceptional circumstances, because the judge is obliged to hear the 
statement of both parties. And since this requirement cannot be 
fulfilled if the accused is absent, and because the latter might have 
evidence which could refute the claim against him the judge cannot 
render his judgment by default. 
(2) The majority of Maliki, 175 Shafi'i'76, and Hanbali' 177schools believe 
that the judge can render his judgment by default; because God orders 
us to apply justice and He did not confine this to present or absent 
persons. Moreover, their argument goes, not adjudicating by default 
might lead to rights being lost, and might open the gate for 
procrastinators to elude their duties. 
This is of course if it is a crime in connection with a private right, but if it is a crime in 
connection with God's rights, such as adultery or drinking, then according to the 
majority's view the judge is forbidden to adjudicate by default, because Islamic law in 
this kind of crime favours forgiveness and immunity, and because the absent accused 
might have defence evidence. 178 
Similar to the case-law of the European jurisprudence, 179 Islamic law states that if the 
accused comes to the court during the hearing, the judge must enable him to attend the 
hearing, and if he attends after the judgment is delivered he has the right to contest the 
judgment and the judge must allow him to adduce his evidence. 
Section Two Saudi law 
1: Shari'ah Courts 
Article 20 of the Law of Criminal Procedure declares: "If it appears to the court in 
any case pending before it that such a case involves accused persons other than those 
being prosecuted or facts related to the charge in question, it shall notify the 
173 
172 
- Tabeen Al Haga'iq Part 4 P. 191 
Bedaet Al Muitahid (1405H) Part 2 P. 352 174 
- AL Mughni (1348) Part 9 P. 109 175 
- Tabsert Al Hokam 1378H) Part I. P. 108 177 
- Al Mohatheb(l 379H) Part 2 P. 302 
Al Mughni (1348H) Part 9 P. 109 179 
- Al Mughni 0348H Part 9 P. 110 179 
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235 
complainant accordingly in order to complete what is required for the proper 
consideration and adjudication of the case in a manner compatible with Shari'ah 
principles. This procedure shall apply to the Appellate Court whenever appropriate. " 
This article means that if other accused persons have not been informed and asked to 
be present at court, the prosecution or the complainant of private right must be 
instructed to notify them. 
The presence of the accused is not restricted to the hearing: he also has the right to 
attend all the investigation proceedings. The Investigator may, however, conduct the 
investigation in the absence of the accused whenever this is deemed necessary for 
determining the truth, provided that he allows the accused to review the investigation 
immediately after the necessity has ended. 180 
If the Investigator is of the opinion, following completion of the investigation, that 
there is sufficient evidence against the accused, the case shall be referred to the 
competent court, and a summons shall be served on the accused to appear before it. 181 
In addition, if an action is initiated before a court, the accused shall be summoned to 
appear before that court. But no such summons shall be necessary where the accused 
appears for the hearing and a charge has been issued against him. 182 
The summons shall be served to the accused personally, or at his place of residence, 
and if he is in detention or in prison he shall be summoned through the detention 
officer or prison warden, or their deputies. 183 This, it can be said, is in agreement with 
the European human rights. '84 
The legal nature of the presence of the accused depends on the offence committed. If 
he is accused of committing one of the serious crimes designated in the law, his 
attendance is generally compulsory. But, if he is accused of committing a non-serious 
crime his presence is optional. The reason for this distinction is that punishments in 
serious crimes are much severe than those in other crimes. Therefore, the law requires 
that a hearing with regard to a serious crime must be undertaken in the presence of the 
accused in order to enable him to practice his defence rights. Article 140 provides: "In 
major crimes, the accused shall personally appear before the court, without prejudice 
to his right to seek legal assistance. As to other crimes, he may be represented by a 
180 
- Article 69 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 181 
- Article 126 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 182 
- Article 136 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 183 
- Articles 138&139 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 184 - Goddi v Italy. (1984) Para 29 (Application No. 0008966/80) 
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representative or attorney for his defence. In all cases, the court may issue an order 
for the personal appearance of the accused. " Moreover, Article 141 provides: "If the 
accused who has been duly summoned fails to appear on the day specified in the 
summons document and has not sent a representative where such representation is 
permissible, the judge shall proceed to hear the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence and 
enter them in the case record. The judge shall not render a judgment except in the 
presence of the accused. If the accused fails to appear without an acceptable excuse, 
the judge may issue a warrant for his detention". 
Obviously, this article requires that any criminal judgment must only be rendered in 
the presence of the accused, even if he fails to appear before the court in spite of being 
summoned. The court cannot adjudicate the case unless the accused or his 
representative is present where representation is permissible. This article is stipulated 
in a manner consistent with Islamic law regarding this issue. 
Consequently, it can be argued that the law in Saudi Arabia by providing a stricter 
guarantee with regard to the accused's right to be tried in his presence; goes far 
beyond the European human rights standard. 
Furthermore, if an action is initiated against several persons with respect to one 
incident, and some of them fail to appear in spite of being summoned, the judge shall 
proceed to the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence against all of them, and shall enter 
the same in the case record. He shall not render a judgment against the absentees until 
they appear before the court. ' 85 
Since the objective of the presence of the accused is to enable him to supervise the 
proceedings and effectively exercise his right to defence, the law states that no 
physical restraints shall be placed on the accused during court hearings, and that he 
shall not be dismissed from any hearing during deliberation of the case unless he 
gives cause therefore. In that case, the proceeding shall continue and the accused may 
be admitted to the hearing whenever such cause for his removal ceases to exist. 
However, the court must keep him informed of any action that has been taken during 
his absence. 186 
Nevertheless, the presence of the accused is not guaranteed before the appellate court 
unless it considers his presence is important to clarify some relevant points. Article 
199 provides: "The Appellate Court shall dispose of the subject matter of the appeal 
185 
- Article 142 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. "36 
- Article 158 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 
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on the basis of the evidence included in the file of the case. Litigants shall not appear 
before the court, unless it decides otherwise". Yet, if the Appellate Court is satisfied 
with the responses furnished by the trial court with respect to the comments it raised, 
it shall affirm the judgment. If not, it shall reverse the appeal in whole or in part, as 
the case may be, and shall state the grounds for doing so. It shall then remand the case 
to another court for rendering a judgment in accordance with the law. If the judgment 
appealed against is complete in every respect, and if urgent action is deemed 
necessary, the Appellate Court may render judgment on the subject matter. Whenever 
the Appellate Court renders a judgment, such judgment shall be rendered in the 
presence of the litigant. ßg7 
2: The Board of Grievances 
According to article 9 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances, upon 
receipt of the case the Circuit trial shall fix a date for the hearing and serve a 
summons to the accused. 
Unlike cases before the Shari'ah courts, the presence of the accused before the Board 
is obligatory in all crimes. Article 19 provides: "The accused shall appear in the 
hearing ". In addition, where a person who is charged with a criminal case has been 
summoned but has failed to appear he shall be served with another summons to 
appear in another session and if he again fails to appear, the Circuit may adjudge the 
case in default or may issue a warrant and bring him before it on a fixed date; if his 
arrest was impossible it will adjudge the case in default. 188 This is clearly different 
than the case in Shari'ah courts, as we have pointed out. 
Moreover, the judgment is deemed as having been rendered in the accused's presence 
where the accused has attended the hearing and adduced his defence, even where the 
hearing in which the judgment has been rendered was adjourned and has defaulted 
from the adjourned hearing' 89 
Similar to cases before the Shari'ah courts the accused will appear before the Circuit 
without being handcuffed. He must not be expelled from the hearing unless he has 
committed a breach of its regulations; the Circuit may carry on the hearing of the case 
187 
- Article 205 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 188 
- Article 19 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances. 189 
- Article 20 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances. 
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until such time when it becomes possible to proceed with the case in his presence 
provided it briefs the accused about the proceedings taken during his absence. 190 
In all cases where the Scrutinizing Circuit decides to hear the case it will decide after 
having heard the statements of the litigants. 191 
If the accused was convicted in default he may apply within 30 days, to run from the 
date of service of the judgment on him, for reconsideration of the judgment rendered 
against him. The President of the Board of Grievances or whoever he has delegated 
will refer the application to the Circuit which rendered the judgment for retrial in the 
presence of the accused. 192 
Accordingly, one can conclude that the accused right to be tried in his presence before 
the Board of Grievances is required by the Board law in a manner consistent to the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Part VII: Right of the Accused to defend himself in Person 
The European Convention in article 6 provides: "Everyone charged with a criminal 
offence has the following rights... (c) to defend himself in person.... " The discussion 
below is devoted to Islamic law and the Saudi law respectively. 
Section One Islamic law 
According to Islamic jurisprudence the judge is obliged to hear the accused since he 
hears the Prosecution and he is forbidden from rendering his judgment before 
enabling the accused to present his defence. A judgment rendered without hearing the 
accused's defence must be reversed even though the accused has a previous criminal 
record. The judge is obliged to apply justice and no justice can be achieved without 
hearing the defence of the accused. '93 
Al Turkmani states that it is unjust to provide the complainant or the prosecution with 
the right to adduce their claim, while at the same time denying the accused his right to 
reject and refute the accusation against him. The interest of the right to defence is not 
limited to the accused person but must rather also be considered as a right of society. 
190 
- Article 22 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances. 191 
- Article 36 of the Rules Pleadings before the Board of Grievances. 192 
- Article 41 of the Rules Pleadings before the Board of Grievances. 193 
- Omer, 0( 1988 ) p. 212 
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The accused has a personal interest to be assumed innocent and society has a real 
interest in confining the conviction and punishment to the criminal . 
194 
The accused can defend himself in person provided that he is capable of doing so. If 
he is unable to defend himself effectively the judge cannot convict him. Therefore, 
some jurists argue that if the accused is dumb, the Haddud punishment cannot be 
imposed against him even if guilt is proved against him, because if he is able to speak 
he may raise doubt regarding the evidence or his legal liability. ' 95 
As we have seen in chapter (2) of this thesis there is little jurisprudence in the 
European Court of Human Rights regarding the right of the accused to defend himself 
in person. Generally speaking, according to the European Court the accused should be 
given the opportunity to defend himself in person if he wishes. This right cannot be 
sustained (deprived) except if the accused is unable to do so. These requirements are 
in agreement with their counterpart in Islamic law. Nonetheless, it could be 
maintained that since some Islamic scholars state that the judge cannot convict the 
accused in Haddud crimes if he is disabled even if he is legally represented, Islamic 
law in this regard pays greater attention to the protection of this right than European 
human right law does. 
Section Two Saudi law 
1: Shari'ah Courts 
Article 4 of the Law of Criminal Procedure provides: "Any accused person shall have 
the right to seek the assistance of a lawyer or a representative to defend hint during 
the investigation and trial stages". The phrase "have the right" indicates that the 
accused is not obliged to be defended by a lawyer; rather this article clearly enables 
the accused, if he wishes, to exercise the defence right in person. This understanding 
is confirmed by article 140, which states: "in major crimes, the accused shall 
personally appear before the court, without prejudice to his right to seek legal 
assistance. As to other crimes, he may be represented by a representative or an 
attorney for his defence. In all cases, the court may issue an order for the personal 
appearance of the accused. " 
194 
- Al Turkmani, A (1999) "AL Ijra'at AL Jina'i Al Island" Riyadh. Naif Arab Academy for Security 
Sciences p. 84,85 
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- Al Mabsut (no year) Part 18 P. 172 
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However, the law does not provide an answer to the question that arises if the accused 
is unable to defend himself in person, for example, if he is a minor, or if he lacks 
intellectual ability. So when dealing with criminal matter in which the accused has 
opted to defend himself in person, the judge will apply Islamic rules regarding this 
issue. So if the judge realizes that the accused is not capable of representing himself, 
he should advise him to be represented by a lawyer. 
2: The Board of Grievances 
According to article 19 of the Rules of Pleading before the Board of Grievances the 
accused must personally attend the hearing, and is allowed to defend himself in either 
oral or written form. This article uses similar language to that used in article 4 of the 
Law of Criminal Procedure. The accused is thus not obliged to defend himself 
through a lawyer but rather may defend himself in person. 
Moreover, as in the Shari'ah court, laws governing the Board do not mention the 
question of the accused who lacks intellectual ability. Therefore, the same suggested 
answer is applicable, namely that the judge in the Board will advise such an accused 
to seek the help of a lawyer. 
To sum up, it is said that laws in both the Shari'ah courts and the Board of Grievances 
raise no difficulty as to compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights 
in respect of the right of the accused to defend himself in person. 
Part VIII: Right to Equality of Arms 
Like the right of the accused to be tried in his presence, the right to equality of arms is 
not articulated in the European Convention on Human Rights. But rather it emerges 
from the notion of a fair trial as has been stated in chapter two of this thesis. In the 
following right to equality of arms will be examined in Islamic law and Saudi law 
respectively. 
Section One Islamic law 
Islamic law gives considerable attention to the principle of equality in all aspects of 
life. God said: (0 mankind! We have created you from a male and a female, and 
made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most 
honourable of you with Allah is that (believer) who has At-Tagwa [i. e. he is one of the 
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Muttaqun (the pious)]. 196 God also said: (0 Dawud (David! Verily! We have placed 
you as a successor on the earth; so judge you between men in truth (and justice) and 
follow not your desire- for it will mislead you from the Path of Allah. Verily, those 
who wander astray from the Path of Allah (shall) have a severe torment, because they 
forgot the Day of Reekoning)197. 
He also said: (0 you who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah; 
even though it be against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, be he rich or poor, 
Allah is a Better Protector to both (than you). So follow not the lusts (of your hearts), 
lest you avoid justice; and if you distort your witness or refuse to give it, verily, Allah 
is Ever Well-Acquainted with what you do) 198 
Equality in Islam is also applied to non-Muslims. The story is told that Omer (The 
Second ruler after the death of the Prophet) saw an old blind Jewish man asking for 
help. Omer asked him what drove him to this situation. The man answered: ask my 
age, my status (blind), and the capitation (poll tax). Omer led him home by the hand 
and ordered the treasurer to pay for this man and all like him. Omer said: "I swear by 
God we did not deal with him justly if we benefit from him in his springtime and 
disappoint him in his decrepitude". 
Another story is that when the King of Gassan circumambulated the Kaaba in the 
Holy Mosque in Mecca, a Bedouin (nomad) accidentally trod on his apron hem. The 
King struck him in the face. The nomad complained to the Ruler Omer bin Al Kattab, 
who called the King and told him: "either you make your peace with him or he will 
strike you as you have struck him". The King said: "do not you differentiate between 
the King and the layman? " Omer replied: "No, Islam has made you equal. " 199 
Yet equality among litigants is one of the most important guarantees that should be 
provided during the trial. Therefore, Islamic law is keen to emphasize such equality 
before the court. The Prophet said, "Those who lived before you have been destroyed 
because they used to release the noble if he steals, and inflict punishment on the weak 
if he steals. By God if Fatima, daughter of the Prophet, steals I will cut off her hand". 
196 
- Surah 49 Al- Hujurat. Verse No. 13 197 
- Surah 38 Sad. Verse No. 26 198 
- Surah 4 An-Nisa. Verse No. 135 199 
-Madkor, A& Al Kattab, A (1992) "Hugug Al Insan Fi Al Eslant" Dar Talas Ldrassat Wa Al 
Targamah Wa Al Nasher p. 113 
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The History of Islam is rife with examples of an application of this equality. It is 
narrated that Ali bin Abe Taleb200 was brought to suit by a Jew before the second ruler 
(Omer bin Al Kattab). Ali was sitting next to the Ruler. The Judge (Omer) said to him 
"abu Al Hassan [Ali's nickname] sit next to the other litigant. Then Omer adjudicated 
the case. Omer noticed that there was an anger in Ali's face. So he asked him: "Are 
you angry because I asked you to sit next to your litigant? " Ali replied: "No, but I 
wish you did not call me by my nickname in which the right to equality might be 
breached". 201 
Moreover, in a message to one of his administrative managers Omar Ibn Al- Khattab 
the second Caliph said: "Make sure you give equal attention to people when you hear 
them, and this should be reflected in your looks, justice and in the place where you sit, 
so that no man of honour may hope to take advantage of your vacillation, and the 
weak will despair of your justice". 202 
Therefore, Jurist ibn Al Keem states in his comment on Omer's statement, "if a judge 
applies equality and justice in accordance with this manner, this is an indication of 
his just judgment in the case before him. Whenever, however, he favours 
(distinguishes) one party by permitting him alone to have access to the judge, or by 
standing for him, or seating hint in the front part of the court, or by giving him more 
attention, or gaiety in his glance, this is considered as an indication of his 
injustice. "203 
Muslim jurists are concerned to apply the principle of equality between parties before 
the court. They articulate clearly the requirement of equality before the judge in these 
terms: "If the litigant parties appear before a judge he should treat them equally in 
glance and tone. His attendance should be addressed to both as well as his turning 
away. He should not attend one and ignore the other. When he speaks, he should 
address both and when he refrains, he should abstain from both. He should never 
speak to one party and disregard the other. He should equalize betweell the noble and 
the poor and between the ruler and the ruled. All of them should be treated on equal 
footing and terms while appearing before him". 204 
200 
- The Fourth Ruler after the death of the Prophet. 201 Ahmad Shalabee (1989) "Al Teshrea Wa Al Qada'a Fi Al Faker Al Islami" Dar Al Nehdah Al 
Masreah. Cairo p. 262 
202 
- E'lam Al Moge'en (no year) part 1 p. 85 203 
- E'lam Al Moge'en Part I P. 89 204 
- Nasser Al Jofan (1416 AH) p. 715 
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In general, equality should be preserved throughout the trial stage starting from the 
admission of litigants before the court until completion of the trial. Equality will 
include all aspects in which impartiality of the court can be achieved. Consequently, 
Article 19 Para (a) of the Cairo Declaration on Human Right in Islam states that: 
"People, whether they are the ruled or the rulers, are equal before the law. " 
A comparison between the right to equality of arms in Islamic law, and the European 
human rights law leads to the conclusion that: (1) unlike the case-law of the European 
Court, Islamic scholars did not confine their discussion to criminal matters. Thus, 
rules provided in Islamic jurisprudence are, as a general principle, applicable to civil 
cases as well. (2) The European Court has restricted the scope of this right to some 
technicalities, while jurisprudence of Islamic law does not limit the scope to these 
technicalities, but rather the scope is widened to the degree that the accused's feeling 
of this equality is assured. The idea in Islamic jurisprudence is that unless the accused 
feels that he is treated on equal footing with the prosecution, his right to defence is 
infringed. 
Section Two Saudi law 
The right to equality of arms has not been particularly mentioned in any article of 
laws governing trial before the Shari'ah courts and the Board of Grievance. It could 
be argued that the legislature felt no need to stipulate particular articles for such 
rights, because the body of Islamic rules regarding equality is enormous, and an 
attempt to include them in one or more articles is both an awkward and a useless task, 
particularly since judges in Saudi Arabia, both in Shari'ah courts and in the Board, 
should seek reference to Islamic law. Article 8 of the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia 
states that "Ruling in Saudi Arabia stands on Justice, Consultations and Equality 
according to the Islamic law. " 
Nabeel Omer states that equality before the court in Saudi Arabia is embodied in 
many aspects: 1- everyone is entitled to recourse to the court in any civil or criminal 
case; 2- the hearing of cases as a general principle is organized according to their 
registrations; 3- the judiciary is free; 4- the law, whether Shari'ah or enacted law, is 
applicable to every level of society. 205 
205 
- Omer, N (1993) "Usul Al Morafa't Al Shar'aeeh" Monsha't Al Ma'rf Be Al Eskandarah p. 27&28 
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However, to ascertain whether, though no particular articles are provided, the law in 
Saudi Arabia recognizes the same understanding of equality as that required by the 
ECHR, one should emphasize that according to the ECHR, the principle of equality of 
arms in criminal cases means that the accused must be given a reasonable opportunity 
to present his case before the court under the same conditions provided to the 
prosecutor. 206 The European Court on Human Rights has decided that the right to 
equality of arms will be violated if, for example, (1) the prosecutor before the 
appellate court is provided with more rights than those provided for the accused, and 
(2) if the accused's expert witnesses are not treated equally to those appointed by the 
COUR. 
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As to the first point, namely lack of equality between the prosecution and the 
appellate before the Court of Appeal, this infringement might occur if the prosecution 
alone is allowed to attend the hearing. The accused in Saudi Arabia is provided with 
the right to present his case before the Appellate court under the same conditions 
provided to the prosecution. This fact can be identified through a number of aspects. 
For example, both the accused and the prosecution are entitled to appeal against any 
judgment whether it relates to conviction, acquittal, or lack of jurisdiction. 208 
Moreover, neither the prosecution, the claimant of the private right of action, nor the 
accused are permitted to attend at the court of Appeal209. So the prosecution has no 
particular privilege in this regard. In addition, both the accused and the prosecution 
are permitted to submit new evidence to support the grounds of their appeal. ' to If the 
Appellate court decides to render the judgment after reversing the judgment of the 
trial court, such judgment must be rendered in the presence of both the prosecutor and 
the accused. 211 Moreover, the scales sometimes tend in the accused's favour. The 
right to reconsider the final judgment is mainly provided for the accused in certain 
circumstances prescribed in the law. 212 Furthermore, in major crimes, the law requires 
that if the decision is against the accused, that is to say he is convicted; such judgment 
must be appealed against even if the accused does not request it. However, if the court 
206 
- Borgres v Belgium (1991) Paras 27,28,29 (Application No. 00012005/86) 207 
- Ibid 208 
- Article 193 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. Similarly article 9 of the same law provides that: 
"sentences shall be appealable by either the convicted person or the Prosecutor" 
209 
- Article 199 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 210 
- Article 200 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 211 
- Article 205 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 212 
- Article 206 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 
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acquits the accused this judgment is only appealed against if requested within the time 
limit. 213 
Interestingly, in contrast to the European Court of Human Rights where it was 
unjustifiably held that granting the prosecution a longer time to lodge an appeal than 
that provided to the accused is not considered a breach of the right to equality of 
arms214, the law in Saudi Arabia prescribes the same time limit within which both the 
accused and the prosecution should lodge their appeal. 215 
As far as the second point is concerned, that is, equal treatment of the accused's 
expert witnesses to those appointed by the court, although the investigator is entitled 
to seek the assistance of a specialized expert, pursuant to article 77 the accused may 
submit a report prepared by another expert retained by him in an advisory capacity. 
He can also, provided that there is sufficient cause, object to the appointment of the 
expert. When an objection has been filed, the expert shall not continue in his 
assignment until the investigator issues his decision within the three days of the 
submission, except in case of urgency in which case the investigator shall order the 
expert to continue. 216 If the prosecution lodges the appeal, the court may confirm, 
cancel or amend the judgment. Where however the application emanated only from 
the person condemned the court may only confirm or amend the judgment in his 
favour. 217 
Part IX: Right of the Accused to Call and Cross-examine Witnesses against him 
Article 6 (3) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that: "Everyone 
charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights... (d) to examine or 
have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.... " 
Again, our discussion will address the topic in Islamic law firstly and in Saudi law 
secondly. 
213 
- Articles 11 & 195 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 214 
- Kren: zow v Austria (1993) Para 75 (Application No. 000123501/86) 215 
- Article 194 of the Law of Criminal Procedure provides that: "An appeal against a judgment shall 
be within thirty days from the date of receipt of a cop)' of the judgment... " See also articles 31 &37 of 
the Rules of Pleading before the Board of Grievances. 
216 
- Article 78 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 217 
- Article 37 of the Rules of Pleading before the Board of Grievances. 
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Section One Islamic law 
Three issues offer illustration of this subject in Islamic law. The first two are the right 
of the accused to examine witnesses against him, and his right to challenge the 
credibility of the witnesses. The difference between these two rights is that in the first 
case what the accused challenges is the facts presented against him by the witnesses, 
whereas in the second case the challenge will focus on the witnesses' character. 
Islamic law is distinguished by the fact that the testimony to be accepted must only be 
given by just persons. 218 "A just person" means a person who shows obedience to 
Islamic teachings. A person who strictly fulfils God's orders, and abstains from any 
prohibited act. A person, for example, cannot be just if he does not pray, or if he 
gambles, drinks alcohol, dishonest etc. Therefore, not everyone can be accepted as a 
witness. Islamic law cannot impose punishment based on testimony unless the judge 
is certain of the credibility of witnesses; thus the accused is provided with the right to 
challenge witness credibility. The third issue to be studied here is the right of the 
accused to call his witnesses. 
In respect of the first matter, that is the accused's right to examine witnesses against 
him, similar to the human rights in Europe219, the witnesses, pursuant to Islamic law, 
must give their testimony in the court and before the accused to enable him to 
examine the witnesses . 
220 The judge cannot base his judgment on testimony which 
the accused has not been given the chance to examine and discuss with the 
witnesses221. 
Moreover, to be sure of their testimony the judge must examine the witnesses by 
questioning them about how they saw the accused committing the crime and what 
they heard; and if he has any doubt about their testimony he must question them 
separately. 222 
As to the second matter, Islamic law provides the accused with an important 
guarantee regarding this issue. That is to say, the testimony cannot be accepted in the 
court unless given by unbiased persons. God said: { And take as witness two just 
ýý3 persons}" 
218 
- J. N. D. Anderson "Muslim Procedure and Evidence" Journal of African Administration. Vol. 1 
No. 3 July 1949 p123-183 
219 
- A. M. v Italy (1999) Paras 26,27,28 (Application No. 00037019/97) 220 
- Al Awa, M "Fi Usul Al Nedam Al Gena'ee Al Islami" P. 302 221 
- Al Turkmani, A (1999) p. 161 222 
- Al Muqhni (no year) Part 9 P. 87 223 
- Surah 65 At- Talaq. Verse No. 2 
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Accordingly, if the judge is certain of the character of the witness he can base his 
judgment on his testimony; otherwise he must reject the testimony. 
Jurists confirm that the accused has the right to challenge the character of the 
witnesses against him on grounds of bias, as well as the right to contest the credibility 
of biased witnesses in respect of the fact or the crime in question. 224 In addition, 
jurists argue that after the testimony is given, the judge must ask the accused if he has 
any claim against their character. 225 
Jurists state many grounds on which the personal characteristics of the witness can be 
challenged. For example: 
1- If the witness is accused of being a debauched person, because the 
testimony will not be accepted if given by a biased person (rebellious 
and disobedient to Allah). 
2- If the witness is said to be an opponent of the accused. If this is proved 
the witness's testimony cannot be accepted. 226 
3- If it is claimed that by giving his testimony, the witness will either gain 
personal benefit or prevent personal damage. 227 
4- If it is claimed that the witness has a bad memory, and is therefore 
unreliable. 228 
5- If the witness is a kinsman of the interested party. 229 
6- If it is shown that the witness has been punished for committing the 
crime of defamation, because the testimony of a defamer cannot be 
accepted unless the convicted has repented. 230 
7- If it is claimed that the witness has given his testimony with the 
purpose of erasing his previous bad reputation by demonstrating to the 
public that his testimony is now accepted. For example, if his 
testimony was rejected in a previous case because he was debauched. 
So he is testifying in the present case merely to show people that he is 
now a just person. In this latter case his testimony will be rejected. 
However, the burden to prove these claims is upon the accused. 231 2 
224 
- Nasser Al Jofan (1416 AH) p. 591 &592 225 
- Al Muqhni (1348H) Part 9 P. 87 226 
_ Ibid, part 9 P. 158 227 
- Ibid, part 9 P. 186 228 
- Ibid, part 9 P. 188 229- Ibid, part 9 p. 191 
230 
_ Ibid, part 9 P. 179 
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In fact, this requirement causes dissimilarities between Islamic law on the one hand, 
and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the other. To begin with 
the European Court has accepted that in some circumstances evidence can be given by 
an unidentified witness, provided the accused has ample opportunity to challenge the 
evidence. 232Moreover, it has also accepted the use of anonymous police officer. 
233 
In contracts, strictly speaking, these exceptions cannot be admitted within Islamic 
jurisprudence. As we have pointed out above the personal character of the witness is a 
relevant matter, and thus he must be identified in order to provide the accused with 
the opportunity to challenge his personal credibility. 
As far as the third issue is concerned, jurists discuss the accused's right to hear his 
witnesses under the same conditions as witnesses against him in terms of the idea of 
counter testimony. If witnesses testify before the court that the accused has committed 
a crime in a particular city at a certain time, the accused can bring other witnesses to 
testify that during that date and time the accused was seen in a different place. 234 This 
shows conformity with European Court of Human Rights. According to the latter the 
general rule is that the national courts are free to assess whether the justice needs to 
call the accused's witness or not. The Convention does not require the attendance and 
examination of every witness on the accused's behalf: its essential aim is, as indicated 
by the words "under the same conditions", full equality of arms in the matter. 235 
In conclusion, a careful analysis of the above reveals that Islamic law not only 
requires similar guarantees to be provided to the accused, but also Islamic law gives 
the accused further guarantees to challenge the credibility of the witness. Such 
safeguard is not provided by the case-law of the European Court. 
Section Two Saudi law 
1: Shari'ah Courts 
The Law of Criminal Procedure mentions only two rights in this regard, namely, the 
accused's right to examination of witnesses against him, and his right to call his 
witnesses to be heard under the same conditions as witnesses against him. The 
accused's right to challenge the personal character of the accused against him is not 
231 
- Bandar Al -Swailam (1987) p. 358 232 
- Doorson v The Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330 233 
- Van Meahelen and others v The Netherlands (1997) 25 EHRR 647 234 
- Bandar Al -Swailam, (1987) p. 365 235 
- Vidal v Belgium (1992) Para 33 (Application No. 00012351/86) 
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mentioned. But this should not be understood to mean that before the Shari'ah court 
the accused would not be provided with such guarantee, because in these 
circumstances judges will refer to Islamic law within which the accused is provided 
with this right. The following case illustrates the point. 
In 28/5/1410H a person before the General Court in Riyadh was accused of 
committing apostasy. During the trial he stated, "There is hatred between the first 
witness and me. We are both married to two sisters, and he always created disputes 
between my wife and me, he is also in debt to me, and recently I have called upon him 
to pay this money through the Yemeni Ambassador". With regard to the second 
witness the accused stated, "He became angry and gave his testimony after he knew 
that I am a creditor of his uncle. As to other witnesses they are all relatives". The 
General Court stated that: "After considering the case and what has been stated by the 
accused and since the accused has denied the prosecution against him and because of 
the challenge stated against the witnesses and since their testimonies contradicted 
each other, and because their testimonies differ in times and places in respect of the 
crime which means that the), are not in agreement which creates doubt about their 
testimony, the crime of apostasy is not proved. " 236 
However, the following discussion will be limited to the first two issues mentioned 
above. 
As to the accused's right to examination of witnesses against him, article 98 of the 
Law of Criminal Procedure provides: "The Investigator shall hear each witness 
separately, and he may hear the witnesses in the presence of other witnesses and 
litigants". This is to enable the accused to contest the content of the testimony in the 
stage prior to the trial stage. Accordingly, following the hearing of the witness, the 
accused may comment on the testimony. 237 
With regard to the trial stage, article 163 provides the accused with the right to cross- 
examine the witnesses called by the other party. Moreover, to insure the practice of 
this right the law requires that testimony shall be given at the court session. 
Furthermore, the law also requires the judge to take the necessary steps to examine 
the credibility of the testimony. Therefore, each witness shall be heard separately, and 
where necessary, witnesses may be kept apart and confronted with each other. 
238 
236 
- This case is mentioned in Saud Al Hammali (1419-1418 H) p. 190&191 237 
- Article 99 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 238 
- Article 169 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 
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In a case before the General Court in 13/ 6/ 1416 Ha representative of the private 
party claimed that the accused had murdered the victim intentionally and requested 
the infliction of the death penalty upon the accused. The accused, who was defending 
himself in person, stated that the investigation report was based on the testimony of 
witnesses whom he had not been allowed to cross-examine in the investigation stage, 
and who apparently did not give their testimonies before the trial court. Therefore, the 
General Court correctly rejected the request for the death penalty. 239 This judgment 
shows clear consistency with case-law of the European human rights jurisprudence. 
For instance, In Said v France240 the applicant to the European Court, who was 
convicted for drug offences, claimed that since the judicial bodies refused to organize 
a confrontation between him and the prosecution witnesses, his right to a fair trail is 
breached. The European Court pointed out that neither at the stage of investigation 
nor during the trial was the applicant able to examine or have examined the witnesses. 
Thus, the lack of any opportunity to confront the prosecution witnesses violates Art 6. 
Despite the difficulties involved in securing evidence in relation to offences of drug 
trafficking, these considerations, according to the European Court, did not restrict the 
right of the defence guaranteed by Article 6. Consequently, the European Court stated 
that Article 6 (1) and 3(b) is violated. 
Furthermore, if in exceptional circumstances the court in Saudi Arabia decided to 
move to hear a witness who is unable to appear before the court, the accused shall be 
permitted to appear at the other place. 241 Thus, if the court decided to hear the 
testimony of, for instance, a person ill in hospital, the judges concerned should hear 
the testimony in the presence of the accused. Needless to say the accused will be 
allowed to examine the witness in this case, otherwise his attendance is pointless. 
In respect of the right to call his witnesses, Article 95 provides: "The Investigator 
shall hear the statement of the witnesses called by the litigants unless he considers 
that their testimony would be useless. He may also hear statements from others whom 
he deems necessary with respect to the facts that may lead to the proof of the crime, 
its circumstances, and its attribution to the accused or his innocence". Therefore, the 
right of the accused to call his witnesses is guaranteed in the investigation stage. 
Before the General Court in Saudi Arabia in 27/11/ 1411 H the victims' representative 
239 
- This case is found in Saud Al Hammali (1419-1418 H) p. 174 & 175 240 
- (1994) 17 EHRR 251 241 
- Article 170 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 
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claimed that the accused had murdered the victim intentionally and asked for 
application of the death penalty on the accused. In his defence the accused stated that 
he killed the victim by mistake, not with intent. In order to prove that he did not 
murder the victim intentionally the court allowed the accused to bring two witnesses 
to support his defence. They testified that both the victim and the accused were very 
close friends in the same workplace and there was no hatred or dispute between them. 
Therefore, in its judgment the court ruled that the killing was not intentional. This 
judgment became final after being ratified by the Appellate Court. 242 
In addition, before the court the accused may request to call any witnesses. 
243 The 
court is under obligation to protect the witnesses and must refuse to direct any 
question intended to influence the witness, or any leading question. The court shall 
not allow any indecent question, unless it relates to material facts, leading to decision 
in the case and shall protect the witnesses against any attempted intimidation or 
confusion during the testimony. '' This is, generally speaking, similar to the standard 
required by the European Court. 
2: The Board of Grievances 
Only two articles deal with the subject. Article 19 provides: "... he (the accused) may 
apply for a summons to be issued to witnesses for hearing their evidence... " Thus, 
before the Board the accused has the right to call his witnesses. 
Article 23 provides: "... circuit may of its own accord or upon application being made 
by the representative of the Attorney General or the accused issue summonses to such 
witnesses whose statements (evidence) it deems necessary to be heard; the circuit 
shall bar the posing to witnesses of questions which are not relevant to the subject 
matter of the case or will intimidate or confuse the witness". 
Although the accused's right to cross-examine witnesses against him is not stipulated 
in the law, one should not conclude that this right is not guaranteed before the Board 
because reference will be made to the Islamic law, as pointed out above. Article (48) 
of the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia declares: "The court shall apply, to matters brought 
before them, the provisions of Islamic Shari'ah, in accordance with the precepts of 
the Book of God and the Sunnah ... " 
242 
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- Article 169 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 
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Part X: Right of the Accused not to be compelled to confess Guilt 
Section One Islamic law 
Confession is the most important source of evidence in Islamic law. After hearing the 
prosecution or the complainant in a private right of action, the judge usually asks the 
accused for his response to such accusation. If he admits guilt the judge will render 
his judgment. The confession is considered as sufficient means to prove the case 
provided that it has been given in an unequivocal manner. 
245 
However, if the accused admits his guilt, this confession is invalid if he has done so 
under compulsion. The justification offered for this is that justice requires that no 
confession should be accepted if a person is compelled to admit his crime. 
246 God 
said: { Whoever disbelieved in Allah after his belief [after being believer], except him 
who is forced thereto and whose heart is at rest with Faith; but such as open their 
breasts to disbelief, on them is wrath from Allah, and theirs will be a great 
tonnent}247. 
Jurists state that if in this verse God forgives those who commit the crime of apostasy 
which is considered to be the most serious crime of all, because they spoke under 
compulsion, it is fortiori not to punish for other crimes if a person is compelled to 
confess his guilt. 248 
Omer ibn Al-Kattab states that: "a man is not true to himself if he is in pain, bound, 
beaten, or scourge "249 
Moreover, jurists maintain that the accused cannot be coerced to confess guilt. A 
confession which is to be taken as evidence of committing a crime must be given in 
the court by the accused by his free will and without any coercion. Jurists support 
their view by stating that if a person admits his guilt freely he is more likely to be 
telling the truth, because no rational person will admit something that could cause 
harm to him unless for a specific reason. But if a person is forced to confess guilt he is 
unlikely to be telling the truth; rather he more probably admits guilt in order to avoid 
the current tort imposed against him. 250 
245 
- Bandar Al-Swailam (1987) p. 176 246 
- Salim Ali Farrar (1999), p 199 247 
- Surah 16 An-Nahl. Verse No. 106 248 
- Salah Al Heedan (1986) "Wesa'l Tahgeeg Al Adelah" in Al Motahem Wa 
Huquqh Fi Al Shari'ah 
Al Islami. Part I P. 176 
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Accordingly, the majority of Muslim jurists believe that if the accused is coerced, his 
's guilt is void and not valid .l 
Therefore, it could be argued that both the European Court of Human Rights and 
Islamic law requires that confession must be given without force. Confession obtained 
by force has no legal validity in both jurisprudences. 
Yet some Islamic jurists say that if the accused is, for instance, known for his 
corruption and lewdness or has previous convictions for theft, the authority concerned 
can obtain confession by force. However, they confine their view regarding this 
matter to civil, not criminal liability. That is to say that they accept the exercise of 
force upon the accused to refund the stolen money to the interested person. But the 
confession is not a valid ground for imposing punishment for theft upon him. 
252 This 
matter should be distinguished from the rules against self-incrimination that are 
mentioned by the European Court. Using a force in the above example in Islamic 
jurisprudence has nothing to do with evidence. The presumption of the example is that 
the offence is proved and accordingly the person is judicially convicted for the crime 
of theft. But jurists accept the use of force in this case if the convicted person still 
possesses the stolen money and refuses to submit it back to the owner. So jurists 
accept the use of force in order to get the money back. 
Interestingly, a significant guarantee that is provided in Islamic law in this regard is 
that a person accused of one of the Haddud crimes, those that are regarded as crimes 
in connection with God's rights, can withdraw his confession. This might be 
exercised explicitly or implicitly. And more importantly, if the accused admits 
without coercion to committing one of the Haddud offences, the judge is obliged 
according to the view of some jurists to encourage the accused to withdraw his 
confession. Their argument is legitimately founded in stories that were narrated to the 
Prophet or his companions. For example, when a person called Ma'az came to the 
Prophet and admitted that he had committed adultery, the Prophet said to him: "you 
might just have kissed here, looked at here, or touched here". The man said: "no, but I 
committed adultery". Then he was punished. Another story that could be cited in 
this regard is that when a man who was accused of committing a theft was brought to 
251 
- Dofeer (2000)p. 95 252 
- Ibid, p. 95 & see also Awed M. Awed, "The Rights of the Accused under Islamic Criminal 
Procedure", in M. Cherif Bassiouni, (1982). The Islamic Criminal Justice System. Oceana 
Publications, London p. 106 
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the ruler Omer ibn Al Kattab, Omer said to him did you steal? Say no. The accused 
said no. So, Omer left him unpunished . 
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The accused's right to withdraw his confession is not limited to one stage, but rather it 
can be exercised at any stage of proceedings even after the final judgment is rendered. 
For example, if a person admits that he committed the crime of adultery and insists on 
his confession until the guilt is proved against him and then withdraws his confession, 
the punishment for the crime of adultery cannot be inflicted against him. 
254 
As to the crime of Ta'azir if the accused withdraws his confession, the court is given 
discretion to accept the withdrawal. This is distinguishable than the case in Haddud 
offences. Unlike the Ta'azir offences, the judge in Haddud offences is bound to 
accept the withdrawal and he has no discretion in this regard. 
However, in respect of the crime of Qisas, since these crimes involve individuals' 
rights the withdrawal cannot be accepted provided that the court is satisfied the 
confession has been given without force. 
Section Two Saudi law 
1: Shari'ah Courts 
The law in Saudi Arabia is very cautious in respect of confession as a means of proof 
of crime. The legislator's aim when enacting the Law of Criminal Procedure seems to 
have been to insure that confession is made without force. Article 102 provides: "The 
interrogation shall be conducted in a manner that does not affect the will of the 
accused in making his statements. The accused shall not be asked to take an oath nor 
shall he be subjected to any coercive measures. He shall not be interrogated outside 
the location of the investigation Bureau except in an emergency to be determined by 
the investigator. " 
In addition, Article 162 provides: "If the accused at any time confesses to the offence 
of which he is charged, the court shall hear his statement in detail and examine him. 
If the court is satisfied that it is a true confession and sees no need for further 
evidence, it shall take no further action and decide the case. However, the court shall 
complete the investigation if necessary". 
This article provides two crucial guarantees in this matter. First: the confession will 
not be accepted unless it is made before the court. Second: the court must insure that 
253 
- Mosanf Abdulrazaq (1403H) Part I P. 224 2,54 
- Al-Shafi'i (1324H) Al-Om. Part 6 p. 153 
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the confession matches the facts concerned. So, the confession will not be accepted 
unless the court in question is convinced of its credibility. 
The Royal Degree No. 27/8 in 22/2/1405 H states that: "torture must not be practiced 
in the investigation because the accused will plead guilty even if he is not guilty" 
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As to the right to withdraw confession, in a case before the General Court in Riyadh a 
woman was accused of committing adultery. In this case during the investigation 
stage she admitted that after she discovered her unlawful pregnancy, she took a 
medicine for abortion which caused internal bleeding, and she was taken to hospital. 
The confession was ratified by a judge. However, during the trial she withdrew her 
previous confession by stating that she was raped. She insisted that her intercourse 
and pregnancy were not her wish. 
The General Court stated that: "because the accused has withdrawn her confession 
which was legally ratified before a judge and because she claimed that she was 
raped, this claim creates doubt about the fact and because Haddud punishment 
cannot be inflicted in the presence of doubt even though the case papers indicate 
clearly that she committed the crime by her free will, her withdrawal is accepted 
because adultery is a Hadd crime in which immunity and forgiveness are strongly 
recommended. " 256 
In another case a person was charged of committing buggery. During the 
investigation he admitted his guilt and a judge ratified this confession. But before the 
trial court, after reading the accusation memorandum, he pleaded not guilty and 
claimed that he confessed because he was forced by the investigator to admit guilt. 
Accordingly the court decided that: "since the accused claimed that he was compelled 
to confess guilt, his withdrawal has been accepted. " 257 
As to other crimes, namely Ta'azir and Qisas crimes, confession must also be made 
without coercion. The trial court has discretion according to the circumstances of the 
case to decide whether the confession was obtained by coercion. In practice if the 
accused admits guilt, he will be asked to confirm his confession. For instance, in 
crimes of theft by presenting the stolen money, or in a case of murder by presenting 
the means by which the crime was carried out. He is then taken to the court to ratify 
his guilt before the president of the court and a single judge. This means that as a 
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- Quoted in Emad Al Najar ( 1997 ) p. 298,299 256 
- This case is mentioned in Bader Al Qamdee (1420-1421 H) p. 258 257 
- Ibid, p 266 
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general rule confession must be rendered before two judges. 
258 The judges will 
question him about his confession and ask whether or not he was compelled to make 
it. If he admits guilt this confession will be considered as evidence against him unless 
he proves before the trial court that it was achieved by force. This is a matter of 
discretion which is left to the trial court. 
2: The Board of Grievances 
The Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances do not specify any articles 
concerning evidence, which means that it is left to be decided according to Islamic 
law. As we have stated above confession is regarded as an important means to prove 
guilt in Islamic law. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the Board of Grievances has jurisdiction 
over only Ta'azir crimes and is not empowered to deal with Haddud crimes. Thus, if 
the accused admits guilt during the investigation and two judges in the Shari'ah 
courts have ratified this confession, he has no right to withdraw his confession. 
Therefore, the only way provided to challenge his previous confession is to claim that 
he was compelled to confess guilt. This is in fact a subjective matter. In the decision 
No. H/1/59 in 1400 H the Board of Grievances ruled that: "the accused's claim that 
his confession was a result of intimidation and beating, and that his confession was 
ratified by the judge in the Shari'ah court despite his denial, has in fact no evidence, 
therefore his claim is not acceptable". 259 
However, in another case a person was charged of committing forgery. The 
prosecution was based on the accused's confession that he added new information to 
an official copy of the document, and presented it to the agent concerned. Before the 
Board the accused denied the prosecution charge. He claimed that he added the new 
information to the official copy of the document by mistake while casually checking 
through his papers, one of which was the document in question. He also said that he 
did not present the amended copy to the agent concerned, but rather he had produced 
a non-amended copy; however, the agent in question had asked him to present the 
original copy of the document whereupon the difference between these two copies 
was discovered. The Board ruled that: "the case papers may support the accused's 
258 
- Circular No. T/12/154 dated on 20/12/1400 
H. Ministry of Justice. AL- tassneef a! - Maudouy Li- 
tameem al-Wazarah [The Classification Book for the Ministry of Justice Regulation and Administrative 
Circulars], Vol. 3 (Ministry of Justice, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1413 H). 
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defence. On the copy of the document produced by the accused, on which the 
accusation is based, with the application to the agent concerned, no addition was 
made. This claim is supported by two persons' testimonies. The Board clarified that 
in accordance with the above, the accused's defence is proved by both evidence and 
logic, because the accused produced a non-amended copy to the agent, and produced 
the amended copy only after it was requested by the agent. It cannot be conceived 
logically that the accused will adduce evidence against himself by presenting a 
correct copy followed by a forged copy. The crime of forgery is not completed 
because the criminal intention is absent. The Board therefore concludes that the 
accused was innocent. "260 
In brief, rules governing the confession in both Shari'ah courts and the Board of 
Grievances are, as general principle, in agreement with their counterpart in the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
260 
- The Board of Grievances. Decision No. 18/1/3/D/G/2/76 in 1415H 
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CHAPTER 6 
Independence of the Judiciary and the Rights of the Accused 
Introduction: 
An important feature distinguishing between the judicial bodies on the one hand, and 
the executive and legislative bodies on the other, is that the viability of the judicial 
body depends entirely on public confidence in the impartiality and independence of 
the judiciary. Justice is the ultimate objective in every society, and in order to achieve 
this goal, nations of differing backgrounds all strive to establish confidence in their 
judicial system by means of their court organization. 
This chapter is divided into four parts, dealing respectively with the accused's rights 
to an independent court, to an impartial court, to public hearing, and to reasoned 
judgment. As in chapter 5 each part will be treated under the two separate headings 
of Islamic Law and Saudi Arabian Law. However, whereas in the previous chapter 
each discussion of Saudi Arabian law is sub-divided into two areas, (i) Shari'ah 
Courts and (ii) the Board of Grievances, in each part of this chapter Saudi Arabian 
law will be treated in a single discussion. The reason for this is that most relevant 
conditions are applicable to both institutions, as illustrated in the following. 
Article 16 of the Board of Grievances Statute provides: "notwithstanding the 
requirements hereof, the Board members shall have the same rights and guarantees 
and be under the same obligations as those enjoyed or undertaken by the judges [of 
the Shari'ah courts]" Moreover, Article 17 provides: "appointments and promotions 
of the Board members shall be effected in accordance with the procedures and 
formalities prescribed for appointments and promotions of the law of the Judiciary; 
the Administrative Affairs of the Board shall in general have with respect to its 
members the same powers as those conferred upon the Supreme Judicial Council in 
regard to members of the judicial system [ Shari'ah Courts]. " In addition, article 18 
provides: "in regard to salary, allowances, rewards and benefits, a board member 
shall be treated in the same way as an equivalent member of the judicial system 
[Shari'ah Courts]. " Accordingly, the Law of the Judiciary, which was originally 
enacted to cover the Shari'ah courts, governs many of the topics relevant to this 
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chapter. Furthermore, the law of the Board of Grievances makes few provisions in 
respect of these topics. Therefore, there is no need to treat the two institutions in 
separate sub-divisions, and the discussion provided here must be understood to cover 
both institutions unless otherwise stated. 
Part I The Right to an Independent Court 
Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: "In the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent 
... tribunal.... " The right to an 
independent court in Islamic law and Saudi law will be 
dealt with in turn. 
Section One Islamic law 
Early Islamic jurisprudence does not seem to have provided a legal theory in respect 
of the independence of the judicial system; instead different aspects of the judge's 
independence are discussed in a variety of separate studies. Even though there is 
considerable variation among existing studies, both ancient and contemporary, as to 
the elements which constitute the independence of the judiciary, the following 
elements have been widely recognized as forming the cornerstone of independence: 
1- The appointment of judges; 
2- The relationship between on one side the ruler and governor, and on the other 
the judges; 
3- Deposing (dismissing) judges; 
4- The protection of judges from litigants. 
In order to examine the doctrine of independence in Islamic law one should thus 
consider each of these in turn. 
As to the first element, namely the appointment of judges, the basic idea in Islamic 
law is that the ruler alone is responsible for judging between people, because the 
judiciary is one of his duties towards his citizens. In Islamic law rules are divided 
into two categories: (1) Those of personal obligation (individual duty); (2) Those of 
collective obligation. The former are those whereby the individual in question must 
1- Obeed, M (1991) "Istiglal A! Qada'a" p. 49 
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undertake (perform) the conduct in person. For instance, prayer or fasting must be 
practised in person, which is to say that every person in Islam is under obligation to 
pray and fast himself. On the other hand, collective obligation means that the 
community of Muslims in a particular place is obliged to exercise the conduct, but if 
some Muslims undertake the conduct in question, other Muslims are not then obliged 
to do so. In the case of funeral prayers for instance, the prayers must be fulfilled by 
some Muslims, but other Muslims may then be exempted from the duty. 
The ruler's duty to adjudicate between citizens is classified as a personal obligation. 
So he must perform it in person. However, since the fulfilment of this duty is 
impossible due to the increasing spread of Islam, the ruler has the right, by way of 
exception, to appoint other persons to adjudicate on his behalf. '` 
As a consequence this appointment is also classified as a personal obligation, which 
means that the ruler must exercise it in person, because it is one of the ruler's duties 
and responsibilities towards his citizens pursuant to the ruling contract between the 
public and the ruler. 3 Muslim jurists state that the ruler must appoint judges unless 
there are exceptional circumstances, for example, if there is no ruler or if a minority 
of Muslims lives under a non-Muslim government. In this case election is permissible 
as a method of appointing the judge. However, the word "election" here has a 
different meaning from that employed in some modern legal systems4. The word 
"election" here means a procedure undertaken by jurists and scholars and not by 
ordinary persons who have no knowledge of judges' conditions and requirements. 
The appointment of judges in Islamic jurisprudence is assigned to the ruler himself 
because adjudication is the responsibility of the rulers. No one has power to exercise 
it save the ruler himself or his deputy. It is considered an important task, thus the 
ruler himself must exercise it in person. In his era, the Prophet himself judged 
between people, and also appointed judges. After his death his companions continued 
to follow this approach. Accordingly, the only means to appoint judges in Islam is 
through the ruler himself, and if a judge is appointed without the ruler's permission 
his appointment becomes invalid. 5 
However, it should be emphasized that the ruler's discretion to appoint judges is 
limited by the conditions which a judge must fulfil. There are certain conditions with 
2- Obeed, M (1991) " Istiglal Al Qada'a" p. 49 
3- Bada'a Al Sana'i (1986) Part 7 P. 2 
d- Al Kelanee, F (1977) "Istiglal Al Qada'a" p. 126 &127 
5- Bada'a Al Sana'i (1986). Part 7 P. 
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regard to the judge's qualifications: (1) he must be a Muslim; (2) he must be a person 
of sound mind which means he is not an insane person; (3) he must have reached the 
age of discretion; (4) he must be a free person, that is to say, not a slave. This 
condition no longer applies because the era of slavery has ended; (5) he must be a just 
person. This means that he does not commit any act that could be considered 
detrimental to his honour (damage of chivalry); (6) he must have the faculties of sight, 
speech and hearing; (7) he must be male; (8) he must have no previous criminal 
record; and finally (9) he must be a scholar in Islamic law6. This last condition means 
that he must be a specialist in Islamic law, particularly in Islamic jurisprudence, and 
in the Arabic language. 
Moreover, Islamic law requires particular characteristics in the judge's personality. 
Abdur Rahman I. Doi states: "Those who perform the function of the Qadis (judges) 
or Qadi al- Qudat (Chief Justice) must be not only men of deep insight, profound 
knowledge of the Shari'ah, but they must also be Allah fearing, forthright, honest, 
sincere men of integrity. "7 The Prophet said: "The Qadis are of three types. One type 
will go to paradise and the remaining two will end up in the fire of hell. The person 
who will get to paradise is one who understood the truth and judged accordingly. 
Those who judged unjustly after understanding the truth, they will go to hell. 
Likewise, Qadi who judged in ignorance will also go to hell. " 
In his comments on the above Hadith Abdur Rahman explains: "The above Hadith 
shows how delicate and responsible the job of Qadi is in Islam. His knowledge of 
Qur'an and Shari'ah must be very deep and (sic) that he judges justly. Otherwise, it 
can really ruin a man's spiritual ficture in the next world. The life in this world is only 
for a limited period, while the life in the next world is forever. Then why should one 
really undertake to be a judge when he does not have the required qualifications and 
character to be a judge? .... 
Naturally, a man who is appointed as a Qadi or a judge 
does not have an easy job to perform. If he becomes slightly irresponsible and unjust, 
he will be caught on the Day of Judgment. On the other hand, when he is just and 
administers justice according to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet (S. 
A. W. ) he is taken (as) an enemy of highly influential people in society. The 
6 
-A] Qassim, A (1982) "Al Qada'a Wa Al Taqadee Wa Al Tanfeeth" p. 47- 49. However, some of these 
conditions are controversial. 
7- Doi, A(1997)p. 11 
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responsibility of a Qadi is like a double-edged sword, and one has to be 
extraordinarily careful in fulfilling it. ,8 
Generally speaking, when appointing a judge the ruler is responsible for the following 
matters: 
1- As to the number of judges, he has the duty of appointing the 
necessary number in each district. 
2- He must select the best of his citizens in terms of knowledge, 
religiosity, chastity and impartiality. 
3- He must refuse to appoint any person who requests appointment as a 
judge. 9 
Some current Islamic writers consider this approach to be an important guarantee 
towards the independence of the judiciary. They support their argument on the 
following grounds: (1) Confining the appointment of a judge to the ruler himself 
could serve as a protection from any influential power that could be practiced against 
the judge by any high ranking employee. (2) The appointment of the judge by the 
ruler is contingent on his being confident of the judge's capacity to fulfil the 
requirement of this position. Otherwise the appointment is invalid. 
However, throughout the ages Islam spread across different continents in such 
significant proportions that it became impossible for the rulers to undertake this 
obligation themselves. The role of appointment was therefore delegated to senior 
judges. 1° During the Abbasid era after extensive proliferation of the Islamic state a 
new office was created for (Qadi al Qudat) the Chief Justice. The person who was 
appointed to this position was the reference for all judges, responsible for their 
appointment, dismissal, supervision of their affairs, and scrutiny of their judgments. 
The Chief Justice was argued to hold the function of selecting judges and sending 
their names to the ruler. In most cases the ruler would appoint those chosen by the 
Chief Justice. This practice has been extended to the establishment of supreme 
judicial councils to replace the office of Chief Justice. " 
I- Ibid, p 11&12 
9- Kashaf Al Kana' (1982). Part 6 p. 186 &187. 
10 
- Ali Al Mawardi (1971). Adab Al Qadee. part 1 p. 138 11 
- Salah, A (1421 AH) "Hasanat Wa Istiglal AL Qada'a Fi Al Fiqh Al Islami Wa Tatbegatha Fi 
Andamat Al Gomhoreeh Al Islami Al Moreetaneeh". Naif Arabic Academy for Security Studies. A 
Master Dissertation p. 126 
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With regard to the second element of the independence of the judiciary in Islamic law, 
that is to say the relationship between the judges on the one hand, and the ruler and 
governors on the other, Islamic principles prevent rulers and governors from 
interfering in the judiciary. God said: {Verily! Allah commands that you should 
render back the trusts to those to whom they are due; and that when you judge 
between men, you judge with justice. Verily, how excellent is the teaching which He 
(Allah) gives you! Truly, Allah is Ever All-Hearer, All-Seer}. 
12 He also said: {O 
you who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah as just witnesses; and let not the enmity 
and hatred of others make you avoid justice. Be just: that is nearer to piety; and fear 
Allah. Verily, Allah is Well-Acquainted with what you do) . 
13 
A judge called Shoreeh sentenced a man to imprisonment. When the governor of Al 
Basrah and AlKofah heard of it, he asked the judge to release the prisoner. The judge 
replied by stating that: "the jail is yours, and the guardian is yours, but 1 am 
convinced that he deserved it". The judge refused to release him. 14 
In addition, if a judge receives a letter from the ruler he will not read it until the 
hearing has started. One ruler wrote a letter to a judge called Ibn Abee Lela. When 
the messenger brought it to the judge outside the court, the judge refused to take it. 
The messenger told him that the letter had no bearing on the case concerned. The 
judge said "I will not receive it except during trial. 905 
Jurists state that if a case is brought before a judge and then the ruler interferes to 
prevent the judge from continuing to adjudicate the case, the judge should ignore the 
interference and must adjudicate the case and render his verdict. 
Once the judge is appointed, the ruler can only advise him in any difficulty that the 
judge might face, without interfering in the judge's job. This means that the judge 
can seek advice from the ruler on the matter if he wishes to, without obligation to 
apply the advice. 16 
12 
- Surah 4 An-Nisa Verse No. 58 13 
- Surah 5. Al-Ma'idah Verse No. 8 14 
- Wakee'a bin Hean (no year). Akbar AL Qudat. Part 2 P. 279 15 
- Wakee'a bin Hean (no year) Akbar AL Qudat. Part 3 P. 310. Similarly, the ruler Abu Ja'fer Al 
Monsor sent a letter to the judge Abe Kazamah in Egypt. When the messenger handed it to the judge, 
the latter did not open it, and when the messenger asked him to open it the judge refused that and he 
said it is part of the case and there is a place for judiciary. Muhammad Al Kanadee (no year) . 
AL 
Wolat Wa AL Qudat. P. 336 
16 
-It should be noted here that according to Islamic law the ruler must be a scholar in Islamic law and 
has the same qualification as judges. 
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Interestingly, rulers and governors are subject to the judges' powers. The ruler 
himself is subject to the judiciary power in both criminal and civil cases. The ruler in 
the Islamic state has no privilege or immunity in respect of the judiciary, but is rather 
deemed to be only an ordinary person'. To support this view many stories of 
Islamic history have been cited. For example, it was narrated that Ali bin Abe Talb 
(the fourth Ruler after the death of the Prophet) had sued a Jewish person before a 
judge and claimed that the Jew had stolen his breastplate. The judge asked Ali to 
present evidence to support his claim. Ali brought his son Al Hassan as a witness. 
The judge refused to accept his son's testimony and decided the case in the Jew's 
favour, because the ruler (Ali) had not brought acceptable evidence. The Jew was 
astonished at the ruler's respect for the independence of the judiciary, and said, "I 
certify now that the breastplate is not mine, but belongs to the ruler. " He then 
converted to Islam. 18 Recent examples can be found in the judicial system in Saudi 
Arabia. A member of the Royal Family was charged of committing the crime of 
murder, and he was convicted and sentenced to a capital punishment by the Shari'ah 
Court's judgement no 209/16 in 11/7/1420 H (1999-2000). This judgement was 
20 
upheld by both the Court of Appeal, 19 and the Supreme Judicial Council. 
In fact great power is in the hands of judges in Islamic countries, because they have 
the crucial power to decide whether the ruler himself is consistent with Islamic law in 
his administrative practice, whereupon people's obedience to him becomes 
obligatory, or whether the ruler's practice is incompatible with Islamic law, 
whereupon he loses his legitimacy'`. 
As far as the dismissal of the judge is concerned, the majority of jurists state that the 
ruler is prohibited from dismissing the judge if the latter is still qualified. This should 
not however be understood to mean that the judge will stay in office even if he acts 
without diligence. If he commits serious errors he must be removed from his post. 
17 
- Ateeh, J "The Right to Fair Trail". Al- Muslim AL - Muasir. The Contemporary 
Muslim Journal. 
Vol. 21 No. 84 May, June, July 1997. P. 103 
18 
- Wakee'a bin Hean (no year). Akbar AL 
Qudat. Part 2 P. 200 
19 
- Decision No 535/M1/A in 6/8/1420 H 20 
- Decision No 483/4 in 29/8/1420H 21 
- Ateeh, J "The Right to Fair Trail". Al- Muslim AL - Muasir. The Contemporary 
Muslim Journal. 
Vol. 21 No. 84 May, June, July 1997. P. 103 
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If the judge's status changes and he becomes unqualified to handle cases because he 
no longer meets the conditions required of a judge, or if he becomes ill, jurists are in 
agreement about the need for dismissal in these cases. Jurist Ibn Qodamah says: "if 
the judge's status has changed because he has become an unjust person (disobedience 
to Allah), or if he has a mental disability, or an illness which prevents him from 
exercising the judiciary function, or if he ceases to meet part of the judge's conditions 
he shall be removed 22 
According to Islamic law the judge will be deposed in the following circumstances: 
(a) If he becomes Fisg (disobedient to God's instructions). In general this means that 
he has committed a prohibited act. (b) If he intentionally renders a prejudiced (unjust) 
judgment. (c) If he loses a required qualification such as his vision, hearing, or 
reason. 23 Designating certain rules governing the removal of judges is, generally 
speaking, in line with the European Court of Human Rights. Not only that but also the 
European Court actually requires less standards when it decided that: "it is true that 
the irremovability of judges by the executive during their term of office must in 
general be considered as a corollary of their independence and thus included in the 
guarantee of Article 6 para. 1 ... 
However, the absence of a formal recognition of this 
irremovability in law does not in itself imply lack of independence provided that it is 
recognized in fact. 1124 
However, the question remains as to whether the ruler may dismiss the judge even if 
the judge continues to meet the prescribed conditions required for judges. 
Jurists disagree on the issue. The reason for this disagreement is a lack of consensus 
about the judges' status. That is, whether judges are representatives of the ruler, or of 
the Muslim citizens. Those who say they are representatives of the ruler accept their 
dismissal by the ruler, whereas those who hold judges to be representatives of the 
Muslim community deny the ruler's right to dismiss them. 25 Their discussion can be 
illustrated as follows: 
First: the majority of Maliki2G, Al Shafi'i27 and Al Hanbali28 schools argue that the 
ruler cannot remove the judge from his office if the judge still possesses the required 
22 
- Al Muqhni (1981) Part 9 P. 104 23 
- Obeed. M (1988) "Isriglal AL Qada'a" p. 209 - 217 74- Campbell and Fell v UK (1984) 2 E. H. R. R. 165 
u- Ibn Rajeb AL Hanbalee (no year). Al Goud. P. 114 
26 
- Az Adeen Abdulaziz ibn Abdulsalam Al Salmee (no year). Goud Al Ahkam Fi Masalah Al Anam. 
Part I P. 68. 
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qualifications. The ground offered for this argument is that the ruler's appointment of 
a judge is made for the public interest; therefore if the judge is still qualified the ruler 
cannot dismiss him. 
Second: Al- Han afi'`9, and some jurists of Shafi'i30, and Hanbali3'believe that the 
ruler has the right to dismiss the judge even if the judge still possesses the judiciary 
qualifications, if the interest of society requires this. They reach their conclusion by 
analogy. If the judiciary is analogous to representation, they argue, then since the 
principal has the right to dismiss his representative, the ruler can also dismiss his 
representative, that is to say, the judge. 
As to the judge's protection from litigants, it is argued that since the judge handles 
disputation, he might be subject to aggressive acts on the part of some litigants. 
Therefore, the state is under obligation to protect him. Therefore, Muslim jurists say 
that citizens must not be allowed to sue their judges in connection with their judicial 
functions. The judge's verdicts should be assumed correct unless the opposite is 
proved because if a judge resigns or dies, litigants will challenge his judgments with 
the aim of revenge. Thus, the ruler should protect the judge by prohibiting this. 32 In 
fact immunity from suit is an important guarantee in terms of independence of court 
members. In Millar v Dickson33 it is argued that the security of tenure and immunity 
from suit are the most important ways of ensuring that judges perform their duties 
impartially and without fear of the consequences. 
However, this should not be understood to mean that the judge is immune from 
punishment if he commits a punishable act: rather the aim is to provide the judge with 
necessary guarantees to be precise about the accusation made against him and to take 
all the necessary steps to prevent all false accusation against him which might be 
exercised to put the judge under pressure. The aim is then to ensure the independence 
of the judiciary, because complaints against judges could be harmful to the reputation 
of the judiciary, diminishing the judges' dignity and casting doubt on their 
impartiality. 
27 
- Yaha Al-Nawawi (1386 H). Muqhni AL Muhtaj Ala Ma'refat Ma'nee Alfad Alntenhaj. part 4 p. 
381 
28 
- Al Muqhni (1981). Part 9 P. 103 29 
- Al Kasani (1986). Bada'a Al Sana'i. part 7p 16 30 
- Ali Al Mawardi (1990). Al Ahkam Al Soltanah Fi Al Welayeet Al Denah. p. 37 31 
- Al Muqhni (1981) Part 9 P. 103 32 
- Al Tarahlsee (1306 H). Mo'en Al Hokam p. 34. 33- (2001) UKPC D4 [2002] 3 All ER 1041-1073 
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Section Two Saudi law 
In spite of the fact that independence is the most valuable aspect of the judiciary, there 
is no clear unified definition of the independence of the judiciary which permits 
analysis of the independence of a particular judicial system. The notion of 
independence can be easily confused with the term impartiality. Martin L. Friedland, 
for instance, states that: "reasonable apprehension of lack of independence in a 
criminal case would surely go along with reasonable apprehension of lack of 
impartiality". 34 As Chief Justice Lamer states: "Judicial independence is critical to 
the public's perception of impartiality. Independence is the cornerstone, a necessary 
prerequisite, for judicial impartiality". Moreover, some argue, "A lack of 
independence could be considered a good indication of lack of impartiality" . 
35 
Article 46 of the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia puts further emphasis on the 
independence of the judiciary. It declares: "The judiciary is an independent authority; 
there is no authority to impose on them, when adjudicating, other than that of the 
Islamic Shari'ah". In very similar language, article 1 of the Law of the Judiciary 
provides: "Judges are independent and, in the administration of justice, they shall be 
subject to no authority other than the provisions of Shari'ah and laws in force. No 
one may interfere with the judiciary"36. Yet neither the Shari'ah courts nor the Board 
of Grievances in Saudi Arabia has tried to set criteria to examine the independence of 
the judiciary. Therefore, since the European Court of Human Rights has established 
criteria by which the independence of the judiciary may be examined, one should 
apply these criteria to examine the independence of the judiciary in Saudi Arabia. 
The European Court has used four main criteria by which the independence of a 
particular tribunal can be examined. These are: (1) the manner of appointment of its 
members; (2) the duration of their term of office; (3) the existence of guarantees 
against outside pressure; and (4) the question whether the body presents an 
appearance of independence. 37 In the following discussion I will examine these 
points respectively as applied to the judicial system in Saudi Arabia. 
34 
- Friedland, M (1996) "Judicial Independence and Accountability: A Canadian Perspective" 
Criminal Law Forum. Volume 7 Number I p. 617. 
35 
- Quoted on Friedland, M (1996) "Judicial Independence and Accountability: A Canadian 
Perspective". Criminal Law Forum. Volume 7 Number I p. 617. 
36 
- Article 1 of the Board Grievances Statue provides: "The Board of Grievances is an autonomous 
body for administrative justice which is directly connected to HM the King... " 
37 
- See for instance, Findlay v. United Kingdom (1997) 24 E. H. R. R. p221-249& Campbell and Fell v. 
UK (1984) E. H. R. R 165. See also Lauko v Slovakia, 19998-VI (1998) (Application no. 00026138/95) 
Paras 63-64 
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As far as the first point is concerned, the Basic Law states: "The appointment and 
termination of service of the judge shall be by a royal order, made upon the proposal 
of the Supreme Judicial Council as provided for the law"38. In addition, the Law of 
the Judiciary requires that to appoint a judge a Royal Order will be made upon a 
decision taken by the Supreme Judiciary Council. 39 The President of the Supreme 
Judiciary Council will be appointed by a Royal Order. 40 
It is argued that the appointing of the above process may be considered to be an 
important guarantee of the judges' independence. Firstly, restricting the appointment 
of judges to a Royal Order could guarantee that no one can be appointed as a judge 
unless the requirements of both Shari'ah and the law are fulfilled. Secondly, although 
the law requires a Royal Order for the appointment of judges, their appointment 
depends overall on nomination by the Supreme Judiciary Council. The Council is a 
judicial body consisting of five full-time members, to be appointed by a Royal Order, 
who constitute the Permanent Panel of the Council, and five part-time members. The 
latter include the Chief of the Appellate Court or his Deputy, the Deputy Minister of 
Justice, and three from among those having the longest service as Chief Judges of the 
General Courts. Together with the full time members, they constitute the General 
Panel of the Council. 41 
As to the question of whether an appointment by the king (Royal Order) breaches the 
individual's right to be tried before an independent court, the European Court of 
Human Rights is of the opinion that appointing tribunal members by the executive 
body is not, in itself, incompatible with the Convention, and does not breach the right 
to be tried before an independent tribunal42. In fact, the Supreme Judicial Council 
ultimately has sole responsibility for appointing judges. Even though the Law of the 
Judiciary requires a Royal Order to appoint a judge, the requirement is only a 
formality. 43 Consequently it may be concluded that the appointment of judiciary 
members by the King does not contradict the right to be tried before an independent 
court, but rather has a particular justification in Saudi Arabia since this approach is a 
requirement of Islamic law as illustrated by the following: 
38 
- Article 52 39 
-Article 53 of the Law of the Judiciary. 40 
-Article 49of the Law of the Judiciary (added by Royal Decree No. M/76 of AH) 41 
- Article 6 of the Law of the Judiciary 42 
- Campbell and Fell v. UK (1984) 2 E. H. R. R. 165 43 
- Obeed. M( 1988) p. 164 
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The principle of separation of powers is not applied in Saudi Arabia. The King is the 
reference for all authorities. Article 44 of the Basic Law reads: "The authorities of the 
state shall be made up of the following: the judicial Authority; the Executive 
Authority; the Administrative Authority. These authorities shall carry out their 
functions through cooperation and harmony in accordance with the provisions of this 
and other laws; their ultimate authority is the King". This is in fact consistent with 
Islamic law as we have pointed out above. In Islamic law the ruler is the sole figure 
responsible for guaranteeing the application of Islamic principles in respect of the 
function of all these authorities. Article 55 of the Basic Law provides: "The King 
shall abide by the precepts of the Islamic Shari'ah in administering the nation; he 
shall ensure that the Islamic Shari'ah, as well as the laws and general policy of the 
State.... " The legitimacy of the king is derived from his application and obedience to 
Islamic law. Accordingly, in order to preserve his legitimacy the king will keep such 
power for himself. An ordinary person in Saudi Arabia is allowed to lodge his 
complaint, whether against the judiciary, executive or even against the legislative 
authorities, in person directly to the king. In such a case it is the king's duty to 
investigate the complaint, either himself or by delegating such discretion to another to 
perform the requirement under the direct supervision of the king. Article 43 of the 
Basic Law states: "The audiences of both the King and Crown Prince are open to 
every national or to anyone having a complaint or who has been wronged; every 
individual has a right to address the public authorities regarding any need that may 
arise". Consequently, the king shall have power of direct intervention with all these 
authorities in order to supervise their functions. This is clearly the reason for granting 
the King such power to appoint judges, but it should be explained that the King's 
discretion in respect of appointing judges is not unlimited. To be valid, the 
appointment must adhere to the conditions required in both Islamic law and enacted 
law`34. This can be clearly seen from the fact that the king's power in this matter is 
44 
- Article 37 of the Law of the Judiciary provides: " To be appointed as a judge, a candidate shall 
fulfil the following requirements: 
a. He shall be of Saudi nationality. 
b. He shall be of good character and conduct. 
c. He shall be fully qualified to hold position of judge in accordance with the Shari'ah 
provisions. 
d. He shall hold the degree of one of the Shari'ah colleges in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or 
any equivalent certificate, provided that, in latter case, he shall pass a special examination to 
be prepared by the Ministry of Justice. In case of necessity, persons well-known for their 
learning and knowledge who do not hold the required degree may be appointed as judges. 
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restricted to approving the proposal presented by the Supreme Judicial Council. The 
appointment of judges depends mainly on the recommendation of this latter body. 
The practice of selection to the Council depends on committees established in 
Shari'ah Colleges to supervise the most distinguished students during their studies at 
the university and to scrutinize their conduct, in particular their obedience to Islamic 
instructions. These Committees interview candidates and examine their understanding 
of and ability to apply Islamic law. The committees then report to the Supreme 
Judiciary Council, who selects the best from the list of candidates. Jeffrey K. Walker 
writes: "In order to serve as a qadi (judge) in Saudi Arabia, a man must first become 
a scholar in his own right. While at a university, the man would need to demonstrate 
exceptional knowledge of the Koran, the Sunna, other sources of Islamic knowledge, 
and Arabic. Additionally, his social and academic interaction with others must be 
exemplary. If the man meets these requirements, the university faculty may 
recommend him to the Ministry of Justice, who will then send a delegation of sitting 
judges to investigate the nominee. If the candidate is deemed acceptable at all levels, 
he serves as apprentice to an experienced qadi (judge) for an indefinite period, 
usually two to four years, in which time he is instructed and observed in judicial 
method. In addition to these other requirements, a qadi (judge) must remain 
throughout his career a great follower of Islam; his example as a true believer must 
never be called into question. 45 
With regard to duration of their term of office, judges in both the Shari 'ah courts and 
in the Board of Grievances are subject to a long-term appointment. Their 
appointments stand until they reach the age of retirement, that is the age of 70 years. 46 
Clearly appointing judges for a long period of time is an important factor in ensuring 
that their appointment by the executive does not contradict their independence. In 
Millar v Dickson47 it is argued that appointment by the executive is consistent with 
e. He shall not be less than forty years of age if he is to be appointed to the rank of an appellate 
judge, and not less than twenty-two if lie is to be appointed to any other rank in the judiciary. 
f. He shall not have been sentenced to a Hadd ('Qur'anic prescribed punishment") or a Ta'azir 
('discretionary punishment') or for a crime affecting honor, or punished by disciplinary action 
dismissing him from a public office, even though he may have been rehabilitated". In 
addition, article 39 of the same law states: "To hold the rank of Assistance Judge, a candidate 
shall in addition to the requirements listed in Article 37, be holder of a B. A. degree with a 
general rating not lower than "Good" and with a rating of at least "Very Good" in both Islamic 
jurisprudence (Fiqh) and the Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Usul al- Fiqh)". 
as 
- Walker, J (1993) "The Rights of the Accused in Saudi Criminal Procedure". International & 
Comparative Law Journal. Vol. 15 P. 869 
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independence only if it is supported by an adequate guarantees that the appointed 
judge enjoys security of tenure. 
As to the application of the third and forth criteria, namely the guarantees against 
outside pressures, and the appearance of independence, these will be dealt with jointly 
because their link is clearly established. These factors contain two components: (a) 
Members of the judiciary must not be removed during their term of office 48 . 
(b) 
Members must not receive orders or instructions from the executive49 
As to component (a), removal of judges here should be understood to mean either 
dismissal or transferral of judges to other jobs. With regard to the first meaning, 
pursuant to article 2 of the Law of the Judiciary members of the judiciary are not 
subject to removal (dismissal) from office except in the cases set forth in the law. The 
Saudi law designates the following reasons for terminating the judge's service: 
1: acceptance of his resignation. 
2: acceptance of his request that he be placed on retirement in accordance with 
Retirement Law. 
3: death. 
4: a judge shall initially be appointed on probation for a period of one year. Following 
the expiration period and after the appointee's competence has been proven; the 
Supreme Judicial Council shall issue a decision confirming him. Before the issuance 
of the decision, he may be dismissed by decision of the Supreme Judicial Council. 
5: if he reaches the age of 70. 
6: if he lost the confidence and respect required by the office. 
7: if it appears that for health reasons a judge cannot perform his work in the proper 
manner. 
8: if the judge receives a below average rating in three consecutive proficiency 
reports. 50 
Furthermore, as to the legal tool by which the judges' determination in the above 
circumstances will be taken, Article 86 states: "in cases other than death and 
placement on retirement for having reached the statutory age, the service of a 
46 
- Article 51 of the Law of the Judiciary 47 
- (2001) UKPC D4 (2002) 3 All ER 1041-1073 48 
- Campbell and Fell V. UK (1984) 2E. H. R. R 165 49 
- Ibid. 50 
- Articles: 50,51,57,69, and 85 of the Law of the Judiciary. 
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member of the judiciary shall be terminated by a Royal Order based on a decision by 
the Supreme Judicial Council. " 
Obviously, designating certain grounds for termination of the judge's service, and 
confining their termination to a Royal Order based on a decision by a judicial body 
shows clear compliance with the European standards of human rights in respect of 
guarantees provided for the judge against an outside pressure. 
Regarding the second meaning of the word removal, namely transferral of judges to 
other jobs, article 3 of the Law of the Judiciary guarantees that judges will not be 
transferred to other jobs unless by their consent or by reason of promotion. Moreover, 
article 55 of the Law of the Judiciary provides: "Members of the judiciary may not be 
transferred or assigned [to another position] within the judiciary except by decision 
of the Supreme Judiciary Council. Similarly, they may not be transferred, assigned or 
seconded outside the judiciary except by a Royal Order based on a decision of the 
Supreme Judiciary Council, in which the remuneration due to the assigned or 
seconded judge shall be specified. The period of assignment or secondment shall be 
one year renewable for another year. However, the Minister of Justice may, in 
exceptional cases, assign a member of the judiciary to another position within the 
judiciary or outside the judiciary fora period not exceeding three months per year. " 
In view of the fact that transferring the judge to exercise another task was not 
considered by the European Court as a violation of the guarantees against outside 
pressure 51, one can argue that the Saudi law in respect of the rules governing 
transferring of judges is consistent with the law of human rights in Europe. 
As to component (b) of the third and forth criteria, that is to say, that members of the 
judiciary must not receive orders or instructions from the executive, and the 
appearance of independence, here we should distinguish between two areas of 
independence. The first is the personal independence of the judge when handling the 
case in question. In other words, independence in respect of any pressure that could 
be exercised against the judge when the case comes under his jurisdiction. The 
second is the independence of the juridical body from the executive. 52 As to the 
former, this type of independence is clearly guaranteed in the judicial system of Saudi 
Arabia. No one, whatever his position, may interfere in the judge's job. This area of 
s' 
-Harris (1995) p. 233 52 
- Obeed, M (1988)p. 21 
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independence is guaranteed by two elements. (1) Islamic law differs in nature from 
secular law in that it is a part of religion. When handling a case, the judge Fils that he 
is under the supervision of God. Although from a western point of view this attitude 
might be seen as "toothless", anyone who is familiar with Saudi experience knows 
otherwise. In practice the religious dimension of the judge's function serves as an 
important guarantee towards the independence of judges. Parker T. Hart concludes 
his article on Saudi Arabia by stating: "Several factors have caused the system to 
work more satisfactorily than might be expected. The first is the absolute 
incorruptibility and independence of the Shari'ah courts, and the exceptional moral 
caliber of the Shari'ah judges with their ability to see through the complexities of 
machine-age behavior to the essentials of right and wrong. , 53 (2) The Law of the 
Judiciary guarantees various aspects of the judge's personal independence. No one 
can force him to act or not to act in a certain way. His only constraint is the 
requirement to apply Islamic law as well as enacted laws. Furthermore, if a case is 
formally filed with a court, this case shall not be transferred to another court except 
after the trial court has rendered a judgment, or has decided that it has no jurisdiction, 
whereupon the case shall be transferred to the competent authority54. This is in fact 
an important guarantee because allowing the executive body to withdraw a case from 
the jurisdiction of the court would subjugate the judiciary to the will of the executive 
members. Whatever reasons are provided the executive authority is not permitted to 
withdraw a case from the jurisdiction of the court. The President of the Council of 
Ministers in resolution No. 13002 in 4/5/1395 H declares: "The High Bureau of 
Judiciary has noted that some government's agents withdraw some cases before a 
final judgment is concluded on the basis that the case should be reconsidered or sent 
to an administrative committee to investigate it. Since such practice clearly infringes 
the law, the following points must be clarified: First: after being filed to the court, the 
case is under the court's jurisdiction. No one is permitted to withdraw the case even 
if the court has no jurisdiction to handle it. In such circumstances the court must 
decide the case, or declare its lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, whereupon it 
should forward the case to the authority concerned.... Third: withdrawing the case 
53 
- Hart, P (1953) "Application of Hanbalite and Decree Law to Foreigners in Saudi Arabia". George 
Washington Law Review. Vol. 22 P. 172 
54 
- Article 5 the Law of Criminal Procedure. Likewise, article 11 of the Law of Procedure before 
Shari'ah Courts declares: "no case properly filed with a competent court may be transferred to another 
court or agency before judgment is rendered. " 
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from the judge before his adjudication will delay the proceeding, whereby the interest 
of the litigants will be prejudiced.... Fifth: the existence of an ongoing case in one of 
the government agencies, which is related to a case before a court, cannot be 
considered as a proper justification for transferring the latter case from the 
competent court. However, the correct action in such situation is to commit the case 
in the government agency to the court. " 
Now we should turn to the second area of meaning of independence, that is the 
relationship between the judicial authority and the executive authority. The Saudi law 
gives special concern to insure the independence of the judiciary. This can be seen 
from more than one event. To begin with, the law established a judicial body to 
supervise judiciary affairs, that is to say the Supreme Judicial Council. The President 
of the Council was originally the Minister of Justice. This arrangement was subject to 
criticism since the Minister of Justice is a member not of the judicial authority, but of 
the executive authority. Therefore, according to the Royal Decree No. M/67 in 
14/10/1395 H the Minister of Justice is no longer eligible to become President of the 
Supreme Council of Judiciary. Moreover, to insure independence from outside 
pressure the Law of Impeachment of Ministers55 prohibits ministers and anyone in the 
same grade from interfering in the judiciary. 56 
In addition, Article 73 of the Law of the Judiciary states: "Disciplinary action against 
judges shall be the responsibility of the Supreme Judiciary Council... " Confining 
disciplinary action against the judge to a judicial body is a significant guarantee 
against outside pressure. Pursuant to article 84 the judge, except in a case of a 
flagrante delicto, may not be arrested or subject to any investigation, nor may 
criminal proceedings be commenced against him except with the permission of the 
Supreme Judiciary Council. Moreover, the imprisonment of judges and 
implementation of the penalties restricting judges will take place in a separate location 
from that applying to ordinary prisoners. In fact judges are usually imprisoned either 
in the building of the Ministry of Justice or in the court buildings 
55 
- Enacted by a Royal Decree No. 88 on 22/9/1380 H (1960) 56 
- Article 5 57 
- Jeerah, A (1988) P. 352&353. 
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Further, Article 4 requires certain conditions to sue judges. It provides: "A judge may 
not be sued except in accordance with the conditions and rules pertaining to the 
disciplining of judges. " 58 
58 
- Chapter V of the Law of the Judiciary specifies the following rules to take disciplinary actions 
against judges. Article (73) provides: "The disciplinary actions against judges shall be the 
responsibility of the Supreme Judicial Council convening in a General Panel in its capacity as a 
disciplinary board. If the judge brought to trial is a member of the Supreme Judicial Council the 
Minister of Justice shall assign one of the Judges of the Appellate Court to replace him on the board. A 
judge who had previously participated in requesting that the accused be placed on retirement or who 
has requested the institution of the disciplinary action against him should not be barred from sitting on 
the disciplinary board. " Article (74) states: "The disciplinary action shall be instituted at the demand 
of the Minister of Justice, acting on his own or on the recommendation of the Chief of the Court to 
which the judge belongs. Such request shall be submitted only on the basis of a criminal or 
administrative investigation conducted by one of the Judges of the Appellate Court assigned by the 
Minister of Justice. " Article (75) provides: "The disciplinary action shall be instituted by a 
memorandum including the allegation and supporting evidence, and shall be brought before the 
disciplinary board which shall decide on summoning the accused to appear before the board. " Article 
(76) states: "The board may conduct such investigations as it may deem necessary, and it ºnay assign 
any of its members to carry out such investigation. " Article (77) provides: "If the disciplinary board 
find justification to initiate trial proceedings for all or some of the allegations, it shall summon the 
accused to appear at a suitable time. The writ of summons must include a sufficient statement of the 
subject matter of the action, and the evidence of the allegation. " Article (78) states: "When the 
disciplinary board decides on the initiation of trial proceedings, it may suspend the accused front 
performing the duties of his position. The board may at any time reconsider the suspension order. " 
Article (79) provides: "The disciplinary action shall come to end by the resignation of the judge. The 
disciplinary action shall have no effect on the criminal or civil suit arising from the incident itself. " 
Article (80) states: "The hearings of the disciplinary hoard shall be in closed session. The disciplinary 
board shall render its judgment after it has heard the defense of the defendant judge, who may submit 
his defense in writing or entrust a member of the judiciary to defend him. The board shall always have 
the right to summon the accused to appear in person. If the accused does not appear in person, or 
empower somebody on his behalf a judgment by default may be rendered after ascertaining the 
validity of the case. " Article (81) provides: "The judgment rendered in the disciplinary action must 
include the grounds on which it is based, and such grounds Hurst be closed session. The judgment of the 
disciplinary board shall be final and unappealable". Article (82) states: "The disciplinary penalties 
which may be imposed on the judge shall be reprimand and retirement. " Article (83) provides: 
"Decision of the disciplinary board shall be conveyed to the Minister of Justice. A royal Order shall be 
issued for the implementation of the retirement, and a decision of the Minister of Justice shall be issued 
for the implementation of the reprimand. " Article (84) states: "In cases where the judge is caught in a 
criminal act, the matter shall, upon arrest and imprisonment of the judge, be reported to the Supreme 
Judicial Council convening in its Permanent Panel within the following twentyfour hours. The Council 
may decide whether he shall continue to be imprisoned or whether he shall be released on or without 
bail. The judge may request that his statements be heard before the Council, upon bringing the case 
before it. The Council shall specify the term of imprisonment in the decision ordering either 
imprisonment or continuation thereof. The aforementioned procedure shall be followed whenever the 
continuation of protective custody is deemed necessary after the expiration of the term fixed by the 
Council. Except in the forgoing cases, the judge may not be arrested nor may investigation proceedings 
be instituted against hint, not may he be criminally prosecuted except with the permission of the 
Council. Imprisonment of judges and punishments restraining their freedom shall be implemented in 
separate places. " 
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Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Council is given discretion to participate in the 
regulation of the administrative and financial affairs of the judiciary members. 
Article 8 of the Law of the Judiciary provides: "In addition to the function set forth in 
this law, the Supreme Judicial Council shall... (c) Provide opinions on issues related 
to the judiciary... " Moreover, the salaries of the members of the judiciary in all ranks 
shall be in accordance with the salary scale for judges, issued by Royal Decree No. 
M/38 dated 19 May 1975. 
Consequently, as an outside observer, Abdullmon'em Jeerah states that: "the 
independence of the judiciary in Saudi Arabia is clearly settled historically, factually, 
and lawfully. An examiner of the history of the judiciary since the unification of Saudi 
Arabia will recognize the high post the judges possess. This respect has successfully 
achieved its goal. No one can deny the success of this approach in making Saudi 
Arabia a very safe place. This success is achieved only by the application of Islamic 
law. If the judiciary is weak and does not enjoy full independence no one can protect 
his rights, which will lead to riot and disorder in society. "59 
Nevertheless, two areas of deficiencies can be identified in respect of the 
independence of courts in Saudi Arabia. The first is the relationship between the 
Minister of Justice and the judiciary, and the second is the link between the King and 
the judiciary. 
As to the first point the law in Saudi Arabia contains texts that render the relationship 
between the Ministry of Justice and the judicial body questionable. For example, 
Article 9 of the Law of the Judiciary provides: "The Supreme Judicial Council shall 
convene as a Permanent Panel composed of its full-time members, presided over by 
its Chief or by a designee from amongst the senior most member in the judiciary, to 
look into the issue and sentences mentioned in paragraphs 2,3, and4 of Article 8, 
except those which the Minister of Justice decides that they be looked into by the 
Council's General panel The Council's General Panel consisting of all members 
59 
-Jeerah, A (1988) P. 64 
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shall convene, presided over by the chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council to look 
into other issue. The convening of the Council's Permanent Panel shall be valid if 
attended by a majority of its members, except in reviewing the sentences involving 
death, amputation, or stoning, in which case all its members shall be in attendance. In 
case of the absence of one of the members, he shall be replaced by someone 
nominated by the Minister of Justice from among the Council's non full time 
members. The Council's General Panel meeting shall be valid only if attended by all 
members. In case of the absence of one the members, or if the Council looks into a 
case relating to that member or in which he has a direct interest, he shall be replaced 
by someone nominated by the Minister of Justice from among the members of the 
Appellate court. Decisions of the Council convening, either as a Permanent or a 
General panel, shall be made by vote of the absolute majority of the panel member. " 
Moreover, article 129 of the Law of the Criminal Procedure states: "The General 
Court shall have jurisdiction over cases that fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
Summery Court provided for under Article 128 hereof, or any other case that law falls 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of this court. In particular, this court, convening 
as three judges, shall have jurisdiction over cases wherein the sentence claimed is the 
death penalty, rajm (stoning), amputation or qisas (retaliatory punishment) in cases 
other than death. This court shall not be entitled to issue a death sentence by way of 
Ta'azir, except pursuant to a unanimous vote. Should such unanimity be impossible, 
the Minister of Justice shall assign two other judges in addition to the three judges 
who shall together be entitled, either unanimously or by majority vote, to issue a 
death sentence by way of Ta'azir. " 
The above articles especially the second one might raise a considerable concern 
because this appears to allow direct interference in the judicial process. If a 
unanimous decision cannot be reached by three judges to impose the death sentence, 
as is required by law, the sentence cannot be imposed. 
In addition, pursuant to the Law of the Judiciary a technical department for research 
was established at the Ministry of Justice to fulfil various functions, among them to 
answer enquiries from judges. Generally speaking, judges sometimes seek 
clarifications from the Ministry of Justice with regard to the application of a particular 
enacted law or some general principles and rules of Islamic Law. It seems that such 
practice in Saudi Arabia is a continuation of what was established in Islamic societies 
a long time ago. In Islamic law the judge is under obligation to consult jurists and 
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scholars if he has any difficulty in respect of understanding the rules governing a case. 
As we have mentioned, in early Islamic states these jurists attended most cases 
because most cases were tried before a single judge. Apparently, this custom no 
longer exists owing to the change of life-style in a modern Islamic state whereby 
scholars and jurists are no longer willing to attend every case due to the increase of 
the number of cases and courts. Thus the legislature has apparently established a 
research department to fill gaps created by the recent changes in modern life. 
However, the legislature had failed to take into account the difference between jurists 
on the one hand and a department in the Ministry of Justice on the other. Here one 
should realize that early jurists were ordinary persons and not employees in the 
government. So their independence is not in question. But the scholars who 
constitute the department are in fact employees in an executive body; therefore a 
judge's consultation of such a department may raise the question of independence. 
Nevertheless, as to the question whether such practice violates the standards of 
independence required by the European Court, it is important to reiterate that the 
European Court's approach when assessing the relationship between the members of 
the tribunal in question and the executive is to distinguish between instructions and 
mere guidelines. The executive may issue guidelines to members of the court about 
the performance of their functions, as long as any such guidelines are not, in realty, 
instructions. 60 Directions by the executive that is amounted to instructions, however, 
infringe the Convention, because by doing so the court surrenders its judicial function 
to the executive. In addition, in a different case, 61 the European Court found that 
accepting an opinion from a Foreign Minister as binding for a judge is regarded as 
infringement of the independency of the tribunal. So, it seems that, the crucial point in 
this regard is how judges view the opinion provided by the executive. If executive's 
views are taken by judges as binding this violates the independence of the judiciary. 
But if executive's opinions are taken as mere guidelines or consultations then there is 
no violation of the independence of the courts. Consequently, since the judge in Saudi 
Arabia is not obliged to accept and follow such consultation, the right to be tried 
before an independent tribunal in Saudi Arabia is not breached according to the 
standards of the European Court of Human Rights 
60 
- Campbell and Fell v. UK (1984) 2E. H. R. R 165 61- Beaumartin v France (1994) Paras. 38-39 (Application no. 00015287/89) 
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As to the relationship between the judiciary and the King (Presidency of the Council 
of Ministers), article 8 of the Law of the Judiciary provides: "in addition to the 
function set forth in this law, the Supreme Judicial Council shall... (b) Look into 
issues which, in the opinion of the King, require that they be reviewed by the 
Council... (d) Review death, amputation, or stoning sentences". This means that, 
except judgment entailing the above punishments, all criminal judgments rendered 
from the Court of Appeal will be considered final. Nevertheless, other Appellate 
judgments might be subject to a review by the Supreme Judicial Council if the King 
orders the Council to do so. Even though we have argued when discussing the 
appointment of judges that Saudi Arabia does not apply the principle of separation of 
powers and that the King is the sole reference for all authorities and must therefore 
have access to all of them, this cannot justify the above legal deficiency. In recent 
times the King has had to deal with matters more important than scrutinizing 
individual cases. This has led to the King's involvement in such cases being a 
formality only. In practice his decision whether the Supreme Judicial Council will 
review the case concerned depends entirely on the opinion of the King's consultants. 
Although consultants are very highly qualified in Shari'ah as well as Law and most of 
them have judicial experience, and despite the fact that the religious character of these 
consultants plays a significant role in guaranteeing the independency of their work, 
they are in fact still part of the executive body. Needless to say, providing such 
members with indirect power to decide whether the Council should review a 
particular case is regarded as an infringement of the independence of the judiciary. 
What makes the problem worse is the fact that these consultants have not in fact yet 
established precise grounds on which the decision to order the Supreme Judicial 
Council to review a particular case will be based, but rather every case is decided 
individually. This opens the possibility that the Council's decisions on these issues 
are not objectively assessed. Here the links between the Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers and the Supreme Judicial Council cannot enhance the latter's reputation for 
independence, and the judicial body is thus exposed to criticisms that could be 
avoided if the system was organized differently. 
Therefore, one can suggest that in order to achieve the standard of independency 
required by the European Court of Human rights, the Saudi law should be reformed in 
a way that insures the independence of the judiciary. The relationship between the 
Ministry of Justice and the judicial body needs to be reconsidered, and the power of 
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the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to commit cases to the Supreme judicial 
Council has to be abolished. Put it differently, even though the personal independence 
of judges in Saudi Arabia is no doubtly, guaranteed, the structural independence need 
to be addressed. This suggestion is based on the general requirement mentioned by 
the European Court62 that restrictions on human rights must be prescribed by law. It is 
also grounded on the argument that judicial independence can be threatened not only 
by interference by the executive, but also by a judge's being influenced, consciously 
or unconsciously, by his hopes and fears as to his possible treatment by the executive. 
It is for that reason that a judge must not be dependent on the Executive, however 
well the Executive may behave: "independence" connotes the absence of dependence. 
Here it should be emphasized that judge's personal integrity and independence of 
mind in Saudi Arabia are not in doubt and that it is not suggested that there was any 
conscious or unconscious bias or any subjective partiality felt or displayed in their 
work. However, the appearance of independence is just as important as the question 
whether this quality exists in fact. Justice not only be done, it must be seen to be done. 
The function of the European Convention on Human Rights is not only to secure that 
the judges are free from any actual personal bias or prejudice. It requires this matter to 
be seen objectively. The aim is to exclude any legitimate doubt as to the court's 
independence. 63 
Part II The Right to an Impartial Court 
Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: "In the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... 
by an independent and 
impartial 
... tribunal.... 
" The impartiality of the court is examined firstly in Islamic 
law and secondly in the Saudi law. 
Section One Islamic law 
Unlike their approach in respect of other subjects, Islamic jurists study the judge's 
impartiality in great detail. In general, they prohibit the judge from exercising certain 
conducts that could be detrimental to his impartiality. They have also established 
62 
- See for example, Kruslin v. France (1990) (Application no. 00011801/85) 63 
- More discussion regarding the importance of the appearance of independence is provided in the 
Millar v Dickson (2001) UKPC D4 [2002] 3 All ER. 1041-1073 
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particular circumstances in which the judge must withdraw from handling the case. 
Under the heading "judge's impartiality", they have discussed the following subjects: 
(1) the right of the judge to accept a gift or present, (2) the right of the judge to accept 
a private invitation, (3) the right of the judge to involve himself in business or 
commercial activities, (4) the right of the judge to render a legal opinion on subjects 
that could be raised before the judge as a legal case, (5) the right of the judge to host 
one of the case parties, (6) the right of the judge to instruct one party in giving his 
evidence (dictate evidence), (7) the judge's right to judge himself, (8) the right of the 
judge to judge cases pertaining to his antagonists, relatives or those who are legally 
under his trustee- or guardianship. In the following discussion I will deal with each of 
these subjects in turn. However, before approaching these matters, it might be helpful 
to state that there is a disagreement between Islamic scholars with regard to each of 
the above issues, and the Saudi law in order to ease the function of judges in respect 
of the right to be tried before an impartial court, designates certain circumstances in 
which the judge must recuse from hearing the case. Thus, to avoid repetition, the 
comparison with the European standards of human rights will only be undertaken in 
the section concerns the law of Saudi Arabia. 
As to giving presents, it should be emphasised that this is different from bribery. A 
present is not given conditionally in order to bring about a particular conduct. 
Needless to say bribery is forbidden whether offered to a judge or another person, and 
it is irrelevant to our subject. 
In Islam as perhaps in other cultures, a present is always welcomed since it gives 
happiness and pleasure to the recipient and thus enhances the relationship between 
citizens. Many Hadith. (prophet traditions) encourage people to sent gifts to friends, 
neighbours, relatives etc. However, these Hadith are confined to ordinary persons. 
But for those who are in charge of public affairs such as judges, governors and others 
the case may be different. Since our topic concerns the impartiality of the judge the 
discussion provided here will be limited to judges. 
Jurists disagree about the judge's acceptance of a gift. Their controversy can be 
outlined as follows: 
1- According to the Al Hanafi School, the judge's acceptance depends on 
circumstances defining the sender's status. Central is whether the sender was 
already in the habit of sending gifts before the judge's appointment. If the 
sender did not send gifts to the judge before his appointment, it must be asked 
282 
whether he is related to the judge or not. If the sender is a relative, it must 
then be asked whether he has a case before the judge or not. If he has a case, 
the judge must not accept his gift because doing so could create doubt in 
respect of his impartiality. But if the sender who is a relative to the judge 
does not have a current case the judge can accept the gift because in this case 
there is no suspicion with regard to his impartiality; and because accepting the 
gift from a relative is a kind of kinship which is an obligatory principle in 
Islamic law. 
If a stranger gives the present, the judge cannot accept it whether the sender 
has a current case or not. The reason for this is that if he has a current case the 
gift will be considered as bribery, and if he has no current case he might have 
in the near future. Therefore, the judge should not accept it. If he receives it 
he must send it back, and if this is impossible the judge must send the gift to 
the public treasury. 
However, if the gift is given by a person who already has an established 
custom of giving to this particular judge, one should distinguish between two 
situations: (i) if the sender has a current case the judge must not accept his 
present. (ii) If he has no current case one should consider whether the gift 
itself is similar to his previous gifts or not. If his current gift is similar to, or 
less substantial than, his previous gifts (before the judge was appointed), the 
judge can accept it. But if the gift is greater (superior) in quality and quantity, 
the judge should accept only to the same value as the previous ones. 64 
2- According to the Al Maliki School, the judge is not allowed to accept a gift 
because this could affect his impartiality. But in cases where the giver was 
already in the habit of sending gifts, Maliki jurists are of two opinions. First: 
the judge is prohibited from accepting the present. Second: it is not forbidden 
but it is not recommended. 65 
3- According to the Al Shafi'i School, if the giver is currently involved in a suit 
or if he is likely to have a case in the near future the judge is forbidden to 
accept it whether or not the giver had established the custom before the 
appointment of the judge. 
64 
- Al Kasani 
(1986) Bada'a Al Sandi . Part 7 P. 1029. 
65 
- Al Karshi 
(no year). Al-Karshi Ala Mokta. ser Kaleel Part 7 P. 151 
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If the gift is given by a person who had established the custom before the 
appointment of the judge and he has no current suit, the judge is permitted to 
accept his gift provided that it is similar to the previous ones. 
66 
4- According to the Al Hanbali School, the judge is not permitted to accept a gift 
from a person who had not established the custom before the appointment of 
the judge. But he is permitted to accept the gift if the person had previously 
given him similar gifts, provided that the giver has no current suit; otherwise 
he is not permitted to accept the gift, because it will be regarded as bribery. 
67 
The second matter is the right of the judge to accept a private invitation. Jurists are in 
agreement about the prohibition of accepting a private invitation from one party, 
because this might create doubt as to the judge's impartiality and because it breaches 
the equality between litigants. 
68 However, jurists disagree about the judge's 
acceptance of a private invitation if the inviter is not involved in a suit. Some argue 
that the judge is forbidden from attending a private invitation. 
69 Other jurists claim 
that the judge is permitted to accept a private invitation if the inviter has no suit. But 
if the number of private invitations has significantly increased the judge should not 
accept them all. He must not accept some invitations and refuse others because this 
might infringe the equality between people, unless of course he has a legitimate 
reason. 70 
With regard to the third subject, the right of the judge to participate in commercial 
activities, there are two main views: 
(1) The majority of Hanafi71, Maliki72, Shafi'i, 73 and Hanbali74 schools state that a 
judge is not recommended to involve himself in commercial activities; however, he is 
permitted participation in commercial activities through anonymous representative. 
They base their view on the following grounds: (a) The Prophet said: "A ruler will not 
be just if he involves himself in business activities". (b) The companions of the 
66 
- All Al Mawardi (Al Shafi'i) (1971). Adab Al Qadee. part 2 p. 264,265,266 67 
- Al-Muqhni (1981) part 9p7,78 68 
- Bada'a Al Sana'i (1986). Part 7 p. 10 69 
- Ibid, part 7 p. 10. 70 
- Muhammad Bin Meflah (1967). Al Froo'. part 6 p. 451 71 
- A] Sarkasee (no year) Al Mabsut. part 16 p. 77 72 
- Abraheem bin All Al Malekee (1986). Tabsert 
Al Hokam Part 1 P. 34 
73 
- Al Nawawi (1386 H). Muqhni Al Muhtaj part 4 p. 391 74 
- Muhammad Bin Meflah (1967). Al Froo'. Part 6 P. 451 
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Prophet after his death condemned the involvement of Abu Baker (the First Ruler 
after the Prophet's death) in commercial activities. (c) When he appointed his judge 
Shoreeh, Omer ordered him not to involve himself in commercial activities. (d) If the 
judge practises commercial activities himself his concern will focus on his business. 
Moreover, merchants might flatter the judge in their business. So the judge will lack 
impartiality when one of the merchants has a case before the judge. 
In general, these jurists say that it is not recommended but it is not prohibited. 
(2) Some jurists of the Hanafi75, Maliki76, and Hanbali77 schools argue that the judge 
is forbidden to engage in commercial activities. They support their argument with the 
same evidence as that cited by the first group; however they reach a different 
conclusion. They conclude that the judge is forbidden to engage in commercial 
activities, because people usually flatter the judge in their business. 
With regard to the fourth matter, that is the judge's right to render a legal opinion on 
subjects that could come before the judge as a legal case, it is first necessary to clarify 
the meaning of this matter. In Islamic society Muslims constantly ask those who have 
knowledge of Islamic rules about matters related to their lives, in order to gain an 
appropriate Islamic perspective on particular subjects. Since judges in an Islamic 
state must be specialists in Islamic religion, people sometimes seek their legal opinion 
in respect of particular matters. Because some of these matters could be raised as a 
case before the judge who has rendered the legal opinion, jurists discuss the right of 
the judge to render a religious legal opinion. They disagree on the subject, but before 
outlining their views it is worth mentioning here that they all agree upon the judge's 
right to render a legal opinion with regard to religious matters such Praying, Zakat 
(alms tax) and other forms of worship, which clearly will not be subject to 
adjudication between people. 
As to the main question in this discussion, namely the judge's right to deliver a legal 
opinion on matters that could become a judicial question, jurists disagree about this 
matter as follows: (a) the majority of jurists of Hanafi78, Maliki79, Shafi'i80, and 
75 
- Abdulrahman bin Muhammad Bin Suleiman (1310H). Mojam' Al Antiar Fi Sharh Moltaga Al 
Abhor. Part 2 p. 125 
76 
- Muhammad bin Arafh Al Dusuqi (no year). Hasheet Al- Dusuqi Ala Al Sharh Al Kabeer. part 4 p. 
124 
77 
- Muhammad Bin Meflah (1967). Al Froo'. Part 6 P. 451 78 
- Abdulrahman hin Muhammad bin Suleiman (1310H). Mojam' Al Anhar Fi Sharh Moltaga A/ 
Abhor. Part 2 p. 125 
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Hanbali81 say that for two reasons the judge is not forbidden to render a legal opinion: 
(i) the four Islamic rulers after the death of the Prophet did render legal opinions and 
at the same time they also adjudicated between litigants. (ii) The judge is qualified to 
do this. (b) However there are some jurists of Hanafi82, Maliki83, Shafi'i84, and 
Hanbali85 schools who believe that the judge is forbidden to render legal opinions 
related to judiciary matters. They offer as reason for their argument that by 
consulting the judge on his opinions, litigants will know in advance his view in 
respect of particular matters. This might be regarded as an indication of his judgment 
should the case be lodged before him, so if the judge's opinion supports the interest of 
the party, he will raise the case before this judge, but if the judge's opinion is against 
the party's interest the party will raise the case before another judge. 
The fifth matter is that of the judge's right to host one of the case parties. This issue 
requires careful explanation, because it seems that such a custom is not common in 
western societies, particularly modern ones. Islamic societies and particularly Arabs 
are familiar with hosting (accommodating) travellers, even strangers, in their homes 
for at least three days. The traveller usually introduces himself to the first person he 
meets in the town. Upon learning that the person is a traveller the latter is under a 
social obligation to host him in his home and offer him every possible assistance. 
Although this custom is nowadays less common in modern Islamic cities, because the 
life style has considerably changed, it is still practised by some people in towns and 
villages. As a judge might thus become host to a traveller, jurists have discussed what 
the judge should do if the traveller has a case before the judge. 
Generally speaking, judges are obliged to apply justice; therefore it is their duty to 
avoid any act that could jeopardise this principle. Thus, jurists state that the judge 
must not accommodate a single litigant 86 . They support their claim with the 
following: 
79 
- Hasheet Al-Dusuqi ( no year) part 4 p. 124 80 
-Muhammad bin Al Monther (1408 H). AlEgna'. Part 2 P. 514 81 
- Ali Al Mawardi (1958). AI Ensaf part 11 p. 187 82 
- Al Fatawa Al Hendeeh (1310 H) Part 3 P. 266. 83 
- Hasheet Al-Dusuqi (no year)part4 p. 124 84 
- Muhammad Al Moptee'ee (no year). AI Majmoo' Sharh AI Mohatheb. Part I P. 42 s5 
- Ali Al Mawardi (1958). AI Ensaf part 11 p. 187 s6 
- Al Fatawa Al Hendeeh (1310 H) Part 3 P. 262. 
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(a) It is narrated that a traveller came to Ali bin Abee Taleb (the Fourth 
Ruler after the death of the Prophet). So Ali asked him: "do you have a 
case against another litigant? " The man said yes. Ali asked him to go 
somewhere else and he said: "I heard the Prophet said: "Do not 
accommodate (host) one party unless you also host the other party. " 87 
(b) Accommodating one party could be harmful to the judge's 
impartiality. 88 
The sixth matter is the judge's right to instruct one litigant in his evidence (dictating 
evidence). The issue here is whether the judge should take a passive role with regard 
to the proceedings and the evidence adduced by all parties, or whether he should be 
proactive in investigating the truth, even to the extent of instructing one party in 
giving his evidence and of notifying him of any weakness in the other party's speech 
which he could benefit from. Jurists' opinions on the issue differ as follows: 
First: the majority of Hanafi89, Maliki90, Shafi'i91, and Hanbali92 schools argue that 
the judge is not allowed to instruct the parties in giving their evidence because this 
might breach the impartiality of the judge. If he instructs one party, that means that 
he supports him against the other party. Second: on the other hand, some jurists of the 
Hanafi School argue that the judge is permitted to give instruction. 93 Third: some 
jurists of the Maliki state that the judge can instruct the litigant in giving his evidence 
if the latter is unable to adduce it for any reason, provided that he does the same with 
both parties. But they stipulate that the judge should not instruct them to speak 
falsely. 
Now we move to the seventh matter, the right of the judge to handle his own case. 
Jurists from all schools of thought state that the judge is not permitted to judge 
himself or participate in any judgment pertaining to him. They cite the following 
arguments to support their view: 
87 
- Al Behagee (no year). Al Sonan Al Kobra. Part 10 P. 137 88 
-, Ali Al Mawardi (1971). Adab Al Qadee Part 2 P. 264 89 
- Faker Al Deen Othman Al Zeela'ee (1314 H). Tabeen Al Haga'iq, Shad? Kanz Al Daga'g. part 4; 
p 179 
Borhan Al Deen Abraheem Bin Ali Al Malekee (1986). Tabsert Al Hokam. Part 1 P. 47 
91 
- Ali Al Mawardi (1971). Adab Al Qadee. Part 2 P. 255&256 92 
- Al Muqhni. (198 ]). Part 9 P. 82 93 
- Al-Jofan (1416 H) p. 464 
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(a) By the principle of analogy, since a person cannot testify for himself, 
so the judge cannot judge himself. 
(b) The companions of the prophet did not judge themselves, but rather they 
presented their cases before different judges. 94 
In respect of the final matter, that is the judge's right to handle a case pertaining to a 
personal opponent, the judge is forbidden to adjudicate the case of his antagonist. If 
he has rendered a verdict his judgment must be reversed. 95 Similarly, according to 
the majority of jurists the judge is forbidden to handle a case pertaining to one of his 
relatives. Thus he is not allowed to judge his father, mother, sister, brother, and his 
wife etc. for the reason that the judge's impartiality cannot be guaranteed when 
handling such cases. 96 Further, jurists have discussed the judge's right to handle the 
case of any person under his guardianship. Some believe that the judge should not 
adjudicate any case pertaining to a person under his guardianship, while other jurists 
state that he is allowed to do so. 97 
Section Two Saudi Law 
Before examining the case in Saudi Arabia it is worth mentioning here that laws 
governing the Board of Grievances provide only a single general article. Article 25 of 
the Rules of Pleadings of the Board of Grievances states: "The accused or any 
interested party may apply to disqualify any of the members of the Circuit if there is 
ground for such rejection; subsequent to filing the application and until it has been 
decided the hearing will be suspended; the President of the Board of Grievances will 
decide the application, and his decision is final. Where there are reasons 
necessitating the retirement of a member of the Circuit from the case he (the judge) 
shall refer the matter to the President of the Board of Grievances who will make a 
decision in respect thereof ". Clearly the draftsmen of the law prefer not to designate 
specific circumstances on which the disqualification of a judge will be based. They 
only articulate the principle, leaving the disqualification of a judge to the discretion of 
the President of the Board of Grievances, according to Islamic law. As a result our 
discussion here will be limited to the Shari'ah courts. 
94 
- Al Muqhni (198 1). Part 9 P. 107 95 
- This is the majority' opinion. They analogize testimony to the judiciary. See for example, Ali Al 
Mawardi (1971). Adab Al Qadee. part 2 p. 417 
96 
- Shams Al Deen Al Makdasee, Muhammad Bin Meflah (1967). Al Froo'. Part 6 P. 451 97 
- Abraheem Bin All Al Malekee (1986). Tabsert Al Hokanm, part I p. 92 
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In order to find out whether the judicial system in Saudi Arabia protects the right to be 
tried before an impartial court in a manner consistent with the standards of the 
European human Rights law, one should explain, at this stage, the standards required 
by the European Court of Human Rights. But, since the scope of the tests provided by 
the European Court might be better illustrated by reference to English jurisprudence 
in this issue, five English cases will be referred to also. The objective here is to reveal 
the difficulties that English courts have engaged with in their attempt to achieve an 
appropriate principle to test the impartiality of a member of judiciary. It might be 
helpful to point out at this stage that the comparison between the judicial system in 
Saudi Arabia, and the English or the European Court jurisprudence is undertaken 
broadly. In other words, it will focus on the main aspects of each system. This is 
because both systems have applied different approach to handle the issue of 
impartiality. While the Saudi law designates certain circumstances for the automatic 
disqualification of the judge, thereby appears more cautious than the European 
standards as exemplified by the English experience that prefers to set up a test which 
will be applied separately in every individual case. 
As to the European Court, it specifies that impartiality could be tested by a distinction 
between a subjective approach, that is endeavouring to ascertain the personal 
conviction of a given judge in a given case, and an objective approach, that is 
determining whether he offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt 
in this respect. As to the subjective approach, the Court explains, the personal 
impartibility of a judge is to be presumed until there is proof to the contrary. 
However, it is not possible for the Court to confine itself to a purely subjective test; 
account must also be taken of considerations relating to the functions exercised and to 
internal organisation (the objective test). In this regard, even appearance may be 
important; in the words of the English maxim that "justice must not only be done: it 
must also be seen to be done. " The Court continues to point out that what is at stake is 
the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public and 
above all, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, in the accused. 98 
In respect of the English cases, they will be dealt with in considerable details, and in a 
historical order to clarify the development of the tests. In Rv Gough99 the appellant 
98 
- De Cubber v. Belgium (1984) 7 E. H. R. R. 236. & Pfeifer and Plank! v. Austria (1992) 14 E. H. R 
. R. 
693. See also Oberschlick v. Austria (1991) 19 E. H. R. R. 389. 
99 
- [1993] 2 All ER 724 - 740 
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and his brother were charged with robbery. At the committal proceedings the brother 
was discharged and the appellant was indicated on a single count that he had 
conspired with his brother to commit robbery. One of the jurors was a next-door 
neighbour of the brother but she did not recognize him or connect him with the man 
referred to in court until he started shouting in court after the appellant had been 
convicted and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The House of Lords held that 
"except where a person acting in a judicial capacity had a direct pecuniary interest in 
the outcome of the proceedings, when the court would assume bias and automatically 
disqualify him from adjudication, the test to be applied in all cases of apparent bias, 
whether concerned with justices, members of other inferior tribunals, jurors or 
arbitrators, was whether, having regard to the relevant circumstances, there was a 
real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question, in 
the sense that he might unfairly regard or have unfairly regarded with favour or 
disfavour the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him. Where the case 
was concerned with bias on the part of the justice' clerk, the court should go on to 
consider whether the clerk had been invited to give the justices advice and, if so, 
whether it should infer that there was a real danger that the clerk's bias infected the 
views of the justices adversely to the applicant. " 
In the second case 100, the applicant was the former head of state of Chile. His 
extradition was sought by Spain so that he could be tried for various crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed whilst he was head of state. Two provisional warrants 
for his arrest were issued. The applicant successfully applied to the Divisional Court 
to quash those warrants, but the quashing of the second warrant was stayed to enable 
an appeal to the House of Lords on the question of the proper interpretation and scope 
of the immunity of a former head of state from arrest and extradition proceedings in 
the UK with regard of acts committed while he was head of state. Amnesty 
International (Al) was granted leave to intervene in the proceedings. The appeal was 
allowed by a majority of three to two and the second warrant was restored. 
Subsequently, the applicant discovered that one of the Law Lords in the majority was 
a director and chairperson of Amnesty International Charity Ltd, which had been 
incorporated to carry out Al's charitable purposes and petitioned the House to set 
aside the order to appeal. The House of Lords decides: "The principle that a judge 
100 
- Ex pv Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577- 599 
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was automatically disqualified from hearing a matter in his own cause was not 
restricted to cases in which he had a pecuniary interest in the outcome, but also 
applied to cases where the judge's decision would lead to the promotion of a cause in 
which the judge was involved together with one of the parties. That did not mean that 
judges could not sit on cases concerning charities in whose work they were involved, 
and judges would normally be concerned to recuse themselves or disclose the position 
to the parties only where they had an active role as trustee or director of a charity 
which was closely allied to and acting with a party to the litigation. " 
The third case is Locabail Ltd v Bayfield Properties10' in which the Court of Appeal 
considered five applications concerning disqualification of judges on ground of bias. 
The Court ruled that: "... (3) A judge must recuse himself from a case before any 
objection is made if the circumstances give rise to automatic disqualification or he 
Fils personally embarrassed in hearing the case. If, in any other case, the judge 
becomes aware of any matter which can arguably be said to give rise to a real danger 
of bias, it is generally desirable that disclosure should be made to the parties in 
advance of the hearing. Where objection is then made, it will be as wrong for the 
judge to yield to a tenuous or frivolous objection, as it will be to ignore an objection 
of substance. However, if there is real ground for doubt, that doubt must be resolved 
in favour of recusal. (4) In considering whether there is a real danger of bias on the 
part of a judge, everything depends on the facts, which may include the nature of the 
issue to be decided. However, a judge's religion, ethnic or national origin, gender, 
age, class, means or sexual orientation cannot form a sound basis of an objection. 
Nor, ordinarily, can an object be soundly based on the judge's social, educational, 
service or employment background or that of his family; his previous political 
associations; his membership of social, sporting or chartable bodies; his Masonic 
associations; his previous judicial decisions; his extra-curricular utterances; his 
previous receipt of instructions to act for or against any party, solicitor or advocate 
engaged in a case before him ; or his membership of the same Inn, circuit, local Law 
Society or chambers . 
(5) In contrast, a real danger of bias may well be thought to 
arise if there is personal friendship or animosity between the judge and any member 
of the public involved in the case, if the judge is closely acquainted with any members 
of the public involved in the case, particularly if that person's credibility may be 
101 
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significant in the outcome of the case; if, in a case where the judge has to determine 
an individual's credibility, he has rejected that person's evidence in a previous case 
in terms so outspoken that they throw doubt on his ability to approach that person's 
evidence with an open mind on a later occasion; if the judge expressed views, 
particularly in the course of the hearing , on any question at issue in such extreme and 
unbalanced terms that they cast doubt on his ability to try the issue with an objective 
judicial mind; or if , 
for any other reason there is real ground for doubting the 
judge's ability to ignore extraneous considerations; prejudices and predilection ; and 
his ability to bring an objective judgment to bear on the issues. However, no 
sustainable objection can arise merely because, in the same case or previous case. 
The judge has commented adversely on a party or witness, or found their evidence to 
be unreliable. Furthermore, other things being equal, the objection will become 
progressively weaker with the passage of time between the event which allegedly 
gives rise to a danger of bias and the case in which the objection is made. (6) Where, 
following appropriate disclosure by the judge, a party raises no objection to the judge 
hearing or continuing to hear a case, that party cannot subsequently complain that 
the matter disclosed gives rise to a real danger of bias. The level of disclosure 
appropriate depends in large measure on the stage that that matter has reached. Thus 
if, before a hearing has begun, the judge is alerted to some matter which, depending 
on the full facts, may throw doubt on his fitness to sit, he should inquire into the full 
facts, so far as they are ascertainable, in order to make disclosure in light of those 
facts. In contrast, where a judge has embarked on a hearing in ignorance of matter 
which emerges during the hearing, it is sufficient for the judge to disclose what he 
then knows. If he does make further inquiry and learns additional facts, he must also 
disclose those facts. However, it is generally undesirable to abort hearings unless that 
is required by the reality or the appearance of justice. " 
The Court of Appeal in a different case102 held that: "Giving effect to article 6 of the 
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and taking 
into account the approach of the European Court of Human Rights in accordance 
with Human Rights Act 1998, the court had first to ascertain all the circumstances 
which had a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased and then ask 
whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to 
102 
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conclude that there was a real possibility, or a real danger, the two being the same, 
that the judge was biased; that the material circumstances included any explanation 
given by the impugned judges as to his knowledge or appreciation of those 
circumstances and where any such explanation was disputed the reviewing court did 
not have to rule whether the explanation should be accepted or rejected but rather 
had to decide whether the fair-minded observer would consider that there was a real 
danger of bias notwithstanding the explanation advanced; that instead of determining 
whether the R's (a member of the court) statement was truthful the court should have 
considered what impression her conduct, including her explanation for it, would have 
had on a fair-minded observer. " 
In a response to the two judgments mentioned above by the Court of Appeal, the 
House of Lords determined in Porter v Magill103 to amend its previous decision in Rv 
Gough104 regarding the test by which the judge impartiality is assessed. In its words 
the House held: "In determining whether there had been apparent bias on the part of 
the tribunal, the court should no longer simply ask itself whether, having regard to all 
relevant circumstances, there was a real danger of bias. Rather, the test was whether 
the relevant circumstances, as ascertained by the court, would lead to a fair- minded 
and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal 
had been biased. " 
Moving now to the question of the impartiality of judges in Saudi Arabia, the Law of 
Procedure before Shari'ah Courts devotes part eight to recusal and disqualification of 
judges. In particular circumstances the judge is prohibited from hearing the case and 
thus he must disqualify himself automatically, whereas in other circumstances the 
disqualification of a judge is not an automatic but rather will depend on all facts 
before the court concerned. In the following I will deal with these two issues 
respectively. 
Pursuant to article 90 of the Law of Procedure before Shari'ah Courts, a judge shall 
be prohibited from considering and hearing a case, even if no litigant makes such a 
request, in the following circumstances: 
A- If he is the spouse, relative, or in-law up to the fourth degree of a 
litigant. 
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B- If he, or his wife, has an existing dispute with a litigant in the case or 
with the latter's wife. 
C- If he is an attorney-in-fact, guardian, trustee, or presumptive heir of a 
litigant or if he is the spouse of a litigant or if he is a relative or an in- 
law up to the fourth degree of such guardian or trustee. 
D- If he, his wife, a relative, or an in-law in the ancestral line, or a person 
for whom he is trustee or guardian, has an interest in the existing case. 
E- If he had issued a fatwa (religious legal opinion), litigated for one of 
the litigants in the case, or written about it, even if it were before he 
joined the judiciary, or if he had earlier considered the case in the 
capacity of judge, expert, or arbitrator, or had been a witness in the 
case or had engaged in any investigative action therein. 
Therefore, an action or decision taken by a judge in any of the foregoing 
circumstances is null and void even if it was with the agreement of the litigants. This 
is perhaps because impartiality is a structural matter of general public interest. 
Moreover, if such nullification occurs with respect to a judgment upheld by the 
Appellate Court, a litigant may request the said court to nullify the decision and 
assign another judge to reconsider the appeal105. In addition, consistent with Shari'ah 
principles in which a judge is not allowed to adjudge his case, a judge shall be 
precluded from trying the case if the crime has been committed against the judge 
himself outside the time of court hearings. 106 
It could be argued that designating certain circumstances in which the judge must 
automatically disqualify himself from hearing the case can ease the complexity that 
courts might engage with in order to determine the question of impartiality. Needless 
to say that, a court when considering the impartiality of a given judge faces a very 
difficult task. As Lord Goff in Rv Gough puts it: "there are difficulties about 
exploring the actual state of mind of a justice or juryman. In the case of both, such an 
inquiry has been thought to be undesirable; and, in the case of the juryman in 
particular, there has long been an inhibition against, so to speak, entering the jury 
room and finding out what any particular juryman actually thought at the time of 
decision. But there is also the sample fact that bias is such an insidious thing that, 
even though a person may in good faith believe that he was acting impartially, his 
105 
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mind may unconsciously be affected by bias. " Subsequently, he urged the House of 
Lords to examine the question of impartiality in the hope of being able to establish 
some readily understandable and easily applicable principles. English courts, for 
example, had struggled to find the appropriate test to determine the court's 
impartiality. Until 1993 there had been some divergence in the English authorities. 
Some had expressed the test in terms of a reasonable suspicion or apprehension of 
bias, whilst other had expressed the test in terms of a real danger or likelihood of bias. 
This diversity was permanently settled in England and Wales by the House of Lords' 
decision in Rv Gough 1993 in which the real danger test was favoured. 107 This test, 
nevertheless, has not commanded universal approval. Scotland, Austria, Canada, New 
Zealand and South Africa have adhered to the reasonable suspicion or reasonable 
apprehension test, which may be more closely in harmony with the European Court of 
Human Rights' approach. 108 Therefore, in the light of the above and for the sake of 
the consistency with jurisprudence of the European Court, the Court of Appeal109 took 
the opportunity to call for reconsidering the appropriate test when determining the 
court's impartiality. Finally, the House of Lords in Porter v Magill decided to shift the 
test from the real danger test into whether the relevant circumstances, as ascertained 
by the court, would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there 
was a real possibility that the tribunal had been biased. In addition, even though 
English courts have recently chosen the test that is more consistent with European 
Court' approach; the future application of this test may raise practical difficulties. In 
fact, the distinction between tests discussed by the English courts; real danger test, 
and an outsider observer test is not certainly established. This led Lord Hope in Porter 
v Magill"() to say that: "Although the tests ... were 
described differently, their 
application was likely in practice to lead to results that were so similar as to be 
indistinguishable... The Court of Appeal, having examined the question whether the 
real danger test might lead to a different result from that which the informed observer 
would reach on the same facts, concluded ... that 
in the overwhelming majority of 
cases the application of the two tests would lead to the same outcome. " 
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Now we will turn to the second issue here that is those circumstances that make the 
disqualification of a judge optional. According to article 92 of the Law of Procedure 
before Shari'ah Courts a judge may be disqualified for any of the following reasons: 
A- If either he or his wife is pursuing a suit similar to the case before him. 
B- If he, or his wife, enters a dispute with a litigant or his wife after the lawsuit 
was filed and pending with this judge, unless the said lawsuit was filed with 
the intention of disqualifying him from considering the case before him. 
C- If his divorced wife with whom he has a child or one of his relatives or in- 
laws up to the fourth degree has a dispute before the judiciary with a litigant 
in the case, or with his wife, unless the case was brought with the intention of 
disqualifying him. 
D- If a litigant is his servant or the judge had habitually dined or lived with him, 
or if he had received a gift from him shortly before the lawsuit was filed or 
thereafter. 
E- If enmity or friendship exists between him and a litigant such that it is likely 
he would not be able to judge impartially. 
Obviously, this article leaves such discretion to the judge himself, which means that 
the judge must reach a decision in accordance with his character. If he knows that in 
such circumstances he will lose the required impartiality he should withdraw. Some 
judges will feel confident with respect to their impartiality even if one of the above 
circumstances is involved in the case. Nevertheless, and more importantly, if there is 
cause for a judge to recuse himself and he fails to do so, a litigant may request his 
disqualification. If the reason for disqualification is not one of the above 
circumstances, a request for disqualification must be made before any defence or plea 
is presented in the case; otherwise such a right is forfeited. However, such a request 
may be made if the reasons for it occur afterwards or if the petitioner proves that he 
had no knowledge of them. ' 11 
Clearly, from a legal point of view the difference between the two circumstances 
mentioned above is that the first circumstances are considered as a structural matter of 
general public interest. Hence, the law must be applied and is not subject to any 
waiver. Even the litigants concerned have no power to agree that the judge may 
handle their case. However, the second set of circumstances is considered only as a 
111- Article 94 of the Law of Procedure Before Shari'ah Courts 
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litigant or a private right. Therefore, if the interested party fails to request the 
disqualification of a judge the court should proceed to adjudicate the case. 
Although such approach does not raise any contradiction with the European standards 
of human rights, it might be said that requiring a judge to disclose to the parties any 
information that could raise questions in respect of his impartiality, is more consistent 
with European standards of human ri ghts. Furthermore, in order to bring the practice 
of the judicial system in Saudi Arabia to a closer harmony with that of the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Saudi courts when assessing the impartiality of a given 
judge in respect of the second set of circumstances could use the same tests that are 
applied by the ECHR. Namely, the subjective and objective tests. Alternatively, they 
could apply the test that is recently settled in the English jurisprudence i. e. whether 
the relevant circumstances, as ascertain by the court, would lead a fair-minded and 
informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal had 
been biased. ' 1' 
In respect of procedures required to disqualify judges, disqualification is effected by a 
declaration to the court administration, signed by the petitioner personally or by his 
attorney-in-fact under special power of attorney, to be attached to the declaration. A 
declaration for disqualification must include reasons and enclose whatever supporting 
papers are available. ' 13 In this situation the court administration must immediately 
show the declaration for disqualification to the judge, who must within the following 
four days of reviewing the declaration write to the Chief Judge of the court or the 
Chief Judge of the Provincial courts, as the case may be, about the facts and causes of 
disqualification. If he does not write within the prescribed time, or if he writes in 
support of the reasons for disqualification, or if he writes a denial but proof is 
established, the Chief Judge of the court or the Chief Judge of the provincial courts 
must declare him disqualified from considering the case 114 
Another aspect of protecting the appearance of the court's impartiality is that no 
judge, public prosecutor, or court employee may be the attorney-in-fact for a litigant 
in a case, even if filed with a court other than their own. They are allowed to do so, 
however, on behalf of their spouses, other generations of their family, and persons 
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legally under their guardianship' 15 Even though an exclusion of those persons from 
the rule of the article might appear at prima facie to be a strange rule, the reason for 
this exclusion is that as we have seen before, the judge is not allowed to adjudge their 
cases. There is thus no fear of the judge losing his impartiality simply because he will 
not be allowed to be a judge in their cases. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the Saudi law applies a higher standard in respect of the 
court's impartiality than that required by the European human rights law. This is 
evident by the following comparisons. Jurisprudence of both the European Court of 
Human Rights and English courts allows a judge to hold other careers simultaneously. 
For example besides being a judge he can be at the same time a lawyer 116, a member 
of the education committee, a governor of schools, 117 or director of international 
organization. "8 A judge according to the European jurisprudence is disqualified from 
hearing a given case only if he plays an active role in respect of the case at hand. 
This altogether differs than the case in Saudi Arabia in which a judge cannot have 
another career or job or be involved in commercial activity. Article 58 of the Law of 
the Judiciary provides: "A person may not hold the position of a judge and 
simultaneously engage in commerce or in any position or work which is not consistent 
with the independence and dignity of the judiciary. The Supreme Judicial Council 
may enjoin a judge from engaging in any work which, in its opinion, conflicts with the 
duties of the position and the proper performance of such duties. " Therefore and may 
be more interestingly, if the judge has another job or engage in commerce, he is then 
not only disqualified from hearing a particular case, but he will cease to be a qualified 
judge at all. The rationale of this idea in the Saudi law is that there is a conflict of 
interest between the functions of the judge on the one hand, and the functions of a 
lawyer, for example, on the other hand. According to Islamic law the judge must not 
engage in social activities especially with those who have an interest in the judiciary. 
In addition, English courts accepted the standards that where the case was concerned 
with bias on the part of the justice' clerk, the court should go on to consider whether it 
should infer that there was a real danger that the clerk's bias infected the views of the 
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justices adversely to the applicant-119 In contrast, article 8 of the Law of Procedure 
before Shari'ah Courts provides: "Process servers, clerks, and such other judicial 
assistants may not perform any work that lies within the scope of their jobs in cases 
involving them or their spouses, relatives, and in-laws up to the fourth degree and any 
such work shall be null and void. " 
Another area of comparison, is that according to the law of Saudi Arabia the judge is 
automatically disqualified from hearing a case, and if he does, his judgment is void 
and null if he, his wife, a relative, or an in-law in the ancestral line, or a person for 
whom he is trustee or guardian, has an interest in the existing case or if he had issued 
a fatwa (religious legal opinion), litigated for one of the litigants in the case, or 
written about it, even if it were before he joined the judiciary, or if he had earlier 
considered the case in the capacity of judge, expert, or arbitrator, or had been a 
witness in the case or had engaged in any investigative action therein. This standard is 
wider than that applied by the ECHR and the English law. 
The idea in the Saudi law is that it is very difficult to prove the actual bias of the 
judge especially since bias is such an insidious thing that even though a person may in 
a good faith believe that he was acting impartially, his mind may unconsciously be 
affected by bias. And applying general tests for determining the court's impartiality 
could lead to practical difficulties that could result in undesirable uncertainty when 
handling the issue of impartiality. More importantly, the appearance of the judge's 
impartiality cannot be safeguarded if the judge engages even slightly with, for 
instance, the accused investigation. There is an overriding public interest that there 
should be confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice. 
A final point that supports our conclusion is that, Islamic jurists have discussed in 
great details the impartiality of the judge. As a general rule, they restrict the judge 
from, for instance, accepting a gift, private invitation, or to host one of the case 
parties. The aim is to avoid any act that might cast doubt with regard to the judge 
impartiality. 
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Part III The Right to Public Hearing 
Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on human Rights declares: "In the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing... " 
Section One Islamic law 
Even though jurists did not explicitly stipulate that the right to public hearing is 
obligatory, the factual application of the judiciary throughout Islamic societies 
indicates that Islamic law requires the hearing to be held in public, 220. The right to an 
open court can be identified through the following six points: 
First: the Prophet and his companions after his death judged between litigants in the 
mosque. The mosque is a public place and most Muslims worship Allah in the 
mosque. No one is entitled to prevent a Muslim from visiting it at any time. 
Therefore, the public are permitted to hear any case until the final judgment is 
rendered. The majority of jurists are in agreement about using the mosque as a court 
to adjudicate cases because all Muslims have access to mosques and in their view a 
judiciary is a form of worship, thus the mosque is the best place for adjudications., 21 
They support their view by citing the following verses spoken by God: { And has the 
news of litigants reached you? When they climbed over the wall into (his) Mihrab (a 
praying place or a private room). When they entered in upon Dawud (David), he was 
terrified of them. They said: Fear not! (We are) two litigants, one of whom has 
wronged the other, therefore judge between us with truth, and treat us not with 
injustice, and guide us to the Right Way) . 
122 
Consequently, they argue that these verses indicate that the Prophet David judged 
between litigants in the mosque and accordingly, judiciary in the mosque is 
recommended. 
Second: there is no doubt that the chosen place of the judiciary is an important aspect 
in its power to affect the proceedings. Jurists have always recommended that 
judgment should be held in a spacious place. They also have recommended that the 
judge should sit in a high and accessible place. ' 23 Furthermore, judges throughout the 
Islamic state are familiar with such practice, as they have taken the most popular and 
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public places to adjudicate between people. Ali ibn Abee Taleb (the fourth ruler after 
the death of the prophet) for example, judged between litigants in the public 
market. ' 24 
Al Shafi'i (the founder of the Shafi'i School of thought) stated: "No ruling shall be 
valid unless in public". He also said: "I like the court to adjudicate in a distinctive 
place" 125 
The reason for recommending the hearing to be held in public and open places is in 
the view of Islamic jurists because judgment is more likely to be fair if it is held in a 
public place. 126 
Third: the majority of jurists argue that the judge is not allowed to use his home as a 
place of judiciary, because such practice might create doubt with regard to his 
judgment. It is told that Omer ibn Al Kattab (the second ruler after the death of the 
Prophet) prevented Sa'ad ibn Wakas and Abu Mosa Al Ash'aree from using their 
houses as places for judgments. '27 
If the judge uses his home as a place for judgments his house must be made accessible 
to everyone, because if he handles cases in camera he will be accused of favouring 
one of the litigants. 128 A man came to the ruler's (al ma'mon) house and complained 
against him before the judge Yah bin Aktham. The ruler said to the judge: "you judge 
between us. " The judge said he would not. The ruler asked why. The judge replied: 
"because your house has not been made a place for judgment. " The ruler said: `from 
now on it is a place for judiciary". The judge said: "I will call the public to make it a 
judiciary place. " The ruler said: "call them. " The judge opened the door and the 
caller started to call people to attend the hearing in the ruler's house. When people 
were attending, the judge started to judge between the ruler and his litigants. 
Fourth: considerable attention is given to the attendance of jurists at the hearing. The 
judge is recommended to call jurists to hear the case and to seek consultation with 
them in respect of the case before him. They supervise his treatment of the parties, 
his understanding of the case, and his application of Islamic rules. 129 
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It is told that Othman Ibn Afan (the third ruler after the death of the Prophet) did not 
hear cases before the attendance of Ali Ibn Bee Taleb, Talahah, Al Zobeer and other 
of the Prophet companions. He started by asking the litigants to address their claims 
and after that he consulted the companions about the case and then he rendered his 
verdict. 130 Jurist Al Kamal Ibn Al Homam states that "the judge must stay while 
handling the case with those who usually stay with him otherwise he will be accused 
of taking a bribe or he might be accused of being unjust in his verdict. " 131 Moreover, 
jurist ibn Farhoon explains that: "the judge must not adjudicate the case unless in the 
presence of scholars with whom he can consult". 132 Likewise, it is stated that: "the 
judge is recommended to seek the attendance and consultation of jurists". 133 
Fifth: some jurists argue that the judge should seek the attendance of just witnesses to 
hear the trial. 134 They state that the judge must not hear the case except in the 
presence of witnesses. In fact the object of this requirement is not to achieve open 
and public hearing, but rather to enable the witnesses to hear the trial, because through 
such attendance, the jurists' argument goes, it can be ensured that the judge will 
decide the case on the basis not of his' knowledge, but rather of the witnesses' 
testimony. However, this requirement in itself supports the right to public hearing, 
because frequent attendances on the part of just witnesses make them more 
experienced in judiciary matters. 
Sixth: according to the majority's view the judge is not permitted to bring a guard into 
court unless with good reason. The reason for preventing the judge from bringing in a 
guard is that the judge might by this means prevent anyone who has a complaint, or 
he might be not equal in his treatment of the litigants. 135 
To sum up, the hearing of trials in Islamic societies has always been held in public. 
The public is entitled to hear the proceedings in all its stages. The justification 
offered in this regard is that justice is more likely to be guaranteed if the case is heard 
in an open court. Yet, the right to an open court is not guaranteed if the interest of 
justice so requires. According to Islamic law the judge has the right to hear the case in 
camera. Jurists argue that the judge handles different kinds of cases, some of which 
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are of criminal, civil, commercial, and personal or family nature. Some of these cases 
are very personal and the interest of the parties requires them to be held in camera136. 
Therefore, it can be said that the attitude of Islamic law in respect of an open court, is 
similar to that of the European Court of Human Rights. Both require the court to be 
open, nevertheless, Islamic law differs in that it does not designate certain 
circumstances in which the hearing can be exceptionally held in a closed session, but 
rather it articulates the principle and leaves it to the judge concerned with a somewhat 
wide discretion to determine whether the case should be heard in public. On the 
contrary, the European Convention on Human Rights strictly limits the exceptions of 
the right to an open court to certain circumstances, as is pointed out later. 
Section Two Saudi Law 
Harris and others in their comments on the right to fair trial provided in the European 
Convention on Human Rights state that the aim of a public hearing in criminal cases 
is to (a) maintain public confidence in the administration of justice and to (b) protect 
the accused from the dangers of handling his case in camera. 137 Islamic scholars 
implicitly provide the same reasons for requiring the publicity of the hearing. As we 
have pointed out above most jurists argue that the judge should not be allowed to use 
his home as a place of judiciary, because there he will be concealed from people, 
which might cast doubts on his judgment. They also say that if the judge uses his 
home as a place for judgment, his house must be located in the centre of the city so 
that everyone may have access to it, and he must permit everyone to enter his house, 
because if he remains alone he will be accused of favouring or prejudicing one of the 
litigants. 138 Jurist Al Kamal Ibn Al Homam states: "the judge must stay while 
handling the case with those who usually stay with him otherwise he will be accused 
of taking a bribe or he might be accused of being unjust in his verdict". 139 
Accordingly, both Islamic jurists and western writers provide arguably the same 
reason for requiring the hearing to be held in public. However, the means over which 
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they dispose to achieve this goal may differ. Here we will focus on the Saudi Arabian 
experience as to the scope and application of the right to an open court. 
Like the European Convention on Human Rights which states in article 6 (1) that 
"Every one is entitled to a... public hearing. " the judicial system in Saudi Arabia 
emphasizes public hearing in the following articles. Article 33 of the Law of the 
Judiciary provides: "Court hearings shall be public. " Similarly, article 155 of the Law 
of Criminal Procedure states that: "Court hearings shall be public. " Likewise, article 
15 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances stipulates that: "... the 
session shall be public. " 
Exceptions to the principle 
However, since the interest of society as a whole or of individuals might be harmed 
by publicising the case, the law in both the Shari'ah courts and the Board of 
Grievances provides exceptional circumstances in which the right to an open court 
will be not applied. Article 33 of the Law of the Judiciary provides: "Court hearings 
shall be public unless the court decides that they be held in a closed session in 
deference to morals or the sanctity of the family, or for the maintenance of public 
order. In all cases, judgments shall be pronounced in a public hearing". Equally, 
article 155 of the Law of Criminal Procedure states: "Court hearings shall be public. 
The court may exceptionally consider the action or any part thereof in closed 
hearings, or may prohibit certain classes of people from attending those hearings for 
security reasons, or maintenance of public morality, if it is deemed necessary for 
determining the truth". Similarly, article 15 of the Rules of Pleadings before the 
Board of Grievances stipulates that: "... the sessions (shall) be held in camera in the 
interest of public morality and public order; in all cases the pronouncement of a 
judgment must be in open court". Clearly, the Law of the Board has not mentioned 
family reasons as an exception from a public hearing. The reason for this is that the 
Board is an administrative court; family matters are not under its jurisdiction. 
Consequently, the judicial system in Saudi Arabia restricts the exceptions of the 
principle of a public hearing to the following circumstances: (a) morality reasons, (b) 
the protection of Juveniles, or family (private) life, (c) security reasons, (d) and if it is 
deemed necessary for determining the truth. The European Convention is stipulated in 
a manner to limit these exceptions to three grounds. Namely; (1) morality reasons, (2) 
for the interest of juveniles or protection of private life (family life), (3) and to the 
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extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interest of justice. 
As to (a) and (b) of the Saudi law these are absolutely similar to (1) and (2) of the 
European Convention. With regard to (c) security reasons provided in the Saudi law, 
although it has no explicit counterpart in the European Convention, the European 
Court in Campbell and Fell v UK 140 found no violation of Article 6 (1) when prison 
disciplinary proceedings were held in secret for reasons of public order and security. 
In respect of (d) of the Saudi law i. e. if it is deemed necessary for determining the 
truth, and (3) of the European Convention that is, to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the 
interest of justice, they are provided to some extent in a broad terms to enable the 
judge concerned to avoid circumstances where prejudice of justice could occur as a 
result of the publicity. Thus, it could be argued that exceptional circumstances are 
provided equally in both systems. 
In addition, if the court in Saudi Arabia decides to hear the case in camera it is not 
obliged to prove reasons for such an exception because it is not a judicial judgment. 
Moreover, the court may decide to hear the whole case in closed hearings, or may 
confine the closed hearing to a particular session. Yet these exceptions should not 
mean that the litigant may present evidence secretly. On the contrary, all arguments 
l and evidence must be recorded in the session minutes4l 
However, in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights the notion of a 
public hearing has a slightly different meaning than its counterpart in Saudi Arabia. 
In the European context it means that the public and the press must be allowed to hear 
the trial. 142 These aspects should therefore be examined in the law of Saudi Arabia. 
Namely, the right of the press to attend and publish details of the proceedings, and the 
public right to attend the hearing. 
First, in respect of the right of the press to attend the trial and publish whatever they 
deem suitable, this right raises a clear difference between the judicial system in Saudi 
Arabia and the European Convention, and maybe also most western countries. The 
European court regards the press as an important means to build public confidence in 
140 
- (1984) 2 E. H. R. R. 165 141 
- Abdullmon'em Jeerah (1988) p. 122 142 
- Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: ".... The press and public 
may be excluded from all or part of the trial... " 
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respect of justice. It is argued that the press allows citizens to scrutinize the function 
of the court. The European Court held that: "The courts could not operate in a 
vacuum: while they were the forum for settling disputes, this did not mean that there 
could be no prior discussion of disputes elsewhere. It was incumbent on the mass 
media to impair information and ideas concerning matters that come before the 
courts just as in other areas of public interest. "' 43 In contrast to this view, many 
Islamic writers argue that press involvement cannot in any circumstances enhance 
public confidence in the judicial system because those who present the media are not 
specialists in Islamic or codified law. Moreover and more significantly, providing the 
media with the right to engage in cases, and particularly criminal cases, will promote 
sinning and evil; and Islamic societies are obliged not to promote sinning. The idea of 
broadcasting procedures of inquiry and trial through the media, therefore, is not in 
line with some Islamic principles, hence it is undesirable. For the sake of clarity these 
principles should be illustrated and explained. 
First: Islamic law aims to form the idea of righteous work that displays no evil and 
makes good deeds very clear. Article 17 (a) of the Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam declares that: "Every person has the right to live in a clean 
environment free of mischief and moral vices in such a manner that will enable him to 
develop himself morally. The state and the community are responsible for providing 
this right. " Therefore, the Shari'ah commands the doing of good deeds and forbids 
evil. Muhammad Abu Zahra comments on this concept saying that, to make sure that 
the public opinion is clean and pure and that things harmful to eyes as well as 
embarrassing sins are not shown, Islam forbids the declaration of crimes. Islam 
considers the declared crime as two crimes; the crime of the deed and the crime of 
declaring it. Therefore the Prophet said "Oh people, any one who committed any one 
of these dirts and concealed himself he will be concealed by God, and he who 
declares his sin will be punished ". He also said: "The furthest people from God are 
those who are open ". He was asked who are those? He said: "those who do 
something by night, covered by God, but when awake say I did so and so and unveil 
what God has covered ". 
Abu Zahra continues to argue that concealing crimes can make the sin hide and not 
appear. This may be a reason to purify the sinner's heart and civility of soul. Fear of 
143 
- The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom [ 1979] 2 E. H. R. R. 245 
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declaration weakens the tendency to be evil. In the end this may lead to the sinner's 
repenting. In contrast, declaration reduces purity and civility of heart and may lead to 
absolute violation and loss of morality. Those who declare their crime eagerly ask for 
this. God counts these people as spreaders of bad deeds. " 
Abdul Salam Alshareef makes similar comments on the Prophet's encouragement of 
Ma'az to withdraw his confession of adultery. This indicates affection and mercy for 
the criminal, leaving it a matter between him and God to repent and ask pardon for his 
sins. The Prophet hated the spreading of news about crime: he did not want believers 
to hear it or society to talk about it. 145 Newscasts which broadcast news about crimes 
unveil the hidden. The exaggeration of this news may provoke young people to 
commit crimes, but Islam's way is to fight crimes by righteous public opinion. 
Anyone who looks deep into the verses of the Holy Qur'an and the Prophet's sayings 
on the subject of crime finds that they treat the social situation effectively and look at 
society as a single unit. They do not distinguish one section of society at the expense 
of another. They try to promote good deeds in society through social and personal 
conviction, and to use various means by which to avoid crimes, including inner 
processes of reason and Filing etc. '46 
Along the same lines, Abdel Fattah Kuder says: "In most cases the spreading of crime 
news in newspapers as soon as the crime occurs serves the particular agenda of the 
media, causing excitement and distracting from the reality. All this affects the purity 
and cleanness of society and its life and security. Therefore it is good for Islamic 
society not to announce crimes as soon as they are committed, but to wait until the 
authorities catch the criminal and control the evidence and pronounce fair 
judgment. " 147 
Liberalism in western contexts holds the view that freedom of press, openness, and 
public discussion of public affairs including judiciary, leads to good and informed 
citizens. 148 Truth, according to their view, is only discoverable by subjecting opinions 
144 - Abu Zahra, M (1988 ) p. 27&28 145 
- Alshareef, A (1988) "Al Mabad' Al Shar'aeeh Fi Ahkam Al Uqubat Fi Al Fiqh Al Islatni" p. 
322 
146 
- Dofeer, S (2000) Part I p. 57. 147 
- Kuder, A (1982) "Al Nedam Al Gena'ee" Part 1 the Institution of Public Administration p. 
53 & 54 
148 
- John Stuart Mill "Liberty of the Press" [182-? ] Reprinted from the 
Supplement of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. Special Collection of Robinson Library at the University of Newcastle upon 
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to free examination and discussion by those who are in favour of or against them. 
John Stuart Mill wrote the most significant and most influential statement of the 
irreducible value of human individuality "On Liberty" which was first published in 
1859. In this work he wrote that: "There is a class of persons... who think it enough if 
a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge 
whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it 
against the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get their creeds 
taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its 
being allowed to be questioned. Where the influence prevails, they make it nearly 
impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it 
may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is 
seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt 
to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument. Waiving, however, this 
possibility- assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a 
prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against argument- this is not the way in 
which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, 
thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which 
enunciate a truth. " 149 
Regardless of the fact that this may appear to be in a sharp contrast with Islamic law's 
point of view, it must be clear that openness, free discussion, and the right of all 
citizens in a Muslim society to be informed and participate in public affairs, thought 
not put in actual practice in most Islamic countries, do not contradict Islamic law. The 
principle mentioned above in Islamic law regarding the declaration of criminal cases 
is the only exception which must not be interpreted widely. 
Second: Islamic law calls for cover for criminals according to good public criteria. 150 
Covering here means not to notify of crimes. If somebody knows that a person has 
committed a crime that does not threaten the rights of others, such as drinking alcohol, 
then in this case this person is recommended not to inform the authority concerned 
Tyne. See also A. T. H. Smith "The Press, The Courts, and The Constitution". Current Legal Problems 
(1999) Vol. 52, p126 
149 
- John Stuart Mill "On Liberty and Other Writings" Edited by Stefan Collini Cambridge University 
Press 1991. p 37 
150 
- J. N. D. Anderson "Muslim Procedure and Evidence". Journal of African Administration. Vol. 1 
No. 3 July 1949. 
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about the crime and the person who did it. It is always preferred if that person try to 
advise the criminal kindly to give up such habit. In addition, rulers of Islamic states 
have the right to forgive accused persons if they believe that there is benefit in this, 
especially if the criminal has no previous criminal record. Applying the concept of 
Veil or cover, the judge may also see that in some cases forgiveness may be better. 
The wisdom of this concept is that any person may err. The law wants to give the 
erring individual a chance, since the crime is not made known and this "covering" 
may help the criminal to repent. 
This principle has applications in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A circular from the 
Ministry of Interior on veiling or covering suggests that such simple cases as 
pestering (importuning) women and others be veiled. 151 Moreover, Article 54 of the 
draft of the by-law of the Investigation and Public Prosecution Bureau provides: "it is 
allowed, upon approval from the Committee of the Administration Bureau, to refrain 
from enquiring in Ta'azir (chastisement) crimes where the following applies, even 
when the crime is confirmed: 
a) If the damage or the danger of the matter is not significant. 
b) If the follow-up to the crime may cause scandal that exceeds the benefit of 
punishment and greater damage than the damage of the crime itself. 
c) If the trial is going to increase the risk of danger and aggression and 
antagonism in such a way that new crimes may be committed. 
d) If the governing body believes that there is nothing to be gained in pursuing 
one of its criminals. 
e) If the crime is a result of negligence or carelessness of parents or children and 
no one except family members were harmed. 
f) If the aggrieved withdraw his/her case. 
g) In cases of private financial crimes when the criminal makes recompense for 
his crime as soon as this has been asked for. 
151 
- Circulation No. 16/C/ 39 dated on 14/ 1/ 1415 H 
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h) If the consequences of arresting and investigation are thought to be some sort 
of satisfactory punishment. 
i) If there is fear that youth may mix with criminals in the prison or detention 
centres ". 
In these circumstances members of the Investigation and Public Prosecution Bureau 
can rule out some cases on the principle of Veil or cover. However, the application of 
the Veil concept should in general follow the following criteria: I- The crime should 
not be major. 2- The criminal should not commit his crime publicly. 3- The crime 
should not concern a private right. 4- The criminal should not be famous for his 
crime or the habit of this crime. 152 
Third: some Muslim authors argue that publicising crimes and the names of criminals 
during the period of investigation and trial and before the final ruling, is a violation 
according to the principle of the presumption that the accused is innocent until proved 
otherwise, as stated in Islamic law. It is argued that the presumption of innocence in 
Islamic law will be violated if the media publicises any criminal case under the 
court's jurisdiction 153. The view is justified by the claim that prejudice will no doubt 
attach to the accused, and his reputation will be harmed, should his name be published 
during the criminal proceedings as a suspected person. Such damage is not limited to 
the accused himself but also to his family. This damage, the argument goes, will not 
be resolved by a judicial decision reflecting his innocence. My personal observations 
with regard to publicising the details of cases support this view. If we take the case of 
the murdered Cambridgeshire schoolgirls Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman as an 
example, it was clear that when reporting the case the media suggested, albeit not 
explicitly, that the accuseds were in fact guilty. When one of the accuseds (Maxine 
Carr) was taken to the court, the media had already convinced people that she was a 
criminal. Spectators threw different items at her and assaulted her verbally. Yet the 
presumption of innocence should have entailed that until a final judicial decision is 
rendered, she be presumed innocent. After the outcry against her it is hard to claim 
152 
- Al Qamdee, A "A! Setter Fi A! Qada'ee 
At Jina'i" 11th issue, Third Year. 1422 H. Al Adl Journal. 
Ministry of Justice; Saudi Arabia; P. 68- 96 
153 
- Omer, 0 (1988) p. 235& 236 
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that society deemed her innocent. Moreover, it casts doubt on whether her right to be 
presumed innocent until a final judgment proves her guilty is being protected. 
Fourth: Muhammad Elhalaby criticizes the publicising of trial procedures by the 
media in these terms: "Permission to publicise sessions of the courts of justice in 
radio and TV, and reporting all events makes them some sort of entertainment rather 
than a pursuit of the truth. This affects the gravity of the court and diminishes the 
status of judges in people's minds. This contradicts the purpose of publicity, which is 
to guarantee the people's rights and respect their freedom. Therefore I think that 
publicising court sessions on radio and TV, contradicts the aims of publicity. " 54 
Now we will deal with the second aspect of the right to an open court, that is, the 
citizens' right to attend sessions of the hearing. Obviously the Saudi judicial system 
requires the court to be open which means that as a general rule any person is 
permitted to attend any case. This means the right is not confined to a certain class of 
people, whether citizens, foreigners, laymen, specialists or scholars, relatives or non- 
relatives. In practice however it does not seem that people of any of the above classes 
desire attendance at the hearings. Scholars for instance, who have a longstanding 
tradition in Islamic societies to hear cases, have recently been less willing to do so 
because it is impossible for them to attend an increasingly high number of cases. Not 
only that, but also the accused or even the litigant in a civil case prefers the case to be 
held in camera. The word "reputation" in Islamic societies and in particularly in Saudi 
society has acquired an autonomous meaning. If a person is accused before the court, 
such accusation whether confirmed by a conviction or not will have a direct social 
effect not only on the accused himself or his immediate family, but also on relatives 
who share the same family name. This may be the reason that makes judges careless 
with regard to the application of the right to an open court. 
Strangely, if the judge decides to hold the case in a secret session the accused can 
only challenge such decision before the judgment is concluded. Research into the 
judicial system in Saudi Arabia reveals hardly a single appeal against a judgment on 
the ground that the case was decided in camera. This may be because: (1) Islamic 
law, although recommending the open court as we have seen above 15S, does not entail 
the annulment of the judgment if it is decided in camera. (2) Although the law in 
54 
- Elhalaby, M (1996) "Al Wassatt Fi Sharh Qanoon Usul Al Muhakmat Al Jaza'eeh" Part 3 p. 14 X55 
_ See our discussion in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Saudi Arabia stipulates in an unequivocal manner that all cases as a common rule will 
be handled in public, it does not provide a remedy if the judge violates this right. (3) 
Neither the law in Saudi Arabia nor actual practice requires the judge to mention 
whether a case is held in public or in camera. 
Since as we have mentioned above, scholars in recent times have been unable to 
attend trials, and since the history of Islamic societies indicates that Islamic 
jurisprudence requires the hearing to be held in public, the law in Saudi Arabia needs 
reform with regard to the right to public hearing in order to be consistent with the 
ECHR's approach, which regard the right at hand as a fundamental one that should be 
effectively safeguarded. 
Although the right to have an open court is clearly stipulated in many articles as we 
have pointed out above, these articles fail to provide a remedy in case of the violation 
of this right. The law should decide what remedy might be applied whenever such 
right is infringed. Moreover, the law should oblige the judge to state clearly whether 
the hearing is to be held in public or in a secret session, and to provide reasons in the 
latter instance. My justification for this suggestion is that holding the hearing publicly 
is an important matter. First: it provides a guarantee in respect of the accused's 
defence rights, because it means that the accused will not be denied these. Second: it 
builds public confidence in the administration of justice. Third: it protects the 
accused from the dangers of holding his case in camera. '56 This danger was described 
by Shoket Al Tonee when he mentioned prejudices that had occurred in Egypt during 
the revolution era in 1952. He writes: "since the revolution in 1952 the principle of 
public hearing had no longer applied. This was an indication of the fact that those 
who were in power knew that they misled the public deliberately and they did not 
want people to know this scandal. They only announced the accusation and people 
were deprived of their right to supervise trials.... Our fear in this era was due to the 
fact that they would accuse the Egyptians of spying or having committed the crime of 
high treason. The accusation would be made public but the trial would be held in 
secret sessions until the sentence was rendered. Those who were accused of such 
crimes called for a public hearing to protect themselves by publicity. However, those 
who were in charge of public affairs had a magic wand to achieve their goals. That is 
156 
-Harris (1995) p. 218 
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to say the claim that the case contained secret information and hence the interest of 
the state required it to be decided in camera". 157 
However, the right to an open court in Saudi Arabia is only confined to the court of 
first instance. Article 199 of the Law of Criminal Procedure states: "The Appellate 
Court shall dispose of the subject matter of the appeal on the basis of the evidence 
included in the file of the case. Litigants shall not appear before the court, unless it 
decides otherwise". Aljofan criticizes the status when he writes: "This exception 
contradicts the fundamental principles of the judiciary procedures, and breaches the 
principle of fairness and the principle of justice in judiciary to which the public 
hearing was decided. The text provided requires that the hearing will be held in a 
secret session even for litigants in the case.... It would have been better for the 
legislator not to exempt the Appellate Court from the principle of publicity when he 
declared public hearing to be the general rule because the same justification for its 
existence in the court for f rst instance exists in the Court of Appeal. Not only that but 
also the benefit from establishing this principle cannot be fully achieved unless the 
sane principle is applied in the appellate court. This is because most cases are 
subject to appeal, and most condemned persons desire their cases to be reconsidered 
before the court of appeal. "158 
Finally, the pronouncement of judgments must always be rendered in a public 
manner even if the case itself is tried in a secret session. The above-mentioned 
articles have explicitly declared this rule. 
Part IV: The Right to A Reasoned Judgment 
The right to a reasoned judgment is not explicitly provided for in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. However, it emerges from the notion of fair trial as has 
been explained in chapter two of this thesis. 
Section One Islamic law 
Two aspects of reasoned judgment may be distinguished: (i) legal reasons; and (ii) 
factual reasons 159. The former aspect denotes illustration of Shari'ah ruling with its 
cited evidence from the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and jurists' statements with regard to the 
157 
-Quoted in Ahmad Shalabee (1989). AL Teshrea Wa Qada'a Fi Al Faker Al Island. p. 261 158 
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facts concerned. When the judge renders his judgment he shall explain to the 
condemned person the rule of the Islamic law and the cited evidence in respect of the 
fact. 160 The aspect of factual reasoning indicates the explanation of fact that is 
considered to provide the grounds for the judgment and the methods of proof. Jurists 
argue that the judge should reveal to the condemned person the claims adduced by 
him and his litigant; what facts are proved before him; their impact on the judgment; 
and whether they are proved by testimony, confession or other means of evidence. 161 
In the view of the jurists the legality of reasoned judgment is based on the following: 
In the Qur'an, God provides reasons for his rulings. For instance God said: (What 
Allah gave you as booty to His Messenger (Muhammad) from the people of the 
townships it is for Allah, His Messenger (Muhammad) the kindred (of Messenger 
Muhammad), the orphans, the poor and the wayfarer, in order that it may not become 
a fortune used by the rich among you. } 162 It is clear from this verse that God reveals 
the principle of reasoned rulings and its interest. The last sentence of the verse "in 
order that it may not become a fortune used by the rich among you" clearly states the 
reasons for legislating the rules. 
Judge Ibn Koneen argues that if the Qur'an successfully justifies its rulings to those 
who apply them, judges' application of such approach is fortiori. They are required to 
provide cited evidence for their judgments and to explain how the facts have been 
proved. 163 
There is no disagreement among jurists with regard to the legality of reasoned 
judgment. However, they differ in respect of the legal ruling vis-ä-vis reasoned 
judgment: in other words whether it is obligatory or recommended. 
(a) Some say that a reasoned judgment is obligatory, thus the judge must reveal his 
reasoning in all cases whether criminal or civil '64. (b) Other jurists argue that a 
reasoned judgment is recommended but not obligatory. 165 
160 
- Yusuf bin Abdullah Al Kortbee (1398 H). Al Kafee Fi Figh Ahl Al Madianh. Part 2 P. 958 161 - Shams Al Deen Al Sarkasee (1416 H). Al Mabsut. part 16 p. 108 162 
- Surah 59 Al Hashr Verse No. 7 163 
- Abdullah Al Koneen (1420 AH) "Tassbeeb Al Ahkam at Qad'ah Fi Al Shari'ah Al IslamP' p. 28. 
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The importance of reasoned judgment in Islamic law is that: (1) rendering judgment 
without reasons could lead to suspicion that the judge has judged the case in 
accordance with his whim or ignorance, without proof or cited evidence from the 
Qur'an or the Sunnah. (2) The requirement of reasoned judgment encourages the 
judge to make efforts to establish the legal and factual ruling for his judgment. (3) It 
reassures the condemned person and it also enables the condemned person to appeal 
against the judgment if he is not satisfied. (4) It makes the interpretation of the 
judgment easier and clarifies the authority of the judgment . 
166 
As to the consequence of the judge's failure to provide reasons for his judgment, there 
are three opinions. (a) Some claim that such judgment must be reversed whether the 
lack of reasons concerns legal or factual matters and whether the judge is Mujtahid or 
non- Mujtahid. 167 (b) Other jurists differ between the Mujtahid and non-Mujtahid 
judge. They say that if the judge is a Mujtahid his judgment must be reversed if 
factual reasons are absent. If the judge is not Mujtahid his judgment must be reversed 
if he does not reveal the evidence that is considered as the ground for the judgment. 
But if he later provides reasons for his judgment when asked, his judgment should not 
be reversed. However, they state that reversal of judgment is not called for where 
legal reasons are absent168. (c) The judgment must be reversed if the judge does not 
mention the witnesses' names, if the judge is not commonly known as a just judge169 
Moreover, if the court of the first instance fails to provide reasons for judgment, 
pursuant to the view of the jurists the court of appeal has the right to provide the 
reason for the judgment and hence the judgment will not be cancelled . 
170 If there are 
no legal reasons for the judgment but it is correct with regard to its result, the court of 
appeal can provide the reason for the judgment and accept it. It also has the right, 
where reasons are inadequate, to make up the inadequacy and permit the decision. 
Judge Ibn Koneen states that this rule is also applicable in the case of inadequate 
factual reasons. If the judgment is subject to reversal as a consequence of lack of 
166 
- Muhammad Al Buker (1408 AH) "Al Soltah Al Qud'ah Wa Shakseet Al Qadee Fi Al 
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reasons the judgment can be reasoned and permitted provided that the outcome of the 
judgment is correct. 171 
In addition there is the question of whether, if the appellate court decides to reverse 
the judgment of the court of first instance, it is under obligation to provide reasons for 
its reversal or not. Jurists disagree about the issue. (1) The Al Hanafi School states 
that the judge is not obliged to state his reason if he reverses a judgment rendered by 
another person, because the decision of the reversal judge must be assumed correct''`. 
(2) The Al Maliki School argues that the reversal judge must provide reasons for his 
decision. The judge who reversed the judgment must reveal the reason for his 
decision: whether for example because it contradicts Islamic law or because the facts 
have not been exclusively proved. If he reverses the judgment without stating the 
reason for such reversal and if he refuses to give reasons, his decision will be void. 173 
(3) The Al Shafi'i and Al Hanbali schools state that the judge should provide reasons 
if he reverses the decision of another judge. If he does not reason his judgment and if 
he refuses to do so his reversal will not be accepted. 174 
Section Two Saudi law 
Before examining the accused's right to a reasoned judgment it is important to 
remember that the European Court of Human Rights is of the opinion that the national 
courts have the ultimate discretion to organize the content and form of the judicial 
judgment. However, they must state precisely the grounds for their judgment to enable 
the accused to establish his appeal according to the reasons given. ' 75 A court is 
obliged to provide a detailed answer only to fundamental questions. 176 
In Saudi Arabia similarly the aim of requiring the judgment to be reasoned is to 
enable parties to scrutinize the outcome of the judgment, and to enable them to 
contest the judgment before the court of appeal. Moreover, it enables the court of 
appeal to exercise its function when considering the appeal'. " 
171 - Al Koneen (1420 AH) p. 116,117&118 172 - Al-Koneen (1420H). p 130 173 
- Abraheem Bin Ali Al Malekee (1986). TabsertAl Hokant; part 1p. 81 174 
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- Hadjianastassiou v Greece (1992) 16 E. H. R. R. 219 Para 33 176 
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In his comment on the importance of reasoned judgment the President of the Board of 
Grievances notes that by stating the reasons, the judge will clarify any ambiguity in 
the case and accordingly protect himself from suspicion of being arbitrary. 
178 
Generally speaking, a judgment rendered by both the Shari'ah Courts and the Board 
of Grievances must contain the reasons upon which the judgment is based. In the 
following I will deal with reasoned judgment in each institution respectively. Article 
35 of the Law of Judiciary provides that: "Judgments shall include the grounds on 
which they were based and the legal authority thereof. " As far as criminal cases are 
concerned, this article implies that the judgment must provide the grounds on which 
the judgment is based, that is the prohibited act, and the legal authority, namely the 
text which prohibits the act in question. 
With regard to the content of the judgment, it must indicate the name of the rendering 
court, its date, names of the judges, names of litigants, the nature of the crime, a 
summary of claims or defences submitted by litigants and the supporting evidence and 
arguments, the stages of the action, the text of the judgment, reasons and legal bases 
therefore, and whether it was rendered unanimously or by majority vote. 179 
Nevertheless, a dissenting judge must explain his dissent and the reasons for this in 
the case record, and the majority must explain its opinion by addressing the 
dissenter's opinion in the case record 180. Accordingly, dissenting discussion will not 
be provided in the judgment itself but will rather appear only in the case record. 
Even though the law does not provide precise criteria and conditions for reasoned 
judgment the judiciary before the Shari'ah courts has established the following 
criteria which courts are obliged to apply: 
1- Reasoned judgment must be based only on the facts adduced before the court 
and recorded in its minutes. The factual reasons for judgment shall be derived 
from claims, responses and arguments adduced by litigants and recorded in the 
case file. Thus the judge cannot provide reasons that have not been adduced 
and discussed during the hearing. If one party invokes evidence that is 
recorded elsewhere, and if the judge sees it as significant evidence in the 
present case, the evidence invoked in this case must be written in the present 
case file. The judge may then use it as basis for his reasons. 
178 
- His letter No. 1l dated 1402 H. Mentioned in Belal, A P1062 179 
- Article 182 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 180 
- Article 34 of the Law of the Judiciary 
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2- The judge shall provide sufficient reasons for his judgment. This means that 
he must provide whatever factual and legal reasons he deems necessary to 
convince parties and others of its correctness. Jurist (Shake) Muhammad bin 
Abraham (the previous Chief Justice) reversed a judgment on the ground that 
the reasons provided were not sufficient. He states: "The judge has convicted 
the driver, and he ruled that the driver was liable for payment of the blood 
money of the death person. However, he did not provide sufficient reasons for 
his judgment". ' 8' 
3- The reasons shall be consistent with each other and must not contradict either 
each other or the judgment. Consequently, it is the judge's duty when 
pronouncing judgment to clarify among his reasons what facts have been 
proved before him, and to refute any claim which contradicts them. He must 
also reply to and clarify any confusion. 
4- The reasoning should be provided according to a logical sequence. His 
deduction (inference) shall lead from its premises to its conclusion (outcome), 
deriving the unknown facts from the known facts. 
5- The reasoning should not be exaggerated. It should be presented in a balanced 
manner, which means that in his reasoning the judge may not focus on 
particular reasons and ignore others. For instance, the judge should not insist 
on the reasons for incrimination in Ta'azir punishment and at the same time 
ignore the aggravating or extenuating circumstances. 
6- The reasoning shall be provided concisely, and in clear and precise Arabic 
language. The judge should also avoid using complicated or strange 
terminology. 192 
Even though the law does not provide a precise remedy if the court fails to provide 
reasons for its judgment, it seems that the court of appeal will reverse the judgment on 
the grounds of major deficiency in the reasoning of the judgment. For example, the 
judgment will be reversed if. (a) there is an error in the classification of the facts or if 
there is a failure in providing the right description of the prohibited act. (b) If there 
are no reasons at all. (c) If the judge fails to mention the conducts that constitute the 
181 
- Muhammad bin Qassim (1399 H) "Fatwa Wa Rasa'il Eshaikh Muhammad bin Abraheem Al - 
Eshaikh" Mecca, Saudi Arabia 8/ 158,11/ 306 
182 
- The discussion above is provided by a judge in General Court in Riyadh, Al Konan (1420 AH) p. 
65- 76 
318 
crime in question. (d) If the reasons provided are vague. (e) If there is contradiction 
between the judgment and facts proved before the court during trial. 183 
Yet the obligation to provide reasons is limited to judicial judgments only. In other 
words, the judge is not obliged to provide reasons for other judicial functions. In 
practice, before the Shari'ah courts judges do not provide reasons for other decisions 
or orders because they are not deemed to be judicial judgments in which disputes are 
resolved. For example, judges do not provide reasons for the following decisions: 
(A) Cases concerning the proof or documentation (notarization) of 
particular facts such as issuing title deeds, registration of endowment, 
recording of marriage, probate, divorce, divorce at the instigation of 
the wife, death and determination of heirs. In such cases the court is 
not required to provide reasons because the reasons for such decisions 
are usually clearly provided in the case record. 
(B) Preventive judicial measures taken by the judge during the hearing 
such as banning the accused from travelling. Such an order does not 
need to be reasoned because such discretion is left entirely to the judge 
concerned. Abdullah Al Konan criticizes the above status, arguing 
that it is very important to provide grounds for such orders because 
they significantly affect the litigants' interest. 184 
(C) Evidence procedures during the proceeding. During the trial the judge 
may order the litigants to prove their claims or he may appoint an 
expert such as an accountant. In this case the judge will not, as a 
general rule, provide the reason for such an order. 
(D) Administrative functions relevant to the case proceedings. An 
example might be one party's request for deferral of judgment; or if 
the court were asked to include in the case whoever would rightly have 
been a litigant when the case was filed. If the judge accepts or refuses 
such requests he is not obliged immediately to provide reasons for his 
decision, provided that such reasons are provided in the judgment. 185 
This approach applied by the Shari'ah Courts shows, speaking generally, a 
compliance with European standards of human rights. Pursuant to the European Court 
183 
- Dofeer, S (2000) p. 245 184 
- Al Konan (1420 AH) p. 62 185 
- Ibid, p. 61-64 
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of Human Rights a state enjoys a considerable freedom in the choice of appropriate 
means to ensure that its judicial system comply with right to fair trial. National courts 
are only required to indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which their 
decisions are based. '86 
As to the Board of Grievances, the law governing the Board generally speaking 
provides similar rules to those provided in the Shari'ah courts. The judgment must 
contain the reasons on which it was based and the legal basis for these. '87 In other 
words, criminal judgment must specify the prohibited act and provide the article 
which declares the illegality of the conduct in question. If judgment is issued by 
majority vote, the dissenting member must explain and give reasons for his dissent in 
the minutes of the proceedings, and the majority of the members must also explain 
their point of view in response to the dissent in the minutes of the proceedings. '88 
The form of the Board's decisions includes accurate reasons for its judgments. The 
form of judgment contains firstly the facts in respect of the case, secondly the legal 
and factual reasons, and thirdly the pronouncement of judgment. However, the law 
does not mention the deficiencies that might arise regarding the reasons for the 
judgment; therefore it does not provide a remedy if there is a deficiency. Yet the 
practice of the Board requires consistency between the judgment and reasons 
provided. The Board decided that: "it is sufficient for a judgment to be based on 
reasons consistent with it.,, 189 In another case the Board has distinguished between 
major reasons and non-major reasons. The judge is not required to mention all 
reasons, but rather he has the right to answer only the crucial questions. This approach 
is consistent with case law that is established in the European Court of Human Rights. 
According the ECHR a court is obliged to provide a detailed answer only to 
fundamental questions. In Helle v Finland190 the applicant in his second submission 
has contended that the fairness of the domestic proceedings was vitiated on account of 
the failure of the Cathedral Chapter and Supreme Administrative Court to articulate 
clearly the reasons which led them to reject his interpretation of the 1966 decision and 
the evidence which he had adduced to that end. The European Court notes in this 
context that while Article 6(1) obliges the courts to give reasons for their judgments, 
186 See for example, Hadjianastassiou v. Greece [ 1992] 16 E. H. R. R 219 
187 
- Article 31 of Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 
188 _ Article 30 of Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 189 
- Mentioned in Al Sobeel, 0 (1422 AH) "Tassbeeb Al Ahkarn Al Qada'eeh Fi Al Fiqh Wa Al 
Nedam". Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University. Riyadh. A master dissertation. p. 76 
190 
- [1997] 26 E. H. R. R 159 
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it cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument adduced by a 
litigant. The extent to which reasons must be given depends on the nature of the case. 
In addition, the Circuit can summarize its reasons. The Board concluded that: "even 
though the Circuit's judgment is somehow summarized, it established its judgment for 
proper and adequate reasons. Therefore, the circuit judgment does not contain 
fundamental violation nor formal or procedural deficiencies that could result in its 
nullification. "191 
191 
- Mentioned on Al Sobeel, 0 (1422 AH) p. 76&77 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Accused's Rights after Criminal Judgment 
Introduction: 
Although judicial decisions should carry considerable weight, and must each be 
regarded as examples of justice, it is imperative to note that the deliberation of a 
judgment may be subject to errors. To guard against this possible contradiction, the 
accused must be provided with certain rights operative after the delivery of judgment. 
This chapter focuses on the rights of the accused after delivery of a criminal 
judgment. Topics included in this chapter are: 
1- The right to appeal. 
2- The right to compensation for miscarriage of justice. 
3- The right not to be tried twice for the same offence. 
4- The right to a pardon. 
5- The right to stay of execution of punishment. 
6- The right to repent. 
Rights encompassed by items 1,2, and 3 are mentioned in protocol no. 7 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. However, the rights mentioned in items 4, 
5, and 6, are not mentioned in the European Convention on Human Rights and 
possibly are similarly absent from all international instruments regarding human 
rights. Their presence here expresses the special properties of Islamic law. 
This thesis concerns the rights of the accused during the trial stage. Some of the 
rights mentioned above appear to be more relevant to the convicted person than to the 
accused person, and may thus be thought not relevant to the trial stage. However, the 
fact is that these rights are also applicable to trial and investigation stages, because 
they are exercisable throughout the trial, during which the accused may enjoy them. 
It should be mentioned here that my approach in treating each topic will vary. Those 
rights whereby Saudi Arabian law relies heavily on Islamic law will be dealt with in a 
single discussion, namely one confined to Islamic law. Where the law of Saudi 
Arabia needs separate discussion, other rights are handled in two separate sections. 
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Part I The Right to Appeal 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights lays down 
that: "1- Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall have the right to 
have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this 
right, including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law. 
2-This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to offences of a minor character, 
as prescribed by law, or in cases in which the person concerned was tried in the first 
instance by the highest tribunal or was convicted following an appeal against 
acquittal. " 
Prior to protocol No. 7 the right to appeal is not mentioned in Art. 6 as freestanding 
right, but is a way of putting right defects in the lower courts. In the following the 
right to appeal in Islamic law and the Saudi law are illustrated in turn. 
Section One Islamic law 
The right to appeal in Islamic law is considered among contemporary writers to be the 
most controversial issue. Some argue that Islamic law prohibits the right to reverse a 
judgment, and hence that the Islamic state is unable to establish a system for appeal. It 
is often maintained that: "The prevailing wisdom among Islamicists has maintained 
that there are no appellate structures in Islamic law, that the decision of a qadi is 
final and it-revocable, that a judge may not change his mind once he has rendered his 
decision, and that a judgment may not be reversed under any circumstances. "' In the 
same vain Joseph Schacht states: "The Kadi (judge) has the duty of giving just 
judgment, a duty which is enjoining in the Koran, but there is no means of reversing 
an unjust judgment because strict Islamic law does not recognize a stage of appeal; 
only the tribunal of mazalim can, in a way, be regarded as an appellate court. "2 
Similarly Martin Shapiro in his article "Islam and Appeal" concludes that appeal is 
absent in Islamic law. 3 
However, David S. Power responses to Shapiro's argument mentioned above by 
stating that: "Shapiro has been poorly served by Islamicists scholarship on the nature 
and organization of the qadi's court and that quasi-appellate structures were more 
'- David S. Powers "On Judicial Review in Islamic Law" Law & Society Review. Volume 25, number 
2(1992)315 
2 
-Schacht, J "An Introduction to Islamic Law" Clarendon Press. Oxford 1991. P. 189 3- Martin Shapiro "Islam and Appear,. California Law Review. Vol. 68. March 1980. no. p. 350-381 
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common in Muslim societies than he has thought. " He continues to explain that: "the 
decisions of qadis were in fact reversible, albeit under precisely defined conditions, 
and that Islamic legal theory provides for a distinctive, nonhierarchical formed of 
appeal.. . 
My analysis suggests that hierarchical organization was regular feature of 
Muslim polities and these polities appear to have developed a rudimentary, informal 
appellate structure in which the court of the chief qadi of the capital city served as a 
court of review for the decisions of local and provincial judges. ,4 
Despite the fact that Islamic law does not divide courts into courts of first instance 
and courts of second or third instance as modern law does, and even though Islamic 
law does not distinguish between an appeal and judicial review, this cannot be 
understood to mean that Islamic law has no means to review and reverse a judicial 
decision. The idea of reversing a wrong judgment was applied clearly during and 
after the Prophet's era. Moreover, Islamic jurists provide detailed explanations to 
illustrate the concept. 
The best way to show the fallacy of the above claim is by examining jurists' 
discussions in respect of the right to reverse a judgment. But before doing this I will 
explain the reasons why some writers mistakenly believe that the right to appeal is not 
permitted in Islamic law. 
(a) Islamic law, as we have pointed out above, does not divide courts into 
courts of first instance and courts of second or third instance. This, 
however, cannot be regarded as a proper reason for concluding that 
Islamic law does not accept the right to appeal. In the past, cases were 
straightforward and tried before a single judge whose judgments were 
in most circumstances considered final. However, if one party did not 
accept the judgment he had the right to have the judgment reviewed 
either by the ruler himself or by a supreme judge. This view is 
supported by the fact that Saudi Arabia, though applying Islamic law 
very strictly, had since the enactment of the first judicial law 
established a High Judicial Authority to review judgments. 
(b) Generally speaking, in Islamic law judicial judgments carry 
considerable weight. A just judgment is seen as God's judgment of the 
case, because it is assumed that the judge implements God's 
- David S. Powers "On Judicial Review in Islamic Law" Law 
& Society Review. Volume 25, number 
2(1992)315 
324 
instructions provided in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Nevertheless, this 
understanding does not contradict the fact that the judge can commit 
errors in his judgment. So if it is revealed that his judgment is wrong, 
it must be reversed. 
(c) In this regard Islamic law applies the rule that "reasoning cannot be reversed 
by reasoning. " Or judgment that is formed by an independent judgment cannot be 
reversed by another independent judgment. 
This rule means that if the judge fails to find a text applicable to the case before him, 
he is entitled to derive his judgment from the general principles provided in the 
Qur'an or the Sunnah. If the judge reaches his judgment by this means his judgment 
cannot, according to this rule, be reversed, provided that it does not breach divine 
texts or general Islamic principles. The reasons provided for this rule are: (1) the 
judge has based his decision on human reasoning and everyone's views have equal 
status, no individual being able to claim the superiority of his opinion. (2) If a 
judgment can be reversed by a personal view, this could create instability. The 
reversed judgment can also be reversed by further human reasoning. 
Yet, this rule should not be considered as a proper reason for claiming that Islamic 
law does not permit the right to appeal. Firstly, the rule mentioned above is excluded 
to judgment based on judicial reasoning. In fact the wrongness of the judgment might 
be due to its contradiction of the Qur'an, the Sunnah, Consensus, or Islamic 
jurisprudential principles, in which case it must be overturned. Secondly, the majority 
of jurists argue that this rule applies only to a Mujtahid judge. A judgment that is 
rendered by a judge, who does not have the qualification of a Mujtahid judge, will be 
reversed even if based on judicial reasoning. The Mujtahid judge has the right to 
follow his own reasoning to evaluate between different opinions and find a point of 
balance, whereas the non-Mujtahid judge must apply the teaching of his schools 
Thirdly; most current judges, in fact, do not have the qualification of a Mujtahid, 
therefore, if the judge in Saudi Arabia, for instance, reaches his verdict by way of 
5- Abdullah Al Sodees (1407/1408). Naqd Al-Ahkam Al-Qada'eeh. Master Dissertation. Imam 
Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University. The High Judicial Institution. Riyadh, p. 111. Hereinafter 
will refer to as Al-Sodees (1407/1408) 
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reasoning, his finding shall be subject to review if its judgment is irrational, 
unreasonable6 or on the ground of procedural impropriety. 
After this outline of the reasons that have led some writers to claim that Islamic law 
does not accept the idea of appeal, the right to reverse judgment in Islamic law will 
now be examined in the following sequence: 
1- The legality of reversal of judgment 
2- The legal status of reversal of judgment 
3- Who has the right to reverse judgment 
4- Grounds for reversing judgment. 
Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning here that scholars of Islamic law have discussed 
the right to review a judgment without distinction between criminal and civil cases. 
Thus, discussion provided here covers both cases. 
(1) The legality of reversing judgment 
The right to reverse a judicial decision in Islamic law is based on the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah, the conduct of the Prophet's companions, consensus, and analogy, as 
follows: 
A- God said: "And (remember) Dawud (David) and Sulaiman (Solomon), when they 
gave judgment in the case of the field in which the sheep of certain people had 
pastured at night; and We were witness to their judgment. And We made Sulaiman 
(Solomon) to understand (the case); and to each of them We gave Hukm (right 
judgment of the affairs and Prophethod) and knowledge. And We subjected the 
mountains and the birds to glorify Our Praises along with Dawud (David). And it was 
We Who were the doer (of all these things). "8 
In these two verses God reveals that the Prophets Dawud (David) and Sulaiman 
(Solomon) judged a single case in two stages. At first it was adjudicated by David but 
his judgment was wrong, therefore the Prophet Solomon reversed it and rendered a 
new decision. 9 
B- The Prophet says: "There were two women, each of whom had a child with her. A 
wolf came and snatched away the child of one of them, and the other said, `It 
snatched your child. ' The first said, `It snatched your child. ' So they both carried the 
6- In a number of cases before Shari'ah Courts judgments were reversed by the Appellate court on the 
ground that the punishments, though within the trial court discretion, are disproportionate. See for 
example the decision of the General Court in Riyadh No. Q/ 17/ 246 in 23/9/1419 H. 
- For example, if he does not provide reasoning to his judgment. 8- Surah 21. Al-Anbiya. Verses No. 78&79 
9- Al Sodees (1407/1408) p. 81 
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case before Dawud who judged that the living child be given to the older lady. So 
both of them went to Sulaiman the son of Dawud and informed him (of the case). He 
said, `bring me a knife to cut the child into two pieces and distribute it between them. ' 
The younger lady said, `May Allah be Merciful to you! Don't do that, for it is hers 
(i. e., the other woman's). ' So he gave the child to the younger lady. "10 
It is claimed that the Prophet Muhammad told his companions the story without 
declaring an objection to the reversal provided in the story. Jurists therefore state that 
the Prophet accepted the idea of reversing a judicial decision. 
(C) It is narrated that two tribes litigated before the judge Ali bin Abee Talap in a case 
known as Al Zebeeh. Ali told the litigants that he would decide the case, but if they 
did not accept the judgment they could review the case before the Prophet. When he 
rendered his judgment the litigants did not accept it, so they went to the Prophet. The 
Prophet upheld Ali's judgment. 
In his comment on this story Ahmad Al Bahee argues that this is evidence that the 
judge's decision is subject to review. If it is correct it will be ratified but if it is wrong 
it will be reversed and the case will be reheard. ' 1 
(D) Omer (The Second Ruler after the death of the Prophet) prevented the 
implementation of any judgment rendered in serious crimes unless ratified by him. 
(E) By consensus: All jurists agree on reversal of judgment if the latter contradicts the 
Qur'an, the Sunnah and Consensus. 
(F) By analogy: As a general rule, if a representative breaks the agreement made 
between him and the principal, his act becomes illegal and null. Similarly the judge is 
a representative of the ruler and people, who delegate to him the power to deliver a 
just judgment. If he violates this power his judgment is void. 
To sum up, it may be concluded that the right to appeal is permitted and was applied 
in early Islamic societies. The rulers established committees consisting of scholars to 
review judicial decisions. 12 
(2) The legal status of reversal of judgment 
The reversing of a judgment can be obligatory, prohibited, or permitted. 
10 
- The Translation of the Meanings of Summarized Sahih Muslim. Arabic- English. Volume 1. No. 
1057 
11 
- Ahmad Abdullmon'em Al Bahee (1965) " Tareek A! Qada'a Fi Al Eslam" p. 71 12 
_Wakee'a Muhammad bin Hean (1306 H) Akbar Al Qada'a. part 2 p. 96 
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(a) Obligatory status: If the judgment contradicts the Qur'an, the Sunnah, or 
the consensus it must be reversed because such a decision is clearly 
wrong. 
13 
(b) Prohibited status: since the original status is that the judgment is not 
reversible without reasons, it is thus prohibited to quash a judgment if it is 
consistent with Islamic law. 14 
(c) Permitted status: the reversing of a judgment will be permitted if the 
decision is correct with regard to Islamic law, but breaches the judge's 
jurisdiction. If the judge renders a judgment in respect of a case outside his 
power in terms of place, time, or type etc. this decision can be reversed or 
can be accepted by the ruler. If a judge is authorized to judge only civil 
cases or if he is authorized to handle cases only in one city, but breaches 
this by adjudicating criminal cases or crimes committed in another city, the 
ruler who limits the judge's power has the right to accept these judgments. 15 
(3) Who has the right to reverse judgment? 
The right to reverse judgment in Islamic law is confined to those who have jurisdiction 
to conduct a judicial function. 
1: The Ruler 
The ruler of the Islamic state has the right to judge between people himself, and hence 
he also has the right to reverse a wrong judgment. It is assumed that the ruler should 
possess the qualifications and personal character required for a judge. 16 This right is 
conditional upon the ruler's fulfilling all conditions required for a judge. If lie ceases 
to fulfil one of them, he becomes unqualified to reverse a judgment. 
2: Representatives of the Ruler: 
If the ruler fails to fulfil one or more of the conditions required for judiciary function, 
or to conduct the judicial function himself owing to his other commitments, he will 
delegate such jurisdiction to one or more scholars who may review judicial 
decisions. 17 
13 
- Al Muqhni (no year). Part 9 P. 56 14 
- Muhammad bin Abee Baker (no year)E'lam Al Moge'en. Part 4 P. 224 15 
- Abdullah bin Omer Al Dabosee (no year). Tasses Al Neda'er. P 84 16 
- All Muhammad Al Samnanee (1404H). Rodat Al Qudat Wa Tareek Al Najat. part I p. 61 17 
- Al Sodees (1407/1408) p. 93 
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A post of Chief Justice was created during the Abbasid era and was authorized to 
review judgments. '8 
3: The Judge 
The judge who renders the decision has the right to reverse his judgment if it appears 
to him later that his judgment was wrong, provided that he has a proper reason for 
doing so. 19 
However, his right to reverse his judgment is limited to decisions that are in 
contradiction with Islamic provisions. If however, he decides a case according to his 
judicial reasonings where there is no text to cover the case, he cannot reverse his own 
judgment in this later case. His new view will be applied only to new cases before 
him. 20 
It seems that the idea of reversal of judgment by the same judge who renders it is not 
familiar in secular law; however in Islamic society the judge will not hesitate to 
reverse his judgment if he discovers the wrongness of his judgment . 
21 
(4) Grounds for reversing the judgment 
The reasons for reversing a judgment can be divided into two categories as follows: 
(a) Reasons related to the judge himself; and (b) reasons related to the judgment. 
(a) Reasons related to the judge himself 
Three factors may lead to reversal of the judgment: 
1: unqualified status of the judge: 
If the judge no longer fulfils one of the requirements, his judgments become null and 
subject to reversal. But the question that is asked is whether all judgments rendered 
by this judge must be reversed, or whether reversal is limited to his wrong judgments 
alone. 
Jurists hold two views. Some argue that all his judgments must be reversed whether 
correct or not. However, others say that only his wrong decisions must be reversed, 
because justice is done by the correct judgments and there is no benefit from reversing 
them. 22 
18 
- Hader Ahmad Daff Allah (1989) "Darajat Al Taqadee Fi Al Fiqh Al Island" PhD Thesis Cairo 
University p. 101- 112. hereinafter will refer to as Hader Ahmad Daff Allah (1989) 
19 
- Muhammad bin Ahee Baker (no year). Elam Al Moge'en. Part I P. 86 20 
- Ibid, p. 111 21 
- Hader Ahmad Daff Allah ( 1989) p. 101- 112 22 
- Al Muqhni (no year) Part 9, P. 58 
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2: Lack of Jurisdiction: 
If the judge decides a case outside his jurisdiction his judgment is subject to reversal 
because a judge is restricted to exercising his function within the jurisdiction that is 
empowered to him by the state. If he breaches this with regard to place, time, or type 
his judgment is then subject to nullification. 23 
3: the existence of an impediment (obstruction) 
For example if the judge is a relative of one party. This discussion appears in the 
chapter dealing with the right to an impartial court, and need not be repeated here. 24 
(b) Reasons related to the judgment itself: 
Four factors are suggested here as reasons for reversing the judgment: 
First: if one of the conditions for passing the judgment is absent, it becomes subject to 
reversal. 25For example, some cases require a complaint from the aggrieved party 
before starting the hearing; otherwise the case cannot be tried. For instance in the 
crime of murder, if the victim's family does not demand capital punishment, the judge 
cannot apply it. If he does so his judgment is null. 
Second: if the judge misapprehends the facts, his judgment must be quashed. If the 
judge concludes his judgment by rendering the death penalty upon a person who has 
not killed, such judgment is null . 
26 If the same judge or another judge discovers a 
critical fact after the decision is made he must reverse the judgment. For example, if 
his decision is based on testimony and after the judgment is delivered the witnesses 
withdraw their testimony. In this and similar circumstances the judgment must be 
reversed. 
Third: if it is discovered after the judgment that it was based on the testimony of 
persons who lack the conditions required for giving testimony, for example if they are 
not just persons then the judgment must be quashed. 27 
Fourth: if the judge fails to apply the correct rule to the case before him. For instance, 
if he decides to apply the sentence of capital punishment to a person who commits the 
crime of defamation, the judgment must be quashed. 28 
23 
- Muhammad bin Muhammad Al Garss (no year) "A! Fawakh Al Badreeh" P. 75 24 
- See chapter 6 of this thesis. 25 
- Al Muqhni (no year) Part 9 P. 50 26 
- Ahmad Al Gorafee (1347 H). "Al Furuq" Part 4 P. 41 27 
- "Al Muqhni" (1981) Part 9P 257 28 
. 
28 
_ Al Sodees (1407-1408H) p. 132 
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In summary, grounds for reviewing judgments in Islamic jurisprudence, though 
formulated differently, are in a broad sense comparable to those provided in the 
English jurisprudence. Namely, illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. 29 
Section Two Saudi law 
It may be essential for the comparison between the judicial system in Saudi Arabia 
and the European Convention on Human Rights in respect of the right to appeal, to 
reiterate at this stage the general scope of this right in the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
In accordance with the Explanatory Report of Protocol No. 7, some Contracting States 
restrict the right to appeal to questions of law, while in other States parties it is 
allowed against facts as well as law. The Explanatory Report states "Different rules 
govern review by a higher tribunal in the various member States of the Council of 
Europe. In some countries, such review is in certain cases limited to questions of 
law.... In others, there is a right to appeal against findings of facts as well as on the 
questions of law. The article leaves the modalities for the exercise of the right and the 
grounds on which it may be exercised to be determined by domestic law. " 
Article 6, generally speaking, requires a high level of review in relation to matters of 
law. 30 As to the fact article 6 requires a right to challenge findings of fact, but not 
necessary a full re-investigation of the facts, as an aspect of the right to a fair trial. 3I 
It seems that the general scope of the right to appeal in civil cases, provided above, is 
also applicable to criminal cases. Provided that the trial court complies fully with 
article 6, the appellate court might not fully comply with these requirements. For 
example, the right to public hearing, or the right to present at hearing in criminal 
cases, can be restricted before the court of appeal if these rights are provided in the 
trial court. In Kamasinski v Austria 32 the applicant complained that he did not have a 
fair trial in criminal proceedings in Austria, and in particular the non- attendance of 
the defendant at the hearing on appeal against sentence and compensation order. The 
Court observes, "Personal attendance of the defendant does not take on the same 
29 
- John Alder (2002) p. 368 30 
- Bryan v. The United Kingdom. (1995) para. (Application No. 00019178/91); 31 
- See, Bryan v. The United Kingdom. (1995) para. 40 (Application No. 00019178/91); and also 
Chapman v. UK (2001) (Application No. 00027238/95) 
32 
-[ 19891 13 E. H. R. R 36 
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crucial significance in an appeal hearing as it does for the trial hearing. This is an 
area where the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation. " 
1: Shari'ah Courts: 
In 1927 the Saudi government established the first integral judicial law. 33 This law 
contained for the first time the idea of reversing a judicial decision. Article 5 of this 
law stated that a Committee for judicial Review would be established to supervise all 
courts and to review and if necessary reverses their judgments. 
However, after 28 years a Royal Order was issued in 1374 H to cancel the right to 
review and reverse the judgment. This Order considered any judgment to be final and 
required it to be implemented immediately. 
Although the Royal Order did not provide reasons for the cancellation of the idea of 
appeal, it seems to have been based on the jurisprudential rule mentioned above, 
namely "reasoning cannot be reversed by reasoning"34 
But this status did not last for long. After only 6 years the right to appeal was re- 
instated by the establishment of a Committee to review judicial decisions consisting of 
senior scholars presided over by the Chief Justice. 35 
As to the current status the Law of Criminal Procedure clearly confirms the right to 
appeal in criminal cases. Article 9 declares: "Criminal judgments shall be appealable 
by either the convicted person or the prosecutor. "36 Thus, a convicted person is 
entitled to challenge both his conviction as well as sentence before the court of appeal. 
This may differ from the European standards where the right of a convicted person to 
appeal may be restricted to a review of his sentence. 37 Interestingly, the Saudi law 
allows the accused to have his conviction reviewed by the Appellate Court even if he 
freely admitted his guilt before the trial court. 
Before the issue of the Law of Criminal Procedure the right to appeal was not 
guaranteed for all offences. Minor offences were not appealable. This status was 
subject to serious criticism, because a conviction whether related to a serious or non- 
serious crime causes damage to the convicted person. Therefore Article 9, whereby 38 
33 
- The law was published in the Official News paper " Om Al Kora" issue No. 140 date 19/8/1927 34 
- Muhammad Abraheem (1998) p. 18 35 
- Abdulaziz Abdullah Al Eshaikh ( 1990) p. 130 & 131 36 
- The Official Translation Division has used the term "sentences". But I prefer to use the terms 
"Criminal Judgments" instead, because the word sentence might imply in legal sense that an appeal is 
only limited to sentences and not permitted to convictions. 
37 
- Explanatory Report of Protocol No 7 38 
- Muhammad Abraheem ( 1998) p. 117 
332 
all crimes are now subject to appeal, seems to be a response to the above criticism. As 
a result, unlike the standard before the European Court, the right to appeal in criminal 
cases before the Shari'ah courts has no exceptions at all. Pursuant to Art. 2 of 
Protocol No 7 to the European Convention the right to appeal in criminal cases can be 
restricted on the following grounds: 
(a) Offences of a minor character. (b) In cases in which the person concerned has been 
tried in the first instance by the highest tribunal. 39 (c) Where the accused was 
convicted following an appeal against acquittal. 40 
A careful speculation of the last two exceptions shows them as groundless 
exceptions. Adjudicating the accused for the first time before the highest court will be 
resulted in losing the opportunity to examine his case before two or more judicial 
bodies. Put differently, if the accused is tried before a court of first instance, he is then 
given two probabilities. Either he will be convicted or acquitted. If he is convicted he 
has another chance to be acquitted before the court of appeal. So he is given in reality 
two opportunities to challenge his conviction. However, if he is tried for the first time 
before the court of appeal, he will be given only one chance to challenge the 
accusation against him. By this way the appeal runs counter to its original objective. 
Studying a case before two independent judicial bodies wakens the possibility of 
having a wrong judgment. The same criticism could be said to the third exception. 
As to the number of judges in the Appellate Courts, the criminal panels consist of five 
judges to review sentences of death, stoning, amputation or Qisas (retaliatory 
punishment) in cases other than death. For other cases, the criminal panels will 
consist of three judges. 41 
Most criminal cases will be considered final after being ratified by the Appellate 
Court. However, sentences of death, stoning, amputation, or Qisas in cases other than 
death that have been affirmed by the Appellate court, are not final unless confirmed by 
the Permanent Panel of the Supreme Judicial Council. 42 If the Council does not 
confirm judgment in this case, it should be reversed and the case will be remanded for 
reconsideration by other judges. 43 
39 
- For example, by virtue of his status as a Minister, judge or because of the nature of the offence. 40 
- Explanatory Report. 41 
- Article 10 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 42 
- Article 11 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 43 
- Article 12 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. 
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According to the Law of Criminal Procedure there are two ways to object to judgment, 
namely appeal and reconsideration. The latter was only recently introduced for the 
first time in the history of the judicial system in Saudi Arabia. The Appellate Court 
was familiar only with appeal. 
The main difference between the two options is that the Appellate Court has the 
jurisdiction to review the appeal, whereas the trail court is empowered to handle 
reconsideration. 
In the following these two approaches will be explained, but before doing so an 
attempt must be made to answer the question whether the Appellate Court deals with 
matters of law and fact or with matters of law only. 
The majority argues that the Appellate Court in Saudi Arabia can only handle matters 
of law. They offer the following grounds for their view. (a) The Court of Appeal does 
not rehear cases comprehensively. (b) It does not call parties to attend before it, but 
rather it decides the case according to papers (case-file). (c) It considers the case in 
camera. 44 
(d) This view can be also advanced by reference to articles 201 and 202 of the Law of 
Criminal Procedures. Article 201 provides: "A judgment shall be reversed if it 
contradicts the text of the Qur'an or Sunnah or the consensus of Muslim jurists" and 
article 202 states that: "A judgment shall be reversed if it violates the laws concerning 
the competence of the court with respect to its composition or jurisdiction to review 
the case. The Appellate Court shall designate the competent court and refer the case 
to it. " All circumstances mentioned above concern matters of law. 
A careful study of the case in Saudi Arabia, however, can confirm that the Court of 
Appeal has the power to deal with matters of both law and fact. The following points 
support the view: 
1- Although articles 201 and 202 mentioned above are articulated as such, this does 
not mean that the legislature's intention was to confine the appeal to the above 
grounds, but rather the purpose was to mention circumstances where the decision is 
invalid by law, and to place the court of Appeal under no discretion to determine 
otherwise. 
2- As some writes put it correctly, the law does not confine the Appellate Court to 
matters of law, but rather gives it the right to review judgment generally. Article 199 
44 
- Muhammad. M. Abraheem (1998) p. 28 &217-218 
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of the same law states: "The Appellate Court shall dispose of the subject matter of the 
appeal on the basis of the evidence included in the f rle of the case.... " This article does 
not exclude matters of fact. An appeal is an inherent part of the judiciary, and unless 
limited by statute an appeal court has general jurisdiction. 45 This interpretation is 
similar to the common law approach which states that a court of appeal has general 
jurisdiction unless restricted by law. 
3- Pursuant to article 200 of the same law, the Appellate Court may permit the 
litigants to submit new evidence to support the grounds of their appeal. 
Consequently allowing parties to adduce new evidence before the Appellate Court is a 
crucial point in respect of the controversy between writers. Considering evidence is 
no doubt a matter of fact. 
4- Finally and more significantly, the actual practice of the Court of Appeal confirms 
that it interprets the law in a way that support our view. Examining its approaches 
when handling cases reveals that it deals with both matters. Two cases are sufficient 
examples in this regard. The first case46 was that a person was accused of shooting 
with an official (governmental) pistol but he did not cause any physical harm. Before 
the Summary Court in Riyadh he was convicted and sentences to imprisonment of 9 
months, and 300 hundreds lashes. The Court of Appeal quashed the judgment on the 
ground that the punishment, though within the trial court discretion, is 
disproportionate with the offence committed. 
Now to understand this one should know that the trial court in this kind of crimes 
(Ta'azir) has, in principle, unlimited discretion to decide the appropriate punishment. 
In the above case the trial court did not violate any of the grounds provided in the law. 
Namely the Qur'an, the Sunnah, or Consensus nor did it violate the laws concerning 
the competence of the court with respect to its composition or jurisdiction to review 
the case. And yet, as has been seen the Court of appeal reversed the judgment. 
In the second case, 47 the accused was prosecuted for committing robbery under arms, 
but the Summary Court in Riyadh in its decision No 164/15 in 12/7/1421 H ruled that 
the accusation is not proved due to lack of sufficient evidence. The Court of Appeal 
after reassessing the sufficiency of the evidence decided to quash the judgment. 
45 
- Amad Al Najar (1997) p. 427 & 434 46- decision no. Q/17/267 dated on 15/11/1419 H. mentioned in Muhammad Al Shammary (2001) 
"Naqd Al Ahkam Al Jina'i Fi At Shari'ah Al Island Wa Tatbegatha Fi Al Qada'a Al Saudi". Master 
Dissertation. Na7f Arab Academic for Security Sciences. P. 217 
47 
- Mentioned in Muhammad Al Shammary (2001) p.. 229 
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Again, in this case the court of appeal reconsidered the evidence and replaced its own 
view against the trial court's view. 
Therefore, one can conclude that Court of Appeal in Saudi Arabia deals with matters 
of both fact and law. 
With respect to the period within which the appeal must be made, an appeal against a 
judgment should be within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the 
judgment. Following the reading of the judgment, the court will designate a date for 
the receipt of a copy of the judgment, within a maximum period of ten days from the 
date of reading the judgment, and enter the same in the case record. 
48 
In addition, the appellant is required to sign an acknowledgement of receipt. If he 
fails to appear on the date appointed for receiving a copy of judgment, the copy will, 
on the same date, be deposited in the file of the case, and a note to that effect is 
entered into the record pursuant to a judge's order. The thirty-day period specified for 
the appeal starts running on the deposit date. 
If the convicted person is in prison, the authorities in charge of the prisoner are under 
obligation to bring him at the prescribed time to receive a copy of the judgment, and 
he must be allowed to submit his appeal within the designated time. 49 
If the appellant fails to file his memorandum of appeal within the period mentioned 
above, the trial court will, within forty-five days from the date of pronouncing the 
judgment, file that judgment with the Appellate Court. 
By way of exception, if the judgment involves a death sentence, stoning, amputation 
or Qisas (not involving death), it must be appealed against even if no litigant so 
requests, and the court will file its judgment with the Appellate Court within the 
above-mentioned period. 5o 
These punishments are severe, therefore the law correctly insists on reviewing them 
regardless of the accused's attitude. The aim is to minimize the possibility of 
rendering a wrong judgment in these punishments. 
With regard to procedures for appeal, the appeal memorandum should be filed with 
the trial court, stating the judgment appealed against, its date, and the grounds for that 
48 
- Article 194 of the Law Of Criminal Procedure 49 
- Article 194 of the Law Of Criminal Procedure 50 
-Article 195 of the Law Of Criminal Procedure 
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judgment, the appellant's requests, and reasons supporting his appeal. 51 This is a 
matter of public interest, thus it cannot be violated even by the agreement of the 
litigants. 52 
The purpose of requiring the appeal to be filed to the trial court rather than to the 
Appellate Court is to apply the principle of offering the judge who rendered the 
judgment a chance to reverse it, if the appeal memorandum reveals to him that there 
has been an error in his judgment. This principle finds its basis in Islamic 
jurisprudence, as mentioned above. 53 
In contrast to the hearing before the trial court where the case can be lodged orally, 
the appeal must be provided in a written form. 
Moreover, pursuant to article 197 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, it is the duty of 
the court rendering the judgment appealed against to review the memorandum of 
appeal with respect to grounds for the appeal without further hearings, unless 
otherwise necessary. An examination of the judgment must be limited to the grounds 
and reasons provided for the objection. The jurisdiction to reverse a judgment is not 
unlimited, but rather it is restricted to grounds provided in the memorandum. 
Consequently, if the grounds contained in the memorandum are rejected, the trial 
judge has no right to reverse the judgment on other grounds that are not provided in 
the memorandum, as this could be regarded as a violation of the right to an impartial 
COUft. 54 
It should be emphasised here that the judge in the trial court, in this case, is obliged to 
review the memorandum adduced by the convicted person. This entails that he should 
discuss and examine the reasons provided in the appeal, and that his responses to 
these must be recorded in the judgment. ss 
If the Appellate Court discovers that the judge in the trial court did not review the 
memorandum and has forwarded it without a review, the Appellate Court should send 
the case back to the trial court to make good the omission. In its decision No. 956 in 
1412 H the Appellate Court states: "it is decided that the case file No. (13504) will be 
sent back to the judge of the trial court to review the appeal memorandum". 
51 
- Article 196 of the Law Of Criminal Procedure 52 
- Muhammad Abraheem (1998) p. 200&201 53 
- Ibid, p. 23 54 
- Ibid, p. 205&206 55 
- Ibid, p. 197 
337 
Furthermore, if it appears to the court that there is reason for amending that judgment, 
it must be amended accordingly. Otherwise, the court will uphold its judgment and 
refer it with all the documents to the Appellate Court. If the judgment is amended, 
this should be communicated to the appellant and to the other litigants and, in that 
case, will be subject to the applicable rules of procedure. 56 
If the judge in the trial court amends his judgment and renders a new decision, he 
must record it in the case in the litigant's absence. He should then designate a session 
for a public hearing. The litigants will be called to be informed of the new decision. 
If one party at the hearing objects to the new judgment, the judge of the case cannot 
amend his new judgment. He must send it to the Appellate Court. In that case, the 
new judgment will be subject to the applicable rules of procedure. That is, the 
contesting party will receive the judgment, and his memorandum of objection will be 
adduced to the same judge; however, the judgment will be recorded with the words 
"this is a second objection". The aim of these words is to prevent the judge from 
reviewing the memorandum for a second time. Needless to say, if litigants accept the 
new judgment it becomes final. 57 
Prior to reviewing the subject matter, the Appellate Court will first consider the 
formalities of the appeal, and whether the appellant is entitled to file an appeal, and 
then decides whether to accept or reject the appeal on formal grounds. If the form of 
the appeal is rejected the court will issue a separate decision to that effect. 58 
As to the right to public hearing before the court of appeal, Article 199 of the Law of 
Criminal Procedure provides: "The Appellate court shall dispose of the subject scatter 
of the appeal on the basis of the evidence included in the file case. Litigants shall not 
appear before the court, unless it decides otherwise". 
If the Appellate Court accepts the form and substance of the appeal, it must remand 
the judgment to the trial court for reconsideration on the basis of the comments 
supporting the decision of the Appellate Court. If the trial court is satisfied with those 
comments, it will amend the judgment accordingly. But, if the trial court is not 
satisfied and maintains its previous judgment, it should answer the comments raised 
by the Appellate Court. 59 
56 
- Article 197 of the Law Of Criminal Procedure 57 
- Muhammad Abraheem ( 1998) p. 210- 212 58 
- Article 198 of the Law Of Criminal Procedure 59 
- Article 203 of the Law Of Criminal Procedure 
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The Appellate Court is obliged to give its comments on the judgment referred to it 
with or without an appeal. 60 
If the Appellate Court is satisfied with the trial court's responses to the comments it 
has made, it will confirm the judgment. If not, it will reverse the appeal in whole or 
in part, as the case may be. Moreover, it should state the grounds for its decision. It 
must then remand the case to another court for the rendering of judgment in 
accordance with the law. If the appeal judgment is complete in every respect, and if 
urgent action is deemed necessary, the Appellate Court may render judgment on the 
subject matter. Whenever the Appellate Court renders a judgment, such judgment 
will be rendered in the presence of the litigants and its judgment must be final, unless 
it is a death sentence, stoning, amputation or Qisas (other than death), in which case it 
must be referred to the Supreme Judicial Council. 61 
We turn now to the second method provided for the challenging of a judgment, 
namely reconsidering the judgment before the same trial court. 
The law designates particular circumstances as grounds for objecting to the judicial 
decision; the application of this approach therefore strictly excludes all but the 
designated circumstances. 
Article 206 of the Law of Criminal Procedure provides: "Ally of the litigants may 
apply for reconsideration of any final judgment imposing punishment, in the following 
circumstances: 
a. If an accused has been convicted of murder, but the person 
alleged to have been murdered turns out to be alive. 
b. If one person has been convicted of having committed a 
certain act, but another person has also been convicted of 
having committed the same act, thus resulting in 
contradiction leading to the conclusion that one of the two 
persons should be acquitted. 
c. If the judgment has been based on evidence that turns out to 
be forged, or on testimony that turns out to be per jurious. 
60 
- Article 204 of the Law Of Criminal Procedure 61- Article 205 of the Law Of Criminal Procedure 
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d. If the judgment has been based on a previous judgment that 
was nullified. 
e. If after judgment, new evidence or facts that were unlaiown at 
the time of the trial appeared, which could have led to the 
acquittal of the accused or the mitigation of punishment. " 
Despite the fact that the above article uses the word "litigants", this method of 
challenging judgment is designated only to the interest of the convicted person. This 
interpretation is clearly supported by the special circumstances provided. It seems 
that the law uses the term "litigants" instead of the term "convicted person" in order 
to give the prosecution the right to prove that the previous prosecution and conviction 
were wrong, and to suggest the correction of this mistake. 
As to the procedure for requesting reconsideration, a petition must be submitted to the 
trial court which will specify the judgment to be reconsidered and the grounds for the 
request. The Court of Appeal thus has nothing to do with the reconsideration. 
62 
The trial court considers the petition for reconsideration and will first decide whether 
the petition is satisfactory in formal terms. If the petition is accepted, the court will 
designate a date for considering its substance, and will notify the parties 
accordingly. 63 
Nevertheless, the court's acceptance of the formal aspect of a petition for 
reconsideration of a decision should not lead to the stay of execution of the judgment, 
unless the court orders otherwise. But if the judgment involves a corporal punishment, 
the execution must be stayed. 64 
In addition, if a petition for the reconsideration of a decision is rejected, any new 
petition based on the same facts will not be filed. 65 
Furthermore, objections to judgments rendered on the subject matter, pursuant to a 
petition for the reconsideration, can be made before the Appellate Court, unless of 
course, this judgment was rendered by the Appellate Court. 66 
In conclusion, as far as compliance with European standards of human rights in 
respect of the right to appeal in criminal case is concerned, it might be argued that 
62 
- Article 207 of the Law Of Criminal Procedure 63 
- Article 208 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 61- Article 209 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 
65 
- Article 211 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 66 
- Article 212 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 
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regardless of the fact that it is not held in public, and parties are not allowed to attend 
the hearing save if it is necessary, the Appellate Court in Saudi Arabia complies with 
the standards required by the European Court because the ordinary trail courts in 
Saudi Arabia, generally speaking, satisfy the requirement of a fair trial as required by 
art 6 of the European Convention. When assessing whether a contracting State 
complies with Convention requirements, the European Court considers the overall 
proceedings of the case at hand. Deficiencies in one stage may be compensated in 
another. Provided that the trial court complies fully with article 6, the appellate court, 
according to the ECHR, might not fully comply with these requirements. For example, 
the right to public hearing, or the right to be present at hearing in criminal cases, can 
be restricted before the court of appeal if these rights are provided in the trial court. In 
Kamasinski v Austria67 the applicant complained that he did not have a fair trial in 
criminal proceedings in Austria, and in particular the non- attendance of the defendant 
at the hearing on appeal against sentence and compensation order. The European 
Court observes, "Personal attendance of the defendant does not take on the same 
crucial significance in an appeal hearing as it does for the trial hearing. This is all 
area where the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation. " The Court also 
ruled in a different case that: "The public character of judicial proceedings protects 
litigants against the administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny and 
maintains confidence in the courts. Nevertheless, in applying the publicity 
requirements of Article 6 (1) account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings 
conducted in the domestic legal order. In the present case the Federal Court of 
Justice, which solely determines issues of law, was empowered by German law to 
proceed without a hearing only if it dismissed the appeal and made final the order of 
the lower court of appeal. The proceedings of the lower court complied fully with 
publicity requirements of Article 6. " 
68 
2: The Board of Grievances 
Article 6 of the Board of Grievances Statute states: "The Board shall exercise its 
power through Circuits. Their Numbers, formation and jurisdiction shall be 
designated by a decision of the President of the Board. " 
6' 
-[ 1989] 13 E. H. R. R 36 68 
- Axen v. Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 195 
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Pursuant to the above article the President of the Board issued a number of 
administrative decisions. Decision no. 8 in 11/8/ 1403 H established the Scrutinizing 
Committee in Riyadh. This Committee is empowered to review the decisions 
rendered by the Circuits. It consists of three judges. 69 
There are two methods of objection to judgment rendered by the Circuits in the 
Board. Namely: (a) an appeal, and (b) reconsideration. 
As to an appeal, again the Scrutinizing Circuit deals with matters of both facts and 
law. There is nothing in the law that limits its jurisdiction to matters of law. In 
addition, the actual practice of the Board confirms that it has power to handle both 
matters. 
After rendering the judgment the criminal circuit should inform the convicted person 
of his right to demand scrutiny of the judgment within 30 days, to run from the date of 
delivery of the judgment. If he fails to demand scrutiny of the judgment within the 
said time limit, the judgment is final. 70 
However, the criminal circuit may be convinced that the accused's failure to submit 
his objection within the time limit is due to force majeure. In this case an exception 
may be made and the late request can be accepted. The Board decides that: "the 
reason submitted by the accused, as an excuse for his failure to object to the judgment 
within the time limit, is well-founded, and acceptable. Therefore, his late objection 
will be formally accepted". 
The Scrutinizing Committee must either confirm or reverse the judgment. If the 
judgment is reversed the Scrutinizing Committee has two alternatives. It may return 
the case to the Criminal Circuit, or hear the case itself. If the judgment is returned to 
the criminal circuit, this body might insist on its view. So if the Scrutinizing 
Committee is not satisfied with the point of view provided by the circuit, it will hear 
the case. 72 
Where the Scrutinizing Committee decides to hear the case, it must allow the 
attendance of litigants. Judgments rendered by the Scrutinizing Committee are 
73 frnal. 
69 
- Article 1 of the Decision No. I1 in 1406 H 70 
- Article 31 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 71 
- Decision No. 453[r/1414 H. The Scrutinizing Committee. 72 
- Article 36 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 73 
- Article 36 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 
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Moreover, if the scrutiny is requested by the public prosecution, the Scrutinizing 
Committee will confirm, cancel or amend the judgment. However, if the decision is 
not in favour of the accused, the Committee must hear his statements prior to deciding 
the amendment of the judgment. If the application emanated from the convicted 
person only, the Scrutinizing Committee must only confirm or amend the judgment in 
his favour. 74 
The second method of objection to a judgment is, as mentioned, reconsideration. If, 
after a final decision has been made, fresh facts have been revealed or persons not 
known at the time of the trial have been produced, either of which may tend to acquit 
the convicted person, either the latter or the prosecution has the right to apply to the 
President of the Board to reconsider the final judgments. 
In a case before the Board, the accused was finally convicted. Nevertheless, he 
submitted a petition requiring a reconsideration of his conviction because the person 
who informed the police about the crime withdrew his statement and admitted that his 
previous accusation was false. This new fact was supported by testimonies. Thus, the 
Board decided that the convicted person was not guilty. 75 
As to the application for reconsideration, it must comprise the judgment and the 
causes for reconsideration, 76 and should be filed within 30 days of the date of 
becoming aware of the new facts. 
Similar to the case before the Shari'ah Court, the right of a convicted person to have 
his conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal is provided in the Board in 
a manner consistent, in general, with European Court approach. 
Part II The Right to Compensation for Miscarriage of Justice 
This right is guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights which provides: "When a person has by a final decision been 
convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been 
reversed, or he has been pardoned, on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact 
shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has 
suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to 
74 
- Article 37 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 75 
- Decision No. 105/T/3 1416 H The Scrutinizing Committee 76 
- Article 42 of the Rules of Pleadings before the Board of Grievances 
343 
the law or the practice of the state concerned, unless it is proved that the non- 
disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him. " 
According to the Explanatory Report this article requires three conditions: (1) the 
person concerned must be convicted of a criminal offence by a final decision, (2) the 
ground for reversing the conviction should be based on new facts that show 
conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, and (3) the non- disclosure 
of facts were not attributable totally or partially to the convicted person. 
In the following an analysis of the subject-matter is undertaken in Islamic law and the 
Saudi law respectively. However, before approaching this task it is important to 
mention that Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 of the European Convention applies this right 
where the damage is caused by a final judgment. Thus, it does not redress damages 
that could occur during the investigation. Nonetheless, discussion demonstrated in the 
following includes damages caused during both investigation as well as trial stages, 
for Islamic law does not make distinction between these stages. 
Section One Islamic law 
Early Islamic jurists discussed the idea of compensation in general. They also 
discussed the idea of compensation where a judge commits a mistake in his judgment. 
This discussion encompasses both criminal and civil cases; therefore it is applicable to 
right of the accused to be compensated for any damage occurring to him during the 
investigation or the trial stages. 
Two main topics will be examined here. First: the idea of compensation in Islamic 
law. Second: the idea of compensation if the judge commits a mistake in his 
judgment. 
(A) Compensation in Islamic law 
It should be noted here that this subject is manifold, and for full examination would 
require more than a single thesis. The present discussion must therefore be restricted 
to the main aspects of the topic. 
Early Islamic jurists had discussed compensation under the heading (Al-Daman): 
warranty against different instances, such as destruction of or damage to money, 
human life, and parts of the body. 
In general jurists are in agreement about the legality of compensation to protect 
people's money and life. They base their view on the rule of "Al Darrer Yuzal". This 
rule is composed of two words. The first is "Al Darrer" meaning `damage', and the 
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second word "Yuzal" means `be removed'. In combination, the words mean that any 
damage must be removed. The instigator of the damage must remove or cancel the 
damage he caused. The only means of removing the damage is to compensate the 
damaged person. The victim has no right to cause similar damage to the instigator, as 
a kind of retaliation. If he does, both the instigator and the damaged person become 
responsible for compensating each other according to the damage that each has caused 
the other. 77 
The accused might be adversely affected during the investigation and the trial. In the 
jurists' view, damage occurring to the accused is of three types: (1) incorporeal 
(moral) damage, (2) corporal damage, and (3) financial damage. In the following 
discussion, these subjects are approached respectively. 
(1) Incorporeal (moral) damage: it goes without saying that directing an 
accusation towards a person is very harmful to his reputation and his status in 
society. If the accusation is not proved this damage should be "removed". 
Many stories have been told in which the Prophet declared the discovery of 
an accused's innocence to the public, and asked the accused's forgiveness. 78 
Yet the right to financial compensation for moral damage is a matter of 
controversy among jurists. Some argue that there is no financial 
compensation under Islamic law for moral damage, because the latter cannot 
be evaluated financially. 79 Others, however, disagree with this argument, 
because the Prophet's companions compensated for moral damage. 80 
(2) Corporal damage: if the accused is tortured, he is entitled to financial 
compensation. 81 If the accused needs medical treatment owing to his torture 
he will be compensated. Jurists say if the corporal torture leads to the death 
of the accused, the victim's family must be compensated. If the accused, 
while attempting to escape torture, falls from a high position and dies as a 
result, his family will be compensated. 82 
77 
- Ahmad Suleiman Ahmad (1985) "Daman Al Motlafat Fi Al Fiqh Al Islami". PhD Thesis. Al Zhar 
University. Egypt p. 38 & Al Sa'ad Kamal (1986) "Gaza't Al Togeef Geer Al Mubere? " The First 
Scientific Symposium in the Arabic Centre for security and Training Studies. 22-24 September 
78 
- Bandar Al Swailam (1987) p. 380&381 79 
- Mustafa Ahmad Al Zarka (1988) "Al Fa'1 Al Dar Wa Al Daman Fih" p. 124 80 
- Muhammad R'fat Sa'ad (1983) "Al Motahent Wa Httgttgh Fi Al Shari'ah Al Islattti" p. 51 81 - Bandar Al Swailam(1987) p. 382 82 
- Abdulrahman Abdulaziz Al Othman (1993) Part 2 p. 497 
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(3) Financial damage: the accusation might damage the accused financially; for 
example, detention will prevent him from exercising his commercial 
activities. It might also result in loss of employment opportunities. 
Early Islamic jurists illustrated this kind of damage by stating that if the judge 
should prevent a person from exercising his business by detaining him, whereby 
his goods were spoiled (impaired), the accused must be compensated. They also 
said that if the judge detained a shepherd, the latter would be compensated if the 
sheep died. 83 
Al Swailam argues that in such situations Islamic law entitles the accused to 
compensation, because after compensation an innocent accused feels that the 
damage that was inflicted upon him is removed. 84 
(B) The right to compensation owing to judge's error 
The idea of compensating the accused for damages caused to him by the judge's 
mistake was covered by jurists during their discussion of the judge's responsibility 
for his mistakes. 
Jurists agree that the judge is not liable to make compensation for his non-intentional 
mistakes, but he will be liable if he deliberately delivers an unjust judgment. It is 
argued that in this latter case he deserves a criminal penalty, disciplinary action, and to 
make civil compensation. 
As to his non-intentional mistakes, jurists distinguished between two situations: 
First: if the judge renders his wrong judgment in respect of a case classified as a crime 
against God (society), such as drinking alcohol or adultery, the judgment should be 
reversed. However, if this wrong judgment is already implemented, the convicted 
person must be compensated by the state "public treasury". The judge is not 
responsible for compensation, because he is appointed by the ruler. The citizens of the 
Islamic state agreed to appoint the ruler, therefore the whole of society, not the judge 
himself, should bear the cost of compensation. 
Second: if the judgment related to an offence that is classified as a crime against the 
individual (pertaining to a private right) such as a murder (Qisas), the judgment must 
be reversed if the mistake is discovered before implementation. However, if the 
punishment has already been inflicted, the judge is similarly not responsible for 
83 
- Jom'ah Muhammad Soraj (1986) "Ta'weed Al Motahein Ama Ylhagoho Besbab Al Da'we 
Al 
Kadabah". In "Al Motahem Wa Huquqh Fi Al Shari'ah Al Islami" Part 2 Arabic Centre for Security 
and Training Studies. Riyadh 1986. P. 302 
84 
- Bandar Al Swailam (1987) p. 382&383 
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compensation. In such cases the private accuser in the criminal case will be 
responsible for compensation, if is proved that he distorted the information against the 
convicted person. 
Yet it should be noted that if the crime is murder and the punishment that is inflicted 
is capital punishment, the private accuser will not be executed, but should pay blood 
money. 85 
In respect of the judge's intentional mistakes, if the judge renders unjust judgment 
intentionally, his judgment must be reversed. But if the judgment is implemented, 
the judge must be subject to a criminal penalty, disciplinary action, and as far as this 
discussion is concerned, civil compensation. That is to say, the judge, not the state, 
is responsible for compensating the convicted person or his family. 
On the whole, it is said that jurisprudence illustrated by Islamic scholars in respect of 
the right to compensation for miscarriage of justice, is in line with standards required 
by European Convention on Human Rights. 
Section Two Saudi law 
The above discussion confirms that Islamic law provides the accused with the right to 
compensation for miscarriage of justice, whether this occurs during the investigation 
or trial stages. Thus, the law in Saudi Arabia places considerable emphasis on 
protecting the accused from any harm that could occur to him during a criminal 
action. Article 36 of the Basic Law provides: "The State shall provide security for all 
its nationals and aliens living on its territory; no person's liberty may be restricted 
nor may he be arrested or imprisoned (detained) except in accordance with the 
provisions of the law". Moreover, article 2 of the Law of Criminal Procedure states: 
"No person shall be arrested, searched, detained, or imprisoned except in cases 
provided by law. Detention or imprisonment shall be carried out only in the places 
designated for such purposes and shall be for the period prescribed by the competent 
authority. An arrested person shall not be subjected to any bodily or moral harm. 
Similarly, he shall not be subjected to any torture or degrading treatment". 
The rights of the accused may be breached during the investigation whether by 
subjecting him to torture or by detaining him illegally, which can be deemed as an 
85 
- Al Muqhni (1367 H) Part 9 P. 332. He is also subject to a Ta'azir punishment. 
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infringement to his liberty and freedom. He can also be subject to miscarriage of 
justice during the trial stage, by for example convicting him unjustly. 
As to the jurisdiction to deal with cases of compensation, the judicial system in Saudi 
Arabia differentiates between two situations. If the harm is caused during the 
investigation stage, the accused can claim his right to compensation before the Board 
of Grievances, but if the accused's rights are breached during the trial stage he can 
lodge his claim with Shari'ah Courts. These situations will be discussed in turn. 
As to the first situation, the Board of Grievances has the power to deal with claims for 
compensation adduced by accused persons with respect to their rights during the 
investigation. The Board's jurisdiction to deal with such matters is based on article 8/c 
of the Board Statute. 86 This article declares: "(1) The Board of Grievances shall have 
power to adjudge the following... (c) compensation claims addressed by interested 
persons to the Government or public persons, which are caused by its Workers". 
The Board decides that to deprive a person of his personal freedom without a decision 
from the competent court, and in contradiction with the law, is deemed a mistake by 
the investigation authority. Thus, it is its responsibility (obligation) to compensate 
such harm. Further, the body concerned (the investigation authority) has in turn the 
right to refer (reclaim) the sum of compensation to the person in charge, that is to say 
the investigator. 
In such cases the accused will receive compensation from the investigation authority. 
The latter will claim a refund of the amount of the compensation from the person 
responsible for the violation, provided that conditions for the refund are satisfied. 
87 
Obviously, the method mentioned above provides the accused with an important 
guarantee of his rights. First, he is entitled to compensation, and second, the person in 
charge of the investigation will be responsible if he violates the law. This latter 
penalty makes the investigator more careful with regard to the application of the law. 
Accordingly, an investigator who carries out the investigation arbitrarily is subject to 
a compensation payment as well as to disciplinary and criminal actions. 
In the Board judgments concerning compensation are based on the Islamic rule 
mentioned above, which states that damage must be removed. The only way to 
remove the damage is by compensating the person who suffers. 88 
86 
- Decision No. 8/D/ F/35 in 1419H. 
& Decision No. 3/D/F/ 39 in 1422H. This jurisdiction is also 
confirmed by the Royal Order No. 1407/M in 16/12/1420H. 
87 
- Decision No. 8/D/F/ 35 in 1419H. 
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With regard to the compensation sum arising from detaining the accused illegally, the 
Board decides that: "the harm caused by illegal detention varies according to 
people's social status. Therefore, the compensation to make good this harm will also 
vary accordingly. "89 
In one case it was decided that since the illegally detained claimant worked as a 
Pentair for a monthly wage of 1800 Saudi Riyal (approximately £380), the 
investigation authority must make him compensation of 120 Saudi Riyal 
(approximately £22) for every day he spent in detention. 90 In another case, since the 
plaintiff, who was illegally detained, was a businessman and was illegally deprived 
from exercising and supervising his commercial activities, the Board decided that he 
must be compensated by 1000 Saudi Riyal (approximately £175) for every day he 
spent in detention 91 
Pursuant to the case law of the Board, the judge who handles the compensation claim 
has the ultimate discretion to assess the compensation. 
92 His evaluation is final. 
Therefore the Scrutinizing Committee cannot interfere to re-assess the compensation, 
except if the circuit judge commits a material mistake in his calculation. 
93 
The accused's right to compensation is considered to be a personal (private) right, 
which means that if he does not claim for compensation, the court will not grant it 
spontaneously. If the accused claims for compensation, he has the right to waive it at 
any stage. He can waive some of his claim and claim the rest. 94 
According to the case law before the Board, the investigation authority's 
responsibility is based on the omissive responsibility (liability). That is to say it 
commits a fault by breaching the law. Therefore, as a general rule, if the investigation 
authority does not infringe the law no compensation can be granted because it has not 
committed a fault. 95 This approach provides similar standards to that of the European 
Convention. The Explanatory Report of Protocol No. 7 illustrates that in order to 
apply this right there should be some serious failure in the judicial process involving 
grave prejudice to the convicted person. 
88 
- Decision No. 8/D/F/ 35 in 1419H. 89 
- Decision no. 6/D/A/18 in 1422 H 90 
- Decision No. 3/D/ F/ 39 in 1422H 91 
- Decision No. 6/D/A/18 in 1422H 92 
- Decision no. 6/D/A/18 in 1422H 93 
- Decision No. 8/D/F/ 35 in 1419H. 9" 
- Decision No. 81D/F/ 35 in 1419H. 9s 
- Decision No. 3/D/F/ 39 in 1422H 
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Nevertheless, the accused's interests might be prejudiced even though the authority 
concerned has not committed any fault. In this case too the accused in Saudi Arabia 
is entitled to compensation. The compensation here is based on liability on the basis 
of risk. To grant compensation it is sufficient to prove the harm caused by a 
particular conduct practiced by the administration, although there is no fault in the 
part of the investigation authority. 
This kind of liability is based on the idea of collective solidarity. This means that if 
the administration causes any harm, though no fault is committed, the community 
(state) will bear the liability of the administration's conduct, if this conduct causes 
harm to persons. 
This rule is an exception to the original rule of liability, in which the establishing of 
fault is a crucial factor. Therefore, the Board does not apply this exceptional rule 
unless two conditions are satisfied. (1) The harm must be inflicted on a person or a 
group of persons. If it is inflicted on the whole population, the exceptional rule 
cannot grant compensation. (2) The harm must be unusual, that is serious (flagrant) 
harm. 96 
This rule was first adopted in 20/5/1400 H (1979-1980), when the Board decided that: 
"... it has been established jurisprudentially and judicially that a person who is 
harmed by an act that is conducted legally deserves compensation. This 
compensation is not based on fault because the conduct in question is legally 
permitted and serves the interest of society. There is no fault in practising it. 
However, the compensation is based on another legal principle more inclusive than 
the fault liability principle. This is the idea that citizens are equal in terms of public 
obligation (responsibility). This implies that if the administrative body adopts legal 
conduct which unexpectedly causes harm to someone, it is unjust for this person alone 
to bear this harm, since that is deemed to be an infringement of equality in terms of 
public duty. Thus, the state must compensate the damaged person. , 97 
Obviously, such high standard goes well beyond any human rights requirements. In 
contrast to the European standards of human rights, compensation pursuant to the 
above approach does not require a failure on the part of the administration. It seems 
96 
- Abdullmon'em Jeerah (1988 ) p. 470 97 
- "Majmu't Al Mabadee A/ Shar'eeh Wa Al Nedameeh" 1400 AH p. 220. The Board has reiterated 
this rule in a number of his judgments. For example, decision. No. 15/T in 30/6/1401 H. Majmu't Al 
Mabadee Al Shar'eeh Wa Al Nedameeh" 1401H P. 92& decision No. 37/T in 19/9/1401 Majmu't Al 
Mabadee Al Shar'eeh Wa Al Nedameeh" 1401 H P. 279 
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that courts in Saudi Arabia refer to the general principles of justices that are inherent 
in the religion of Islam. 
With regard to the second situation, namely if the damage is caused during the trial 
stage, which means that the court convicted the accused wrongly, the Board of 
Grievances is not empowered to handle such cases. If the accused is convicted 
wrongly and later it is discovered that he was innocent, he has the right to 
compensation. 
The Law of Criminal Procedure clearly provides an accused person with the right to 
compensation in the case of miscarriage of justice. The subject is covered in two 
articles. 
Article 210 declares: "Any acquittal judgment pursuant to a petition for 
reconsideration must, if the convicted person so requests, include moral and material 
compensation to mitigate the damage suffered by him. " 
If the accused is wrongly convicted of committing a crime, but later by means of 
reconsidering the case the accused was found not guilty, the second judgment that 
declares his innocence must contain compensation. 
It should be noted that this article considers compensation to be the accused's right if 
his innocence is proved. According to this article compensation will not be based on 
proving the presence of harm, but rather the fact of rendering a judgment that declares 
a fault in the previous conviction will indicate damage. It seems that the law 
presumes that any wrong conviction will cause harm. 
Interestingly, the law specifies that compensation must be both financial and moral. 
As to the financial compensation, even though the law uses the word "material 
compensation", it only can mean "financial compensation". 
Yet the term "moral compensation" is vague. It could mean asking the convicted 
person for forgiveness according to what has been established in Islamic law as we 
have pointed out above. It can also mean removing his name from the previous 
records or publishing his acquittal in the media. 
As to Article 217 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, it provides: "... an accused 
person, who has been harmed as a result of malicious accusation or as a result of 
being detained or imprisoned for a period exceeding the term prescribed for such 
detention or imprisonment, shall be entitled to compensation". 
This article demonstrates two issues: 
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(a) The accused is entitled to compensation if he is harmed as a result of 
malicious accusation. Malicious accusation can only occur if the accusation is 
the outcome of a private complaint. The law does not mention whether such 
compensation will be paid by the investigation authority or by the 
complainant. So it seems that the damaged person has the right to claim 
compensation from the private complainant directly, or he could claim it from 
the investigation authority. In this latter case the investigation authority can 
claim a refund from the private complainant provided that the conditions are 
satisfied. 
(b) The accused is also entitled to compensation if he is illegally detained during 
the investigation, or imprisoned in accordance with a judgment for a period 
exceeding the term prescribed. However, this compensation is conditional on 
proof of the damage. This is different from the case in article 210 mentioned 
above. According to article 210 the damage is already presumed, while in 
article 217 the damage is not presumed and needs to be proved in order to 
deserve the compensation. 
Nevertheless, the text provided in this article unjustifiably restricts the damage the 
accused might suffer due to detention or imprisonment longer than he legally 
deserves. The law does not mention the damage the accused might suffer from, for 
instance, physical torture. It would be better if the law stated the principle of 
compensation for the damage an accused might suffer, without limiting it to a 
particular action. 
In short, it goes without saying that not only the judicial system in Saudi Arabia 
guarantees the right to compensation for wrongful conviction, but also, as is evident 
from the above analysis, it applies a higher standard than that required by the 
European law of human rights. 
Part III The Right not to be tried twice for the Same Offence 
The right not to be tried again for the same offence is provided for by Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It states: "1-No one 
shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the 
jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally 
acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. 
2-The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the re-opening of the 
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case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there 
is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental 
defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. " 
Searching on early Islamic jurisprudence reveals that there is no such discussion of 
the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence. This can be attributed 
to the fact that old Islamic societies did not know other than an ordinary Shari'ah 
courts. 
Nonetheless, in principle, the rule against double jeopardy is in complete harmony 
with the Islamic principles of justice. Commenting on this rule Mashood A. Baderin98 
argues that: "Retrying a previously tried and convicted or acquitted person on the 
same facts is tantamount to injustice and perhaps witch-hunting. " In the Resolution 
adopted after the First International Conference on the Protection of Human Rights in 
Islamic Criminal Justice System held in Syracuse, Italy in 1979, the Conference 
resolved that "The letter and spirit of Islamic Law on the subject of the protection of 
the rights of the criminally accused are in complete harmony with the fundamental 
principles of human rights under international law. "99 
As a result the legislative authority in Saudi Arabia did not find it difficult to 
guarantee such right even though it has not been discussed or demonstrated by early 
Islamic jurisprudence. This is in fact an area where Islamic state by adopting the 
principle of public interest as a source for legislation, can reveal the capability of 
Islamic law to accommodate new human rights norms essential to the proper 
administration of justice. By stipulating this right in terms to a great extent similar to 
those provided in the international human rights law, the Saudi legislature shows 
Islamic law as being up to date. This is the proper understanding which does not limit 
Islamic law to jurisprudence existing within Islamic context, but rather it shows 
Islamic law to be capable of absorbing novel human rights principles regardless of 
their origin in order to enhance the protection and observance of the dignity of human 
being. The Law of Criminal Procedure states in Article 187 that: "If an accused is 
convicted, or acquitted, pursuant to a judgment on the subject matter of the criminal 
action, no other criminal action shall be initiated against this accused in respect of 
the same acts and facts upon which the judgment has been rendered. If another 
98 
- (2003) p. 110 99 
- See Mashood Baderin (2003) p. 110 
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criminal action is initiated, the previous judgment shall be maintained at any time of 
this action, even if the case is being considered by the Appellate Court. The court 
shall have due regard of the previous judgment, even if the issue has not been 
maintained by the litigants. Any previous ruling shall be established by submitting an 
official copy thereof, or a certificate issued by the court with respect thereto. " 
In fact, the approach of the Saudi judicial jurisprudence in respect of rule of no 
double jeopardy, may demonstrate that the Saudi law applies this rule strictly as 
compared with the European Court's approach. The European Court has interpreted 
this article to permit the state concerned to retry the accused under different 
classification of the offence before different judicial bodies, on the ground that "that 
is typical example of a single act constituting various offences. "100 This interpretation 
is not accepted by the judicial system in Saudi Arabia. If a person is convicted or 
acquitted by a final decision, he is no longer liable to whosoever kind of proceedings 
even if the single act constitutes various offences. 101 For example in one case a 
Nigerian national was convicted and sentenced for a term of imprisonment by the 
Shari'ah court in Mecca for possessing a personal identity belonging to a Saudi 
person in order to escape his illegal stay in the country. Consequently, he was 
persecuted before the Broad of Grievances for committing the crime of false 
impersonation of another person. The Board after considering the case decided that 
since the Shari'ah court's judgment is final, and because subjecting the accused for a 
trial twice for the same act is unlawful, the case was dismissed. 102 
However, according to the by-law of the Law of criminal Procedure if one offence 
causes damage to more than one victim, a judgment concerning the accused, against 
one of the victims, does not prevent other victims from taking a fresh criminal action 
against the accused in respect of the same offence. The presumption here is that 
actions in these circumstances are private rights and are initiated by the victims 
themselves, not the Public Prosecution. So the state has no right to prevent victims 
from exercising their right to have access to courts even if the Public Prosecution is 
not satisfied in respect of the evidence. 
Although, this might be regarded as an exception to the rule in question, articulating 
the right not to be tried twice for the same offence in the law of Saudi Arabia has 
100 
- Gradinger v Austria (1995) Para 53 (Application No. 00011932/90) 101 
- See Decision no. 19/D/G/3 1421 H 102 
- Decision No H/2/1401 H 
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brought the practice of the judicial system in Saudi Arabia in closer harmony with 
European standards of human rights. 
Part IV The Right to a Pardon 
The right of the accused to pardon has no equivalent in the European Convention of 
Human Rights. In contrast Islamic law and hence the Saudi law provide the accused 
with right to a pardon where his circumstances advocate such a decision. 
Only two articles are provided to cover this subject in Saudi Arabian law. Article 22 
of the Law of Criminal Procedure provides: "Public criminal action shall lapse in the 
following events... (2) Grant of pardon by the King on pardonable matters... 
However, the lapse of public criminal action shall not impede the continuation of a 
private right of action". And article 23 provides: "A private criminal action lapses in 
the following two cases... (2) Grant of pardon by the victim or his heirs. ... 
However, 
the grant of pardon by the victim or his heirs shall not preclude proceedings of the 
public criminal action. " 
The law does not state conditions or criteria for the application of a pardon. When 
applying a pardon, judges refer to Islamic law. Thus, the discussion provided here 
will focus on the pardon in Islamic law. 
Pursuant to Islamic law pardon can be exercised by the victim or his heirs, or by the 
ruler in the Islamic state. It can be practiced before the commencing of the criminal 
action or during the criminal action. Pardon can also be granted after the delivery of 
the judgment and before inflicting the punishment, or during the implementation of 
judgment. For the sake of clarity, the idea of pardon in Islam will be examined in 
respect of all categories of crime in Islamic law. 
One: Haddud crimes 103 
Haddud crimes in general are considered as crimes against God (society). 
Punishments for these crimes are designed to protect the interest of the society. 
Therefore, neither the ruler nor an individual has the right to pardon the criminal in 
this type of crime. 104 
103 
- Haddud crimes are seven: 1- adultery 
2- drinking alcohol 3- apostasy 4- defamation 5 rebellion 6 
theft. 7- Highway robbery or brigandage. 
104 
- Muhammad Abu Zahra (1998) p. 73 
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However, as an exception to the above rule, jurists disagree about the crime of 
defamation. They disagree about the nature of this crime: whether it is deemed to be 
against God or against the individual. 
Al Hanafi jurists argue that defamation is considered to violate the rights of society; 
thus pardon cannot be accepted after the judgment. In contrast to this view Al Shafi'i 
and Al Hanbali jurists believe that defamation is a violation of a private right, 
therefore the victim has the right to pardon the perpetrator before and after the 
delivery of a judgment. 105 
The judicial system in Saudi Arabia seems to have adopted the second view. Article 
29 of the Law of Criminal Procedure provides: "The complaint filed by the person 
harmed because of a crime shall be considered as a claim of private right of action, 
unless he expressly waives such right before the Investigator. The Investigator shall 
enter any such waiver into the record and shall have it witnessed. In case of 
defamation and qisas, such waiver shall be certified by the competent court". 
Moreover, jurists state that in the crime of theft the victim's pardon can be accepted 
before the commencement of criminal action. The prophet's companions encouraged 
mediation with the victim to pardon the culprit before undertaking criminal action. 
God said: "Show forgiveness, enjoin what is good, and turn away from the foolish 
(i. e. don't punish them)s106 
However, if the victim of a theft pardons the culprit after the judgment, the pardon is 
not acceptable. 107 
Other issues related to the crime of theft are also discussed by jurists. They argue that 
if the accused is convicted of committing theft and is sentenced by a Hadd 
punishment, this punishment will be dropped (cancelled) if the victim states that the 
stolen money in fact belongs to the perpetrator. Two reasons are offered for this: 
(1) The criminal action is based on the victim's claim that he is the owner of the 
stolen money. To render a judgment containing a Hadd punishment, the 
criminal action must be based on a complaint of the victim. This complaint 
stands until the implementation of the Hadd punishment. If the victim admits 
that the stolen money belongs to the accused, the basis for the criminal action 
is dropped. Accordingly, the Hadd punishment is also dropped. 
105 - Ibid, p. 74,75&76 10G 
- Surah 7. Al-A'raf. Verse No. 199 107 
- Muhammad Abu Zahra (1998 ) p. 74,75&76 
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(2) A confession of this kind creates doubt, and Hadd punishment cannot be 
inflicted with doubt. 108 
Another issue that was discussed by early Islamic jurists is whether it should 
influence the infliction of the Hadd punishment if the person convicted of theft is 
allowed to keep the stolen money after judgment is rendered. The majority of jurists 
claim that to drop the Hadd punishment on these grounds is unacceptable, because the 
crime of theft has been proved and all conditions for the imposition of Hadd 
punishment have been satisfied; therefore there is no justification for cancelling the 
Hadd punishment. They support their opinion with the following story: 
It is told that a man stole clothes. The victim complained to the Prophet. The thief 
admitted guilt, and was sentenced by the Prophet. The victim felt mercy for the 
criminal and told the Prophet that he did not want him to be punished, and that he 
would like to give him the clothes as a kind of charity. The Prophet refused to accept 
his belated pardon and asked "why did not you pardon him before you made your 
complaint? " 
Yet other jurists state that in this case the Hadd punishment must be dropped. Their 
argument rests on two points: 
1- The victim's complaint in a crime of theft is one of the conditions for 
imposing the Hadd punishment. This complaint must stand until the 
punishment is inflicted. To grant the stolen money to the thief terminates the 
complaint. Through this step the victim is no longer the owner of the money, 
thus one condition to impose the Hadd punishment is absent. 
2- Such a step creates doubt and no Hadd punishment can be imposed with 
doubt. 109 
Two: Qisas crimes110 
Qisas crimes are considered as crimes against the individual, therefore the victim or 
his heirs have the right to pardon the culprit. They can waive their right to punish the 
criminal, either in the form of an agreement with the culprit to pay a certain amount, 
or without payment for the sake of God. 
In this kind of crime the ruler has no right to pardon the culprit, because the crime 
concerns a private right, thus only the victim or his heirs have the right of pardon. 
108 
- Ibid, p. 321 109 
- Ibid, p. 322 110 
- Qisas crimes are two: 1- murder (homicide). 2- Retaliatory punishment 
in cases other than death. 
For instance, breaking an arm or nose. 
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Islamic law calls for forgiveness and pardon even when the sin is a homicide. Islam 
describes those who forgive and pardon as of good moral and human character. In 
the view of Islam, pardon can encourage the criminal to abstain from future crime 
when the one who pardons is the one who is capable of imposing the punishment 
upon them. This might lead the wrong-doer to rehabilitation in the community who 
forgives him. "' 
God said: "Whether you (mankind) disclose (by good words of thanks) a good deed 
(done to you in the form of a favour by someone), or conceal it, or pardon an evil... 
Verily, Allah is Ever Oft-Pardoning, All-Powerful"' 2. He also said: "The good deed 
and the evil deed cannot be equal. Repel (the evil) with one which is better (i. e. Allah 
orders the faithful believers to be patient at the time of anger, and to excuse those 
who treat them badly) then verily he, between whom and you there was enmity, (will 
become) as though he was a close friend. "' 
13 He also said: "The recompense for an 
evil is an evil like thereof; but whoever forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward 
is with Allah. Verily, He likes not the Zalimun (oppressors, polytheists, and wrong- 
doers)". 14 
In the case of the crime of murder, if there is more than one heir of the victim, the 
pardon of one is sufficient to cancel the death penalty, according to the Al Hanafi, Al 
Shafi'i and Hanbali schools, even if the majority of the heirs disagree and insist on 
the application of the death penalty. Two points support their view: (a) to inflict the 
death penalty in the crime of murder, all the victim's heirs must request it. (b) The 
right to grant pardon is given to each of the victim's heirs. 
The judicial system in Saudi Arabia adopts this view, therefore if any one of the 
victim's heirs pardons the culprit, the death penalty will then become null. 
Al Maliki jurists agree that a pardon from one of the heirs will cancel the death 
penalty, provided that the relationship of each heir to the victim was of equal status. 
However, they argue that if there is an heir who stood in a closer relationship to the 
victim than the waiver, this waiver will not be accepted. 
' 15 
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If the victim is partially wounded, he alone has the right to pardon the culprit. And if 
one person stabs another, who pardons the perpetrator before dying, in this case the 
death penalty will be cancelled. ' 16 
If a person commits a murder, and he is found guilty and sentenced to the death 
penalty, the victims can in this case waive their right to inflict the punishment and 
decide to take compensation (blood money) instead. Jurists dispute whether the 
convicted person should have the choice of offering to pay blood money, or whether 
it is the victim's right to be compensated by the blood money whether the convicted 
person agrees or not. There are two views: 
1- The Al Hanafi and Al Maliki schools argue that the convicted person is not 
obliged to pay blood money, unless he agrees to do so. The victim's waiver in 
this case must be deemed an agreement in which the full acceptance of all 
parties concerned is required. 
2- The Al Hanbali and Al Shafi'i schools disagree, stating that it is the victim's 
right to choose equally between the death penalty and the blood money. If he 
decides to waive his first right, the death penalty, then his second right still 
stands. The convicted person has no choice in this regard. ' 17 
In practice in Saudi Arabia, if the pardon occurs during the execution of the death 
penalty, the execution will be stopped and the killer will be sent back to prison. Then 
the case will be sent to the court to ratify the pardon. "8 
However, it should be emphasised that in Islamic law, although a crime of Qisas 
directly violates the victim's rights (a private right), so that the latter is given the right 
to pardon the accused, society as a whole is also harmed by a Qisas crime, because it 
breaches the security of society. Thus, the state is empowered to defend its interest 
by punishing the criminal (the murderer). Consequently, if the victim's heirs waive 
their right to punish the murderer, the private criminal action will be dropped, but the 
society's right to punish the perpetrator still stands. In such a case the public 
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prosecution will commence public criminal action against the accused to punish the 
latter with a Ta'azir punishment. 119 
Accordingly, in the crime of murder, if the victim's heirs pardon the convicted person, 
this pardon has consequences with regard to the private and public domains. 
As to the private domain, the killer is obliged to implement whatever has been agreed 
between him and the victim's heirs. This might be blood money, or less or more than 
blood money. He is also under obligation to satisfy any condition that might be 
suggested by the victim's heirs provided that the court accepts this condition. 
With regard to the public domain, if the death penalty is waived, the murderer must be 
sentenced for five years according to the law in Saudi Arabia. 
120 
Three: Ta'azir crimes 
Generally speaking, Ta'azir crimes are considered as crimes against the interest of 
society. Therefore, society has alone the right to pardon the culprit. Since the ruler 
represents the whole community this right is granted to him. His pardon can save the 
criminal from all, or a part, of his punishment. He can grant this pardon before the 
commencement of the criminal action or during the investigation or trial stages. The 
ruler also has the right to grant the pardon after the conviction and before the 
execution of the punishment, or even during the execution. 
Nevertheless, the ruler must only exercise his power if the interest of society requires 
such a decision. For example, if one person commits a Ta'azir crime, and the judge 
sentences him, the ruler can, according to the circumstances surrounding the crime or 
the criminal, forgive the criminal provided that such a decision is taken as being in the 
public interest; for instance if he sees that the criminal is a first time offender and the 
pardon may help him to rehabilitate himself again in society. 
121 
Nevertheless, it is essential to understand that the pardon granted by the ruler in 
Ta'azir crimes is limited to the protection of society's interest, and has no bearing on 
private rights, namely the victim's rights. Even though some Ta'azir crimes are 
considered as a violation of public rights, they also in some cases cause harm to the 
victim. To illustrate: one person may beat another without causing him injury, or 
express verbal insults which do not constitute the crime of defamation (a Hadd 
119 
- Abdulkader Owda ( no year) p. 777 120 
- Ahmad Belal (1990) p. 1182 121 
- In order to grant a pardon to a convicted person the authority concerned 
in Saudi Arabia applies, 
though with some flexibility, certain factors. For example whether he has a previous criminal record; 
and whether the offence is or is not one of the serious crimes provided for in the law. 
360 
crime); in these circumstances the perpetrator commits the crime of Ta'azir. 
Although such crimes cause harm to the victim, they also cause damage to the public 
order of society. If the ruler waives the right of society to punish the criminal, the 
victim's right to punish the criminal still holds. 
'22 
To conclude, the right to pardon mirrors the humanitarian approach of Islamic law. In 
the views of Islam an offender is not regarded outside the society, and members of the 
society should not reject him, but rather the society, as a whole, should bear the 
burden of rehabilitating the accused, and support him to re-engage properly in the 
community. The basic idea behind the pardon principle is that, Muslim society has to 
strike a balance between the advantages and disadvantages of punishing the criminal. 
Needless to say that such humanitarian nature of the right to pardon, though not 
provided expressly in the European Convention, is clearly consistent with, generally 
speaking, the notion of human rights which calls for an enhancement of the dignity of 
human beings. 
Part V The Right to Stay the Execution of Punishment 
Again the right to stay the execution of punishment for humanitarian reasons is 
unknown to the European Convention on Human Rights. Searching on the provisions 
of the Convention or in the Court's jurisprudence does not provide similar guarantee. 
This part will be dealt with in two sections. The first will be devoted to Islamic law 
and the Shari'ah courts in Saudi Arabia. The second concerns the Board of 
Grievances. But before embarking on the discussion, the meaning of the concept of 
stay of execution must be clarified. 
After convicting the accused the judge might, depending on the convicted person's 
status or according to the circumstances in which the criminal committed his crime, 
consider that the accused is not an experienced criminal, and that putting him in 
prison might cause him harm rather than benefit in terms of the principle of 
rehabilitation. If he is a first time offender, imprisonment among people with 
previous criminal records, and separation from his normal life with his children and 
family will have a negative effect on both himself and his family. It is therefore 
argued that after conviction he should be given another chance, by being placed on 
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probation for a particular period. If he does not commit any crime during the 
prescribed time, the conviction will lose its effect. However, if he commits another 
crime during this time he will be subject to punishment for both crimes. 
One: Islamic law and Saudi Shari'ah Courts 
The concept of staying the execution of punishment is not known in Islamic law. 
However, Islamic law and hence the Shari'ah Courts in Saudi Arabia are familiar 
with a similar idea. Islamic jurists accept the idea of releasing the offender without 
punishment but with the warning that he will be punished, probably with a harsher 
punishment, if he commits another crime similar to the current one. According to 
Islamic law the judge has the right to stay the punishment after convicting the 
defender, if he considers that it is more suitable to rehabilitate the defender. 123 
Nonetheless, such discretion is limited to Ta'azir crimes, thus according to Islamic 
law and hence the Shari'ah Courts in Saudi Arabia the judge cannot stay the 
execution of punishment in Haddud or Qisas crimes. 
124 
Another important point here is that Islamic law and law governing the Shari'ah 
courts do not designate a time during which the staying of punishment will be 
examined. If the defendant is released without punishment, this should have 
immediate effect. This means that the judgment will be considered null immediately 
after rendering the stay of punishment. However, if the defendant commits a second 
similar crime even after a considerable lapse of time, the judge will take into account 
the previous conviction when deciding the due punishment. 
Two: The Board of Grievances 
The Royal Order No. 7/H/3517 in 18/10/1410 H states that the Circuit concerned in 
the Board of Grievances can suggest the staying of execution of punishment in cases 
of bribery and forgery if the Circuit believes from the accused's character, his 
personal status, the circumstances in which he committed the crime, and his 
motivation in committing the crime, that he will not commit the crime again. 
Clearly, the idea of staying the punishment implies that the Board renders a final 
judgment to convict and punish the defendant. Its effect is limited to suspending the 
person sentence for a period of time. 125 
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The objective of staying of execution is to avoid the negative impact of imprisonment 
for a short time, in particular for the first time offender. The application of the 
concept requires a careful study of the accused's personality (character) to evaluate 
whether he deserves to enjoy this privilege. '26 
The Board rules that: "The general rule is that judgments must be implemented. This 
is to achieve the public interest for which these rules are legislated. Imposing 
punishment has a deterrent effect on those who break the law. 
Having said that, however, an exemption from this general rule is permitted in 
particular circumstances, by staying the execution of the punishment whenever a 
reasonable cause exists. i127 
Interestingly, the purpose of staying the execution of punishment cannot be achieved 
unless the execution is fully stayed. The execution of punishment cannot in any way 
be applied partially. This is because this would contradict the aim of staying the 
punishment. The Board rules that: "staying of execution must include the whole 
punishment because the goal of this principle cannot be satisfied if it is applied 
partially. i 128 
Obviously the Royal order mentioned above confines the application of this principle 
to two crimes: 1- bribery and 2- forgery. Therefore, punishments imposed in respect 
of other crimes cannot be stayed. 
However, Fattoh Al Shadlee and Abdulfatah Al Safee claim that in the Board of 
Grievances the Circuit concerned may stay the execution of punishment with regard 
to crimes other than bribery and forgery by reference to Islamic law. They justify this 
view by pointing out that judges on the Board are required to refer to Islamic law 
whenever the statute of the Board is silent. 129 
In addition, it is argued that the term "personal status" mentioned in the Royal Order 
is limited to the defendant's personal circumstances, for example if he voluntarily 
admits guilt, or if he is responsible for a big family. However, the term does not refer 
to the social status arising from his family or career. '30 One of the Board's rulings 
reads: "Since the accused is at an early age and studying at the university, and it 
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seems that when he committed the crime he was not an experienced criminal, but 
rather committed a misdemeanour whose impact he did not evaluate; and because the 
execution of the prison sentence might serve counter to the objective of the 
punishment; and since the Circuit considers the damage he suffered during the 
investigation and trial is sufficient to deter him; therefore, the Circuit decides that the 
punishment will be stayed. " 131 In another case the accused (Pakistani) who was 
working in a private company in `Jeddah city' counterfeited a certificate to permit his 
wife and children to stay in the country for a period longer than what they were 
officially granted. He was convicted and sentenced pursuant to articles 5 and 6 of the 
Forgery Act before the Board of Grievances. However, the Board decided to stay the 
execution of the punishment on the ground that the accused committed the crime in 
order to keep his wife and children close to him. His motivation when committing the 
offence was to make his family life more stable by gathering them in one place. '32 
Other ground for staying the execution of punishment is old age. 133 
Nonetheless, the criminal circuit must provide a clear ground for its decision to stay 
the execution of punishment. It follows that if the criminal circuit decides to stay the 
punishment without providing grounds for this decision, the decision will be 
reversed. ' 34 
As to the sequences of staying the execution of punishment before the Board of 
Grievance, the execution will be stayed for five years. If this period elapses without 
the committing of a new crime, the judgment is null and void and has no legal effect. 
But, if during these five years the defendant commits a new crime, whether under the 
Board's jurisdiction or not, he will be remanded to the Board to decide upon the 
execution of the stayed punishment as well as the punishment rendered in respect of 
the new crime. 135 
The right to stay the execution of punishment which has no counterpart in the 
European contexts of human right demonstrates the spirit of Mercy that is required by 
the religion of Islam. In the Resolution adopted after the First International 
Conference on the Protection of Human Rights in Islamic Criminal Justice System 
held in Syracuse, Italy in 1979, the Resolution states that the accused under Islamic 
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law must enjoy "the right to benefit from the spirit of Mercy and the goals of 
rehabilitation and remobilization in the consideration of the penalty to be 
imposed. "' 36 
Part VI The Right to Repent 
Just like the rights to pardon, and to stay of execution of punishment, the right to 
repent in criminal cases, is not guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
Only a single article is provided in the Law of Criminal Procedure to cover the right 
to repent after the committing of the crime. Article 22 of this law declares: "Public 
criminal action shall lapse in the following events... (3) Repentance, which satisfies 
the Shari'ah requirements... However, the lapse of public criminal action shall not 
impede the continuation of a private right of action". 
No other provision mentions the concept of repentance in any law governing the 
Shari'ah courts and the Board of Grievances. Furthermore, this article is general and 
does not specify any details or conditions for the application of this principle. This 
article requires in clear terms that when dealing with the principle of repentance 
judges must refer to Islamic rules on this matter. Therefore, this part will be treated in 
one section because judges in both Shari'ah courts and the Board of Grievances 
should refer to Islamic law to handle these issues. 
Generally speaking, Islamic law provides the accused with an important guarantee, 
namely that if in the case of particular crimes he repents, he cannot be tried. In the 
following discussion the idea of repentance in general, and the sequences of repenting 
will be described in turn. 
(1) The concept of repentance 
The concept of repentance in Islamic law is grounded in the hope that the wrongdoer 
may abstain from committing further sins if he repents. The ruler in Islam should not 
adopt a position of revenge against those who commit prohibited deeds. He must 
show mercy and forgiveness even towards those who act illegally if they feel sorrow 
for their behaviours. t37 
In the Qur'an God calls for forgiveness for those who commit crimes if they repent. 
He said: "0 you who believe! Turn to Allah with sincere repentance! It may be that 
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your Lord will absolve you from your sins"138. He also said: "And those who, when 
they have committed Fahishah (illegal sexual intercourse) or wronged themselves 
with evil, remember Allah and ask forgiveness for their sins". 139 In other verses God 
said: "Except those who repent and believe (in Islamic Monotheism), and do 
righteous deeds; for those, Allah will change their sins into good deeds, and Allah is 
Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. And whosoever repents and does righteous deeds; 
then verily, he repents towards Allah with true repentance. " 140 
The Prophet also calls for repentance. He said: "0 people repent to Allah. I do repent 
to Allah one hundred times a day. " 141 
The prophet forbade his companions to disgrace a criminal, because this could hinder 
his repentance. The story is told that after punishing a person who had committed the 
crime of drinking alcohol, some of the Prophet's companions said to him "may Allah 
humiliate you. " The Prophet was angry and instructed them not to say this. 
Abdulfatah Kuder in his comment on the above story explains that if the criminal 
feels that he is refused and disgraced, he will take revenge by not accepting rules 
accepted by society. 142 
(2) The consequences of repenting 
One: Qisas crimes 
Qisas crimes are deemed as an assault against private rights, that is the rights of the 
victim or his family; therefore repenting of this crime does not bring about the 
dropping of the punishment. This is because repentance cannot be exercised, unless 
the criminal fulfils all people's rights. 
Two: Ta'azir crimes 
If the crime in this category is an assault against society's rights, the ruler has the 
discretion to accept the repentance if he sees it to be in the public interest. But if the 
crime is an assault against a private right, the repentance does not bring about the 
dropping of the punishment. 
Three: Haddud crimes 
Jurists agree about the Hadd of defamation. They argue that the repentance should 
not lead to the dropping of punishment because defamation is an assault against a 
138 Surah 66 At- Tahrim. Verse No. 8 
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private right. Therefore, the punishment for defamation will be dropped if the victim 
pardons the perpetrator. 
With regard to the crime of highway robbery jurists are in agreement about dropping 
the punishment if the criminals in this type of crime repent before it is too late. That 
is to say, before the authority concerned arrests them. This position is founded on the 
saying of God after designating punishments for the crime of highway robbery. God 
said: "Except for those who (having fled away and then) came back (as Muslim) with 
repentance before they fall into your power; in that case, know that Allah is Oft- 
Forgiving, Most Merciful". 143 
(3) How repentance can be achieved 
Three conditions are required for repentance. Two of them are mental and the third is 
a material condition. 1' The mental conditions are 1- the culprit must admit that he 
committed a sin and feels sorry for this. 2- He must intend not to commit the crime 
again. The material condition is that he must abstain from committing crimes. 
In applying these conditions to the crime of highway robbery, jurists do not discuss 
the mental conditions, because these are left to God. However, they discuss the 
material condition that might provide an indication of whether or not the mental 
requirements are satisfied. 
Two points can satisfy the material condition: 
1- The criminal must satisfy the citizens that he will not commit the crime again, 
and leave the place where he committed his crime. 
2- He should hand over his weapons and declare his obedience to the authority's 
instructions. 
Jurists disagree on whether these conditions must be applied jointly or alternatively. 
There are two opinions: 
(a) Repentance can be achieved by either of the above requirements. 
(b) Repentance can only be achieved by the fulfilment of both the two conditions 
mentioned above. 145 
As to other Haddud crimes there are three opinions'46: 
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(A) Some jurists in the Shafi'i and Hanbali schools believe that repentance should 
bring about the dropping of punishment. They quote two points in support of their 
view: 
1: God said with regard to the Hadd of theft: "And (as for) the male thief and female 
thief, cut off (from the wrist joint) their (right) hands as a recompense for that which 
they committed, a punishment by way of example from Allah. And Allah is All- 
Powerful, All Wise. But whosever repents after his crime and does righteous good 
deeds (by obeying Allah), then verily, Allah will pardon him (accept his repentance). 
Verily, Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful". 147 
In addition, the story is told of a man called Ma'az who admitted his guilt of 
committing the crime of adultery. When the Prophet's companions started to punish 
him, he tried to escape. But the companions prevented him and continued the 
punishment. The Prophet, disagreeing, said, "Why did not you left him escape and 
repent? So may Allah accept his repentance. " 
It is claimed that these texts indicate that repentance is considered as expiation for 
Haddud crimes. Since repentance is regarded as a punishment in this life and as 
expiation in the hereafter, by fortiori it expiates crimes in this life. God said: "Except 
for those who (having fled away and then) came back (as Muslims) with repentance 
before they fall into your power; in that case, know that Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most 
Merciful". 148 
2: both a Hadd punishment and repentance purify the human soul. If the criminal soul 
is purified by repentance the Hadd punishment is superfluous. 
(B) Others argue that repentance does not warrant the dropping of punishment in 
Haddud crimes except in the crime of highway robbery. Al Maliki and Al Hanafi 
adopt this view with some jurists of the Shafi'i, and Hanbali Schools. The view is 
based on the following points: 
1: Haddud crimes are only purified by their punishment. Therefore, those who 
committed crimes during the Prophet's era came to the Prophet to admit their guilt 
and to purify their soul by receiving punishment, and they were punished. If 
repentance, the argument goes, is sufficient to drop the Hadd punishment, no Hadd 
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punishment would be inflicted upon a repentant person, because confession 
particularly if there is no prosecution, is sufficient proof of the repentance. 
2: Haddud punishment is a public deterrent. Every criminal will claim the repentance. 
Repentance under the threat of punishment is not what is meant by repentance, which 
is called for by God. God said: "Allah accepts only the repentance of those who do 
evil in ignorance and foolishness and repent soon afterwards; it is they whom Allah 
will forgive and Allah is Ever All-Knower, All-Wise. And of no effect is the 
repentance of those who continue to do evil deeds until one of them confronts death 
and says: `now I repent"'. 149 
(C) Jurists Abin Tammah and his pupil Abin Al Keem from the Hanbali School 
suggest that both repentance and punishment purify the human soul. Therefore, 
punishment will be dropped except if the criminal himself prefers to be punished to 
purify his soul from his bad deeds. 
Now as to the application before courts in Saudi Arabia, it could be claimed that since 
the judicial system as has been pointed out in chapter three applies as, a general rule, 
the Hanbali School, the last view suggested by Jurists Abin Tammah and Abin Al 
Keem is more likely to be adopted. 
It is evident from the above analyses that similar to the right to pardon and the right to 
stay the execution of the punishment, the right of the accused to repent is clearly 
founded mainly on the thought of rehabilitating the offender. This is a manifestation 
of the significant role of the Islamic religion in respect of the criminal justice system 
in Saudi Arabia. The system is observably influenced by the spirit of Mercy, 
forgiveness, and tolerance even with those who breach the interest of the society. 
Interestingly, the influence of the spirit of religion is not completely alien to the 
European Community and hence as far as this thesis in concerned the European 
human rights law. In fact there is an appreciation among members of the EC of the 
importance of religion as an aspect of culture heritage. Ian Leigh argues that: 
"Plainly the EC is neither Erastian nor a Theocracy. Religion is neither subordinated 
and enlisted in the service of the EC, nor vice versa. This is not surprising-none of the 
member states, current and prospective, are at these extremes. " 150 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion 
Introduction: 
The study examines a single aspect of human rights i. e. the rights of the accused during trial. 
It takes the European Convention on Human Rights as a model for the international standards 
of human rights. It compares rights called for in the European Convention with rights 
provided to the accused during trial in Saudi Arabia. 
The term "human rights" is a relatively recent one, dating from the eighteenth century, but the 
modem concept is seen as an outcome of western philosophical thought during the last 
millennium. A new era for the human rights movement began with the establishment of the 
United Nations. From this time human rights were no longer confined to a local domain, but 
gained an international status via international and regional declarations, treaties, conferences 
etc. Thus an international standard of human rights has been created. 
Irrespective of its origin, the concept of human rights is today acknowledged by all nations 
and states around the globe. No individual country would nowadays accept the designation 
of violator of human rights; such a designation would be regarded as a stigma in a country's 
political history. This is clear evidence of the universality of the concept. Article one of the 
World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna (1993) states: ". .. The universal nature 
of these rights and freedoms is beyond question. " Further, the operative part of the 
Resolution (III) reads: ". .. the 
General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations ... 
" 
However, this universality of the concept should be distinguished from the universalism of 
human rights. The latter concept emerged when an attempt was undertaken to define the 
norms of human rights in the terms of only the Western liberal tradition. From this moment a 
conflict began to take place between advocates of universalism and of relativism. There are 
indeed two clearly opposed positions in this debate. ' 
'- For example, article 8 of the Bangkok Declaration adopted by Asian States in 1993 prior to the Vienna 
Conference provides: "while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a 
dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. " See also Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (Charter 4487/1100 Rev. 1. ) 
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During the Cold War, the argument of relativism versus universalism proceeded mainly 
between the Communist regimes and the democratic west. Today, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the debate takes place between developed and less developed countries, or in a 
religious (Islam-West) scenario. 
Since the engagement of Islamic law and Muslim practice in this debate is today clearer than 
ever before, and since the subject of this thesis is aspects of human rights in an Islamic state 
(Saudi Arabia), it is hoped that the contribution of the thesis is to offer guidelines for 
assessing the case in Islamic societies and to put forward a proposal geared towards 
alleviating the conflict. 
Reflective Equilibrium 
The source of this proposal is found in the work of the contemporary American political 
philosopher John Rawls. Central is Rawls' concept of "reflective equilibrium". The term 
`reflective' refers to the requirement that a society stands back in imagination from its 
subjective ground, to view and test its values from the hypothetical perspective of an 
objective outsider. The term `equilibrium' denotes the desired result, when the influence of 
this perspective enables a society to place its received values of `justice' in a balance with 
alternative modes. 
From the position of reflective equilibrium, a society would recognise which of its considered 
judgments followed essential guiding principles, and where there might be latitude for 
reappraisal in an international context. The model thus offers a possible means of 
reconciliation between western human rights provisions currently held up as `universal' and 
the problems of conflicting cultural norms. 
In Rawls' philosophy, equal status is accorded to the received values of a society and to the 
guiding principles formed from a neutral perspective. Both have instrumental value, in the 
role they can play in defining a society's norms. However, for practical purposes a procedure 
is required. Thus, in the case of conflict between international human rights standards (the 
`neutral outsider' principles) and the considered judgments of an Islamic state, the latter 
would first make every attempt to bring its practices into line with international requirements. 
However, where Islamic law explicitly precludes such modification, the international bodies 
of human rights must allow the state in question to resolve the conflict within its own cultural 
parameters. The exercise of this latitude is denoted by the European Court of Human Rights 
as the principle of `margin of appreciation'. 
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The proposal of this thesis is that it is feasible to apply this model to an Islamic society on the 
grounds of the flexibility of the Islamic law. Guidance granted through God's revelation in 
the Holy Sources, namely the Qur'an and the Sunnah, is of an eternal nature. As a 
consequence it is not subject to change. But what is important here is that these two sources 
have revealed deliberately broad principles and individuals are free to adopt any rules suitable 
to the circumstances. 2 
When the command of Allah or the Prophet is explicitly given, no one is capable of making, 
or qualified to make the least alteration to it. 3 Nevertheless, if the Shari'ah is silent or does not 
speak explicitly, the Islamic state has the right, or may be obliged, to provide an answer to 
new circumstances. 
Empowering the legislative authority in the Islamic state with the right to enact laws might 
appear to be in contradiction with the idea that God alone has this right. However, this 
conclusion would be inaccurate. God exercised His legislative discretion in the Qur'an and 
the Sunnah. These sources do not provide detailed laws to deal with every aspect of life. In 
fact except in some exceptional cases the Qur'an and the Sunnah give only general principles. 
Therefore, the Islamic community or state has the discretion to respond to new circumstances, 
provided that their decision does not breach general Islamic principles. 
This approach to legislation demonstrates the flexibility of Islamic law, which makes it 
applicable in all times and places. Without such an approach Islamic law would certainly have 
been inadequate after the cessation of divine revelation. 
In short, although the Qur'an and the Sunnah are sovereign over all other laws and cannot be 
amended, the Islamic Shari'ah is not out of date, but can adequately deal with new issues and 
meet evolving needs that have not been explicitly addressed in the two sources mentioned 
previously. The legislative approach of the Qur'an and the Sunnah makes the Shari'ahz 
applicable to all times and circumstances, when enacting new rules concerning issues that 
both the Qur'an and the Sunnah are silent about or about which they do not speak 
comprehensively. 
Generally speaking, the thesis demonstrates that all rights required by the European standards 
of human rights are clearly recognized by the judicial system in Saudi Arabia, and further, that 
early Islamic jurisprudence discussed these rights even though sometimes using different 
terminology. Only the right of the accused not to be tried again for the same offence is 
2- Khurshid Ahmad ( 1992) p. 43 
3- Abdur Rahman I. Doi (1997) p. 5 
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apparently not mentioned in early Islamic discussion. But in spite of this fact, and since 
providing such a guarantee does not violate Islamic principles but rather is consistent with its 
humanitarian nature, the judicial system in Saudi Arabia stipulates this right in the Law of 
Criminal Procedures. 
This approach is the core of our call in this thesis. When enacting laws the legislative body in 
Saudi Arabia should take into consideration the international standards of human rights, and 
should try to adopt norms that are not provided in the Saudi law, provided that this norm is not 
inconsistence with Islamic principles. 
On the other hand this study shows that in some circumstances Islamic law and hence the 
Saudi law provides the accused with guarantees that are not provided by the European 
Convention or probably by any other instruments of human rights. The accused's rights to a 
pardon, to repentance, and to stay of execution of punishment on humanitarian grounds, are 
not known to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
In other areas the study demonstrates that the courts in Saudi Arabia, although providing the 
accused with similar rights to those called for by the European Convention, apply these to a 
higher standard. 
Aside from the fact that all the rights of the accused relevant to the criminal trial stage that are 
treated by the European Convention are, strictly speaking, provided by the judicial system in 
Saudi Arabia, there are deficiencies that need to be addressed in order to conform fully with 
European standards of human rights. 
In this conclusion only the most important findings are illustrated. These findings relate, 
respectively, to certain deficiencies in the Saudi judicial system; to points concerning 
presumption of innocence; to the European concept of legality; and to three groups of rights of 
the accused, namely defence rights, rights connected with judicial independence, and rights 
after delivery of criminal judgment. 
The Saudi Judicial System 
An accused person can be tried in Saudi Arabia before the Shari'ah courts, the Board of 
Grievances or one of the administrative committees (tribunals). As to the latter the study 
illustrates that these tribunals, generally speaking, do not satisfy the standard of the right to 
fair trial, and in particular they lack independency and impartiality. Closer analysis of the 
background to the situation reveals that the establishment of the committees may be traced 
mainly to the passive attitude of the Shari'ah courts towards enacted laws. 
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The thesis provides two alternative means to tackle the problem. The first is to subject 
decisions taken by these committees to an appeal before an independent judicial body that 
satisfies the right to fair trial. As some writers correctly suggest this can be achieved by 
subjecting all decisions taken by any of these committees to an appeal before the Board of 
Grievances. But it should be noted here that in order to be consistent with human rights in 
Europe these decisions must be made appealable before the Criminal Circuit in the Board and 
not before the Scrutinizing Committee. This is because deficiencies before the tribunals can 
only be compensated if the system provides a person convicted by one of these committees 
with the right to challenge this decision before a court that satisfies the requirements set out 
in article 6 of the European Convention. Now since the Scrutinizing Committee does not 
guarantee the right to public hearing, and parties are not allowed to attend the consideration 
of the case, it therefore falls short of the right to have a fair trial. Since the original circuits in 
the Board, in general, guarantee the rights required by article 6 of the European Convention, 
it is suggested that decisions rendered by the tribunals should be made appealable before the 
Criminal Circuit in the Board of Grievances. 
Even though this solution redresses deficiencies caused by these committees, and brings the 
practice of the judicial system into a complete harmony with European standards of human 
rights, it does not root out the main problem in this regard i. e. the ideology that causes the 
passive attitude of judges in the Shari'ah courts towards codified laws. Thus an alternative 
solution is also proposed. Three steps need to be taken: (1) Asking the Board of Senior Ulama 
(jurists) to study the whole case. The Board should answer the question whether enacting laws 
that are considered to be in the interest of the state should be permitted or forbidden 
if they 
contain no provision contradicting the Shari'ah law; (2) all drafted laws must be examined 
by 
the Board of Senior Ulama before being enacted. However, this study must focus only on 
whether or not the law in question contains provisions that contradict Shari'ah law. In other 
words, suitability or properness should be left to the legislative authority. (3) The training of 
judges should be extended to include legal theories and principles. 
The Presumption of Innocence 
As to the presumption of innocence, even though Islamic law does not use an equivalent 
expression, it applies similar principles that result in the same consequences. Strictly 
speaking, Islamic law requires that (a) the accused is originally innocent, (b) his innocence 
must be presumed till guilt is proved, (c) his guilt is only proved by conclusive evidence and 
any doubt will be interpreted in the accused's interest, and (d) the burden of proof is on the 
prosecution. Obviously, this requirement is consistent with international human rights 
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requirements in respect of the presumption of innocence. As is evident from a number of 
judgments the judicial system in Saudi Arabia applies the principle of presumption of 
innocence in a manner consistent with European human rights law. 
In exceptional circumstances, such as the crime of smuggling drugs, the burden of proof is 
shifted from the prosecution to the accused. This is because this type of offence involves a 
high social risk, or creates difficulty in respect of proving the case against the accused. 
However, a crucial issue in this regard is the standard of burden that the accused shall bear in 
order to challenge the accusation. In fact, from a number of decisions made by the Customs 
Committee in Saudi Arabia it can be seen that in balancing the evidence the element of doubt 
tends to weigh in favour of the accused. But, these applications lack a legal tool by which 
members of the responsible body can evaluate whether the proof required of the accused 
breaches his right to be presumed innocent. Without a proper legal tool, assessment of the 
accused's counter-evidence may not be based on objective premises, and the outcome of the 
assessment may vary according to who undertakes it. To correct this discrepancy the use of a 
tool that is applied by the English judicial system to resolve this problem may be suggested. 
English courts make a distinction between two kinds of burden. The first is the law or 
persuasive burden, and the second is the evidential burden. The former requires the accused 
to prove, on a balance of probabilities, a fact that is essential to the determination of his guilt 
or innocence. It reverses the burden of proof by removing it from the prosecution and 
transferring it to the accused. But the latter entails upon the accused the burden of introducing 
evidence in support of his case. It requires only that the accused adduces sufficient evidence 
to raise an issue for the issue to become an obligatory aspect of the case. Since the 
prosecution does not need to bring any evidence on this point, the accused must do so if he 
wishes the point to be included. Nonetheless, and this perhaps more importantly, once the 
issue is raised, the burden of proof remains with the prosecution. The accused need only raise 
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 4 Accordingly, once the onus of proof is shifted the court 
concerned can only impose the evidential burden upon the accused, because imposing a legal 
or persuasive onus violates the presumption of innocence. 
This is a very helpful tool that the judicial system in Saudi Arabia could benefit from in order 
to make their consideration as to the presumption of innocence compatible with the 
international standard of human rights. 
- Seethe case of Rv DPP, p Kebeline [1999] 4 All ER 801-859; &Rv ! ltnibert. [2001J 3 All ER 577-644 
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The Principle of Legality 
Again the expression `legality' is not found in the Qur'an, the Sunnah, or old Islamic 
jurisprudence, and the concept was first introduced in Europe. However, in order to find out 
whether or not the same principle is also applied in and throughout Islamic law, our approach 
is to identify components of the principle of legality and to see whether Islamic law as 
applied by the Saudi judicial system has the same components. The principle of legality 
embodies four components: (1) criminal law should not be applied retroactively; (2) it should 
be formulated to maximum certainty; (3) it should be strictly interpreted; (4) it must he 
accessible. 
As to component (1), Islamic law cannot be applied retroactively. Yet, unlike the European 
Court, the judicial system in Saudi Arabia applies the criminal law retroactively if this is in 
the interest of the accused. This is perhaps a reflection of the humanitarian nature of Islamic 
law. Interestingly, this application is compatible with the ICCPR. 
Regarding point (2), that is, criminal law should be formulated to maximum certainty, this 
component does not raise any question in respect of the crimes of Haddud and Qisas since 
every crime in these two categories is defined and its punishment is clearly designated. In 
Ta'azir offences a judge is given considerable discretion to use analogy to punish old 
offences in new forms. The original texts do not provide particular definitions for each crime. 
The judge is empowered to apply these general texts to the facts brought before him. This 
situation might be considered incompatible with the required standard of certainty. First, it 
could appear to imply that according to Islamic law a person can be subject to punishment 
without knowing that such an act is prohibited. Second, another area which puts the certainty 
of Islamic law in question is where the judge is empowered to punish in the public interest, 
even if the person concerned does not commit any prohibited act. 
In respect of the first problem this thesis rejects the criticism on two grounds: 
1- Pursuant to Islamic law conducts are classified into (a) lawful or admissible; (b) 
prohibited; (c) permissible; (d) recommended; (e) unrecommended. A Muslim is 
allowed to exercise conducts within categories (a), (c), and (d). But he is prohibited 
from committing acts within categories (b) and (e). It is every Muslim's duty, as part 
of his religion, to know this. 
2- There is a crucial difference between Islamic law and positive laws in this respect. 
This difference is embodied in the fact that unlike man-made law the conduct that 
constitutes a sin in Islamic law is unchangeable through ages and societies. 
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As to the second problem, it is also within Islamic law to limit the judge's power where the 
interest of society requires this. Therefore, article 3 of the Law of Criminal Procedures 
restricts in a clear and precise language the power of the judge to punish if the person in 
question has not committed a forbidden and punishable act. The judge in Saudi Arabia cannot 
punish for the sake of the public interest if a person has not committed an illegal act. 
When writers deal with the principle of legality in Ta'azir crimes in Islamic law, they often 
mistakenly presume that this principle requires absolute certainty. In fact, absolute certainty, 
practically speaking, cannot be achieved in any legal system. Judicial systems that depend on 
codification as the sole source for criminal law must empower the judge with certain 
discretion to interpret laws and to apply existing rules to new facts by means of analogy. 
Otherwise, many criminals could escape justice because the legislature is unable to foresee 
what conducts will need to be criminalized in future. As to the systems depending on case law 
as a source for criminal law, the Shaw 
5 case reveals that absolute certainty cannot he 
guaranteed, with a considerable discretion given to English courts to consider whether or not a 
particular conduct can be deemed to amount to a corruption of public morals. 
This finding is confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights. It states: "However, 
clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of law, including criminal law, there is 
an inevitable element of judicial interpretation. There will always be a need for elucidation of 
doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances. " 
6 Therefore, one can argue 
that the legality principle requires the criminal law to be precisely and clearly formulated just 
to the extent that this certainty precludes the exercise of arbitrary power. 
With regard to the third component of the principle of legality, which requires that any 
obscurity of the criminal law must be interpreted in the favour of the accused, this study 
shows that the judicial system in Saudi Arabia applies this guarantee in a strict manner. The 
fourth and final component is the accessibility of criminal law. The accessibility of Islamic 
jurisprudence is questionable due to the considerable number of its books, which are also 
written in language of such a level of refinement that a layman has difficulty in understanding 
them. However, several measures have been taken to ease the dilemma. (a) In an attempt to 
unify the judicial rulings, courts in Saudi Arabia generally speaking apply the Hanbali 
School. (b) Of the books of the Hanbali school only six are designated on which judgments 
5- See discussion in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
6-S. W. v. UK A335-B (1995) (Application No. 00020166/92) 
- See chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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should be based8. (c) The laws of both the Judiciary and the Board of Grievances require the 
application of the case law system. (d) Finally, an important point here is that the difficulty of 
accessibility of Islamic jurisprudence might be held to constitute a clear conflict with the 
legality principle, if Islamic law were viewed from a western point of view. But Islamic law 
is not only law9. It is part of a religion and every Muslim is obliged to read and understand 
Islamic law (the Qur'an, the Sunnah and also Islamic jurisprudence). Anyone who has 
difficulties is obliged to ask scholars. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the principle of legality is applied in the judicial system in 
Saudi Arabia in a manner consistent with European human rights standards. 
Defence Rights 
Other rights are classified in this study as defence rights. These are: 
1. Right to legal representation; 
2. Right to an interpreter; 
3. Right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence; 
4. Right to trial within a reasonable time; 
5. Right to prompt information of charge; 
6. Right to trial in own presence; 
7. Right to defend self in person; 
8. Right to equality of arms; 
9. Right to call and cross-examine witnesses; 
10. Right not to be compelled to confess guilt. 
Generally speaking, these defence rights are guaranteed by the judicial system in Saudi 
Arabia. The study demonstrates that all these rights are provided in the judicial system in 
Saudi Arabia and their application does not raise any question in respect to the conformity 
with European standards of human rights, rather the application of these rights complies with 
the European human rights law. However, the following matters may be worth mentioning: 
As to the right to have a lawyer two points need to be reconsidered. First, Article 116 of the 
Saudi law of the Criminal Procedures is not compatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights because it subjects the accused's communication with his lawyer to the 
supervision of the criminal investigation officer. According to the European Court of Human 
8- The Judicial Supervision Committee's decision in (1347 AH). See Ahmad Belal (1990) p. 174 & 175. See also 
Soliman A. Solaim "Legal review: Saudi Arabia's Judicial System" Middle East Journal. 197 I. Vol. 25 P. 405. 
9- See our discussion in chapter 3 
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Rights, if the lawyer cannot receive instructions in confidence, then there is a risk that legal 
consultation might lose much of its effectiveness. 10 
The second point is that the Saudi judicial system does not provide an indigent accused with 
free legal assistance. This is in a clear contravention of the European Convention, and needs 
to be addressed. 
With regard to the right of the accused to be assisted by an interpreter if he does not 
understand the language used in court, this thesis establishes that as a general rule the Saudi 
judicial system requires two interpreters, save in the case of minor offences where the 
availability of two interpreters is not possible. This fact may lead to the conclusion that by 
adopting Islamic jurists' view in respect of the number of interpreters, the law in Saudi Arabia 
goes far beyond the standard required by the European Convention. 
Judicial Independence 
The rights to a court that is independent, impartial, and open, and to a reasoned judgment have 
been discussed in this study under independence of the judiciary and the rights of the accused. 
In respect of the independency of the court the thesis uses criteria employed by the European 
Court to investigate the independency of a judicial body. These criteria are: (1) the manner of 
appointment of the judiciary members; (2) the duration of their term of office; (3) the 
existence of guarantees against outside pressure; and (4) the question whether the body 
presents an appearance of independence. " 
In respect of points (1) and (2) laws governing both Shari'ah courts and the Board of 
Grievances demonstrate a complete compliance with European Court standards. As to factors 
(3) and (4) the thesis distinguishes between two areas of independence. The first is the 
personal independence of the judge when handling the case in hand. In other words, 
independence in respect of any pressure that could be exercised against the judge when the 
case comes under his discretion. This type of independence is clearly guaranteed in the 
judicial system. The second area of independence is the independence of the judicial body 
from the executive. Even though the law confirms the independence of the judiciary the 
relationship between the latter and the executive is open to question. Therefore, one can 
suggest that in order to achieve the standard of independency required by the European Court 
of Human rights, the Saudi law should be reformed in a way that insures the independence of 
the judiciary. The relationship between the Ministry of Justice and the judicial body needs to 
10 
- Brennan v UK (2003) 34 EHRR 18 11 
- See for instance, Findlay v. United Kingdom (1997) (Application No. 00022107/93) & Campbell and Fell v. 
UK (1984) 2 E. H. R. R 165. See also Lauko v Slovakia, (1998)Paras 63-64 (Application No. 0(1(126 13 8/95) 
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be reconsidered, and the power of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to commit cases 
to the Supreme Judicial Council must be abolished. Put differently, even though the personal 
independence of judges in Saudi Arabia is, no doubt, guaranteed, the structural independence 
need to be addressed. This suggestion is based on the general requirement mentioned by the 
European Court12 that restrictions on human rights must be prescribed by law. It also rests on 
the argument that judicial independence can be threatened not only by interference from the 
executive, but also by a judge's being influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by his hopes 
and fears as to his possible treatment by the executive. It is for this reason that a judge must 
not be dependent on the Executive, however well the Executive may behave: "independence" 
connotes the absence of dependence. Here it should be emphasized that judge's personal 
integrity and independence of mind in Saudi Arabia are not in doubt, and that it is not 
suggested that there has been any conscious or unconscious bias or any subjective partiality 
felt or displayed in their work. However, the appearance of independence is just as important 
as the question whether this quality exists in practice. Justice must not only be done, it must 
be seen to be done. The function of the European Convention on Human Rights is not only to 
ensure that the judges are free from any actual personal bias or prejudice. It requires this fact 
to be seen objectively. The aim is to exclude any legitimate doubt as to the court's 
independence. 13 
As to the impartiality of the court, as one might expect since Islamic jurists study the judge's 
impartiality in great detail the judicial system in Saudi Arabia places special emphasis on the 
court's impartiality. This is obvious from the fact that rules regarding the impartiality of the 
court are drafted in very strict terms. Thus, comparing the standard of impartiality required by 
the European human rights law with the required level of impartiality in the Saudi law, it is 
found that the Saudi law clearly applies a higher standard in respect of the court's impartiality 
than that required by the European human rights law. The following comparisons 
demonstrate this: 
First, the jurisprudence of both the European Court of Human Rights and English courts 
allows a judge to hold other careers simultaneously. For example besides being a judge he 
can be at the same time a lawyer 14, a member of the education committee, a governor of 
12 
See for example, Kruslin v. France (1990) (Application No. 0001 1801 /85) 
13 More discussion regarding the importance of the appearance of independence is provided in the Millar v 
Dickson (2001) UKPC D4 [2002] 3 All ER. P 10411-1073 
14 
_ Locabail Ltd V Bayfºeld Properties [2000] 1 All ER 65-96 
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schools, 15 or director of an international organization. '6 According to European jurisprudence 
a judge is disqualified from hearing a given case only if he plays an active role in respect of 
the case at hand. 
This altogether differs from the case in Saudi Arabia, where a judge cannot have another 
career or job or involvement in a commercial activity. Article 58 of the Law of the Judiciary 
provides: "A person may not hold the position of a judge and simultaneously engage in 
commerce or in any position or work which is not consistent with the independence and 
dignity of the judiciary. The Supreme Judicial Council may enjoin a judge from engaging in 
any work which, in its opinion, conflicts with the duties of the position and the proper 
performance of such duties. " Therefore and maybe more interestingly, if the judge has 
another job or engages in commerce, he is then not only disqualified from hearing a particular 
case, but he will cease to be a qualified judge at all. The rationale of this idea in the Saudi law 
is that there is a conflict of interest between the functions of the judge on the one hand, and 
the functions of a lawyer, for example, on the other hand. According to Islamic law the judge 
must not engage in social activities especially with those who have an interest in the 
judiciary. 
Second, there is also a contrast in the positions adapted towards courts' personnel. English 
courts accept the standard that where the case was concerned with bias on the part of the 
justice' clerk, the court should consider whether it should infer that there was a real danger 
that the clerk's bias infected the views of the justices adversely to the applicant. '7 In contrast, 
article 8 of the Law of Procedure before Shari'ah Courts provides: "Process servers, clerks, 
and such other judicial assistants may not perform any work that lies within the scope of their 
jobs in cases involving them or their spouses, relatives, and in-laws up to the fourth degree, 
and any such work shall be null and void. " 
A third area of comparison is that according to the law of Saudi Arabia, the judge is 
automatically disqualified from hearing a case, and if he does, his judgment is void and null if 
he, his wife, a relative, or an in-law in the ancestral line, or a person for whom he is trustee or 
guardian, has an interest in the existing case or if he had issued a fatwa (religious legal 
opinion), litigated for one of the litigants in the case, or written about it, even if it were before 
he joined the judiciary, or if he had earlier considered the case in the capacity of judge, 
15 
-Rv Gough [ 1993] 2 All ER 724-740 1G 
- Ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577-599 17 
-Rv Gough [ 199312 All ER 724-740 
381 
expert, or arbitrator, or had been a witness in the case or had engaged in any investigative 
action therein. This standard is wider than that applied by the ECHR or the English court. 
The idea in the Saudi law is that it is very difficult to prove the actual bias of the judge, 
especially since bias is such an insidious thing that even though a person may in good faith 
believe that he was acting impartially, his mind may unconsciously be affected by bias. And 
applying general tests for determining the court's impartiality could lead to practical 
difficulties resulting in undesirable uncertainty when handling the issue of impartiality. More 
importantly, the appearance of the judge's impartiality cannot be safeguarded if the judge 
engages even slightly with, for instance, the accused's investigation. There is an overriding 
public interest that there should be confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice. 
It could be argued that designating certain circumstances in which the judge must 
automatically disqualify himself from hearing the case can ease the complexity that courts 
might engage with in order to determine the question of impartiality. Needless to say that, a 
court when considering the impartiality of a given judge faces a very difficult task. English 
courts, for example, had struggled to find the appropriate test to determine the court's 
impartiality. Until 1993 there had been some divergence in the English authorities. Some had 
expressed the test in terms of a reasonable suspicion or apprehension of bias, whilst other had 
expressed the test in terms of a real danger or likelihood of bias. This diversity was 
permanently settled in England and Wales by the House of Lords' decision in R t' Gough 
1993 in which the real danger test was favoured. 
18 This test, nevertheless, has not 
commanded universal approval. Scotland, Austria, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa 
have adhered to the reasonable suspicion or reasonable apprehension test, which may he more 
closely in harmony with the European Court of Human Rights' approach. 
19 Therefore, in tlle 
light of the above and for the sake of the consistency with jurisprudence of the European 
Court, the Court of Appeal20 took the opportunity to call for reconsidering the appropriate test 
when determining the court's impartiality. Finally, the House of Lords in Porter V Magill 
decided to shift the test from the real danger test into whether the relevant circumstances, as 
ascertained by the court, would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that 
there was a real possibility that the tribunal had been biased. In addition, even though English 
courts have recently chosen the test that is more consistent with European Court' approach; 
18 - See Locabail Ltd v Bayfreld Properties [2000] 1 All ER 65-96 19 
- See Locabail Ltd v Bayfield Properties [2000] 1 All ER 
65-96 & see also Ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) 
[ 1999] 1 All ER 577-599 
20 
- In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) (CA)[2001 ]I WLR 700-729 (The Weekly Law 
Reports 
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the future application of this test may raise practical difficulties. In fact, the distinction 
between tests discussed by the English courts; real danger test, and an outsider observer test 
is not certainly established. This led Lord Hope in Porter v Magill'r to say that: "Although the 
tests ... were 
described differently, their application was likely in practice to lead to results 
that were so similar as to be indistinguishable... The Court of Appeal, having examined the 
question whether the real danger test might lead to a different result , 
from that which the 
informed observer would reach on the same facts, concluded ... that 
in the overwhelming 
majority of cases the application of the two tests would lead to the same outcome. " 
A final point that supports our conclusion is that Islamic jurists have discussed in great detail 
the impartiality of the judge. As a general rule, they restrict the judge from, for instance, 
accepting a gift, private invitation, or hosting one of the case parties. The aim is to avoid any 
act that might cast doubt with regard to the judge's impartiality. 
With regard to the right to an open court, the study shows that even though Islamic jurists did 
not explicitly stipulate that the right to public hearing is obligatory, the practical application 
of the judiciary throughout Islamic societies indicates that Islamic law requires the hearing to 
be held in public. 22 Therefore, it can be said that the attitude of Islamic law in respect of an 
open court, is similar to that of the European Court of Human Rights. Both require the court 
to be open; nevertheless, Islamic law differs in that it does not designate certain 
circumstances in which the hearing can be exceptionally held in a closed session, but rather it 
articulates the principle and leaves the judge concerned with somewhat wide discretion to 
determine whether the case should be heard in public. In contrast, the European Convention 
on Human Rights expressly restricts the exceptions to the right to an open court to specific 
circumstances. 
Like the European Convention the law in Saudi Arabia requires the hearing to be held in 
public. This right can be restricted in both systems on similar grounds. However, in the 
context of the European Convention on Human Rights the notion of a public hearing has a 
slightly different meaning than its counterpart in Saudi Arabia. In the European context the 
term means that not only the public but also the press must be allowed to hear the trial. '' In 
respect of the right of the press to attend the trial and publish whatever they deem suitable, 
21 
- [2002] 1 All ER [2002] 1 All ER465-523 22 
-Jeerah, A( 1988 ) p. 122 23 
- Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: ".... The press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial... " 
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this right raises a clear difference between the judicial system in Saudi Arabia and the 
European Convention, and maybe also most western countries. The European court regards 
the press as an important means to build public confidence in respect of justice. It is argued 
that the press allows citizens to scrutinize the function of the court. The European Court held 
that: "The courts could not operate in a vacuum: while they were the forum for settling 
disputes, this did not mean that there could be no prior discussion of disputes elsewhere. It 
was incumbent on the mass media to impart information and ideas concerning matters that 
come before the courts just as in other areas of public interest. "24 In contrast to this view, 
many Islamic writers argue that press involvement cannot in any circumstances enhance 
public confidence in the judicial system because those who present the media tire not 
specialists in Islamic or codified law. Moreover and more significantly, providing the media 
with the right to engage in cases, and particularly criminal cases, will promote sinning and 
evil; and Islamic societies are obliged not to promote sinning. The idea of broadcasting 
procedures of inquiry and trial through the media, therefore, is not in line with some Islamic 
principles, hence it is undesirable. 
In respect of the accused's right to receive reasoned judgment the study illustrates that the 
application of this right by both Shari'ah court and the Board of Grievances shows, generally 
speaking, a compliance with European standards of human rights. 
Rights after the delivery of Judgment 
Chapter 7 of this thesis concerns rights guaranteed after the delivery of criminal judgment. 
These rights are: the right to appeal, the right to compensation for miscarriage of justice, the 
right not to be tried twice for the same offence, the right to a pardon, the right to stay of 
execution of punishment, and the right to repent. 
Regarding the right of the accused to appeal against his sentence and conviction, an 
examination of scholars' jurisprudence reveals that contrary to ideas held by some writers and 
in spite of the fact that Islamic law does not divide courts into courts of first instance and 
courts of second or third instance as modem law does, and even though Islamic law does not 
distinguish between an appeal and judicial review, this cannot be understood to mean that 
Islamic law has no means to review and reverse a judicial decision. The idea of reversing a 
wrong judgment was applied clearly during and after the Prophet's era. Moreover, Islamic 
jurists provide detailed explanations to illustrate the concept. 
24 
- The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom [ 197912 E. H. R. R. 245 
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The majority argue that the Appellate Court in Saudi Arabia can only handle matters of law. 
A careful study of the case in Saudi Arabia, however, may confirm that the Court of Appeal 
has the power to deal with matters of both law and fact. (a) The law does not exclude matters 
of fact. An appeal is an inherent part of the judiciary, and unless limited by statute surely an 
appeal court has general jurisdiction. 25. (b) Pursuant to article 200 of the law of Criminal 
Procedures, the Appellate Court may permit the litigants to submit new evidence to support 
the grounds of their appeal. Consequently allowing parties to adduce new evidence before 
the Appellate Court is a crucial point in respect of the controversy between writers. 
Considering evidence is no doubt a matter of fact. (c) The actual practice of the Court of 
Appeal confirms that it interprets the law in a way that supports our view. Examining its 
approach in handling cases reveals that it deals with both matters. 
In general, the right of the accused to have his conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher 
tribunal is provided in the judicial system of Saudi Arabia in a manner consistent with 
European Court standards. 
The accused's right to compensation for miscarriage of justice is fully guaranteed under 
Islamic law whether this occurs during the investigation or trial stages. Thus, the law in Saudi 
Arabia places considerable emphasis on protecting the accused from any harm that could 
occur to him during a criminal action. According to the case law before the Board of 
Grievances, the investigation authority's responsibility is based on the omissive responsibility 
(liability). That is to say it commits a fault by breaching the law. Therefore, as a general 
rule, if the investigation authority does not infringe the law no compensation can be granted 
because it has not committed a fault. 
26 This approach provides similar standards to that of the 
European Convention. The Explanatory Report of Protocol No. 7 illustrates that in order to 
apply this right there should be some serious failure in the judicial process involving grave 
prejudice to the convicted person. Nevertheless, the accused's interests might be prejudiced 
even though the authority concerned has not committed any fault. In this case too the 
accused in Saudi Arabia is entitled to compensation. The compensation here is based on 
liability on the basis of risk. To grant compensation it is sufficient to prove the harm caused 
by a particular conduct practiced by the administration, even where there is no fault on the 
part of the investigation authority. 
25 
- Amad Al Najar (1997) p. 427 & 434 26 
- Decision No. 3/D/F/ 39 in 1422H 
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This kind of liability is based on the idea of collective solidarity. This means that if the 
administration causes any harm, though no fault is committed, the community (state) will 
bear the liability of the administration's conduct, if this conduct causes harm to persons. 
This rule is an exception to the original rule of liability, in which the establishing of fault is a 
crucial factor. 27 
Obviously, this high standard goes well beyond any human rights requirements. In contrast to 
the European standards of human rights, compensation pursuant to the above approach does 
not require a failure on the part of the administration. It seems that courts in Saudi Arabia 
should refer to the general principles of justices that are inherent in the religion of Islam. 
In short, it goes without saying not only that the judicial system in Saudi Arabia guarantees 
the right to compensation for wrongful conviction, but also, as is evident from the above 
analysis, it applies a higher standard than that required by the European law of human rights. 
As to the right not to be tried again for the same offence, a search of early Islamic 
jurisprudence reveals that it contains no discussion of such a right. 
Nonetheless, in principle, the rule against double jeopardy is in complete harmony with the 
Islamic principles of justice. Commenting on this rule Mashood A. Baderin28 argues that: 
"Retrying a previously tried and convicted or acquitted person on the same facts is 
tantamount to injustice and perhaps witch-hunting. " In the Resolution adopted after the 
First International Conference on the Protection of Human Rights in Islamic Criminal Justice 
System held in Syracuse, Italy in 1979, the Conference resolved that "The letter and spirit of 
Islamic Law on the subject of the protection of the rights of the criminally accused are in 
complete harmony with the fundamental principles of human rights under international 
law. , 29 
As a result the legislative authority in Saudi Arabia did not find it difficult to guarantee this 
right even though it was not discussed or demonstrated by early Islamic jurisprudence. This is 
in fact an area where the Islamic state by adopting the principle of public interest as a source 
for legislation, can reveal the capability of Islamic law to accommodate new human rights 
norms essential to the proper administration of justice. By stipulating this right in terms to a 
great extent similar to those provided in the international human rights law, the Saudi 
legislature shows Islamic law to be up-to-date law. This is the proper understanding which 
27 
- The Board has reiterated this rule in a number of his judgments. For example, decision. No. 15rr in 
30/6/1401 H& decision No. 37fF in 19/9/1401 
28 
_ (2003) p. 110 29 
- See, Mashood Baderin ( 2003) p. 110 
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does not limit Islamic law to jurisprudence existing within Islamic contexts. Rather, as has 
been argued in chapter three, Islamic law is capable of absorbing new human rights principles 
regardless of their origin as long as they enhance the protection and observance of the dignity 
of human beings. 
The rights to a pardon, to stay of execution of punishment for humanitarian reasons, and the 
right to repent are not mentioned in the European Convention and possibly are similarly 
absent from all international instruments regarding human rights. Their presence in the Saudi 
judicial system expresses the special properties of this system, which is fundamentally based 
on Islamic law. The right to a pardon reflects the humanitarian approach of Islamic law. In 
the view of Islam an offender is not regarded as outside society, and members of society 
should not reject him, but rather society, as a whole, should bear the burden of rehabilitating 
the accused, and support him to re-engage properly in the community. The basic idea behind 
the pardon principle is that Muslim society has to strike a balance between the advantages 
and disadvantages of punishing the criminal. It goes with out saying that this humanitarian 
nature of the right to pardon, though not provided expressly in the European Convention, is 
clearly consistent with, generally speaking, the notion of human rights which calls for an 
enhancement of the dignity of human beings. _ 
The right to stay of execution of punishment, which has no counterpart in the European 
contexts of human rights, demonstrates the spirit of Mercy that is required by the religion of 
Islam. In the Resolution adopted after the First International Conference on the Protection of 
Human Rights in Islamic Criminal Justice System held in Syracuse, Italy in 1979, the 
Resolution states that under Islamic law the accused must enjoy "the right to benefit from the 
spirit of Mercy and the goals of rehabilitation and remobilization in the consideration of the 
penalty to be imposed. "3° 
Similar to the right to a pardon and the right to stay of execution of punishment, the right of 
the accused to repent is clearly founded mainly on the principle of rehabilitation. This is a 
manifestation of the significant role of the Islamic religion in respect of the criminal justice 
system in Saudi Arabia. The system is observably influenced by the spirit of Mercy, 
forgiveness, and tolerance even with those who breach the interest of the society. 
Interestingly, the influence of the spirit of religion is not completely alien to the European 
Community and hence, as far as this thesis is concerned, to European human rights law. In 
30 
- Ibid, p. 
1 11 
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fact there is an appreciation among members of the EC of the importance of religion as an 
aspect of cultural heritage. In contrast to Islam, however, religion never exerts a direct 
influence on EC legislation. Ian Leigh argues that: "Plainly the EC is neither Erastian nor a 
Theocracy. Religion is neither subordinated and enlisted in the service of the EC, nor vice 
versa. This is not surprising - none of the member states, current and prospective, are at 
these extremes. " 31 
Finally, what distinguishes our findings is that all these suggested reforms do not breach 
Islamic law and can be easily adapted to the judicial system in Saudi Arabia. It is the function 
of this study to demonstrate that they may be accommodated within the Saudi judicial system 
without contravening the law of Islam. 
31 
- Unpublished paper "Alternative Models of Faith/State Relations in the EC'. In a conference at Newcastle 
Law School. 29 October 2002. Under the title: "Structured Pluralism: A Practical Legal Framework for Faith in 
the European Union? " 
388 
Abdulwahed Kamal Al-Deen Muhammad (no year). Sharh Fetah Al-Kuder. Beirut; Dar Ahca' Al- 
Torath Al- Arabee. 
Abee Baker Muhammad (no year). E'lam Al- Moge'en An Rab Al- Abneen. Beirut; Dar Al label. 
Abee Baker Muhammad (no year). Elam Al-Moge'en An Rob Al- Almeen. Cairo; Dar Al-Tab'h Al - 
Menereeh. 
Abraheem Muhammad (1998). Nedam Al Ta'n Be Al Tameez Fi Al Mamlakah Al Arabiah Al Sudiah. 
Saudi Arabia; Riyadh. The Institute of Public Administration. 
Abraheem Zeen Al-Deen (1997). A/- Baher AI-Ra'g Sharh Kanz AI- Daga'g. Beirut: Dar Al- Kotoh Al- 
Almeeh. 
Abu- Zahra Muhammad (1998). Al-Jareemh Wa Al-Oqubah Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islanmi: Al-Jareemh. Cairo: 
Dar Al-faker Al-Arabee. 
Aeesa Muhammad (1980). Al-Gam'a Al-Sahih; Sonan Al-Termadv. Dar Al- Faker Publisher. 
Ahmad Adrees Ahmad (1984). Aftrad Bara't Al- Motahem. Cairo; Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cairo 
University. 
Ahmad Ahmad (1981). Al Damanat Al Fardeeh Fi Al Shari'ah Al Islami. Kuwait; Dar Al Kalm. 
Ahmad Suleiman Ahmad (1985). Daman Al Motlafat Fi Al Figh Al Islami. Egypt: unpublished PhD 
Thesis, Al Zhar University. 
Al Akeel Salah (1422 H). Huquq Al Motahem Fi Al Shari'ah. Al Adl "A Seasonal Scientific Magazin 
Deals with Islamic Jurisprudence and Judiciary. Issued by the Ministry of Justice in Saudi Arabia 91h. 
Issue, Third Year. 
Al Ansarce Abdulhameed (2000). Huquq Wa Damanat Al Alotahent Fi Al Shari'ah At Islami Wa At 
Qanoon. Cairo; Dar Al Faker Al Arabec. 
Al- Awa Mohamed S. (1983). Fi Usul Al- Nedam Al - Gena'ee Al- Island. Dar Al- Ma'arf. 
Al- Awa Mohamed S. (1986) Al- Asel Bara't Al- Motahem. In Al- Motahem wa Huquyh Fi Al- 
Shari'ah Al- Island. The First Scientific Symposium. Riyadh; Arabic Centre for Security and Training 
Studies. 
Al- Azdee Sulaiman (no year). Sonan Abee Dawud. Beirut; Dar Al-Faker. 
Al Bahee Ahmad Abdullmon'em (1965). TareeA: A1 Qada'a Ti Al Eslam. Al Bean Al Arabec 
Al Blwee Salamah (1994). Al Qada'a Fi Al Dowlah Al Islami. Riyadh; Arabic Centre for Security and 
Training Studies. 
Al- Bohotee Mansor bin Yunes (1982). Kashaf A! -Kana' Ala Morten Al- Egna'. Lebanon; Dar Al- 
Feker Le attaba'h Wa Al- Tozee'. 
Al- Bohotee Mansor bin Yunes (1983). Kashaf Al-Kara' Ala Motten Al- Egna'. Beirut; Alm Al-Kotoh. 
Al- Bukari Muhammad hin lsma'il (no year) Sahih Al- Bukari. Dar Ahea' AKotob Al- Artbeeh. 
I 
Al Buqr Muhammad (1408 AH). Al Soltah Al Qad'ah Wa Shakseet Al Qadee Fi A/ Nedam A/ Island. 
Cairo; Al Zahra'a L Alam Al Arabee. 
Al- Dabosee Abdullah bin Omer (no year). Tasses Al Neda'er. Beirut; Dar ibn Zeddon Le Ataba'h Wa 
A] Nasher & Cairo; Maktahat Al-Kolat Al-Azhareeh. 
Al- Deen Salah (1983). Huquq Al-Insan Wa Al-Damanat Al-Qud'ah Fi Al-Islam. Kuwait; Kuwait 
University; Journal of Law Vol. No. 3 September. 
Al- Dusuqi Muhammad bin Arafh (no year). Hashet Al-Dusuqi Ala Al-Sharh Al-Kabeer. Dar Ahea' Al- 
Kotob Al- Arabeeh. Aeesa Al-Halbee Wa Shoraka'h. 
Al- Dusuqi Muhammad bin Arefah (no year). Hashet Al-Dusuqi Ala Al-Sharp Al-Kabeer. Beirut; Al- 
Maktabah Al-Tajareeh Al- Kobra. Twzee' Dar Al- Feker. 
A]- Eshaikh Abraheem (1982) Al- Motahem Wa Huquqh Fi Al- Shari'ah Al Islami. The Third 
Scientific Symposium. Arabic centre for Academic and Training Studies. Majelet Al Amen Wa Al 
he'at. First year. 
Al Eshaikh Hesham (1421 H). Mabd'a Sor'at Al Bet Fi Al Dahoa Fi Al Qada'a Al Shara'e. Al Adl "A 
Seasonal Scientific Magazine deals with Islamic Jurisprudence and judiciary. Issued by the Ministry of 
Justice in Saudi Arabia" 8`h. Issue, Second Year. 
Al- Fattohee Muhammad (no year). Muntaha Al-Eradat. Alm Al-Kotob. 
Al- Garss Muhammad bin Muhammad (no year). Al-Fawakh Al- Badreeh. Egypt; Matha't Al-neel. 
Al Hamed Turki (2001). Al Siyasi been Al Halal Wa Al Haranz. London; Dar Al Saqi. 
A] Heedan Salah (1986). Wesa'l Tahgag Al Adaleh. in Al Motahem Wa Huquqh Fi Al Shari'ah Al 
Island. The First scientific Symposium. Riyadh; Arabic Centre for Security and Training Studies. 
A] Jofan Abdulrahman (1412 AH). Ahkam Altorjoman Fi Al Qada'a. Saudi Arabia; Riyadh; A master 
dissertation, Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University. The High Judicial Institution. 
Al Jofan Nasser (1416H) Damanat Adalet A/ Qada'a Fi Al Fiqh Wa Al Nedaºn. Riyadh; unpublished 
PhD Thesis; Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, the High Judicial Institution. 
Al Jofan Nasser (1421AH). Alaneet Galasat Al Taqadee. Al Adle "A seasonal scientific magazine 
deals with Islamic jurisprudence and judiciary. Issued by the Ministry of Justice in Saudi Arabia 5`h . issue, Second Year. 
Al Kadery Abraheem (1420 H). Al Qada'a Fi Al Masjed. Al Adl "A Seasonal Scientific Magazine 
Deals with Islamic Jurisprudence and Judiciary. Issued by the Ministry of Justice in Saudi Arabia. 3ed 
Issue, First Year. 
Al- Kanadee Muhammad bin Yusuf (no year). Al Wolat Wa Al Qodat. Dar Al-Kotob Al Islami. 
Al- Kasani Abu Baker bin Mashood (1982). Bada'a Al- Sandi Fi Tarreeb Al- Shara'a. Beirut; Dar Al- 
Katab Al- Arabee Publisher. 
Al- Kasani Abu Baker bin Mashood (1986). Dada'a Al- Sandi Fi Tarteeb Al- Shara'a. Beirut; Dar Al- 
Kotob Al- Elmah. 
Al Kelanee Farog (1977). Istiqlal Al Qada'a. Dar Al Nalidah Al Arahah. 
Al Kelanee Ihsan (1983). Asslamh Al- Shakssah Wa Huquq Al- Defi'a Wa Door Al- Mohamat Fi Al- 
Eslam. Kuwait; Kuwait University; Journal of Law, Vol. No. 3 September. 
II 
Al Koneen Abdullah (1420H). Tassbeeb Al Ahkam al Qad'ah Fi Al Shari'ah AI Islami. 
Al- Magrabee Muhammad (1398). Mawaheb Al- Jaleel L-Sharh Moktaser Kaleel. Dar Al-Faker. 
Al- Malekee Abraheem bin Ali (1406 H/ 1986). Tabsert Al-Hokam Fi Usul Al- Aqdeeh Wa Manahj A1- 
Ahkam. Cairo; Maktabt Al-Koleet Al- Azhereeh. 
Al- Mawardi Ali (1953). Al-Ensaf Fi Ma'refat Al-Rajh Mn Al-Klaf Ala Mathehab Al-Imam Ahmad bin 
Hanbil. Beirut; Dar Ahea' Al-Torath Al- Arabee. 
Al Mawdudi Abu A'lal (1975). Al Qanoon Al-Islami Wa Torog Tanfedeh. Mu'ssast Al Resalah 
Al Moheedeef Muhammad (1993). Darah Al- Uqubat bee Alshobehat. Riyadh; Matab; Al- Tagneeh Ll- 
ofeest'. 
Al- Monee' Abdullah (1999) Bahth Fi Qa'dat Al Motahem Bre'a Hata Tathbot Edanatoh. Maimo' 
Fatawa Wa Bohoot; Vol no. 4. Saudi Arabia; Riyadh. Dar Al- Aseemah Le- Anasher Wa Al Tozeeh. 
Al Monther Muhammad (1402 H). Al Egna'. Egypt; Dar Al Da'wah. 
Al Monther Muhammad (1408H). AI-Egna'. Riyadh. Matba't Al-Farzdg Al- Tagareeh. 
Al Othman Abdulrahman Abdulaziz (1993). Al Moda'a Aleeh Wa Huquqh Fi Al Shari'ah Al Island. 
Tunisia; unpublished PhD Thesis, Al Zetonah University. 
Al Qamdee Abdulateef (1422 H) Al Setter Fi Al Qada'a Al Jina'i. Al Adl "A Seasonal Scientific 
Magazine Deals with Islamic Jurisprudence and Judiciary. Issued by the Ministry of Justice in Saudi 
Arabia. II th issue, Third Year. 
Al Qassim Abdulrahman (1982). Al Qada'a Wa Al Taqadee Wa Al Tanfeeth. Matba't Al Sa'adah. 
Al- Rohabanee Mustafa (138 H). Matalb Olee Al-Nokia Fi Sharh Kayah Al-Montaha. Damascus; Al- 
Maktab Al- Islami. 
Al Sa'ad Kamal (1986). Gaza't Al Togeef Geer Al Muberer. The First Scientific Symposium. Arabic 
Centre for Security and Training Studies. 22-24 September. 
Al Safee Abdulfatah (1995). Al Ahkam Al Amah Le Nedam Al Jaza'eeh. Saudi Arabia; Riyadh, King 
Saud University. 
Al- Samnanee Ali Muhammad (1404 H). Radar Al-Qodat Wa Tareek Al Najat. Jordan; Dar Al- 
Forgan& Beirut; Mosset Al Ressalah. 
Al- Sarkasee Shams Al-Deen (no Year). Al-Mabsut. Beirut; Dar AI-Ma'ref L'attba'h Wa Al- Nasher. 
Al- Shafi'i Muhammad (1324 H). Al On. Al- Matba'h Al- Amereah be Bolag. 
Al Shammary Muhammad (2001). Naqd Al Ahka, n Al Jina'i Fi Al Shari'ah Al Island Wa Tatbegatha 
Fi Al Qada'a Al Saudi. Saudi Arabia; Riyadh; master dissertation. Naif Arab Academy for Security 
Sciences. 
Al- Sherazee Abraheem (1379 H). AI-Mohatheb Fi Fiqh Al-Imam Al-Shafi'i. Matba't Mustafa Al- 
Halabee. 
Al- Sherazee Abraheem (no year). Al-Mohatheb Fi Fiqh Al-Imam Al-Shaft'i. Beirut; Dar Al- Ma'refah 
Latba'h Wa Al-Nasher. 
Al Sobeel Omer (1422H). Tassbeeb Al Ahkam Al Qada'eeh Fi Al Figh Wa Al Nedam. Saudi Arabia; 
Riyadh; Master dissertation. Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University. The High Judicial 
Institution. 
III 
A]- Sobkee Abdulwhab (141 1H). Al Ash6ah Wa Al- Neda'er. Beirut; Dar AlKotob Al- Alemmeh. 
Al- Sobkee Ali bin Abdulkafee (1356 H). Fatawa Al- Sobkee. Cairo; Maktabat Al- Qadeseeh. 
Al Sodees Abdullah (1407/1408 H). Nagd A1- Ahkam A1-Qada'eeh. Riyadh; Master dissertation, Imam 
Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University. The High Judicial Institution. 
Al- Suoty Galal Al-Deen (1951). Al-E'tkan Fi Olom Al-Qur'ian. Dar Al- Nasher. Mecca. 
Al Zarka Mustafa Ahmad (1988). Al Fa'l Al Dar Wa Al Daman Fih. Beirut; Dar Al Kalm. 
Al- Zeela'ee Faker Al- Deen Othman (1314H). Tabeen Al- Haqa'iq Sharh Kanz Al- Dag'ag. Beirut; 
Dar A]- M'arefah & Egypt; Al-Matba'h Al- Amerah Be Bolag. 
Al-Alwanee Taha (1406 H). Huquq Al-Motahem Fi Merhalat Al-Tahgeeg. In Al-Motahem Wa Huquq/r 
Fi Al-Shari'ah Al-Islami. Riyadh. Arabic centre for security and Training studies. 
Al-Ansari Kasm (no year). Adrar Al-Shorog Ala Anw'a Al-Faro'a. Beirut; Alm Al-Kotob. 
Al-Askalanee Ahmad (1987). Fateh Al-Baree Be Sharh Sahih A/-Bokmq. Cairo; Dar Al- Reen L-Atrath. 
Al-Bahotee Mansoor bin Yunes (no year). Kashaf AL- kana' Ala Motten Al-Egna'. Riyadh; Maktabat 
Al- Naser Al- Hadeathah. 
Al-Behagee Ahmad (no year). Al-Sonan Al-Kobra. Beirut; Dar Sader. 
AI-Eshaikh Abdulaziz (1421H). Lamahat Hool Al-Qada'a Fi Al-Mamlakah Al-Arabiah AI-Sudiah. 
Alm Al-Fo'd Publisher. 
Al-Fara Muhammad (Abu Ya'la) (1394 H). AL-Abkam Al-Soltanah. Indonesia; Sharkat Maktabat 
Ahmad bin Nebhan. 
Al-Gorafee Ahmad Address (no year). A/-Furuq. Beirut; Alm Al-Kotob. 
Al-Gorafee Ahmad Adrees (1347 H). Al-Furuq. Egypt; Dar Ahea' Al- Katab Al- Arabeeh & Beirut; 
Alm Al-Kotob. 
Al-Hanbilee Abdulrahman bin Rajeb (no year). Al-Goud. Mecca; Dar Al-Ma'refah. 
AI-Homady Abdulrahman (1989). AI-Oada'a Wa Nedamoh Fi AI-Kilaah Wa AI-Sunnah. K. S. A; Om 
Al-Qura' University Publisher. 
Al-Karshi Muhammad (no year). Al-Karshi Ala Moktaser Kaleel. Beirut; Dar Sader. 
Al-Malekee Abraheem bin Ali (1378). Tabsert Al-Hokant Fi Usul Al- Aqdeeh Wa Manaltj Al- Ahkam. 
Matba't Mustafa Al-Halabee. 
Al-Malekee Abraheem bin Ali (1958). Tabsert Al-Hokam Fi Usti! Al- Aqdeeh Wa Manahj Al-Ahkam. 
Mustafa Al-Halabee Wa Oladh. 
Al-Mawardi Ali (1378). Al-Ensaf Fi Ma'refat Al-Rajh Mn Al Klaf Ala Mathhab Al- Imam Ahmad bin 
Hanbil. Cairo; Maktabt Al- Sunnah Al- Muhammadeeh. 
Al-Mawardi Ali (1971/1972). Adab A/- Qadee. Baghdad; Matba't Al arshad, & Matba't Al- Anee. 
Al-Mawardi All (1990). Al-Ahkant A! -Soltanah Fi Al Welaycer Al Denah. Beirut; Dar Al- Katab Al- 
Arabee. 
Al-Moptee'ee Muhammad (no year). Al-Majnzoo' Sharh Al-Mohatheb. 
IV 
A1-Muhmmud Abdullah (no year). Majmo't Al-Rasa'l. Al-maktab Al-Islami. 
Al-Najar Emad (1997). Al-Ed'ah Al-Am Wa Al-Muhakmat Al-Jina'i Wa Tatbegatha Fi Al-Mamlakah 
Al-Arabiah Al-Sudiah. Saudi Arabia; Riyadh. The Institute of Public Administration. 
Al-Nawawi Yaha bin Sharf (1386 H). Muqhni Al-Muhtaj Ala Ma'refat Ma'nee Alfad Almenhaj. Egypt; 
Matba't Mustafa Al-Babee Al Halbee Wa Oladh. 
AI-Qorobee Muhammad bin Ahmad (1405 H). Bedaet Al- Mujtahid Wa Nehaet Al-Moktased. Beirut; 
Dar Al-Ma'ref. 
Al-Qurobee Yusuf bin Abdulber (1398 H). Al- Kafee Fi Fiqh AN Al- Madiaith Al- Malekee. 
Maktabat Al- Riyadh Al- Hadeethah. 
Al-Ramlee Muhammad bin Abee Al- Abas Ahmad (1413 H). Nehaet Al Muhtaj Ala Sharh Al- Manhaj. 
Dar Ahea' Al Torath Al- Arabee. Mossaat Al- Tareek Al- Arabee. 
Al-Salmee Az Adeen Abdulaziz bin Abdulsalam (no year). Goud Al-Abkam Fi Masalah Al-Aram. 
Beirut; Dar Al Ma'refah. 
Al-San'nee Abdulrazaq bin Homam (1392 H). Al-Mosanf. Beirut; Matba't Dar Al-Qalm. 
Al-San'nee Abdulrazaq bin Homam (1403 H). Al-Mosanf. Beirut; Al-Maktab Al-Islami. 
Al-Sarkasee Shams Al-Deen (1406H). Al-Mabsut. Beirut; Dar Al-Ma'refah Le ataba'h Wa Al Nasher. 
Alshareef Abdulsalam (1986). Al Mabad' Al Shari'ah Fi Ahkam Al Uqubat Fi Al Fiq/º Al Islaºni. 
Lebanon; Dar Al Garb Al-Islami. 
Al-Swailam Bandar (1987). Al Motahem Wa Huquqh Fi Al- Fiqh Al-Islami. Riyadh: Arabic Centre for 
Security and Training Studies. 
Al-Tarabisee Ali bin Kaleel (1306H). Moen Al-Hokam Fenia Yatrded Been Al-Kasmeen Men Al- 
Ahkam. 
Al-Tarablsee Ali bin Kaleel (1393H). Moen Al-Hokam Fema Yatrded Been Al-Kasineen Men Al- 
Ahkaºn. Egypt; Shaket Maktabat Wa Matba't Mustafa Al- Halbee Wa Oladh. 
Al Turkmani Abdulsalam (1999). AL ljra'at AL Jina'i Al Islami. Riyadh; Naif Arab Academy for 
Security Sciences. 
Al-Zarkashee Muhammad (1412 H) Sharh Al-Zarkashee Ala Moktaser Al-Koragee. Riyadh; Al- 
Obekan Publisher. 
Al-Zuhaili Muhammad (1997). Huquq Al-Insan Fi Al- Eslam. Damascus& Beirut; Dar Al-Kalm AI- 
Teeb & Dar ibn Katter. 
Ateeh Jamal (1997). AI- Hag Fi Muhakmah Adelah. "The Right to Fair Trial". Al- Muslim AL - 
Muasir. The Contemporary Muslim Journal. Vol. 21 No. 84 May, June, July 
Awd M. Awd (1987). Hag Al Motahem Fi Al Esta'anh Be Moham Been Al Shari'ah Wa Al Qanoon. 
Al-Muslim Al-Muasir. The Contemporary Muslim Journal. Vol. 49. No. 13. 
Belal Ahmad (1990). AL- Ijra'at Al- Jina'i Al-Mogarnh Wa Al-Nedaºn Al-Ejrea'ee Fi Al- Mamlakah 
Al- Arabian Al- Sudiah. Cairo; Dar Al-Nahdah Al- Arabiah. 
Daff Allah Hader Ahmad (1989). Darajat Al Taqadee Fi Al Fiqh Al Islaºni. Cairo; unpublished PhD 
Thesis, Cairo University. 
V 
Dofeer Saeed (2000). Al Nedam Al Ejrea'ee Al Gena'ee Fi Al Shari'ah Al Islami Wa Tatbegatha Fi Al 
Mamlakah Al Arabiah Al Sudiah. Riyadh; Matab'a Samhah. 
Elhalaby Muhammad (1996). Al Wassatt Fi Sharh Qanoon Usul Al Muhakmat Al Jaza'eeh. Jordan; 
Maktabat Dar Al Thakafah Le Anasher Wa Al Tawzeeh. 
Frahat Muhammad (1991). Sharee't Al- Tjreem Wa Al-Eqab Fi Al- Fiqh Al- Islami Wa Al- Nedam Al- 
Qanoony Al- Mo'asr. Riyadh; Journal of Arabic Centre for Security Studies. Vol. 1I 
Huseen Ahmad Al Muhamah Fi Al Shari'ah . 
Journal of Al- Omah Al Oatarah. Issue No. 34 the third 
year. 
Ibin Hean Wakee'a Muhammad (1306 H). AkbarAl- Qudat. Bruit; Alm Al Kotob. 
Ibin Hean Wakee'a Muhammad (no year). AkbarAl-Qudat. Beirut; Alm Al-Kotob. 
Ibin Qassim Muhammad (1399 AH). Fatwa Wa Rasa'il Eshaikh Muhammad bin Abraheem Al - 
Eshaikh. Saudi Arabia; Mecca. 
Ibin Qodamah Abdullah (1348 H). Al-Muqhni. Cairo; Matba't Al-Mawar. 
Ibin Qodamah Abdullah (1367 H). Al-Muqhni. Dar Al- Manar. 
Ibin Qodamah Abdullah (1981). Al-Muqhni. Riyadh; Maktabat Al-Riyadh Al- Hadeathah. 
Jeerah Abdulmen'am (1988). Nedam Al-Qada'a Fi A1-Mamlakah Al-Arabiah Al-Sudiah. Riyadh; the 
Institute of Public Administration. 
Kelaf Abdulwhab (1970). Ilm Usul Al-Fiqh Wa Klast Tareek Al- Tashree'h Al-Islaini. Kuwait; Dar Al- 
Qalm Publisher. 
Kuder Abdulfatah (1404 AH). Wekef Tanfeed Al Uqubat Fi Al Mamlakah Al Arabiah Al Sudiah. Saudi 
Arabia; Riyadh. The Institute of Public Administration. 
Kuder Abdulfatah (1982). Al Nedam Al Gena'ee. Saudi Arabia; Riyadh. The Institute of Public 
Administration. 
Kuder Abdulfatah (1985). Derassh Mojezah An: Saemat Al- Nedam Al- Gena'ee Be Al- Mamlakah Al- 
Arabiah Al- Sudiah. Journal of Arabic Centre for Security Studies Vol. 2. Riyadh; Arabic Centre for 
Security and Training Sciences. 
Madkor Abraheem & Al- Kateeb Adnan (1992). Huquq Al- Insan Fi Al- Eslam. Dar Talass L-Drassat 
Wa Al- Targamah Wa Al - Nasher. 
Matlob Abdulmajeed Muhmmud (1982). Al- Asel Bara't Al- Motahem. In Al- Motahein Wa Huquqh Fi 
Al Shari'ah Al Islami. The First Scientific Symposium. Riyadh; Arabic Centre for Academic and 
Training Studies. 
Meflah Muhammad (1967). Al- Foroo'. Alm Al- Kotob. 
Moseelhy Muhammad (1988). Huquq Al- Insan Been Al- Shari'ah Wa Al- Qanoon A1-Dolley. Cairo; 
Dar Al- Nahdah Al- Arabiah. 
Mustafa Muhmmud (1977). Al- Ithbat Fi Al- Mawad Al- Jina'i Fi Al- Qanoon Al- Mogarn. Cairo 
University Press. 
Nedam and a group of Indian scalars (1310 H). Al Fatwa Al-Hendeeh. Egypt; Al-Mataba'h Al-Kobra 
Al-Amerech, Bollag. 
Obeed Muhammad (1988). Istiglal AL Qada'a. Cairo; PhD Thesis; Cairo University. 
VI 
Omer Al Seed Omer (1988). Huquq Al-Motahem Fi Al-Shari'ah Al-Islami. Saudi Arabia; Mecca 
Master Dissertation; Om Al Kora University. 
Omer Nabeel (1993). Usul Al Morafa't Al Shari'ah. Monsha't Al Ma'rf Be Al Eskandarah. 
Owd Muhammad Mohee Al-Deen (1989). Huquq Al-Insan Fi Al-Ijra'at Al-Jina'i. 
Owdeh Abdulkader (no year). Al- Teshrea' Al- Cena'ee Al-Islami. Cairo; Dar Al -Torath. 
Sa'ad Muhammad R'fat (1983). Al Motahem Wa Huquqh Fi Al Shari'a/i Al Islami. Al Zarga. Maktahat 
Al Manar. 
Salah Alshakanee bin Muhammad (1421H). Hasanat Wa Istiglal AL Qada'a Fi Al Fiqh Al Islami Wa 
Tatbegatha Fi Andamat Al Gonthoreeh Al Islami Al Moreetaneeh. Riyadh; Master Dissertation; Naif 
Academy for Security Sciences. 
Shalabee Ahmad (1989). Al Teshrea Wa Al Qada'a Fi Al Faker Al Islami. Cairo; Dar Al Nehdah Al 
Masreah. 
Soliman Mashohor (1987). Al mohamat; Tarkoha Fi Al Nodom Wa Mogof Al-Eslam Men/ia. Jordan; 
Dar Al-Fahah. 
Soraj Jom'ah Muhammad (1986). Ta'weed Al Motahem Ama Ylhagoho Besbab Al Da'we Al 
Kadabah. In Al Mutaham Wa Hogogah Fi Al Shat-ah Al Eslammeeh. Riyadh; Arabic Centre for 
Security and Training Studies. 
Suleiman Abdulrahman bin Muhammad (1310H). Mojam' Al-Atthar Fi Sharh Moltaga Al-Abhor. Dar 
Sa'adet. 
The Saudi Ministry of justice (1419 AH). Al-Qada'a Fi Al-Mamlakah Al-Arabiah Al-Sudiah. Saudi 
Arabia. 
Unpublished students texts (1989). Al Shari'ah Wa Al Qanoon. Naif Academy for Security Sciences. 
English Sources 
A Short History of the Human Rights Movement: Early Political, Religious, and Philosophical Sources. 
Http: Iwl5fd. lawl5. hotmail. msn. com. Created on julyl4,1994/ last edited on January 25,1997 
(20/07/2001) 
AN Dicey (1959). An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. London and 
Basingstoke; the Macmillan Press Ltd. 
A'I Maududi Sayyid Abdul (1992). The Islamic law and constitution. Lahore: Islamic Publications 
(1960)2 nd. 
Al- Faruqi Isma'iI (1984). Islam. Niles. Illinois: Argus Publications. 
Al- Saleh Osman (1982). "The right of the individual to personal security in Islam". In Bassiouni M. 
Cherif. The Islamic Criminal Justice System. London, Rome, New York: Oceana Publications, INC. 
Al- Turki Abdulrahman (2000). Capital Punishment for Drug Offences in Islam and its Application in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. London; Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London (SOAS) 
Alder John (2002). General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law. Palgrave Macmillan. 
VII 
Al-Jarbou Ayoup (2002). Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: A Comparative Study between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia. USA; Unpublished PhD Thesis; the University of Virginia. 
Allan T. R. S. (1987). Legal Privilege and the Principle of Fairness in the Criminal Trial. The Criminal 
Law Review Journal. Sweet and Maxwell 
Al-Mundhiri Al-Hafiz Zakiuddin Abdul-Azim (2000). The Translation of the Meanings of 
Summarized Sahih Muslim: Arabic- English. Darussalam Publishers & Distributors. 
Al-Qasimi Mohammed (1999). Establishing and Interpreting International Human Rights Standards: 
A Universal Idea in a Plural Society. Unpublished PhD Thesis; University of Durham. 
Anderson J. N. D. (1949). Muslim Procedure and Evidence. Journal of African Administration. Vol 1. 
No. 3 
An-Na'im Abdullah (1996). Islamic Law and Human Rights Today. Interights Bulletin. Vol. 10; p3-6 
An-Nawawi Admiashqi Al-Imam Abu Zakariya Yahya (1999). Commentary on the Riyad-us-Saliheen. . Saudi Arabia; Riyadh; Darussalam Publisher & Distributors 
Ansari Muhammad Fazl-ur-rahman (197-). The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society. 
Karachi, Pakistan; Indus Educational Foundation. 
Ashworth Andrew (1999) Principles of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. 
Ashworth Andrew and Blake Meredith (1996). The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal 
Law. Criminal Law Review p306 
Baalabki Rohi (2001). Al- Mawrid A modern Arabic -English Dictionary. Dar El- Ilm Lilmalayin. 
Baderin Mashood A. (2003). International Human Rights and Islamic Law. Oxford University Press. 
Bassiouni M. Cherif (1969). Islam: Concept, Law and World Habeas Corpus. Rutgers Camden Law 
Journal. 
Beddard Ralph (1993). Human Rights and Europe. Cambridge; Grotius Publications Limited. 
Bertrand Ramcharan. (2000). Complementarity between Universal and Regional Organizations/ 
Perspectives from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Human Rights Law 
Journal: Vol 1. Vol 
.8 
Boutros. B Ghali (1995). The United Nations and Human Rights. New York; United Nations 
Publication. 
Brett Rachel (1994). Is More Better? an exploration of the CSCE human dimension mechanism and its 
relationship to other systems for the promotion and protection of human rights. Colchester; Human Rights Centre, University of Essex. Papers in the Theory and Practice of Human Rights. no 9. 
Bruno Simma (2002) The Charter of the United Nations. Oxford University Press. 
Clements Luke, Mole Nuala, and Simmons Alan (1999). European Human Rights: Taking A Case Under The Convention. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
D' Entreves A. P. (1970). Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy. London; Hutchinson University Library. 
Dato' Param Cumaraswamy (1997). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Is it Universal? Human Ri hts Law Journal. Vol. 18 No. 9-12. 
Dickson Brice (1997). Human Rights and the European Convention. London; Sweet & Maxwell. 
VIII 
Doi Abdur Rahman . (1997). 
Shari'ah: the Islamic law. London; Ta Ha Publishers. 
Drzemczewski Andrew (2000). The European Human Rights Convention: Protocol No. 11- Entry into 
Force and First Year of Application. Human Rights Law Journal; Vol. 21 
El-Awa Mohamed S. (1998). Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative Study. Indianapolis, Indiana. 
USA; American Trust Publications. 
Farrar Salim Ali (1999). "The Role of the Accused in English and Islamic Criminal justice". 
Unpublished PhD Thesis; University of Warwick. 
Faruqi Harith Suleiman (1997). Faruq's Law Dictionary: Arabic- English. Beirut; Libririe du Liban. 
Fenwick Helen (2002). "Civil Liberties and Human Rights" London: Cavendish. 
Fitzgerald Patrich (1962). Criminal Law and Punishment. Oxford; Clarendon Press. 
Friedland Martin L. (1996). Judicial Independence and Accountability: A Canadian Perspective. 
Criminal Law Forum. Volume 7 Number I 
Fuller Lon L. (1969). The Morality of Law. New Haven and London; Yale University Press. 
Glanville Williams, G (1961). Criminal Law. London; Stevens & Sons Limited. 
Glasse Cyril (1989). The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam. Stacey International Publishers. 
Gomien Donna (1998). Short Guide to the European Convention on Human Right. Council of Europe 
Publishing. 
Harland Christopher (2000). The Status of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) In Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial Global Survey through UN Human Rights 
Committee Documents. Human Rights Quarterly Journal. Vol. 22. 
Harris DJ, O'Boyle and Warbrick C (1995). Law of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
London; Butterworths. 
Harris J. W. (1997). Legal Philosophies. Lexis Nexis Butterworths. 
Hart Parker T (1953). Application of Hanabalite and Decree Law to Foreigners in Saudi Arabia. 
George Washington Law Review. Vol. 22 
Heard Andrew (2001). Human Rights: Chimeras in Sheep's Clothing? hup: 
Iw l5fd. Iaw. hotmail. msn. com (20/07/2001). 
Heffernan Liz (1997). A Comparative View of Individual Procedures under the ECHR and the ICCPR. 
Human Rights Quarterly Journal. Vol. 19. 
Hussein Gamil Muhammad "Basic Guarantees in the Islamic Criminal Justice System" In Abdel 
Haleem Muhammad, Sherif Adel Omer, and Daniels Kate (2003). Criminal Justice in Islam; Judicial 
Procedure in the Shari'a. I. B. Tauris. London; New York. 
Ibrahim Saeed Husan "Basic Principles of Criminal Procedure under Islamic Shari'a". In Abdel 
Haleem Muhammad, Sherif Adel Omer, and Daniels Kate (2003). Criminal Justice in Islam; Judicial 
Procedure in the Shari'a. I. B. Tauris. London; New York. 
Janis Mark, Kay Richard, and Bradley Anthony (2000). European Human Rights Law. Oxford 
University Press. 
Janusz Symonides (2000). Human Rights: Concept and Standards. Alderhot, Burlington USA, 
Singapore, Sydney; UNESCO Publishing. 
IX 
Joseph Sarah, Schultz Jenny, and Castan Melissa (2000). The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary. Oxford University Press. 
Kamal Mohammad Hashim (1991). Principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Cambridge; Islamic Texts 
Society. 
Kelly J. M. (1992). A Short History of Western Legal Theory. Oxford; Clarendon Press. 
Khadduri Majid (1984). The Islamic Conception of Justice. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Khan Muhammad Muhsin (1997). The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al- Bukari. Arabic- 
English Saudi Arabia; Riyadh. Darussalam Publishers & Distributors. 
Khurshid Ahmad (1992). Islam: its Meaning and Message. Leicester; The Islamic foundation. 
Leach Philip (2001). Taking A Case to the European Court of Human Rights. London; Blackstone 
Press Limited. 
Leigh Ian (2002). Alternative Models of FaithlState Relations in the EC. A paper delivered at 
"Structured Pluralism: A Practical Legal Framework for Faith in the European Union" Conference 
organised by Newcastle Law School, University of Newcastle, the Jean Monnet Centre at Newcastle 
University, in conjunction with the centre for law and Religion, university of Cardiff and the Group of 
Policy Advisers to the President of European Commission. 
Lynch John Edward (2001). Natural Law. On line: Http: Encarta, msn. com (2.9.2001). 
Mahoney Paul (1998). Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism. Human 
Rights Law Journal. Vol 19 
Mahoney Paul (1999). Speculating on the Future of the Reformed European Court of Human Rights. 
Human Rights Law Journal 20. 
Mahoney Richard (1996). Adequate Facilities to Prepare a Defence: Beyond Disclosure. The Criminal 
Law Quarterly. Vol. 39, No. 1 
Matthias Herdegen (1998). Natural law, Constitutional Values and Human Rights: A Comparative 
Analysis. Human Rights Law Journal. Vol. 19 No. 2-4 
Mayer Ann Elizabeth (1997). Islam and Human Rights; Tradition and Politics. London; Westview 
Press. Pinter Publisher. 
McCauley and McCutcheon (2000). Criminal Liability: A Grammar. Dublin; Round Hall Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
Mill John Stuart (182-? ). Liberty of the Press. Reprinted from the Supplement of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica. Special Collection of Robinson Library at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Mill John Stuart (1991). On Liberty and Other Writings. Edited by Stefan Collini Cambridge 
University Press. 
Misner Robert 1. (1984). Legislatively Mandated Speedy Trial. Criminal Law Journal. Vol. 8 
Nash Susan and Furse Mark (2002). Essential Human Rights Cases. Bristol; Jordan Publishing 
Limited. 
Noaks Lesley and Butler Ian (1995). Silence in Court? Language Interpreters in the Courts of England 
and Wales. Howard Journal of Criminal Justice. No. 34 
X 
O' Sullivan Declan (2001). The Interpretation of the Qur'anic Text to Promote or Negate the Death 
Penalty for Apostates and Blasphemers. Journal of Our'anic Studies. Volume III issue 2. Centre of 
Islamic Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies; University Of London. 
Perry Michael J. (1997). Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters. 
Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 19 No. I 
Powers David S. (1992). On Judicial Review in Islamic Law. Law & Society Review. Vol. 26, No. 2 p. 
315 
R. Panikkar (1992). Is The Notion Human Rights A Western Concept. Diogenes Journal: Vol. 120. 
Rawls John (1999). A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press. 
Rawls John, (1993). Political Liberalism. New York; Columbia University Press. 
Raz Joseph (1977). The Rule of Law and its Virtue. The Law Quarterly Review: Volume 93. London; 
Steven & Sons Limited. 
Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. Weston (1992). Human Rights in the World Community. 
Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Richard T. Antoun (1980). The Islamic Court, the Islamic Judge, and the Accommodation of the 
Traditions: A Jordanian Case Study. Int. J. Middle East Stud. 12 
Robertson A. H. and Merrills J. G. (1996). Human Rights in the World. Manchester and New York; 
Manchester University Press. 
Robertson A. H. and Merrills J. G. (1993). Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Manchester, and New York: Manchester University Press. 
Samuels Alec (1997). Incompetence or ineptitude of counsel as a ground of appeal. The Criminal 
Lawyer. No. 77 November 
Schacht Joseph (1991). An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford; Clarendon Press. 
Schlesinger Rudolf B. (1957). Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized 
Nations. The American Journal of International Law; Vol. 51 
Security Dictionary English- Arabic (1997). Na if Arab Academy for Security Sciences. Riyadh 
Shapiro Martin (1980). Islam and Appeal. California Law Review. Vol 68, no. 2 p350 
Sherif Adel Omer "Generalities on Criminal Procedure under Islamic Shari'a". In Abdel Halcem, 
Muhammad, Sherif Adel Omer, and Daniels Kate (2003). Criminal Justice in Islam; Judicial 
Procedure in the Shari'a. I. B. Tauris. London; New York. 
Smith Rhona. K. M. (2003). Textbook on International Human Rights. Oxford University Press 
Solaim Soliman A. (1971). Legal review: Saudi Arabia's Judicial System. Middle East Journal; Vol. 
25 
Solaim Soliman A. (1971). Saudi Arabia's Judicial System. 25 The Middle East Journal 403 
Starmer Keir (1999). European Human Rights Law. LAG Legal Action Group. 
Steiner Henry J. and Alston Philip (2000). International Human Rights in Context: Laws, Politics 
, 
Morals. Oxford University Press. 
XI 
Tanovich David M. (1993). The Unravelling of the Golden Thread: the Supreme Court's Compromise 
of the Presumption of Innocence. The Criminal Law Quarterly. Vol. 35 No 2. 
Tanovich David M. (1993-1994). Charting the Constitutional Right of Effective Assistance of Counsel 
in Canada. Journal of the Criminal Law Quarterly; Vol. 36. No 4 
Teson Fernando R. (1985). International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism Virginia Journal of 
International Law: Vol. 25. No. 4 
The Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (1947) American Anthropologist. 
A Statement on Human Rights. Menasha Wisconsin, USA. Published by American Anthropological 
Association. Vol. 49 No. 4 
The Noble Qur'an: English translation of the meanings and commentary 1419 A. H = 1999 A. D. King 
Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur'ian. Madianh. K. S. A. 
Thomas, ed Mautner,. (2000). The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy. London: Penguin. 
Vogel, Frank Edward (1993). Islamic law and legal system studies of Saudi Arabia. Unpublished PhD 
Thesis; Harvard University. 
Walker Jeffrey K. (1993). The Rights of the Accused in Saudi Criminal Procedure. International & 
Comparative Law Journal; Vol. 15. 
Walzer Michael (2002). Thick and Thin: Moral Argument At Home and Abroad. Notre Dame; 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
Zepp IRA G, Jr (1992). A Muslin Primer. London; Sheed and Ward. 
XII 
